INDIAS NEWER COLD START WAR DOCTRINE REVISITED
Introductory Observations
Indias Cold Start War Doctrine was unveiled at the Army Commanders Conference on April 28, 2004. The Cold War Doctrine has now been revisited with rapid response multiple attack options in a NBC (Nuclear, Biological and Chemical) warfare environment. The main purpose of CSD is to give a punishing reply to Pakistan in case of any alleged terrorist attack on Indian soil with totally different orientation of the Indian armed forces from defensive to offensive before Nuclear War Scenario.
Under this doctrine, the Indian Army would carry out swift, quick and offensive joint operations with the critical all out support of its Air Force and air elements of Navy while giving no time to Pakistan to respond. It was a radical departure to publicly assert the enunciation of a new war doctrine. This new war doctrine was necessitated by the military lessons learnt from the Kargil War and Indias war mobilization during new exercises, but air power and network destabilization inside Pakistan are the new key elements.
To operationalise CSD against Pakistan, the Indian military has acquired latest weapons, offensive equipment, fire control system, battlefield surveillance radars, drones, much needed air support aircrafts, latest T-90 MBTs, heavier Arjun tanks, artillery, continuous surveillance, reconnaissance and Strategic Air lift aircrafts.
Indias Cold Start War Doctrine was also necessitated by the need to operationalize Indian Armys war fighting in a NBC (Nuclear, Biological and Chemical) warfare environment. Indian Army had also to arrive at a new war doctrine to incorporate new technological advances in the fields of joint C4 I2 (A military composite term encompassing command, control communications, computers, intelligence and information technology) more effectively under a multiple side attack plan.
Almost 80,000 troops, along with 800 MBTs like T-90s, T-72s and the indigenous Arjuns, 120 new artillery guns, various super sonic missiles, rockets, aircraft including upgraded Su-30 MKIs, Jaguars, Mig-27s, Mig-21 Bisons , Isreali AWACS, Battlefield Surveillance Radars, Weapon and Civilian Industrial Locating Radars and attack helicopters like the MI-35 took, were part in the Exercise Sudarshan Shakti. Troops of the 31-Armoured Division of the Indian army and a battalion of the Assam Regiment also participated in this exercise. The Indian army has also utilized the Army Aviation Corps and medium lift transport helicopters for logistical transport operations.
The critical Iron Fist 2013 was
Indian Air Force's first day-night exercise. It was conducted on 22 February 2013 at the
Pokhran firing range. The main objective of this exercise was to display Network-Centric Operations capabilities of the Indian Air Force. In this exercise more than 100 aircraft (equal number of air crafts were at stand by) and 30 different weapon platforms participated in this exercise. Along with aircraft,
National Security Guard and
Garud commandos displayed their tactical skills and rapid operational skills.
The Indian army has demonstrated its capability to strike at enemy targets in a swift and quick tank battle as MI-35 attack helicopters provided aerial and tactical support to the troops on ground. The induction of Apache AH64s is now a key factor. Such synergy and integration is key for any offensive operation. The Exercise Sudarshan Shakti aimed to adopt capability-based approach and the absorption of new technologies such as precision munitions, advance surveillance systems, space and network-centricity.
The military maneuvers involved mechanized forces with the support of artillery guns, strong armoured tanks and IAF jet fighters provided them with tactical and strategic aerial support. The basic aim of the exercise was to practice swift and quick military operations along with synergy and amalgamation with the IAF. According to the Indian army commanders the aim of this exercise was to ensure infusion of latest technology with the weapons and troops while providing real-time information of the battle front to the field commanders.
The Indian military has also tested newly inducted Israeli and European radars, Israeli unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), surveillance systems, precision guided bombs, missiles and space-based assets. Indian army’s General Officer Commanding (GOC) Lt Gen Sanjeev Langer said the exercise was based on the Integrated Theatre Concept where various defence wings and military elements have to participate in a single cohesive format during war. “The army wants to transform itself into a modern, lean and agile fighting force by mastering modern-day warfare techniques, particularly ‘Air Land Battle’ scenarios”.
Lt Gen said that Network Centric Warfare (NCW), which involves real-time data-sharing with various battle units and defence wings, is being practiced in the exercise. “Data gathered from UAVs, radars and intelligence is quickly and digitally shared with fighting groups on the ground, air and sea”. Such capabilities are essential for any offensive operations like CSD.
Indian army has tested swift mobilization and multiple blitzkrieg thrusts across the border in keeping with the Army’s ongoing “transformation” to consolidate its strike capabilities as well as streamline operational logistics in this exercise. The Indian army has also tested the operational effectiveness of the Pivot and Strike Corps of the Southern Army to validate and operationalise its CSD. This shows consistent effort by the Indian army to operationalise its aggressive doctrine against Pakistan.
Indian military has also practiced network centric warfare capabilities in this exercise. According Indian army’s GOC Lt Gen Sanjeev Langer, “Our computers are connected on a local area network and our field commanders are getting the opportunity to take instant decisions. It has been practicing these capabilities from last seven years. In 2005 Indian army introduced Force Multiplication Command Post (FMCP) in Exercise Vajra Shakti to integrate real-time flow of information as a principal tool for decision making and NCW capabilities in the Indian military.
The field training which has progressively been structured to build on from the smallest unit upwards, aimed at validating and integrating the use of all available assets, including Satellites, UAVs and HUMINT to assist commanders in taking dynamic and proactive operational action in a fluid battle field. In 2009 Indian military acquired an Israeli RISAT-2 spy satellite that has day and night viewing capabilities. This satellite can keep 24/7 watch over Pakistan even when the landmass is covered by a thick cloud cover. It would give India an edge in the network centric warfare capabilities. Indian Military has utilized its space assets in the Exercise Sudarshan Shakti to practice its NCW and EW capabilities.
According to Indian defense spokesman, an important facet being validated is the real-time sensor-to-shooter loop, which enables commanders to take instant decisions even as information is shared among platforms and personnel to order the weapons to be deployed. He further said that Network Centric Warfare did provide shared information of the battle space among armed forces and was an integral part of ongoing transformational studies.
India has practiced its Network Centric and Electronic Warfare capabilities in Exercise Sudarshan Shakti. Indian Naval component has also taken part in this exercise. Most important Airborne operations with Special Forces, para-dropped, Strikes Corps, Air fire power, and Pivot Corps were also part of Exercise Sudarshan Shakti. All these elements are essential for the offensive, quick and swift operations that are a basic need of Indian Military’s Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) based operations. Without any doubt this exercise was the biggest exercise in last seven years, and also considered to be a step towards the operationalization of the Indian military’s New Cold Start Doctrine.
Obviously, full details of the New Cold Start War Doctrine could not be released in the public domain. However, this author in a near accurate visualization of the Cold Start War Doctrine discussed the various parameters of this doctrine in two papers on SAAG website as per the following details:
- Indias New Cold Start War Doctrine Strategically Reviewed (Paper No. 991 dated 04.05.2004)
- Indian Armys New Cold Start War Doctrine Strategically Reviewed Part II (Additional Imperatives) (Paper No. 1013 dated 01.06.2004)
These two papers were thereafter reproduced on a number of defense-related websites in India and Pakistan and then followed an intense debate on these websites.
That India's Cold Start War Doctrine has stimulated an international interest can be gauged from the fact that in the United Kingdom, one of the leading universities in a detailed paper reviewed this Doctrine in April 2007. RESEARCH PAPER CAN BE DOWNLOAD HERE:
http://users.ox.ac.u...t NPS Paper.pdf
Years down the line, it becomes necessary to revisit Indias Cold Start War Doctrine and review what progress the Indian Army has made in this direction. For this purpose, this paper shall include a discussion on the following aspects:
1 COLD START WAR DOCTRINE: Major Conceptual Underpinnings
2 Indian Armys Revalidation of COLD START WAR DOCTRINE
3 Indias Political Leadership Still Flawed in its Strategic Approaches
4 Indian Political Decision Making in Defense Acquisitions Limits COLD START WAR DOCTRINE
5 Indias Nuclear Command & Control: Effective Set-up Essential for New Doctrine
6 COLD START WAR DOCTRINE: Overall Assessment
COLD START WAR DOCTRINE: Major Conceptual Underpinnings
Selected excerpts from the authors earlier papers need re-emphasis to provide a backdrop for the present discussion: These are as follows:
India now plans and is ready to act offensively against Pakistan for any perceived acts of strategic de-stabilization of India, proxy war and terrorism.
India has in declaratory terms enunciated it will undertake offensive operations against Pakistan, short of the nuclear threshold.
India could initiate offensive operations either as pre-emptive strikes or initiate offensive operations straight away without giving Pakistan, the time to bring diplomatic leverages in play.
Implicit in this Doctrine is that the Indian Army will no longer concentrate on capturing and holding Pakistani territory as leverage for post-war negotiations but the new operational will aim at destroying the combat potential of the Pakistan Army and its war-fighting capacity
The above is to be achieved by fast moving armored and mechanized operations supported by preponderant artillery fire power, a few tanks and even more preponderant combat fire-power of the Indian Air Force.
Logically the factors that came into play, need to be changed and which were discussed in the first paper were:
(1) The Indian Political Parameters That Need to Come Into Play
(2) Indias National Military Directives Need Change
(3) Indias Strategic Military Objectives Need to be Made Clear
(4) The Imperatives of Dedicated Indian Air Force Close Support and Dedicated Ground Attack Squadrons
(5) Indian Navy Aviation Support for Battle Groups
(6) India Will Have to Use Conventional SRBMs and Cruise Missiles and
(7) Special Forces and Air Assault Capabilities Need Expansion.
The Additional Imperatives spelt out by the author in the second paper and much updated were:
(1) Higher Commanders Mental Robustness and Military Audacity
(2) Up-gradation of C4 I2 Systems
(3) Indian Air Force: Reorientation in Concept of Operations
(4) Air Defense Networks and Systems
(5) Integration With Nuclear Warfare Plans
(6) Electronic Warfare Capabilities much needed Enhancement and
(7) Accelerated Development of Indias ICBMs and SLBMs.
The above factors which were dwelt upon in fair detail would give a good idea of what all is involved to make this Doctrine a success.
Indian Armys Revalidation and Renewal of New COLD START WAR DOCTRINE
In the relentless pursuit of its traditional high standards of military professionalism, the Indian Army has been involved in a continuous process of revalidation of the operational concepts and techniques of the new Doctrine.
The following major exercises have been conducted so far: Divya Shakti 2005, Vajra Shakti 2005, Desert Strike 2005, Sanghe Shakti 2006, Ashwa Medh 2007 and Major exercises and tactical multiple side attack formations using Airforce are being now carried out till date.
All the formations at Corps and Divisional levels that would be required to execute the new doctrine stand tested and the new doctrinal concepts revalidated both in the plains terrain and in desert terrain. It is a continuous process underway involving rapidly changing scenarios.
These were large scale exercises involving at any one time military strengths from 30,000 to 50,000. The Indian Air Force was also employed in all these exercises in joint operations arising from the new Doctrine. A separate exercise of combined arms along with the Indian Navy was also conducted.
At other levels, net-centric warfare, electronic warfare, digital warfare, Special Forces operations in round the clock time frame over five to seven days were exercised to test both professional skills and endurance.
It can be confidently stated that the Indian Army, the Indian Air Force and the Indian Navy stand fully exercised and the new Doctrine stands re-validated at all levels.
Limitations if any in putting into effect this doctrine lays elsewhere and not with the Armed Forces as we will see below.
Indias Political Leadership Still Flawed in its Strategic Approaches
The author in the first paper on this subject spelt out that this new War Doctrine can only be successful if the following political parameters are met:
(1) Political will to use offensive military power
(2) Political will to use pre-emptive military strategies
(3) Political sagacity to view strategic military objectives with clarity
(4) Political determination to pursue military operations to their ultimate conclusion without succumbing to external pressures
(5) Political determination to cross nuclear threshold if Pakistan seems so inclined.
During OP PARAKARAM, the BJP Government faltered in not carrying its "coercion" objectives to their ultimate conclusion due to one or a combination of the above factors.
In the last three years the Congress Government through the pronouncements of its Prime Minister and their attitudinal reflections indicate that India would be found seriously wanting in political will to initiate or execute the COLD START WAR DOCTRINE.
The Congress Governments appeasement approaches to Pakistan under external pressures and those of its captive minority vote-banks do not generate confidence about its strategic approaches and political will to use power. The Governments weak-kneed political approaches to counter-terrorism indicate its lack of political will to use power to defend Indias national security interests.
In the 60th year of Indias independence, the political leadership of this country is still found wanting in strategic vision and strategic mindsets.
For more elaboration, readers could refer to the authors book
Indias Defence Policies and Strategic Thought: A Comparative Analysis.
Indian Political Decision Making in Defense Acquisitions Limits COLD START WAR DOCTRINE
Indias COLD START WAR DOCTRINE woven around the operational concept of offensive operations at the very outset of hostilities cannot proceed towards success on Indian Army undertaking military operations with incomplete military inventories in terms of weapons, equipment and logistics.
This has been one of the starkest reasons of failure of United States Forces in Iraq and should be a military lesson well taken.
Indias defense equipment acquisition process despite recent innovations still impedes the speedy acquiring of the wherewithal for the Indian Armed Forces neglecting the vital imperative of this Doctrine of full military inventories at all times.
It arises from the politicization of the defense equipment acquisition process and bureaucratic lethargy. When this Government came into power, the then Defense Ministers first statement was that all defense deals of the previous government would be probed. The reasons were political. What has been the result?
The Indian Air Force today is critically short of 136 combat fighter aircraft. This deficiency is likely to persist till 2010 and beyond as the initial 18 aircraft of any now deal will come only by 2010. The remainder may stretch till 2020. Further, the Indian Air Force Chief presumably under political directions, has recently stated that the orders would go to a single vendor. This would add to the delays.
Indian Armys artillery is short of over 400 guns of 155mm caliber. Despite trials in 2002, 2004 and 2006, fresh tenders have now again been initiated. One cannot expect this deficiency to be made before 2012 or so.
The COLD START WAR DOCTRINE has been built around the use of preponderant fine-power of the Armys own artillery guns and massive use of Indian Air Force combat fire-power for speedy operations and quick military decisive results.
As on today the Indian Army stands deprived critically of both the instruments of firepower essential for the success of the new War Doctrine. Surely, national security imperatives should not be sacrificed at the alter of bureaucratism and the political leadership should be bold in removing such hurdles when it comes to upholding the imperatives of national security.
So what do we do? Pend COLD START WAR DOCTRINE till 2010 and beyond or await Indias political leadership awakening to the need for coming out with off the shelf acquisitions to remedy the critical shortages which have a debilitating effect on the new Doctrine?
Indias Nuclear Command & Control: Effective Set-up Essential for New Doctrine
It is conceded that the details of Indias Nuclear Command and Control Set-up cannot be released in the public domain. But what cannot be conceded is that the organizational links also have to be kept in wraps. Today, there exist a haziness and ambiguity about the organizational structure of the Nuclear Command and Control Set-up. This does not add to the credibility of India's nuclear deterrence.
Speculation abounds: (1) About the missing links in the operationalizing of a nuclear strike once a political decision has been taken. (2) Has the military been integrated into the nuclear decision-making structure (3) Would the Indian Army be assured that within hours of COLD START WAR DOCTRINE operations being unleashed and Pakistan indulging in a First Strike, the Indian Army formations would not be rendered powerless by the inevitable delays in the political decision making on a nuclear counter-strike?
Indias Prime Minister and the Defense Minister need to be more forthcoming in declarations on the above aspects. Indias Draft Nuclear Doctrine announced eight years back needs to be formalized. It must also integrate the aspects of the COLD START WAR DOCTRINE operationalizing under NBC conditions and Indias responses thereto.
COLD START WAR DOCTRINE: Overall Assessment
The overall assessment on the effective execution and operationalising success of Indian Armys COLD START WAR DOCTRINE has to be viewed at two levels as under:
Indian Army: Has it been successful in training its subordinate formations and higher commanders as per the new War Doctrine and has it re-validated the operational concepts arrived at?
Indias Political Leadership: Does it have the strategic vision and the strategic mindset of having the will to use power to secure Indias national security aims?
The answer to the first question is a resounding Yes. Since 2004 the Indian Army has worked hard to revalidate the new WAR DOCTRINEs operational concepts and fine-tuning these every year and in every type of terrain. The high standards of military professionalism and innovation induces confidence in the Indian Armed Forces. It is this which prompts advanced countries to seek joint military exercises with India.
Unfortunately, while broad details of the Armys exercises appear in the public domain, what does not emerge are the other stark realities, that is:
(1) How are the Armys current military inventory shortages impacting on the new War Doctrine
(2) How is the shortage of 136 combat aircraft in the Indian Air Force will affect the success of the New War Doctrine in the short term?
(3) How does the new Doctrine caters for delays and interruptions due to delays in political decision-making?
In terms of reorganizing the Indian Armys Command and Control structure for implementing the new War Doctrine, some measures are already evident in the raising of the new South-West Command and 9 Corps. Similarly, plans are afoot to raise a Special Forces Command.
However, when one comes to the second aspect, in terms of objective analysis, the answer is negative. In terms of demonstrated performance in crisis management, counter-terrorism responses, policy approaches towards Pakistan and China and the necessity of firm declaratory policies on national security issues, the present Government does not induce confidence that it has the requisite strategic vision and strategic mindset.
Concluding Observations
The Indian Army in joint operations with the Indian Air Force and Indian Navy stand trained and poised for successful execution of the COLD START WAR DOCTRINE in any Hot War Scenario.
The country fervently hopes that Indias political leadership of any political dispensation in power, does not develop Cold Feet when faced with the decision to execute the new War Doctrine in pursuance of Indias National Security Objectives.
(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst.
