The Battle of the Hydaspes: A Mystery in the Mists of Time

[Joe Shearer]

Alexander III of Macedon, son of a great father only overshadowed by his brilliant son, master of battles, unbeaten war-lord, King of Macedon, Hegemon of Greece and King of Kings of Persia, fought four set-piece battles after leaving Greece, when he attacked Persia. The first three were the Battle of the Granicus, the Battle of Issus and the Battle of Gaugamela. These are fairly well-reported, and there is some reasonable agreement on the events and the outcome; in fact, the outcome was evident from actions that followed these battles. They are also symmetrical in a sense, in that the tactics that were followed by the Macedonians were very similar. It is possible to see them as three implementations of the same battle plan, not applied by rote or from the drill book, but implemented with brilliance and flair, and with rock-steady discipline by the Macedonian and partly-Greek army of Alexander.

After Gaugamela, Alexander pursued Darius in hot pursuit, until Darius met his end at the hands of a satrap driven to treachery by the vision of a vengeful Alexander pursuing the former supreme king of kings of Persia right to the ends of the world. Then a period of mountain warfare followed, ending with a descent into the plains of India, more closely-fought mountain battles and a very difficult set-piece battle, the last that Alexander fought in his life, with a relatively small force of Indians, who deployed elephants in their battle line. This was the Battle of the Hydaspes.

It is this battle that is the most interesting of the four Persian battles (counting this as one of the four for reasons that will be made apparent as we go along).

It was different; Alexander had picked up the Scythian archers who had tormented him and his army in the preceding chase of Darius, and the valiant rearguard campaign fought by Spitamenes in Sogdiana and Bactria. This was an innovation. So, too, was his own placement of himself during the battle; in all earlier battles, during his mountain stronghold sieges included, he had inspired his men by his almost-suicidal valour, jumping right into the enemy's lines and fighting hand-to-hand against greater odds until rescued (he might very easily have been killed, and it might well have been termed then suicidal valour). Finally, in other cases, he had audaciously charged the enemy at the earliest opportunity, at Granicus even crossing a river to attack. At this battle, he spent days parading up and down and getting his enemy used to the idea of the Macedonians moving up and down the opposite river bank; he then made a night crossing in two stages, to a river island and then to the opposite bank; the final battle came after a morning skirmish with a detachment of the Indian army.

Even more mysterious is the exact sequence of events which followed in the main battle. We will look at the accounts available and try to see why.

Finally, the outcome is baffling. Alexander was no Edward I; to him, a rival king was to be eliminated at the earliest, and death was the best elimination. He spared neither soldiers nor civilians in earlier victories, not as long as the chase was on. Slightly threatening kings were eliminated quickly; slightly threatening enemy leaders followed swiftly. Pacts made were broken; the Indian mercenaries' massacre after being promised safe passage is a case in point. It was only when it suited him that a life was spared, and a benefit granted, or a submission accepted.

For such a king to not only treat his rival with honour, but to then reward him with part of the territory of an existing ally and the king's deadly rival in north-west Indian politics was bizarre, and strangely out of character (against that, we must set off his generosity to Stagyros).

What was this all about? What really happened?

To answer this and a thousand other questions that arise out of the battle, we need to examine the original accounts of the battle critically, in order to piece together the correct picture - as best as we can. I believe that a reading of these originals along with the critique of acknowledged authorities on ancient campaigns is the only combination that will give us insight into the battle and its events.

 

[niaz]

Alexander had one advantage over all his adversaries; he had been tutored by Aristotle; who was no doubt one the wisest men who ever lived.

Alexander did not win all of his battle thru shear guts and bravado; he was also a very shrewd a wily general. He changed his strategy as the situation demanded. Remember he filled up the sea channel in one of his battles along the Syrian coast.

Any competent general believes in sound intelligence and subterfuge. Porus knew the terrain well but Alexander didn’t. By marching up and down along the banks of Jhelum, Alexander not only managed to reconnoitre the area for the most suitable crossing but also managed to fool Porus into a false sense of security.

Alexander was no doubt a very violent man but he could also be extra ordinarily generous when it suited him. Lands of the Persian Empire conquered by Alexander were meant to be absorbed into Macedonian kingdom and Alexander always left a Greek garrison at key places. IMO Alexander never wanted to absorb India into his domains and therefore he let Porus rule as his viceroy.

 

[indushek]

Alexander had one advantage over all his adversaries; he had been tutored by Aristotle; who was no doubt one the wisest men who ever lived.

Alexander did not win all of his battle thru shear guts and bravado; he was also a very shrewd a wily general. He changed his strategy as the situation demanded. Remember he filled up the sea channel in one of his battles along the Syrian coast.

Any competent general believes in sound intelligence and subterfuge. Porus knew the terrain well but Alexander didn’t. By marching up and down along the banks of Jhelum, Alexander not only managed to reconnoitre the area for the most suitable crossing but also managed to fool Porus into a false sense of security.

Alexander was no doubt a very violent man but he could also be extra ordinarily generous when it suited him. Lands of the Persian Empire conquered by Alexander were meant to be absorbed into Macedonian kingdom and Alexander always left a Greek garrison at key places. IMO Alexander never wanted to absorb India into his domains and therefore he let Porus rule as his viceroy.

The bolded part doesn't seem to fit with Joe's description of Alexander's history, in which he never showed the word generosity. So why only Porus??

 

[Joe Shearer]

Thank you for an out-of-the-ordinary response to the introductory post. This response leads the way easily and naturally to some of the topics raised in what is to follow: an excerpt from Dr. W. W. Tarn's "Alexander the Great: Vol. I: Narrative", and thereafter excerpts specific to the Battle of the Hydaspes from the original sources, wrapped up by a commentary on all of these taken together. It is fascinating to see how you have tersely made some of the key points that Professor Tarn did. Some comments next to your response may help link the two, your response and his observations.

Alexander had one advantage over all his adversaries; he had been tutored by Aristotle; who was no doubt one the wisest men who ever lived. Aristotle was very influential over Alexander, who slept with a copy of the Iliad, annotated by his old teacher, under his pillow. We will see in Professor Tarn's narrative how the question of Ocean remained in Alexander's consciousness to his dying day, and how it may have been the driving force behind this battle and his plans for India.

Alexander did not win all of his battle thru shear guts and bravado; he was also a very shrewd a wily general. He changed his strategy as the situation demanded. Remember he filled up the sea channel in one of his battles along the Syrian coast.In his siege of Tyre, Alexander built a mole up to the walls, through the sea. I quote the passage for readers to read for themselves:

"The city stood on an island half a mile from the coast, and Alexander set about building a mole to it from the mainland. Progress at first was easy; it was when the deep water near the island was reached and the workers came within shot of the walls that trouble began, while winter gales and the Tyrian warships alike hindered the work. Alexander got two siege towers out to the end of the mole, their sides protected against blazing arrows by coverings of skins; but the besieged prepared a fire-ship, fitting long yards to the masts with baskets of inflammable matter depending on the ends. They weighed down the stern to raise the bows above the mole, grounded her successfully, and set her on fire; the crew swam away, and the yards burnt through and discharged their cargoes on to the towers, which also took fire. The arrows from the Tyrian warships prevented any rescue, and the besieged, swarming out in boats, tore down the mole. Alexander began to built it again much broader, to avoid a similar mishap; but he saw that without a fleet he must fail, and went personally to Sidon to collect ships.......

...in all he collected 220 warships, from quinqueremes to small vessels. Azemilk, the king of Tyre, brought his own squadron successfully into his city; but Alexander was far stronger now than Tyre at sea. ....As soon as his new machines were ready - towers, rams and catapults - he placed some on the mole, some on Sidonian transports or warships lashed together in pairs, and attacked the wall.

The Tyrians, however, were ready for him. They had raised towers on the walls, whose fire worried the ships, and had made near approach to the island impossible by dropping rocks into the sea. Alexander brought up merchant ships to sweep for the obstacles; the Tyrian warships attacked them and cut their anchor-cables. He covered the sweepers with warships; Tyrian divers cut the cables under water. Then he anchored the sweepers by chains; the Tyrians had no reply, and he got the rocks out. As a last resort, the Tyrians manned thirteen warships, attacked the Cyprian fleet when the crews had landed for dinner, and destroyed Pnytagoras' flagship and other vessels; but Alexander, who was watching, manned some Phoenician ships, rowed round Tyre, and cut off two of the returning squadron. The way was now open for a great combined assault.

Any competent general believes in sound intelligence and subterfuge. Porus knew the terrain well but Alexander didn’t. By marching up and down along the banks of Jhelum, Alexander not only managed to reconnoitre the area for the most suitable crossing but also managed to fool Porus into a false sense of security. An astute observation, and follows Tarn in sentiment and expression. Of which more later.

Alexander was no doubt a very violent man but he could also be extra ordinarily generous when it suited him. Lands of the Persian Empire conquered by Alexander were meant to be absorbed into Macedonian kingdom and Alexander always left a Greek garrison at key places. IMO Alexander never wanted to absorb India into his domains and therefore he let Porus rule as his viceroy.As we will see, it seems that his wishes altered over time; it seems that what he was thinking of before his troops refused to advance, and what he thought after that were radically different.

Thanks again for these observations full of insight. I do not agree entirely about your opinions regarding Aristotle's influence on his military skills, but that is not strictly germane to this discussion.

 

[Joe Shearer]

The bolded part doesn't seem to fit with Joe's description of Alexander's history, in which he never showed the word generosity. So why only Porus??

Your comment talllies with my views, but niaz' observations are also backed by substantial evidence; they cannot be dismissed without serious examination and deliberation. I have some material later from Professor Tarn which might have a bearing on the subject.

 

[riCoh]

stupids Ads by google, i cant read first post of any thread, anyone else having similar problem???

 

[Nalwa]

I am always amazed by Alexander's zeal to conquer. Kingdom after kingdom, city after city, he annihilated his adversaries and traveled thousands of kilometers from his homeland, followed by a loyal band of soldiers. And his military genius is unparalleled and well documented.

However, I do find a heavy glorification element of his exploits by western authors. And this has percolated down to our history books as well. Alexander, after everything said and done was an invader/conqueror. I can understand his feuds with the Persians and other nations of Asia Minor but beyond that it was just his lust for glory, wealth, power etc. And we do know that he spared no tactic and no enemy to obtain his goal (Porus certainly stands out). So in this respect he's no different than Attila or Genghis Khan. But why are the latter seen as tyrants and evil barbarians while Alexander is revered by historians and military tacticians alike? Its probably the western view that is enforcing us to see Alexander in a greater light than other invaders.

 

[Joe Shearer]

The narrative account of the authority on the Greeks in India, Professor W. W. Tarn, is reproduced here in part, as it relates to our subject, the Battle of the Hydaspes. Professor Tarn’s account was written in 1948; it does not take into consideration any later controversies relating to the Indus Man and such concepts, on which he might have had some pungent things to say. His views are to be read with understanding of this in mind.

This extract consists of Pages 82 to 93; some unnecessary portions are omitted, and interested readers may consult the original to see for themselves what my amateur’s judgement thought unnecessary.
All that is reproduced is original; I have added emphasis where I wished to draw the attention of the reader through bold-facing of the passage in question. My own observations, where absolutely necessary, are in blue. For the convenience of those who exclude all but bare text from their readers, such observations are demarcated by angled brackets, thus <>.

A little background: Antipater had been left in Macedon, to keep order in Greece and to quell any Spartan delinquency, which he did. Cleitus the Black, his rescuer at Gaugamela, had been killed in a drunken brawl in Maracanda, modern Samarkand, and all references to Cleitus from this point on are to Cleitus the White, who came out from Greece with reinforcements for the army, sent out by Antipater. Philip&#8217;s old general, Parmenion, whose son, Philotas, was tried by the army for conspiracy against Alexander and executed, had himself been killed by Alexander&#8217;s orders immediately afterwards, and he was replaced in his post as general commanding the lines of communications.

Alexander and Fortune: the army.​

Alexander received large reinforcements while in Bactria, and reorganised his army for the invasion of India. The phalanx was raised from six to seven battalions, Antipater, whose hands were free after the defeat of Sparta, having sent him another battalion of seasoned troops commanded by Cleitus the White. Of the old phalanx-leaders, Craterus had now taken Parmenion&#8217;s place as second in command, Perdiccas was a Bodyguard and Amyntas was dead; Coenus, Polyperchon and Meleager remained, but Coenus&#8217; defeat of Spitamenes had marked him for early promotion; new men appear, and there were to be further changes in India. The hypaspists{1}, now commanded by Seleucus, the future king, were unaltered; Nearchus had an interim command of one of the battalions. <As he was a Satrap before, many have marvelled at this seeming demotion. Actually, this was a well-discussed but closely-held plan of Alexander and his inner circle for this friend of his to be the admiral of his expedition to Ocean. As fate dictated, he became the Admiral of the Macedonians down the Indus and back to Babylon.>Alexander also took with him, besides the indispensable Agrianians, the Thracian foot and Balacrus&#8217; javelin-men (if they were not the same corps), and an enlarged archer force, with a corps of slingers, but very few mercenaries; he had been leaving mercenaries in every satrapy and newly-founded city, and of necessity, he left a large force of them, 3,500 horse and 10,000 foot (who probably included what remained of the 8,000 mercenaries of Issus) with the satrap Amyntas in Bactria. If every formation was again at paper strength, and taking the highest possible figures, he might have had 20,000 &#8211; 22,000 foot{2}, all Europeans.

There were great changes in the cavalry{3}. Hephaestion still commanded his hipparchy of the Companions, four squadrons; but after the death of Cleitus the Black, Alexander had taken command of the other hipparchy himself, one of its four squadrons being the Royal squadron, henceforth always called the agema, (Guard), which thus came under his personal command; this enabled him to incorporate in it the sons of a few great Persian nobles, and it was now raised to 300 men, if indeed it had not been so all the time. The Companions themselves had come back again to 1,700, the establishment figure of 200 to a squadron (2 lochoi) with the agema of 300. Alexander kept them with him, but sent home all his Balkan cavalry except the Thracians in Medea with Cleander, who had taken Parmenion&#8217;s place as general of that sector of communications. In their stead, as became the Great King, he was recruiting his own subjects, the Eastern Iranian horse who had fought him hard and now served him well. After his final re-organisation at Taxila, he had (paper strength) 6,300 horse, plus a few mercenaries. This meant that he invaded India with an army of from 27,000 to 30,000 men, if every corps was up to paper strength; any figure over 30,000 is impossible, and it cannot be asserted that every corps was up to paper strength. It was thus a smaller force than that with which he had crossed the Dardanelles; for a time he had managed to keep his European field army at a fairly constant figure, but now he had to rely more and more on Asiatics. Plutarch&#8217;s story{4} that his army in India numbered 120,000 foot and 15,000 horse is, as it stands, ridiculous; but if there be reckoned in the native &#8216;wives&#8217; and children of the soldiery, the technicians and writers, the traders and camp-followers, the auxiliary services, the seamen, and the contingents and retinues of the Indian princes, there must have been a very large number of people in camp on the Jhelum. The army had become a moving State{5}, a reflection of the Empire; and provision was made for training the soldiers&#8217; children



NOTES
1: App. I, III
2: See App. I, V, p. 169.
3: For what follows, see App. I, IV
4: Plut. Alex. LXVI, invented for the sake of the propaganda statement that three-quarters of them were lost in Gedrosia; this shows that the inventor had in mind an army of 30,000 foot and 3,750 horse. Repeated, Arr. Ind. 19,5 (not from Nearchus).
5: On such armies, see M. Rostovtzeff, Soc. and Econ. Hist. pp 143-7.

References in the Notes

App.: Appian
Plut.: Plutarch

 

[Joe Shearer]

I am always amazed by Alexander's zeal to conquer. Kingdom after kingdom, city after city, he annihilated his adversaries and traveled thousands of kilometers from his homeland, followed by a loyal band of soldiers. And his military genius is unparalleled and well documented.

However, I do find a heavy glorification element of his exploits by western authors. And this has percolated down to our history books as well. Alexander, after everything said and done was an invader/conqueror. I can understand his feuds with the Persians and other nations of Asia Minor but beyond that it was just his lust for glory, wealth, power etc. And we do know that he spared no tactic and no enemy to obtain his goal (Porus certainly stands out). So in this respect he's no different than Attila or Genghis Khan. But why are the latter seen as tyrants and evil barbarians while Alexander is revered by historians and military tacticians alike? Its probably the western view that is enforcing us to see Alexander in a greater light than other invaders.

As it happens, you may find the next extract (from Tarn) of direct interest. I am sympathetic to that account, as we are talking about a 30-year old, with his mind filled with Aristotle's speculations about the nature of the world and about geography.

Practically the last conversation that he had, as he sank towards the incoherence of his final illness, was with his dear friend Nearchus, about Ocean. This has a direct bearing on what you have asked.

Since I have to type the whole bloody shooting match in, character by character, it is taking me a bit. Please bear with me. It will be up by the end of the day, and I will then start on the original sources.

 

[Joe Shearer]

stupids Ads by google, i cant read first post of any thread, anyone else having similar problem???

Would you like me to repeat it by PM? or personal e-mail if PM doesn't take a large extract?

 

[Nalwa]

As it happens, you may find the next extract (from Tarn) of direct interest. I am sympathetic to that account, as we are talking about a 30-year old, with his mind filled with Aristotle's speculations about the nature of the world and about geography.

Practically the last conversation that he had, as he sank towards the incoherence of his final illness, was with his dear friend Nearchus, about Ocean. This has a direct bearing on what you have asked.

Since I have to type the whole bloody shooting match in, character by character, it is taking me a bit. Please bear with me. It will be up by the end of the day, and I will then start on the original sources.

Would love to read that. And I must commend your for your efforts to replicate your sources here. Great job.

 

[riCoh]

Would you like me to repeat it by PM? or personal e-mail if PM doesn't take a large extract?

The problem solved as i logged in.

Thanks anyways.

 

[rockstarIN]

I'm yet to find out a credible source/reason that why did Porus lost the war.

A good book regarding the strategies of Alexander by Mr. Partha Bose too left out the point that how did they defeated the war elephants.

 

[Joe Shearer]

In this part, Tarn discusses some of what Alexander knew about India. It is of vital relevance in deciphering what he did, and what he had hoped to do.

India in the eyes of Alexander.​

But India had been part of the empire of Darius I; and Alexander&#8217;s invasion was only the necessary and inevitable completion of his conquest of that empire. It had nothing to do with any scheme of world-conquest; indeed it could not have, for in the Far East the &#8216;world&#8217;, like &#8216;Asia, only meant the Persian Empire; nothing else was known. Possibly Alexander did not know, any more than we do, exactly how much of the Punjab Darius I had ruled; on the other hand, with his known interest in Cyrus, he probably believed Xenophon&#8217;s mistaken statement that Cyrus had ruled all &#8216;India&#8217; to the eastern ocean{1} ; in either case, he naturally meant to reduce the entire province, like any other satrapy. He had already, while at Bactra, formed some political connections there; a chief fraom Gangadhara, Sasigupta, who had helped Bessus, had come over to him, and he had been promised aid by the powerful rajah of Taxila, who was having difficulty in withstanding his neighbour Porus and turned naturally to the new King of Persia, whose forerunners had once been Taxila&#8217;s suzerains. Incidentally, Alexander greatly desired, as did Aristotle, to solve the problem of Ocean and the relationship of &#8216;India&#8217; to Egypt. He meant therefore to explore the southern sea with a fleet; for this purpose he took with him to India rowers and shipwrights from Phoenicia, Cyprus, Caria and Egypt, and had already decided that his friend Nearchus should be admiral. That is why Nearchus was recalled from his satrapy, and given an interim command in the hypaspists, an apparent reduction in rank which must have puzzled those not in the secret.


1: Xen. Cyr. VIII, 6, 20 sq. Xenophon in saying &#8216;east&#8217; had the points of the compass wrong; the same mistake in Herod. IV, 44, pros eo. Such errors are common, e.g. Ptolemy, the geographer, put the Orkneys east of, instead of north of, Caithness; for several other instances, see Tarn, Bactria and India, p. 476 and n. 8.

---------- Post added at 01:44 PM ---------- Previous post was at 01:44 PM ----------

I'm yet to find out a credible source/reason that why did Porus lost the war.

A good book regarding the strategies of Alexander by Mr. Partha Bose too left out the point that how did they defeated the war elephants.

Irru, pa, kunchu!

 

[rockstarIN]

I didn't get you..?