fatman17
PDF THINK TANK: CONSULTANT
- Joined
- Apr 24, 2007
- Messages
- 32,563
- Reaction score
- 98
- Country
- Location
The armys last chance?
By Mahir Ali
Wednesday, 21 Oct, 2009
As far as the present drive is concerned, blatant failure is clearly not an option. But a military triumph on its own will not suffice.
THE notion that the spate of terrorist attacks across Pakistan in the run-up to the military operations in South Waziristan was intended as a deterrent comes across as unconvincing, if not altogether untenable.
The infiltration of the military headquarters in Rawalpindi earlier this month, in particular, seemed like a bring it on signal.
If that was indeed the intention, it appears to have served its purpose. The embarrassment factor effectively meant that army action could no longer be put off without such a delay being perceived as a sign of weakness. That does not, of course, explain why it took the military commanders so long to get their act together. Would it not have made sense, for instance, to capitalise on the confusion caused by the elimination of Baitullah Mehsud back in August?
Its possible the army was ill-prepared at that juncture, in the wake of its purported success in Swat, to launch another assault. Perhaps it needed time to work out a tenable strategy. Whatever the cause or excuse it certainly gave the Taliban time to finesse their own modus operandi. Which appears to have included calling on their Punjabi allies to pile on the pressure.
The breach in Rawalpindi and the series of coordinated attacks on security-related sites in Lahore prompted the official admission that jihadist tendencies are by no means restricted to the northwest but are thriving in parts of Punjab as well. This is something that has in fact been evident for quite a while, as has the administrative reluctance to do anything about it.
The sordid killing spree in Mumbai nearly a year ago ought to have served as an eye-opener. But it didnt, and in the present context it is noticeable that whereas groups such as Jaish-i-Mohammad and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi are commonly being cited as Taliban collaborators, there is little mention of Lashkar-i-Taiba, as if the organisation evaporated into thin air following a handful of desultory arrests.
Chances are it was not entirely a coincidence that the Rawalpindi and Lahore terrorist actions were eerily reminiscent of the Mumbai outrage.
Meanwhile, the suicide attack that claimed dozens of lives in Irans Sistan-Balochistan province on the weekend has also been blamed on infiltrators from across the Pakistani border (although Tehran has at the same time cited complicity by the great Satan America and its ally Britain, without attempting to explain why Pakistan-based Sunni extremists might be associating with nations that they, too, perceive as inveterate foes).
The Pakistan Armys reluctance to tackle the Jaish and the Lashkars has invariably been associated with its role in their progeniture. A similar explanation could, of course, be extended to its attitude towards the Taliban, although the intent behind its sponsorship of the latter in their original incarnation was two-pronged: a strategic grasp of Afghanistan (without the sort of investment Moscow or Washington made in pursuit of the same objective), plus the bonus that they would be uprooted from Pakistan.
The first prong proved temporary, the second illusory. The implications of the latter may not have fully manifested themselves until 9/11, but even that was more than eight years ago. Forays into South Waziristan under Gen Pervez Musharraf were spectacularly unsuccessful. The futility of the alternative tack of negotiations ought to have been immediately obvious to the interlocutors from Islamabad.
As far as the present drive is concerned, blatant failure is clearly not an option. But a military triumph on its own will not suffice. The risks inherent in subduing the Taliban and leaving it at that have already manifested themselves in parts of Swat, where the absence of reconstruction and support systems creates conditions conducive to the tug of militancy.
These are not tasks than can or should be left to the army, not least because doing so brings into question the civilian administrations raison dêtre. The latter is in the habit of crying poor in such contexts, perhaps not entirely without justification although it remains an open question whether the problem is the absence of resources or merely their misallocation.
The neglect of decades cannot be made up for in short order, but that is hardly an excuse for inaction. The seminaries that incubate jihadis will continue to flourish in the absence of viable educational alternatives. The absence of even rudimentary state medical facilities makes room for Taliban-affiliated doctors and quacks who selectively offer succour to some with the intention of causing pain to others. And sustained unemployment enhances the seductiveness of unpalatable alternatives.
Therefore, unless the war in Waziristan is followed by a peace that pays dividends in particular to those most susceptible to the lure of the Taliban, it will at best be a pyrrhic victory. The controversy over the latest American aid package has hardly been helpful in this regard. The handout inevitably emphasises Pakistans status as a client state, but the noisiest opposition to it has come not from folks with a principled objection to this kind of charity, but from those who question the conditions attached to it.
Washington was somewhat taken aback because as far as it was concerned, the emphasis on civilian control over the military was little more than a formality. It knows only too well what the reality is, and it pays only lip service to the alternative. It failed to take into account the fact that what the army took in its stride under a military ruler carries different implications in the context of the Zardari administration whose unpopularity proved all to easy to capitalise on.
For some reason, The New York Times Jane Perlez has drifted into the habit of describing the army as an institution that is regarded with the highest esteem among the Pakistani public. That is patently not the case. Not after Bangladesh, Balochistan, the Zia regime, the Afghan jihad, the Taliban, Kargil and other manifestations of the fixation on Kashmir.
For all its foibles, follies and farces, the army at present has a chance to redeem itself. But the onset of winter may well slam shut this small window of opportunity.
mahir.dawn@gmail.com
i may not entirely agree with the writer
By Mahir Ali
Wednesday, 21 Oct, 2009
As far as the present drive is concerned, blatant failure is clearly not an option. But a military triumph on its own will not suffice.
THE notion that the spate of terrorist attacks across Pakistan in the run-up to the military operations in South Waziristan was intended as a deterrent comes across as unconvincing, if not altogether untenable.
The infiltration of the military headquarters in Rawalpindi earlier this month, in particular, seemed like a bring it on signal.
If that was indeed the intention, it appears to have served its purpose. The embarrassment factor effectively meant that army action could no longer be put off without such a delay being perceived as a sign of weakness. That does not, of course, explain why it took the military commanders so long to get their act together. Would it not have made sense, for instance, to capitalise on the confusion caused by the elimination of Baitullah Mehsud back in August?
Its possible the army was ill-prepared at that juncture, in the wake of its purported success in Swat, to launch another assault. Perhaps it needed time to work out a tenable strategy. Whatever the cause or excuse it certainly gave the Taliban time to finesse their own modus operandi. Which appears to have included calling on their Punjabi allies to pile on the pressure.
The breach in Rawalpindi and the series of coordinated attacks on security-related sites in Lahore prompted the official admission that jihadist tendencies are by no means restricted to the northwest but are thriving in parts of Punjab as well. This is something that has in fact been evident for quite a while, as has the administrative reluctance to do anything about it.
The sordid killing spree in Mumbai nearly a year ago ought to have served as an eye-opener. But it didnt, and in the present context it is noticeable that whereas groups such as Jaish-i-Mohammad and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi are commonly being cited as Taliban collaborators, there is little mention of Lashkar-i-Taiba, as if the organisation evaporated into thin air following a handful of desultory arrests.
Chances are it was not entirely a coincidence that the Rawalpindi and Lahore terrorist actions were eerily reminiscent of the Mumbai outrage.
Meanwhile, the suicide attack that claimed dozens of lives in Irans Sistan-Balochistan province on the weekend has also been blamed on infiltrators from across the Pakistani border (although Tehran has at the same time cited complicity by the great Satan America and its ally Britain, without attempting to explain why Pakistan-based Sunni extremists might be associating with nations that they, too, perceive as inveterate foes).
The Pakistan Armys reluctance to tackle the Jaish and the Lashkars has invariably been associated with its role in their progeniture. A similar explanation could, of course, be extended to its attitude towards the Taliban, although the intent behind its sponsorship of the latter in their original incarnation was two-pronged: a strategic grasp of Afghanistan (without the sort of investment Moscow or Washington made in pursuit of the same objective), plus the bonus that they would be uprooted from Pakistan.
The first prong proved temporary, the second illusory. The implications of the latter may not have fully manifested themselves until 9/11, but even that was more than eight years ago. Forays into South Waziristan under Gen Pervez Musharraf were spectacularly unsuccessful. The futility of the alternative tack of negotiations ought to have been immediately obvious to the interlocutors from Islamabad.
As far as the present drive is concerned, blatant failure is clearly not an option. But a military triumph on its own will not suffice. The risks inherent in subduing the Taliban and leaving it at that have already manifested themselves in parts of Swat, where the absence of reconstruction and support systems creates conditions conducive to the tug of militancy.
These are not tasks than can or should be left to the army, not least because doing so brings into question the civilian administrations raison dêtre. The latter is in the habit of crying poor in such contexts, perhaps not entirely without justification although it remains an open question whether the problem is the absence of resources or merely their misallocation.
The neglect of decades cannot be made up for in short order, but that is hardly an excuse for inaction. The seminaries that incubate jihadis will continue to flourish in the absence of viable educational alternatives. The absence of even rudimentary state medical facilities makes room for Taliban-affiliated doctors and quacks who selectively offer succour to some with the intention of causing pain to others. And sustained unemployment enhances the seductiveness of unpalatable alternatives.
Therefore, unless the war in Waziristan is followed by a peace that pays dividends in particular to those most susceptible to the lure of the Taliban, it will at best be a pyrrhic victory. The controversy over the latest American aid package has hardly been helpful in this regard. The handout inevitably emphasises Pakistans status as a client state, but the noisiest opposition to it has come not from folks with a principled objection to this kind of charity, but from those who question the conditions attached to it.
Washington was somewhat taken aback because as far as it was concerned, the emphasis on civilian control over the military was little more than a formality. It knows only too well what the reality is, and it pays only lip service to the alternative. It failed to take into account the fact that what the army took in its stride under a military ruler carries different implications in the context of the Zardari administration whose unpopularity proved all to easy to capitalise on.
For some reason, The New York Times Jane Perlez has drifted into the habit of describing the army as an institution that is regarded with the highest esteem among the Pakistani public. That is patently not the case. Not after Bangladesh, Balochistan, the Zia regime, the Afghan jihad, the Taliban, Kargil and other manifestations of the fixation on Kashmir.
For all its foibles, follies and farces, the army at present has a chance to redeem itself. But the onset of winter may well slam shut this small window of opportunity.
mahir.dawn@gmail.com
i may not entirely agree with the writer
