The 1965 War — revisited

[SilentDeath]

The 1965 War — revisited

Col Ghulam Sarwar (R)

It is a truth now being widely acknowledged that the 1965 war was not of Pakistan Army’s making. Rather, it was imposed on Pakistan. Barring a few scores of officers, majority of them were not in favour of creating tension which could end up in a full-fledged war against India .

However, circumstances took such an ugly turn in 1965 that Pakistan Army was left with no option except entering into war with India. India on its part took Pakistan Army by surprise and launched full throated attacks against Lahore and Sialkot. However, they were taken by surprise on seeing the speed and the quality of Pakistan Army’s reaction. Placing the 1965 conflict in proper perspective, it may be difficult to rank it among major wars but within resources, the two nations did manage to wage a ferocious war against each other. Peeping into the past, we see that the seeds of confrontation between India and Pakistan were laid in the tortured and soul-stirring birth of the two states. The mass killings during the process of partition had left a legacy of acrimony and distrust. As will be seen, the tension between the two countries, continued to assume alarming proportion and war clouds started houring over the horizon. Eventually, it so happened that on 6th September, India launched a full throated attack on Lahore . Responding to this, a first reaction, the Chief of General Staff called a meeting of Directors at GHQ. During the course of deliberations, the participants were informed that the Indians had attacked Lahore and Sialkot , without administrating proper warning and without any provocation. Obviously this news upset the audience.

Next to Lahore , Sialkot was the second target. Others to follow were the war theatres of Kasur, Sulemanki, Rann of Kutch (Phase 2nd). The battle of Sialkot was controlled by Lt Gen Bakhtiar Rana, Commander 1 Corps. According to operational plans, the Corps was responsible for controlling operations from river Chenab to Sulemanki in the South, in front of approximately 300 miles. It had the following formations under command: (1) 1st Armoured Division; (2) 6th Armoured Division; (3) 10 Division; (4) 11 Division; (5) 19 Division. In early September, the operational responsibility of 1 Corps were reduced to an area between Chenab and Ravi and the order of battle was reduced to 6 Armoured Division and 15 Division.

Here it may not be amiss to mention that Maj Gen ® Shaukat Reza has given a graphic account of the ’65 War in his well-researched book: The Pakistan Army – War 1965. The present scribe has profesely benefited from his research. According to Gen Shaukat Reza’s account, in the battle of Sialkot , 6 Armoured Division and 15 Division were pitted against India ’s three infantry and one armoured division. India ’s advantage in numbers was reinforced by the surprises, they had achieved in attacking through Charwa. With six artillery brigades available for support they had the mean to break through the Marala-Ravi Link (MRL). However, they did not achieve this goal. After their united advance through 4 FF, Indian thrusts were reduced to squadron level, overly cautious probe.

History is a witness to the fact that until 18th September, 15 Division continued to be responsible for troops in Sialkot, as also from 115 Brigade, 6 Armoured Division, continued to be overburdened with brigades from 1 Armoured Division and any other troop without a parent. Obviously in view of these adhoc and speedy arrangements, the command arrangements did not make for the best employment of available resources. Strangly, the available armour was never used in a decisive role. Here, through out the period of fighting, reports from forward troops were accepted at their face value and led to weakness in decision. They were unable to make a reasonable assessment of enemy opposition. With regard to defence of Lahore , Maj Gen Sarfraz Khan was assigned the responsibility of defending a front of approximately 60,000 yards from Ravi in north to Bedian in South. On the opening day of battle of Lahore , two Indian divisions, two armoured regiments and three artillery brigades were set against 10 Division. Pakistan ’s units were no more than 75 percent of their authorized strength. The major difference in relative strength was in respect of officers. Pakistani units, in some cases, were below 50 percent of their authorization.

Looking back, we see that Pakistan had division commanders with 25 years service and brigade commanders with 23 years service. Most of them had seen action during World War II. Some of them had commanded battalion/company during 1948 in Kashmir . Almost all the officers who commanded brigades and units had been through some excellent training during the years 1952-64. On courses of instruction in USA and UK , they had competed with some of the best in the world and obtained distinction. It is a matter of great satisfaction to note that during the period 1948 to 1965, inspite of involvement in Martial Law and other non-professional commitments, our officers corps, proudly maintained its professionalism. Comparing the performance of the two armies, one come to the conclusion that the advantage of organizational and numerical superiority, the Indian Army had every opportunity to obtain a decision within 48 hours. But, due to excellent performance of Pakistan Army the Indian Army was halted in its tracks. In several places, it was hurled back across the border. The world was surprised. Surely Pakistan Army had something for which it could be justly proud!

http://pakobserver.net/200909/09/Articles04.asp

 

[comrade uraa]

good article but can anyone tell me how many indian tanks were exactly destroyed in chawinda? maj.gen.rajinder singh sparrow commander indian 1 armd division accepts 120 wats the pakistani claim?

 

[MrIndianSikh]

Indian army never actually entered Lahore they got to the outskirts but that was about it they halted there assault on Lahore and by reading that statement it sounds like you believe Pakistan was attacked first and you won the war?

Operation Gibraltar caused the war of 1965 Operation Grand slam caused India to attack Pakistani Punjab and by the end of the war India had more territory and if you do not want take my word for it then listen to one of your own intelligent journalists

 

[Respect4Respect01]

Indian army never actually entered Lahore they got to the outskirts but that was about it they halted there assault on Lahore and by reading that statement it sounds like you believe Pakistan was attacked first and you won the war?

Operation Gibraltar caused the war of 1965 Operation Grand slam caused India to attack Pakistani Punjab and by the end of the war India had more territory and if you do not want take my word for it then listen to one of your own intelligent journalists

u trust one person (najam sethi) but not other millions who have different opinion.

 

[Solomon2]

It is a truth now being widely acknowledged that the 1965 war was not of Pakistan Army’s making. Rather, it was imposed on Pakistan.

This is disinformation. There is the testimony of captured Pakistani soldiers, U.N. observers who witnessed Pakistani infiltrators cross the border, and finally the arguments of Pakistani leaders Z.A. Bhutto and Ayub Khan in declassified U.S. diplomatic records. (Google them all.) The simple truth is that these two Pakistani leaders started the 1965 war because they wanted to, made a mess of it, and tried to cover it all up afterward.

 

[John Doe]

The thread is completely inaccurate. Please see what one of the greatest Pakistani soldiers has to say about the 1965 war. (Unless you think Air Marshall Asghar Khan does not match your high standards!):


YouTube - ‪A Khan: Pak Started All Wars with India‬‏

 

[Windjammer]

How the World media reported this war makes interesting reading.

SUNDAY TIMES, London, September 19, 1965.

"Pakistan has been able to gain complete command of the air by literally knocking the Indian planes out of the skies if they had not already run away.
Indian pilots are inferior to Pakistan's pilots and Indian officer's leadership has been generally deplorable. India is being soundly beaten by a nation which is outnumbered by a four and half to one in population and three to one in size of armed forces".

 

[Windjammer]

Peter Preston, The Guardian, London.
September 24, 1965.

"One thing I am convinced of is that Pakistan morally and even physically won the air battle against immense odds.
Although the Air Force gladly gives most credit to the Army, this is perhaps over-generous. India with roughly five times greater air power, expected an easy air superiority. Her total failure to attain it may be seen retrospectively as a vital, possibly the most vital, factor of the whole conflict.
Nur Khan is an alert, incisive man of 41, who seems even less. For six years until July he was on secondment and responsible for running Pakistan civil airline, which in a country, where now means sometime and sometime means never, is a model of efficiency. He talks without the jargon of a press relations officer. He does not quibble about figures, immediately one has confidence in what he says. His estimates proffered diffidently, but with as much photographic evidence as possible, speak for themselves. Indian and Pakistani losses, he thinks are in something like the ratio of ten to one.
"The Indians had no sense of purpose, the Pakistanis were defending their country and willingly taking greater risks. The average bomber crew flew 15 to 20 sorties. My difficulty was restraining them, not pushing them on".
" This is more than nationalistic pride. Talk to the pilots themselves, and you get the same intense story".

---------- Post added at 12:18 PM ---------- Previous post was at 12:17 PM ----------

Patrick Seale, The Observer, London.
September 12, 1965.

"Pakistan's success in the air means that she had been able to deploy her relatively small army___ professionally among the best in Asia___ with impunity, plugging gaps in the long front in the face of each Indian thrust.
By all accounts the courage displayed by the PAF pilots is reminiscent of the bravery of the few young and dedicated pilots who saved this country from Nazi invaders in the critical Battle of Britain during the last war".

 

[blackops]

How the World media reported this war makes interesting reading.

They are talking about the air warfare not about land abd no doubt paf did far better than iaf

 

[Windjammer]

Roy Meloni, Correspondent of ABC,
September 15, 1965.

"I have been a journalist now for 20 years and want to go on record that i have never seen a more confident and victorious groups of soldiers than those fighting for Pakistan right now.
"India is claiming all out victory, i have not been able to find any trace of it. All i can see are troops, tanks and other war material rolling in a steady stream towards the front.
If the Indian Air Force is so victorious, why has it not tried to halt this flow?
The answer is that it has been knocked from the skies by Pakistani planes. These Muslims of Pakistan are natural fighters and they ask for no quarter and they give none.
In any war, such as the one going on between India and Pakistan right now, the propaganda claims on either side are likely to be startling, but if i have to take bet today, my money would be on Pakistan side.
Pakistan claims to have destroyed something like one third of the Indian Air Force, and foreign observers, who are in a position to know say that the actual kills may be even higher, but the PAF authorities are being scrupulously honest in evaluating these claims. They are crediting PAF only those killing that can be checked and verified from other sources.

 

[blackops]

Windjammer you are just quating about airforces a war is not wob by a single arm the truth is you guys started it and we came to the doors of lahore

 

[blackops]

TIME magazine quoted a Western official assessing the[ 92] consequences of the war[ 92] — consequences of the war — Now it's apparent to everybody that India is going to emerge as an Asian power in its own right

 

[SR 71 Blackbird]

Overall, the war was militarily inconclusive; each side held prisoners and some territory belonging to the other. Losses were relatively heavy--on the Pakistani side, twenty aircraft, 200 tanks, and 3,800 troops. Pakistan's army had been able to withstand Indian pressure, but a continuation of the fighting would only have led to further losses and ultimate defeat for Pakistan. Most Pakistanis, schooled in the belief of their own martial prowess, refused to accept the possibility of their country's military defeat by "Hindu India" and were, instead, quick to blame their failure to attain their military aims on what they considered to be the ineptitude of Ayub Khan and his government..
Indo-Pakistan War of 1965

 

[blackops]

ar in the modern world since 1815", noted war historian Jeremy Black said that though Pakistan "lost heavily" during the 1965 war, India's hasty decision to call for negotiations prevented further considerable damage to the[ 95] Pakistan Armed Forces. He elaborates[ 95] — Pakistan Armed Forces. He elaborates — India's chief of army staff urged negotiations on the ground that they were running out ammunition and their number of tanks had become seriously depleted. In fact, the army had used less than 15% of its ammunition compared to Pakistan, which had consumed closer to 80 percent and India had double the number of serviceable

 

[blackops]

[ 59] M. Burke writes[ 59] — — After the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965 the balance of military power had decisively shifted in favor of India. Pakistan had found it difficult to replace the heavy equipment lost during that conflict while her adversary, despite her economic and political problems, had been determinedly building up her strength. Most observers agree that the myth of a mobile, hard hitting Pakistan Army was badly dented in the war, as[ 103] critical breakthroughs were not made.[ 103] critical breakthroughs were not made.[ 59] M. Burke writes[ 59] — — After the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965 the balance of military power had decisively shifted in favor of India. Pakistan had found it difficult to replace the heavy equipment lost during that conflict while her adversary, despite her economic and political problems, had been determinedly building up her strength. Most observers agree that the myth of a mobile, hard hitting Pakistan Army was badly dented in the war, as[ 103] critical breakthroughs were not made.[ 103] critical breakthroughs were not made.