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The Atlantique Incident

BS, how many times you see such incidents put on public display the very next day except at some later stage in a war museum or something.



Well, it's all coming out now, why not just plainly admit that it was all staged.

You expected the Indian Armed Forces to ***** foot right after your Karil adventure? You fly close to the border with-in 1 month of an aggressive operation, you are asking for trouble. The pilots had orders, they followed it and paid the price. It is sad, that the higher ups in the PAF did not have better sense than to senselessly send trained professionals to their deaths.
 
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The Atlantique Shoot Down
Indian Air Force

On 10 Aug 99 at 10:51 hrs IST an IAF ground radar picked up an aircraft track inside Sind region of Pakistan near Badin, approaching the Indo-Pakistan international border (IB) on a South-Easterly course. The track was moving at a speed of 370 kmph maintaining a height of 3000-3500 feet. It first touched the international border (at point 68 degree 48 min E, 24 degrees 18 min North) at 10:54 hrs. For the next 17-18 minutes it carried out a series of manoueveres over this area. (In this process, the track stayed within or close to 10 km of the boundary.

The 1991 air agreement between India and Pakistan requires all aircraft (other than helicopters) of the two countries to maintain a minimum distance of 10 km from the border; on two occasions the PN Atlantique actually violated Indian airspace at two points.

Two MiG-21 fighter interceptors of No.45 Squadron, which were on operational readiness at the IAF base at Naliya in Kutch, were brought to a higher state of scramble alert as the track approached the IB. When the track crossed the international border the first time at approximately 10:57 hrs, both the interceptors were scrambled, getting airborne at 10:59 hrs.

The fighter controller of the ground radar vectored the fighters in a Northerly direction, to bring them in the general area at approximately 11:10 hrs (see map above). By 11:12 hrs, the bogey (unidentified Pakistani track) proceeded initially west, subsequently turning and heading south till the IB (at point 68º 32 min East, 23º 58 min North), then turning onto a westerly heading initially. At this time, the IAF interceptors were also directed southwards by the radar controller and generally kept abreast of the bogey, keeping on the Indian side of the IB.

The bogey turned south once again and entered Indian airspace for the third time at approximately 11:14 hrs and penetrated 10 km into Indian territory before turning on an easterly heading. At this stage, the fighter controller maneuvered the IAF MiG-21s so as to place the lead aircraft flown by Sqn. Ldr. P.K. Bundela between the border and the intruder (to stop the intruder from escaping) and the wingman Fg. Off. S. Narayanan was accelerated and brought behind the unknown intruder from the other side in a pincer movement.

Sqn. Ldr. Bundela made radar contact between 10-15 km range with the intruder. Both interceptors visually sighted the intruder and identified it as an Atlantique of the Pakistani Navy. Sqn. Ldr. Bundela closed in to 300 meters of the Atlantique, on his left, intending to formate on him and signal him visually and, if possible, communicate with him on radio to direct him to land at the nearest IAF base.

By now, of course, both interceptors had not only identified the intruder as an Atlantique but visually seen its identification markings. As Sqn. Ldr. Bundela was jockeying into position, the Atlantique turned into him in an aggressive evasive attempt. This was a hostile act. As per international norms he ought to have maintained his course and height and in fact lowered his under-carriage as a sign of submission as per the Rules of Engagement.

The Atlantique had earlier been declared hostile after it had been identified, as the Atlantique falls into the category of "hostile" as per established procedure. A hostile aircraft does not have the option to return home; he has only two options - follow instructions to forceland at an IAF base, or be shot down. When the intruder turned into Sqn. Ldr. Bundela in an obvious attempt to throw him off and make a dash for the border, on clearance from the fighter controller Sqn Ldr Bundela maneuvered his fighter for a missile launch on the PN Atlantique to prevent him escaping.

On being cleared to fire by the ground radar, the Sqn. Ldr. Bundela fired an R-60 air-to-air infra-red heat-seeking missile at the Atnalantique. The missile hit the intruder on the left engine which immediately caught fire and started smoking. This happened at approximately 11:17 hrs when the Atlantique was still 5 Km South of the IB on the Indian side.

The interceptors were immediately ordered to break away to the right to ensure that they stayed within Indian territory. The Atlantique after being shot continued to be seen on IAF ground radars. It entered a loose descending spiral turn to the left, burning fiercely with wreckage falling off; in the process, it described an arc 5 km within Pakistani territory before facing an approximately south-easternly direction again close to the IB before it disappeared from the IAF ground radar screen.

The behavior of the intruder while it was deliberately operating for approximately 18 minutes in the earlier part of the sortie had confirmed that it was neither lost nor violating the border inadvertently. The possibility of it being on a training mission is ruled out beyond all doubt by the profile it followed.

The relevant fact is that the PN Atlantique was military combat aircraft classified as 'hostile' deliberately violating Indian airspace on an operational mission. In such a situation, the Rules of Engagement dictate the shooting down of the aircraft after clearance from the controlling radar. In actual fact, the lead IAF interceptor approached it from the front quarters, showing himself plainly and was intending to formate on the Atlantique to be able to communicate with him and get him to land at an Indian airfield. The PN Atlantique did not respond to this, his last option for survival, but instead acted in a hostile manner by turning aggressively into the IAF interceptor. There was no alternative thereafter but to shoot down the Pakistani intruder to prevent it from running away after being caught while on an obvious illegal operational mission in Indian territory.

In the final analysis, the bottom line is..... the IAF acted in a thoroughly professional manner as per the existing Rules of Engagement, even going so far as to give the intruder a chance for survival which was rejected. The IAF continues to maintain its high state of vigilance and is confident in dealing with any future intrusions is an equally firm manner.
 
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BS, how many times you see such incidents put on public display the very next day except at some later stage in a war museum or something.


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That is to prove your claim of 'flying close to IB' wrong.
 
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What is there to admit,writing is on the wall, your reconnaissance plane violates 10 Km exclusion zone,possibly enters to Indian airspace.

Just months after your Kargil adventure, our patience for your antics was running low, we give it chance to land on an Indian airbase, when it makes a dash for Pakistani airspace we shoot it down. What did you expect would happen?
Reconnaissance plane ??? that too with 16 persons on board. Ask yourself, why would Pakistan send an unarmed slow moving aircraft into Indian airspace ....what was it photographing....marshlands !!! and just by coincidence, the Indian MiGs happened to be in the area. As for expectations, last i heard, your former Gujarat energy minister still attributes his life to PAF, since it's in PAF's doctrine not to shoot down unarmed aircraft....it all boils down to morals.
 
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Reconnaissance plane ??? that too with 16 persons on board. Ask yourself, why would Pakistan send an unarmed slow moving aircraft into Indian airspace ....what was it photographing....marshlands !!! and just by coincidence, the Indian MiGs happened to be in the area. As for expectations, last i heard, your former Gujarat energy minister still attributes his life to PAF, since it's in PAF's doctrine not to shoot down unarmed aircraft....it all boils down to morals.

difference between civilian n military aircraft. Question is a plane armed with electronic gathering equipment why flying close to border or inside border. A trainee can fly in sea and inside oak away from border.
 
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Reconnaissance plane ??? that too with 16 persons on board. Ask yourself, why would Pakistan send an unarmed slow moving aircraft into Indian airspace ....what was it photographing....marshlands !!! and just by coincidence, the Indian MiGs happened to be in the area. As for expectations, last i heard, your former Gujarat energy minister still attributes his life to PAF, since it's in PAF's doctrine not to shoot down unarmed aircraft....it all boils down to morals.

Really..!!

Check the facts before BSing.

PAF shot down a civilian air craft boarded by Guj CM even the pilot pleaded not to fire and showing landing gear as a submission.
 
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Reconnaissance plane ??? that too with 16 persons on board. Ask yourself, why would Pakistan send an unarmed slow moving aircraft into Indian airspace ....what was it photographing....marshlands !!! and just by coincidence, the Indian MiGs happened to be in the area.

What is Breguet Atlantic if not a Maritime Patrol aircraft specializing in aerial reconnaissance and anti-submarine warfare with ability to launch air-to-ground missiles.

IAF migs were not loitering in the area, they were scrambled from IAF base at Naliya. Pakistani plane was loitering in the area for full 18 minutes, violated IB three times during this period, before it was shot down.

How is IAF suppose to know how many people are onboard..question you should be asking, why is Pakistani maritime patrol aircraft training on land, that too so close international border.

IAF followed international rules of engagement, MPA was given a chance to land on Indian airbase, instead it tried to flee..hence was shot down.

As for expectations, last i heard, your former Gujarat energy minister still attributes his life to PAF, since it's in PAF's doctrine not to shoot down unarmed aircraft....it all boils down to morals.


The Gujarat Beechcraft Incident - 1965 War

"It is a twin-engined, twin-tailed aircraft….with four side windows, probably an eight-seater….it is flying at 3,000 ft AMSL. Request further instructions.” Flg Off Qais M Hussain, who had been scrambled from Mauripur Station to check a suspicious radar contact south-west of Bhuj, was reporting to the Ground Controlled Interception (GCI) controller at Badin’s FPS-20 radar[1].

“Standby,” replied the GCI controller Flg Off Aziz A Khan, hesitantly, as he decided to consult the higher ups.

Qais, a rookie who had completed his conversion on F-86s from USA only four months earlier, belonged to No 18 Squadron and was part of a small detachment of pilots that was being rotated at Mauripur, while the rest of the squadron operated out of Sargodha. While on alert duty on 19 September, his F-86F pair was scrambled around 1545 hrs (PST). Qais, however, had to take off as a singleton since his leader, Flt Lt A I Bukhari, had aborted due to a starting problem. Another standby aircraft, flown by Flt Lt A S Kazmi, took off after a delay of 6-7 minutes, but it never caught up with Qais and continued to hold over the border at 20,000 ft.

Initially, Qais had also been told to climb to 20,000 ft to conserve fuel, but was later directed to descend lower and try to spot the reported contact visually. Somewhere during the descent, Qais lost radio contact with Badin but luckily, Kazmi’s F-86 came in handy as a useful radio relay. Looking around intently, Qais caught a glint of bare metal in the afternoon sun. After having closed in and, having examined his quarry thoroughly, Qais passed his initial report to Badin via Kazmi. He then started orbiting over and around what was only later confirmed as a Beechcraft Model 18 commuter aircraft.

“When I saw this aircraft, I asked myself what was I to do with it,” recollects Qais. To his surprise, the Beechcraft pilot reacted to the interceptor’s presence by climbing up from its cruise altitude of 3,000 ft. Qais thought to himself that if shooting orders came, it would only make his job easy, compared to the trickier high-to-low shooting from stern, had the aircraft ducked down to low level.

“During the anxious wait of several minutes, I was wishing and hoping that I would be called back immediately, without firing any bullets,” recalls Qais pensively. However, the stark orders from Badin were relayed by Kazmi: “You are clear to shoot.” Adjusting himself behind the doomed Beechcraft, Qais fired a short burst from about 1,000 ft and saw a splinter fly off from the left wing. Speeding past the stricken aircraft, Qais readjusted for a second firing pass. Firing a long burst this time, he saw the right wing in flames. Moments later, the Beechcraft nosed over into a near vertical dive and exploded in a ball of fire near the village of Suthali, about half a mile from the coast (about 45 nautical miles WSW of Bhuj). Just then, Kazmi called out that Badin radar was reporting several aircraft – possibly Vampires from Jamnagar, it was thought – heading towards the scene of shooting.

Having flown a good 210 nm from home base and, been aloft for 30 minutes, the fuel state of the F-86 was low and precluded possibility of escape while hugging the ground. Qais was, however, fortunate to stumble onto a towering coastal cloud bank that he could hide behind, while climbing away. Reaching 15,000 ft over the border, Qais started a slow descent for Mauripur. His fuel tanks bone dry, Qais landed through a precautionary flame-out landing pattern.

The same evening it was learnt through All India Radio that the eight people on board the Beechcraft, including the Chief Minister of Gujarat State, Balwantrai Mehta, had been killed; also on board were the Chief Minister’s wife, Mrs Sarojben Mehta, three members of the Chief Minister’s personal staff and a press reporter from the daily Gujarat Samachar. The crew of two included an ex-IAF pilot, Jehangir M Engineer, one of IAF’s four famous Engineer brothers[2]. He was the chief pilot of Maharashtra State Government but was on loan to Gujarat. The aircraft had taken off from the Gujarat capital of Ahmedabad and was on its way to the small town of Mithapur that lay 200 nm WSW, at the mouth of the Gulf of Kutch. The aircraft had apparently drifted off-course considerably, for the crash site is almost 40 nm north of the intended destination.

An Indian inquiry into the incident submitted the facts four months later. According to the inquiry report, the IAF authorities at Bombay had refused to let the aircraft proceed on the flight. When the Gujarat government pressed for clearance, the IAF authorities agreed reluctantly, giving clearance for the pilot to proceed at his own risk.

The purpose of the risky visit to Mithapur remains unclear. One could speculate, though, that the Chief Minister may have sought to publicly demonstrate solidarity with his coastal constituency in the wake of Pakistan Navy’s earlier attack on Dwarka which, while tactically insignificant, was wholly morale-shattering. After all, the Chief Minister had, only earlier that morning, presided over a mass National Cadet Corps rally in Ahmedabad “to boost the country’s defence effort.”[3]

Regrettable as the news of civilian deaths were, no one at Headquarters No 2 Sector at Badin had feared that civilians would be on board an aircraft in the thick of the war zone. The Sector Commander, Wg Cdr Mehmood Hassan and the Officer Commanding of the Operations Wing, Sqn Ldr Abdul Moiz Shahzada had hastily surmised that the aircraft was proceeding on some sort of a reconnaissance or air transport mission. Shooting down of the aircraft was, thus, deemed an indisputable answer to the prevailing quandary. The niceties of territorial inviolability had obviously no room for debate, for this was clearly not a peace-time situation.

Both India and Pakistan had utilised civilian registered aircraft for transportation of military supplies, equipment or manpower and, for maritime reconnaissance during the 1965 War (as well as 1971 War). The inherent military potential of any aircraft was well understood and, was suitably exploited. The onus of safety of these platforms lay on the host country, as the lines between their civilian and military usage were blurred during hostilities. Except for United Nations or Red Cross / Red Crescent aircraft whose identity is unmistakably displayed, all other aircraft could be construed as liable to serving military objectives, not withstanding their civilian registration markings. Proper codification of aviation law to remove any doubts on the issue did not exist in the 1965 era and, in fact, was first made part of the Geneva Convention as late as 1977.

It would be worthwhile to study a portion of 'Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions’ of 12 August 1949, and 'Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) Article 52’ of 8 June 1977. Even a cursory reading reveals that total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation of those ‘objects’ that can make effective contribution to military action by virtue of their nature, location, purpose or use, is defensible. The statute clarifies that while civilian ‘objects’ per se shall not be the attacked, it clearly makes an exception ‘if these objects serve military objectives.’

Rather than attempting to seek cover of a later legislation through retroactive application, it would be instructive, purely from an academic standpoint, to see how the incident stands up to contemporary international legalities. It can be seen that the object under discussion namely, the Beechcraft aeroplane, by its nature, was capable of transporting military stores/personnel as well as performing land or maritime reconnaissance (visually at least); its location was also in an area contiguous to the land and maritime war zones. The actual purpose of the flight – which, in the event, turned out to be VIP movement – borders on the suspect when seen in the light of the other provisions mentioned heretofore, which unequivocally qualify the aircraft as ‘serving military objectives.’

Unfortunately, the safety of the aircraft stood compromised from the outset. Sadly, the loss of innocent lives has cast a shadow under which, more than anyone else, Qais has had to live for over four decades. He looks back ruefully, though he has no doubt that he was doing his duty.

http://kaiser-aeronaut.blogspot.in/2011/04/gujarat-beechcraft-incident-1965-war.html
 
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I found this video on YouTube and thought it was a beautiful memory of all 16 men that sadly lost their lives. There are not a lot of content on the internet highlighting the incident and I though this video is much over due.
I would like to thank them for their service and would like to say Shaheed ke jo maut hai, wo quam ke hayaat hai, lahoo jo hai shaheed ka, wo quam ki zakaat hai.

I personally know relitives of Lt.Masood and would like to point out despite the failure of highlight the incident on a world scale there have been honours made to the shaheed's through road names.
There is a road in Lahore named after Lt.Masood near his brother's house.
 
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