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The Arab world and the future of Africa

Can we return to the topic and not "who will flood who with refugees" or who will commit another Holocaust on minorities in Europe?

That would be good.

@Belew_Kelew or another African user, do you have any numbers (most recent ones from 2015) of the bilateral trade between the Arab world and Sub-Saharan Africa?
 
Yes My friend, i was in Eritrea not long ago and the chinese are there helping with some of the developments in the country. As far as i can tell majority of africans wants close economical ties with the chinese and not the americans.

As long Eritrea keeps improving whether it is China or US just doesn't matter, IMO both should do more.
I suppose human should help each other am I right? All the best my friend!
 
It is a good news for Djibouti and the countries in the Sahellion region.

I don't see this happening soon for Eritrea and Somalia sadly. They have a bigger problem. We have a psychopath African North Korea ruining our country and Ethiopia is "Ethiopianizing" Somalia and they are not 'fond' of the Arab relationship after all the rejection in the League while Somalis are still fantasizing their dream but totally forgot how Somalia is becoming an Ethiopian colony.

It is a sad not to see us not being involved despite the majority of the Eritrean (including myself) speak Arabic and there used to be a Revolutionary Front known as Eritrean Liberation Front (JabhatTahiri) who began the independence war. They had relationship with the Arab countries and plans to join the Arab League after the war but 15 years later, Ethiopian backed group known as Sha3bia (EPLF and now PDJP) fought them and succeeded taking over Eritrea. The Regime turned Eritrea in one word "North Korea".

Anyway, it is boiling, when we oust him, it is possible to restore relationship once stability is restored, it would be a dream to have a relationship with Djibouti and others since we are just 25KM away from Arabia (200s of Islands between Red Sea). This will be beneficial economically, no more wars and BS..

Lol @Belew, I have seen Chinese everywhere in Khartoum airport as well. Makes sense.
 
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It is a good news for Djibouti and the countries in the Sahellion region.

I don't see this happening soon for Eritrea and Somalia sadly. They have a bigger problem. We have a psychopath African North Korea ruining our country and Ethiopia is "Ethiopianizing" Somalia and they are not 'fond' of the Arab relationship after all the rejection in the League while Somalis are still fantasizing their dream but totally forgot how Somalia is becoming an Ethiopian colony.

It is a sad not to see us not being involved despite the majority of the Eritrean (including myself) speak Arabic and there used to be a Revolutionary Front known as Eritrean Liberation Front (JabhatTahiri) who began the independence war. They had relationship with the Arab countries and plans to join the Arab League after the war but 15 years later, Ethiopian backed group known as Sha3bia (EPLF and now PDJP) fought them and succeeded taking over Eritrea. The Regime turned Eritrea in one word "North Korea".

Anyway, it is boiling, when we oust him, it is possible to restore relationship once stability is restored, it would be a dream to have a relationship with Djibouti and others since we are just 25KM away from Arabia (200s of Islands between Red Sea). This will be beneficial economically, no more wars and BS..

Lol @Belew, I have seen Chinese everywhere in Khartoum airport as well. Makes sense.

I read sometime last year that Chad and South Sudan wanted to apply for Arab League membership. Not sure why South Sudan would do such a thing considering that there are no Arabs there and that they fought against the Arab North but Chad is a different case. In Chad 10% of the population is Baggara Arab and Arabic along with French is the lingua franca of that country.

Baggara_Arabs_Belt.svg


Arabs in sub-Saharan Africa.

Chad also borders Libya and Sudan. It's a terrible poor country though but fairly rich in resources if I am not wrong.

Can you please elaborate on your initial post, brother?

Yes, Eritrea could quality as an Arab League member state due to its proximity to other Arab countries, Arab minority and the use of Arabic. It should become a member. If Djibouti is a member state so should Eritrea. Don't forget the Rashaida either.







My belief is that relations between the Arab world and nearby Horn of Africa will only improve with time and that this will also reach the Sahel countries (but it requires the North African countries to do their bit) and certainly also the Swahili coastline which historically always had close relations with the Arab world especially Oman.

There is a lot of potential for further trade and the opportunity must be seized at one point for the betterment of all.
 
Saudi Arabian surgeons performed 515 eye surgeries in Nigeria
08dfb114-0469-473e-ac6e-785beb0a9bbb_16x9_788x442.jpg

Five Saudi doctors specialized in eye surgery performed 515 operations in Nigeria. (Supplied)
Staff writer, Al Arabiya EnglishWednesday, 28 February 2018
Text size
Doctors Samir al-Mansouri, Ra'id al-'Umair, Saeed al-Qahtani and Omar al-Abbasi, also participated in the medical convoy.

The five doctors prepared and examined the patients daily, from 7 am to 8 pm, checked on the patients on the second day to ensure the success of the operation and gave the patients instructions and provided free treatments and medicines.

Wedaani said that the convoy was medically equipped and intended to conduct over 400 operations.

However, their enthusiasm, being affected with the situation in the region and seeing the positive impact they had on the Muslim communities in Nigeria pushed them to exceed the expected operations to reach 515 despite the difficult working conditions, poor resources, lack of electricity, tools and experience of assistants, and the difficulty of the medical cases themselves.




He said that the mission started on Feb. 20 and would continue till March 2 in Katsina, Nigeria.

It is being organized by the Medical Committee at the World Assembly of Muslim Youth.

The convoy attracted the attention of the local press who thanked the Saudi doctors for their efforts.

Social media followers commended the efforts of the convoy in Nigeria and requested them to visit other cities in dire need of these operations both inside Saudi Arabia and abroad.

Last Update: Wednesday, 28 February 2018 KSA 22:22 - GMT 19:22

https://english.alarabiya.net/en/fe...ons-performed-515-eye-surgery-in-Nigeria.html

@Gomig-21 given your personal history brother, as told yesterday, I am curious to hear what you think about future Arab-Horner/Sub-Saharan economic cooperation (cooperation as a whole) in the future and the role of China given the very close and increasingly closer Sino-Arab ties?

Personally, if you ask me, being a person that looks at things in a non-short term, I believe that this relationship has amble potential. In particular given the historical influence of Arabs in much of Africa, especially the Muslim parts (Horn of Africa, Swahili Coastline, Sahel, East Africa) and other areas of Africa. We have probably influenced those regions more than any foreigners, even after Western colonization.

Curious to hear your qualified opinions here if you don't mind.

Also not sure if you recall the almost simultaneous visits by KSA's and Egypt's foreign ministers in African countries that we otherwise hear very little about.


It is a good news for Djibouti and the countries in the Sahellion region.

I don't see this happening soon for Eritrea and Somalia sadly. They have a bigger problem. We have a psychopath African North Korea ruining our country and Ethiopia is "Ethiopianizing" Somalia and they are not 'fond' of the Arab relationship after all the rejection in the League while Somalis are still fantasizing their dream but totally forgot how Somalia is becoming an Ethiopian colony.

It is a sad not to see us not being involved despite the majority of the Eritrean (including myself) speak Arabic and there used to be a Revolutionary Front known as Eritrean Liberation Front (JabhatTahiri) who began the independence war. They had relationship with the Arab countries and plans to join the Arab League after the war but 15 years later, Ethiopian backed group known as Sha3bia (EPLF and now PDJP) fought them and succeeded taking over Eritrea. The Regime turned Eritrea in one word "North Korea".

Anyway, it is boiling, when we oust him, it is possible to restore relationship once stability is restored, it would be a dream to have a relationship with Djibouti and others since we are just 25KM away from Arabia (200s of Islands between Red Sea). This will be beneficial economically, no more wars and BS..

Lol @Belew, I have seen Chinese everywhere in Khartoum airport as well. Makes sense.

Despite the insane Eritrean regime, here 3 years later, it seems that Arab-Eritrean relations are warming and back on track. I believe that it is question of time before the Arab world in particular the GCC and Egypt, begin investing more in Horn of Africa. The dam issue between Egypt and Sudan and Ethiopia also seems to be on the right track and after KSA-Sudanese normalization (our Sudanese brothers are fighting with us in Yemen side by side) and Eritrea opening its land (bases) for KSA/Arab coalition presence, we can safely say that it could be much worse.

Most important thing as usual is to kickstart economic cooperation and mutually beneficial cooperation in general.
 
Trade between Africa & Arab World mutually beneficial for member countries (Hamdok)

Cairo, 24 August 2017 (ECA) – Enhanced trade flows between Africa and the Arab World could significantly elevate their share of the global market, said ECA Deputy Executive Secretary and Chief Economist Abdalla Hamdok this morning in Cairo at the 100th session of the League of Arab States Economic and Social Council.

“Deepening regional integration between Africa and the Arab world, beyond their own mega-regional trade agreements (CFTA and GAFTA), looks very promising, as far as supporting their countries’ diversification and structural transformation efforts are concerned, [and] could contribute to elevating the standing of Africa and the Arab world on the world trade landscape”, said Hamdok.

Presently, 6.5% of Africa’s exports benefit the Arab world and 5.3% of the Arab World’s target African markets. Trade between African and Arab economies has increased considerably over the past decade and is expected to keep growing. When looking at the composition of traded goods and exchanges, we realise that trade between both regions tends to be more diversified and have stronger industrial content than their exports to the rest of the world, added Hamdok.

In a global context characterized by slow economic recovery, growing protectionism and uncertainties that can weaken recovering economies and impact global development-friendly trade agreements, it appears that trade between Africa and the Arab word offers many opportunities.

“While regional integration and trade alone do not provide a solution to current economic challenges, these undoubtedly offer means and opportunities to unlock progress, industrialization and better integration into regional and international markets. Unleashing the potential of African and Arab countries, diversifying economies and providing women and men with decent economic opportunities will lead to building improved lives and to more inclusive and resilient societies”, said Hamdok.

Africa, which had to diversify its economies following the collapse of commodity prices, has become a driver of global growth and home to four of the ten best performing economies in the world (Côte d’Ivoire, Tanzania, Rwanda and Djibouti). According to ECA studies, the successful establishment of a Continental Free Trade Agreement in Africa would see intra-regional trade rise to 22 per cent of total African trade and would add approximately USD 1 trillion to the global economy.



التجارة بين أفريقيا والعالم العربي، استفادة مشتركة للدول الأعضاء (عبد الله حمدوك)

Note to the editors

The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) was established by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations in 1958. ECA has a mandate to promote the economic and social development of its member States, foster intraregional integration and promote international cooperation for Africa's development. Composed of 54 member States, of which ten are also members of the League of Arab States, ECA addresses the continent’s development challenges, as a regional arm of the United Nations and as a key component of the African institutional landscape.

Visit www.uneca.org for more information about ECA.

Communication Team
Economic Commission for Africa
Office for North Africa
Tel: +212 (0) 537 548 749
Email: filali-ansary@un.org; cea.an.coms@gmail.com

https://www.uneca.org/stories/trade...d-mutually-beneficial-member-countries-hamdok

KSA have a military base/presence/will have a military base in both Djibouti and Eritrea. UAE is similarly involved heavily in the Horn of Africa. Egypt increasingly as well. Not to mention China.

Why China and Saudi Arabia Are Building Bases in Djibouti

By Joseph Braude

China and Saudi Arabia are building military bases next door to US AFRICOM in Djibouti—and bringing the consequences of American withdrawal from the region into stark relief.

by Joseph Braude and Tyler Jiang

Djibouti, a resource-poor nation of 14,300 square miles and 875,000 people in the Horn of Africa, rarely makes international headlines. But between its relative stability and strategic location—20 miles across from war-consumed Yemen and in destroyer range of the pirate-infested western edge of the Indian Ocean—it is now one of the more important security beachheads in the develohttp://www.amazon.com/Joseph-Braude/e/B001KDV64Kping world. Its location also matters greatly to global commerce and energy, due to its vicinity to the Mandeb Strait and the Suez-Aden canal, which sees ten percent of the world’s oil exports and 20 percent of its commercial exports annually.[1] Since November 2002, the country has been home to Camp Lemonnier, a U.S. Expeditionary base—the only American base on the African continent—along with other bases belonging to its French, Italian, Spanish, and Japanese allies. (The United States maintains numerous small outposts and airfields in Africa, but officially regards Lemonnier as its only full-scale military base on the continent.)

But now there are two new kids on the block: On January 21st, the Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry announced an agreement with Djibouti to host its first-ever base beyond the South China Sea, and construction commenced days later.[2] Though Beijing called the installation a “logistics and fast evacuation base,” the Asian power’s “near-abroad” rivals, such as Taiwan, opined that it is more likely the beginning of a new, aggressive military buildup to rival the United States. Six weeks later, Saudi Arabia declared that it too would construct a base in Djibouti,[3] apparently as part of its newly assertive policy of countering Iranian proxies politically and militarily throughout the region.[4]

Both new players have made substantial economic and soft power investments in the country to boot. Since 2015, Beijing has poured over $14 billion into infrastructure development.[5] Saudi Arabia, itself a prominent donor to Djibouti’s public works, has spent generously on social welfare projects for the country’s poor; built housing, schools and mosques for its swelling Yemeni refugee population; and dispatched teachers and preachers from the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, long a pillar for the promulgation of Saudi-backed interpretations of Islam. Augmenting Saudi aid, moreover, has been further spending by some of its Arab military allies. The United Arab Emirates and Bahrain have poured millions into charitable work over the past few months—and the UAE in particular is working to spur economic development along the lines of the “Dubai model.” Even cash-poor North Sudan, newly returned to the Saudi orbit after a years-long alliance with Iran, began construction of a hospital in Djibouti in early February.

Neither the timing nor the confluence of these projects is mere coincidence. America’s diminishing global military footprint has begun to affect the calculation of allies and rivals alike, and the outsized role Djibouti is poised to play in its neighborhood presents a case in point of the consequences. An examination of the changing role the country plays in American, Chinese, and Arab security policy offers a glimpse into potential conflicts as well as opportunities arising from the shift—and some steps Americans can take to prepare for both.

The American Posture

As the only American base in Africa, Camp Lemonnier serves a vital function for US AFRICOM. Housing 4,000 military and civilian personnel, it is the nerve center of six drone launching stations across the continent, which have attacked targets as far-flung as Al-Shabab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, and Yemeni-based Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. U.S. Special Forces, the CIA, and Air Force surveillance craft converge to process and pool intelligence at the camp. It also serves as headquarters to Task Force 48-4, a counterterrorism unit that targets militants in East Africa and Yemen.[6] Special Forces rely on it too: In 2012, when Navy SEALs rescued American and Danish hostages from Somalia, they brought them to safety in Camp Lemonnier.[7] And as a springboard for American-led anti-piracy operations, Camp Lemonnier helps the U.S. maintain its role as the primary guarantor of mercantile security in the Gulf of Aden, the Horn of Africa, and the Indian Ocean. The significance of the base grows only greater amid regional conflagration: The U.S. has been using it to meet its pledge of technical and intelligence assistance to Saudi Arabia in its war against the Iranian-backed Houthi militia in Yemen.

In 2014, the U.S. signed a new 20-year lease on the base with the Djiboutian government, and committed over $1.4 billion to modernize it in the years to come.[8] This significant expenditure bucks the overall trend of diminishing American military commitments overseas. For example, President Obama has announced plans to reduce the number of active naval vessels to 1917 numbers, possibly including aircraft carriers.[9]

As the segments below will show, America’s status in the country stands to be affected by the activities of the Chinese and Saudi bases. It may also be affected by the two countries’ soft power deployments, each aiming to influence the cultural and political fiber of the country and, by extension, the policies of its government. America’s own soft power commitments have been minimal: the U.S. supplies $3 million worth of food aid annually through USAID as part of the U.N. World Food Program, runs modest health and education projects, and netted only $152 million in trade in 2015.[10] Nor is there any concerted effort to enter the public discussion in Djibouti in the service of American goals or values.

The Chinese Posture

By contrast to the U.S., China has never previously established a base beyond its “near abroad.” Thus the Djibouti project, however modest, fuels the perception that China’s military footprint is growing. Sending such a message may itself be among Beijing’s goals. David Shedd, former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, told us that “[The Chinese] want to signal to the world that they have a worldwide presence. Part of the mission is simply defined as being seen. That in and of itself is defined as an interest.”[11]

With respect to its potential operational significance, the Chinese Foreign Ministry says, “Facilities will mainly be used for logistical support and personnel recuperation of the Chinese armed forces conducting such missions as maritime escort in the Gulf of Aden and waters off the Somali coast, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance.” It would also enable fast evacuation for any of the million Chinese citizens now living in the Middle East and Africa should they require it.[12] The need to prepare for such eventualities became clear to China in the bloody aftermath of the Arab Spring: It evacuated 35,680 nationals employed mainly in Libya’s oil industry, and 629 more from Yemen soon thereafter.[13] During the Libya evacuation, China had only one frigate available in the vicinity, so most of the evacuees had to be flown out of the country on chartered commercial planes.

But from Washington to Taipei, observers suspect that the project is more ambitious than the Chinese let on. In an interview on the national news network Taiwan Today, political analyst Lai Yueqian said, “[The base] can be used to pin down the United States and any U.S.-led organizations, and if [the U.S.] wants to intervene against China’s interests, they will have to think carefully, because China will use their military to protect their citizens and their property.”[14] In the following clip, Yueqian elaborates on this analysis, bespeaking Taiwanese concerns about the base:


Yueqian’s assessment, shared by most Chinese “near-abroad” allies of the United States, is also the view of prominent members of the political class in Washington. At a December hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs in which rumors about the base were discussed, Senator Chris Coons (R-De.) stated in relation to the Djibouti base, “[The US has to be] vigilant in the face of China’s growing ambitions.”[15]

Beijing’s outlook toward nearby North Africa and the Middle East differs with American policies. As Taiwan’s Lai Yueqian described in the video above, the U.S.- and NATO-led military intervention in Libya angered China. At the U.N. Security Council, Beijing subsequently blocked attempts to engineer a Western military intervention in Syria. With respect to the region-wide conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran, America’s tradition of siding with Saudi Arabia — or, for that matter, its more recent tendency to tilt toward Iran — may conflict with Chinese policies: Guided by the need to quench its substantial thirst for oil, Beijing mostly seeks to avoid irking either oil-rich nation. A new military base in boating range of North Africa as well as the Arabian peninsula promises to bolster any Chinese political stance—however modestly—with a measure of force. The base, to be located near the small port city of Obock on the northern coast of Djibouti, lies 20 miles closer than Lemonnier to the conflict in Yemen, to which Washington has committed resources in support of Saudi Arabia’s war with the Houthis.

But China’s strategic goals cannot be explained solely in terms of a perceived reaction to Western policies. According to Beijing’s most recent defense policy paper, released in May 2015, “China’s armed forces will work harder to create a favorable strategic posture with more emphasis on the employment of military forces and means.”[16] This formulation is widely believed to allude to China’s “String of Pearls” and “One Belt, One Road” initiatives. “String of Pearls” is a metaphor for an envisioned network of naval ports of call, predominantly along the Indian Ocean, to secure sea lanes of transit, commerce, and communication from mainland China to Sudan. The “One Belt, One Road” initiative seeks to strengthen Chinese exports through commercial land and sea roads, largely along the historic “silk road,” straddling Europe and the Middle East. The Djibouti base would be vital in ensuring the success of the latter goal, since most of China’s $1 billion in daily exports to Europe traverse the Gulf of Aden and the Suez Canal.[17] With respect to the former plan, Toshi Yoshihara, Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies at the U.S. Naval War College, has been mapping the intersection of Chinese naval and commercial ventures across the Pacific region. Arrayed together, he told us, they “certainly do look like a string of pearls.”[18] Djibouti, home to both the nascent base and extensive Chinese economic investment, would clearly amount to a new pearl on the string (see Figure 1).[19]



Are Chinese and American pursuits in the vicinity of Djibouti necessarily a zero-sum game? Some of China’s stated goals do not conflict with American aspirations, and to the contrary, may benefit both superpowers as well as their allies: Both the growing Chinese capacity to evacuate citizens from war-torn areas and its further enhancement of anti-piracy operations are each a “public good.” On the other hand, a different term in Beijing’s political vocabulary raises more disturbing possibilities. In our conversation with FPRI Senior Fellow June Teufel Dreyer, she stressed the principle of “All Under Heaven”—rooted in Chinese imperial history—which places Chinese central authority at the epicenter of a tributary system of dominance over lesser powers. Some analysts of China see the country’s recent installation of surface-to-air missiles and fighter jets on Woody Island in the South China Sea as a manifestation of this supremacist tendency.[20] One might ask whether the construction of a Djibouti base reflects the extension of “All Under Heaven” beyond China’s traditional orbit.

At a time of rapid Chinese construction of aircraft and aircraft carriers and more serious competition with American military industries, the base in Djibouti could indeed reflect a Chinese aspiration to eventually meet and surpass the United States as a military and economic power in the area. In January 2016, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conducted a 72-hour exercise involving thousands of marines and the navy special operations regiment in the Gobi Desert in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The area’s topography and climate resemble much of North Africa and the Sahel.[21] Between “All Under Heaven” and China’s stated goal of housing up to 10,000 Chinese servicemen in Djibouti, such exercises offer ample basis for concern.[22]

Beijing’s hard power initiative in Djibouti is meanwhile accompanied by its soft power initiatives to build ties with state and society alike. The $14 billion in Chinese support for infrastructure development, widely publicized in Djibouti, has generated enormous goodwill with the population. Far exceeding U.S. spending, the injection is also an investment in the government of President Isma’il Omar Guelleh. There are also cultural ventures, such as the new Confucius Institute in Djibouti City, which Beijing typically uses to cultivate personal ties and “assets” within the society.[23] Add to all this China’s $1.1 billion in trade in 2014—roughly ten times that of the United States.[24] As Chinese influence grows in Djibouti, its ability to influence the government’s foreign policy and security strategies promises to grow along with it.

The Saudi Posture

From a Saudi perspective, stationing troops in Djibouti is both a defensive and a potential offensive measure in its pan-regional conflict with Iran, with particular bearing on the nearby war in Yemen. The defensive aspect was on display in mid-February, when Saudi intelligence officials, tracking the flow of munitions from Iran to its Houthi proxy militia in Yemen, discovered that the Islamic Republic was using Djibouti as a waystation. A ship en route to Yemen carrying encrypted military communication equipment and other hardware had originated in the southern Iranian port of Bandar Abbas. The Kingdom intercepted it en route, and recognized the importance of strengthening its capacity to act in and around Djibouti.[25] In terms of “offense,” Ben Ho Wan Beng, a military analyst in Singapore, speculates that given the Houthi presence in western Yemen, Riyadh could use the base to “open up a new front against the Houthis, who [would] then face the prospect of being attacked from another axis.”[26]

By contrast to the U.S. and its Japanese and Western allies, for which the establishment of a base in Djibouti is a matter of paying rent on a discrete strip of land, Saudis view their own barrack walls as permeable. Djibouti is an Arab League member state, bound to its brethren by ties of blood, culture, and faith. It has also joined the 34-member, Saudi-led “Islamic coalition” against Iran-sponsored terror announced by Deputy Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman in December.[27] Thus from Riyadh’s perspective, all of Djibouti is a kind of “base”—and the Kingdom feels it has a right to weigh in on any of the country’s non-Arab military installations. It was hardly a coincidence when the Djiboutian government recently rejected a Russian proposal to establish its own base in the country: Moscow, a staunch ally to the Iran-backed Assad regime in Damascus, would have been at best unhelpful to Saudi Arabia in the Yemen war.

Saudi soft power activity in the country serves to intensify this bond. One of the state-backed organizations spearheading it is the Riyadh-based World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY). The group historically served as a primary exporter of Islamist preaching across the globe—a mission that enabled both Salafi jihadists and the Muslim Brotherhood to politicize and radicalize Muslim communities. But the Kingdom more recently purged the organization of jihadist preachers, and streamlined WAMY’s religious line to follow “Salafi traditionalism,” which holds that only the head of state has the right to declare “jihad.” Moreover, clerical elites who traditionally controlled the group now share authority with stalwarts of the government—call them “lay leaders”—who have their own direct line to the royal family. In Djibouti, WAMY funds and staffs health and human services for the indigenous population, and tends to the needs of Yemeni refugees. Other goals determined by the state appear to take precedence over preaching: provide disaster and poverty relief; back the government of President Isma’il Omar Guelleh; instill an ethos of Djiboutian nationalism that insulates the population from trans-state ideologies; build person-to-person relationships between Saudis and Djiboutians; engineer support for the Kingdom’s specific regional objectives. Some of these goals are subtly on display in the following excerpt from a March 21, 2016 report by WAMY on its Djibouti bureau:


To be sure, the positive aspects of WAMY’s programs should not diminish the concern that Salafi missionary activity may still promote a profoundly sectarian worldview in Djibouti, casting the Sunni-Shi’ite conflict in existential, rather than political, terms.

As to the presence of 30,000-and-counting Yemeni refugees in Djibouti, Saudis view it as both a humanitarian concern and a strategic opportunity. Twenty-five years ago, in the aftermath of the “Gulf War” to repel Saddam Hussein’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia established a refugee camp in the northern town of Rafha to host 33,000 Iraqis fleeing persecution by Saddam. The installation served Riyadh and some of its international allies as an intelligence listening post—hundreds of Iraqis were debriefed about the situation inside the country—and as a platform for cultivating Iraqi assets.[28]Though the Yemeni and gulf wars are far from analogous, the presence of a substantial number of newly departed Yemeni civilians in a safe environment far from the battlefield presents the opportunity to tap a similar wealth of information and human networks.

In deepening their security and intelligence presence in Djibouti at a time of unease between Riyadh and Washington, they will be keen to explore potential security partnerships with China. As recently as 2014, Beijing sought to forge joint counterterrorism training programs with the Yemeni government that Saudi Arabia is now fighting to reinstall.[29] More recently, Beijing made a rare break with its policy of neutrality between Iran and Saudi Arabia to express support for the Saudi position in Yemen. In January 2016, King Salman hosted a landmark visit to Riyadh by Chinese President Xi Jinping, together with high-level meetings between senior security and intelligence officials of both countries. The strengthening of these ties may serve to lessen Saudi reliance on American support.[30]

The importance of Djibouti has become a popular topic of discussion throughout the Saudi-allied Arab world. Prominent voices in Egypt, for example, are talking about building a base there too, while other Gulf allies are ramping up their own soft power projects in the country. The following video montage begins with a clip from Tawfiq Okasha—an eccentric, ultranationalist Egyptian pundit known for his fondness of Israel—in which he makes the case for a Djibouti base. In perhaps a sign of the times, he bolsters his argument by saying that Djiboutians are one of the lost tribes of Israel, and therefore “good people.”





Grappling with New U.S. Challenges

In a February letter to Secretary of State John Kerry and Defense Secretary Ashton Carter, Representatives Dana Rohrabacher (R-Ca.), Chris Smith (R-N.J.), and Duncan Hunter (R-Ca.) raised alarms about China’s rising influence in Djibouti: “[We are] worried that our own strategic interests around the Horn of Africa, specifically our critical counter-terrorism operations, will be impacted by China’s growing strategic influence in the region.” Recognizing Beijing’s soft power gains, they castigated the Djibouti leadership for its “cozy relationship with China,” and dubbed the government of Ismail Omar Guelleh a “corrupt and repressive regime.” Guelleh is indeed a human rights violator, and the lawmakers’ criticism have been echoed repeatedly by the White House in recent months. Doing so has of course done little to improve Washington’s relationship with Guelleh: Judging from the angry reaction in Djiboutian state media, he reads the American denunciations as support for his political opponents. When Djibouti holds its presidential elections on April 8, the incumbent’s likely victory will bring the government another step closer to China—and a step away from the United States.

America’s shifting circumstances in Djibouti—and, by extension, the Horn of Africa and southern Arabia—are a symptom of its broader political and military withdrawal from conflicts in which longtime Asian and Arab allies have a stake. The situation also reflects the weakness of Washington’s commitment and capacity to wield soft power in politically contested foreign environments. It will ultimately be difficult for Washington to address the concerns about Djibouti raised by American lawmakers and Taiwanese analyst Lai Yueqian without restoring its support for longtime allies in the Middle and Far East, as well as deploying American soft power alongside military might. To be sure, the U.S. should welcome efforts by China to help protect civilians from the region’s tumult and secure the sea lanes for international trade. But it should also be prepared for a formidable new presence in the area capable of challenging American objectives politically and militarily.

Meanwhile, the growing presence of Saudi Arabia alongside China in the country promises to strengthen security ties between Riyadh and Beijing, potentially at Washington’s expense. It is but one example of the increasing interplay between China and the Arab world, for which it behooves Americans to prepare. A first step toward doing so is to address an American gap in studying the phenomenon. From government to think tanks and the academy, Arab affairs specialists have long been institutionally separated from their counterparts in Asian affairs. As the leaders, peoples, and armies of these diverse environments begin to intermingle, the Americans who study and engage them must do the same.

Joseph Braude and Tyler Jiang originally published this article as an E-Note at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.



[1] Ben Ho Wan Beng, “The Strategic Attractions of Djibouti,” The National Interest, March 18, 2016.

[2] Hong Lei, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference on January 21, 2016,” January 21, 2016.

[3] Habib Toumi, “Saudi Arabia ‘to open military base in Djibouti’ Djibouti keen to expand ties and cooperation with Saudi Arabia,”Gulf News Saudi Arabia, March 8, 2016.

[4] Hasan al-Mustafa, “Al-Diblomasiya al-Sa’udiya Tub’id Iran ‘An al-Qarn al-Ifriqi” (Saudi Diplomacy Ejects Iran from the Horn of Africa). Al-Arabiya, October 21, 2015.

[5] Dana Sanchez, “China Financing Most of Djibouti’s $14.4 Billion In Planned Infrastructure Projects,” AFK Insider, June 11, 2010.

[6] Nick Turse, “The US military’s best-kept secret,” The Nation, November 17, 2015.

[7] BBC News, “Somalia: Western Hostages Freed in US Military Raid.” BBC News, January 25, 2012.

[8] Josh Wood, “Djibouti, a Safe Harbour in the Troubled Horn of Africa,” The National, June 2, 2015.

[9] Colin Hanna and J.D. Gordon, “Obama naval Doctrine: Anchors Away?” The Hill, March 3, 2014. http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/homeland-security/199570-obama-naval-doctrine-anchors-away

[10] United States Census Bureau, “Trade in Goods with Djibouti,” accessed 3/27/2016. USAID, “Food Assistance Fact Sheet – Djibouti,” accessed 3/27/2016.

[11] Interview with David Shedd, March 7th, 2016.

[12] Ankit Panda, “Confirmed: Construction Begins on China’s First Overseas Military Base in Djibouti,” The Diplomat, February 29, 2016.

[13] CCTV, “35,860 Chinese nationals in Libya evacuated:FM,” CCTV.com, 3/3/2011.

[14] Entering Taiwan – Taiwan Today, “China to Build Military Base in Djibouti,” Filmed [December 2015], YouTube video, Posted [December 2015].
.

[15] Geoffrey Aronson, “China to open its first naval base in Africa,” Aljazeera, December 22, 2015.

[16] The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s Military Strategy,” en.people.cn, May 26, 2015. http://en.people.cn/n/2015/0526/c90785-8897779.html

[17] European Commission, “Countries and regions: China,” accessed 3/27/2016.

[18] Interview with Toshi Yoshihara, March 9th, 2016.

[19] Ross Rustici and Christopher D. Yung, with Scott Devary and Jenny Lin, “‘Not an Idea We Have to Shun: Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements in the 21st Century,” (National Defense University, October 2014,) 29.

[20] Ray Sanchez and Barbara Starr, “U.S. Says China deploys fighter jets to disputed South China Sea Island,” CNN, February 23, 2016.

[21] Shang Wenbin, Liang Jingfeng, and Li Youtao, “Chinese Marines, Special Forces Training in Gobi Desert,” Military Training International, January 19, 2016.

[22] Daily Pioneer, “China’s military might, now for Africa to see,” Daily Pioneer, February 11, 2016.

[23] Joseph Braude, “Radio Beijing in the Middle East,” The American Interest, January 20, 2014.

[24] World Bank, “World Integrated Trade Solution,” accessed 3/27/2016.

[25] Abd al-Rahman ‘Atiya, “I’tiradh Safina Iraniya min Miyah al-Yemen” (Interception of an Iranian Ship from the Waters of Yemen). Al-Hayat, February 14, 2016.

[26] Beng, “The Strategic Attractions of Djibouti.”

[27] “Al-Sa’udiya Tu’lin Ta’sis Tahaluf Yadhum 34 Dawla li-‘Muharabat al-Irhab’” (Saudi Arabia Announces Establishment of a Coalition of 34 States to ‘Fight Terrorism’). BBC Arabic, December 15, 2015.

[28] Interview with Rafha camp administrative officials, Rafha, Saudi Arabia, January 2003.

[29] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Wang Yi: China and Arab Countries Should Carry Out Counter-Terrorism Cooperation,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, June 4, 2014.

[30] Ben Blanchard, Edited Simon Cameron-Moore and Paul Tait, “China offers support for Yemen government as Xi visits Saudi Arabia,” Reuters, January 20, 2016.


Follow Joseph Braude on Twitter: www.twitter.com/josephbraude

https://www.huffingtonpost.com/joseph-braude/why-china-and-saudi-arabi_b_12194702.html
 
@Gomig-21 given your personal history brother, as told yesterday, I am curious to hear what you think about future Arab-Horner/Sub-Saharan economic cooperation (cooperation as a whole) in the future and the role of China given the very close and increasingly closer Sino-Arab ties?

Personally, if you ask me, being a person that looks at things in a non-short term, I believe that this relationship has amble potential. In particular given the historical influence of Arabs in much of Africa, especially the Muslim parts (Horn of Africa, Swahili Coastline, Sahel, East Africa) and other areas of Africa. We have probably influenced those regions more than any foreigners, even after Western colonization.

Curious to hear your qualified opinions here if you don't mind.

Thanks for asking, bro. You pretty much nailed it, my friend. Who's done more in that area than us, but particularly Saudiya. I think it's great what Saudiya, the UAE and Egypt are doing in Africa and particularly in the horn but it bothers me that Saudiya doesn't get the credit it deserves for its unbelievable generosity and aid to not just these African countries, but so many others across the world. Instead it's showered with all the hate and the focus seems solely on the usual negative narrative.

My father was an administrator with the United Nations for 30 years, hence why I was exposed to these areas as a young child. Born in Ethiopia, lived in Burundi, Zaire (at the time before it became the Congo) and traveled extensively through Rwanda and Kenya. Both my older brothers were born in Pakistan when my father was assigned there and he was reassigned back to Pakistan many years later and so I experienced living there for 2 years. We also lived in Thailand and traveled the subcontinent quite extensively. We were in Cyprus for 3 years prior to the Turkish invasion so I definitely have an affinity for all these special places as I not only passed through them but actually lived there during my early years.

Considering the Saudi/Egypt partnership and cooperation with basically connecting our two countries with that incredible bridge project, it makes our involvement in the horn essential to the security of that connection we are about to see happen. Funny that Okasha was talking about the importance of Djibouti prior to the opening of the new Suez Canal project but I think now it's even more important with the upcoming projects between Saudiya and Egypt. We also have a lot more work to do with Sudan and the Halayeb triangle issue but at least the situation with Djibouti is good and pretty soon we should see the Yemen situation come to a good end and so the entrance into the Red Sea will be fine. But we need to be heavily involved in keeping that whole area of the Gulf of Aden secure and free from any trouble. Bringing China into the fold will be amazing. It will be very interesting to see the impact of the China connection to our relationship with the US, especially if the cooperation involves military products and weapons contracts and not just economic cooperation. If the Chinese will be involved in the construction of many of these projects I think things will be great. But if the capacity is in a larger military sense, I believe there will be a bit of tension with the US but we'll have to see as things develop.

The thing that bothers me in all of this is the misconception (or even lack of mention) of the amazingly generous work Suadiya has done, not only in the Arab world and in the North African region, but in Africa itself. What do we always here (especially here on PDF) from many of these younger members who seem to only focus on hatred, is the "Saudi exporting of wahabism" (which of course you and I and many others have no idea what that made-up element they call wahabism is) and never see, or particularly avoid seeing all the incredible generosity of the kingdom to all these countries. What Saudiya has done in terms of assistance to so many countries and people without asking for anything in return is something that rarely gets mentioned and given credit for and it's really sad. Although the purpose of helping others without any form of gratitude or mention is an essential part of our religion, and one that Saudiya follows in its highest order is sublime, I still wish that there is more of that mentioned and there should be a greater effort to expose that generosity if only for the single reason to counter that false impression and misconception of Saudi wahabism exportation. That's what I'd like to see more of and what you're doing here on this forum is an excellent start, my brother. We need to show more of these things so people who are only exposed to the false narrative can see the actual truth and reality.
 
Thanks for asking, bro. You pretty much nailed it, my friend. Who's done more in that area than us, but particularly Saudiya. I think it's great what Saudiya, the UAE and Egypt are doing in Africa and particularly in the horn but it bothers me that Saudiya doesn't get the credit it deserves for its unbelievable generosity and aid to not just these African countries, but so many others across the world. Instead it's showered with all the hate and the focus seems solely on the usual negative narrative.

My father was an administrator with the United Nations for 30 years, hence why I was exposed to these areas as a young child. Born in Ethiopia, lived in Burundi, Zaire (at the time before it became the Congo) and traveled extensively through Rwanda and Kenya. Both my older brothers were born in Pakistan when my father was assigned there and he was reassigned back to Pakistan many years later and so I experienced living there for 2 years. We also lived in Thailand and traveled the subcontinent quite extensively. We were in Cyprus for 3 years prior to the Turkish invasion so I definitely have an affinity for all these special places as I not only passed through them but actually lived there during my early years.

Considering the Saudi/Egypt partnership and cooperation with basically connecting our two countries with that incredible bridge project, it makes our involvement in the horn essential to the security of that connection we are about to see happen. Funny that Okasha was talking about the importance of Djibouti prior to the opening of the new Suez Canal project but I think now it's even more important with the upcoming projects between Saudiya and Egypt. We also have a lot more work to do with Sudan and the Halayeb triangle issue but at least the situation with Djibouti is good and pretty soon we should see the Yemen situation come to a good end and so the entrance into the Red Sea will be fine. But we need to be heavily involved in keeping that whole area of the Gulf of Aden secure and free from any trouble. Bringing China into the fold will be amazing. It will be very interesting to see the impact of the China connection to our relationship with the US, especially if the cooperation involves military products and weapons contracts and not just economic cooperation. If the Chinese will be involved in the construction of many of these projects I think things will be great. But if the capacity is in a larger military sense, I believe there will be a bit of tension with the US but we'll have to see as things develop.

The thing that bothers me in all of this is the misconception (or even lack of mention) of the amazingly generous work Suadiya has done, not only in the Arab world and in the North African region, but in Africa itself. What do we always here (especially here on PDF) from many of these younger members who seem to only focus on hatred, is the "Saudi exporting of wahabism" (which of course you and I and many others have no idea what that made-up element they call wahabism is) and never see, or particularly avoid seeing all the incredible generosity of the kingdom to all these countries. What Saudiya has done in terms of assistance to so many countries and people without asking for anything in return is something that rarely gets mentioned and given credit for and it's really sad. Although the purpose of helping others without any form of gratitude or mention is an essential part of our religion, and one that Saudiya follows in its highest order is sublime, I still wish that there is more of that mentioned and there should be a greater effort to expose that generosity if only for the single reason to counter that false impression and misconception of Saudi wahabism exportation. That's what I'd like to see more of and what you're doing here on this forum is an excellent start, my brother. We need to show more of these things so people who are only exposed to the false narrative can see the actual truth and reality.

You are being too praiseful here. A wealthy and lucky (circumstances of life) country like KSA should always strive to help those in need. Besides we Arabs are quite generous people by nature, you know. Even those among us that do not have much, tend to display traits of generosity. Of course there are bad apples but I am talking in general here. I think that we can state that without enduring in self-praise.

My brother, this is a problem among those that are ignorant of what KSA and other Arab countries are doing. On PDF the vocal ignorants are outshout the knowledgeable majority.

Your family history is very similar to that of my father and his siblings and to a lesser degree myself although I have not lived in anywhere as many different countries but still more than the average person. Such a background is a blessing IMO. Fascinating stuff really.

Indeed. A lot of interesting developments in the future. KSA and Egypt have pretty much the same goals, worries and plans. A secure Red Sea and connectivity (economic) between us and the neighborhood. Egypt is obviously even more invested in this due to the Nile and current dispute with Sudan and Ethiopia but it seems that this will eventually be solved, at least we all hope that in the region. Given KSA-Sudan ties being reestablished in recent years after years of "bad blood", I think that KSA can serve as a mediator between Egypt and Sudan in case of any problems. Basically, there should be no problems between all 3 neighboring countries. Let alone people to people.

Yes, Yemen is key here. My prediction is, once Yemen stabilizes, that KSA will help China gain a foothold in Yemen in terms of reconstruction work and presence. How the US reacts to this and increased Chinese interest in the Arab world and Horn of Africa (Africa as a whole) we will see although the Chinese have already entered Africa years ago in terms of economic investments.

Yes, the Arab-Sino cooperation here, just like elaborated in that excellent article about the Saudi Arabian and Chinese military base in Djibouti, is an important and exciting element.

I will say that there are and have been certain (at times dominant, post 1979 Makkah Siege and Iranian Islamic Revolution next door as a counter effect) and at other times much less so (prior to 1979 and nowadays), that there have been rather orthodox interpretations of Sunni Islam (Hanbalism) in KSA parroted by some clerics, however people forget that this is a state clergy dominated by Hanbalis (official fiqh) while at least 60% of all Saudi Arabians are NOT Hanbalis. Not that there is anything wrong with Hanbalis as you have "literal" and "conservative" versions. But the boogey-word Wahhabism is easier to parrot. It's quite popular to use "Wahhabism", among superficial "experts", for all the wrongdoings of Muslims worldwide, lol.

The movement at its birth and during the initial era, was, contrary to popular belief, quite revolutionary and had little to do with what is ascribed to it here almost 300 years after.


Rather than a new sect, it was rather a sociopolitical and religious movement.

Even the likes of Hamza Yusuf (who is otherwise quite critical of literal interpretations) debunks such nonsense.


Honestly speaking even the conservative Hanbalis, vast majority of them, are quite harmless people.

Personally I grew up in a family following the Shafi'i fiqh since time immortal with Sufi inclinations, typical of Hijaz btw. Another one out of tons of things that Hijaz and neighboring Egypt have in common.;)
 
What UAE is doing in Somalia is not investment.it is illegal hostile takeover.it is illegal agreement with regions with our consulting with the wishes of the majority of Somalia will backfire.
 
What UAE is doing in Somalia is not investment.it is illegal hostile takeover.it is illegal agreement with regions with our consulting with the wishes of the majority of Somalia will backfire.

Here is the mental abeed again? What are you doing in this thread? Somalia is 1 African country out of what, 60 + Sub-Saharan/Horn of Africa countries? Moreover a country that most of the Arab world has cordial ties to. Some deluded Erdogan lover whose views represent 0,1% of all Somalis (in others words a tiny, tiny minority) who otherwise love Arabs and understand the historical ties and how much Arabs have shaped Somalia and the Horn of Africa and numerous other regions of Africa - Sahel (Arabic name), Swahili coastline (Arabic name), Eastern Africa etc, is irrelevant here. Go contribute with something useful to this thread as done by two Eritrean users already, Chinese users and Arab ones, or stay out.
 
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