Sorry AM, I wrote this before you posted. I’d hate to delete it, but if hellfire continues then we’ll take it to another thread.
Totally far from truth. IA was in no shape to fight as the 50s neglect (due to Nehru's belief that India only needed police) saw India ill prepared on Chinese border as also to fight Pakistan till finish (which was incidentally receiving tremendous equipment supply as part of CENTO from US, CENTO members & Co.) So your contention does not hold. Yes Rann of Kucch was humiliation .... the Sikh troops deployed were shitting en-masse (thinking there are no Pakistani forces in region) when the PA and Rangers took them on at 4 am .... who the hell sleeps at that time? Bloody humiliation I agree!!!! and Hilarious!
That’s fairly odd, you start off your reply with 'totally far from the truth' but then what follows, your own words, don't disagree or clash with my words that you’re supposedly refuting. Yes those wars were humiliating, which was what I said. I wouldn't say that India was 'in no shape' to fight a war because India had been modernizing military at a
faster rate than Pakistan in the 50s, but obviously there were significant shortcomings that were remedied by the time India tried to invade in 1965. The point is the Indian military was in a much better shape, which is something you obviously agree with.
You have thoroughly managed to change and modify history here sir. Pakistan launched Op. Grandslam thinking there shall be a mass insurrection in Kashmir and infact it were the Kashmiris who gave away their presence in the valley to Indian army. So any general is not naive enough to plan such a large scale operation without expecting an attack.
Again, my words and your contentions do not clash. It was indeed Pakistan's mistake in thinking that the Kashmiris were ready for liberation. It would take decades of Indian suppression and neglect before they would turn to Pakistan in the hopes of intervention. Yes, it was the Kashmiris themselves who failed act as hoped by Pakistan and identified the infiltrators themselves.
Was the political and military leadership naïve in not informing the formation commanders of the situation? Yes I believe so. This was an inexcusable mistake that cost Pakistan dearly, but without the benefit of hindsight it is understandable to an extent. GHQ did not appreciate the extent to which the Indians were itching to have a go at the PA, and thus expected that the Indians would prefer to keep the conflict localized. Kashmir was (and is)
Disputed Territory and not a sovereign part of India or Pakistan, thus it was supposed that skirmishes in Kashmir would not immediately result it hostilities across the international border (it didn’t happen during the First Kashmir War). Secondly, it was also expected that an escalation that might lead to full scale conflict would take time to development, with clear diplomatic signals emulating from Delhi giving the Pakistani Army plenty of time to deploy. This obviously did not happen, and without a formal declaration of war or fair warning tens of thousands of Indian troops and armor launched themselves at Pakistan. Thirdly, Pakistan’s foreign minister at the time, Z.A. Bhutto was blustering hawk who proved utterly incapable of managing or monitoring the political situation next door. He did everything in his power to convince important figures and the nation at large that there was no danger. Lastly, the very nature of operation Grand Slam required a level of confidentiality which meant that the formation commanders, the military at large and civil population could not be told of the course being pursued and the risks (no matter how remote at first) involved.
A lot of mistakes and miscalculations all round, and ultimately the responsibility lay with Ayub Khan (who hired advisors like Bhutto). But these were the facts and Pakistan was unprepared. Even the Lahore Garrison commander was caught completely off guard.
4. India was in dire straits. And it was on the imminent positioning of 3 JAT across Icchogil Canal (irrespective of what you all might denounce) and troops from IA getting a stronger hold for second time to build a bridgehead across icchogil to eventually take on Lahore, that forced Pakistan to use its excellent relationship with US to force a peace (the famous incident where the PM of India was reportedly threatened by US and USSR both) ....
That is nonsensical BS. The Indian Army Chief recommended the cease fire, the ceasefire was not ‘imposed’ on India. You’re not Israel, let’s stick to fact not fiction here shall we. By this time all Indian attempts at Lahore (and elsewhere) were exhausted. Now instead of going into a long description, I’ll save us all the time and ask you to demonstrate some credible proof regarding your imaginary claims. A lot of Pakistanis feel we could’ve taken on India too, and numerous Pakistani offensives were canceled as a direct result of American pressure. But since you’re so sure let’s see some impartial evidence…
I never did say IA plans were successful, did I? Please do quote me where such insinuation has been done, I shall gladly clarify and rectify the same. I maintain you lost the war, not India won it! And your capital was threatened imminently, timely diplomatic intervention saved you .....!!!
You’re arguing over lame semantics and I don’t see the point of your arguments. Fine, we both lost the war. Happy? Call it whatever you want, but the most impartial way to put it is to call it a draw.
Can you give me any official directive given to IA to "destroy Pakistan"? My grandfather was commanding an infantry batallion and their mandate was to defend and hold ground. They simply didnt have resources to do even that had PA attacked en-force across LC in Poonch sector (instead of making meek attempts aimed to probe the defenses) also. So your contention is not true.
I can’t give you an official directive, but I can quote to you Brian Cloughley’s book
History of the Pakistan Army which has been endorsed by an Indian Army chief. Destroying the Pakistan Army as a fighting force was the plan at the onset of the attack, as was the invasion of Lahore. As the fighting dragged on and hastily build Pakistani defenses didn’t give way, soaking up India resources and men, I’d presume Indian war-aims became considerably more modest. Cloughley clearly states
“Although India’s immediate concern was to prevent Pakistan severing the link with the north, the aim of the their advance into ‘West’ Punjab was clear: to defeat the Pakistani Army”. There is more, but I don’t feel like quoting it. You best read the book.
distorted history. USSR had mistrust of India (due to help given by US and Britain in '62) and thought NAM leanings were infact a guise for pro-west approach.
Actually, the NAM has historically been considered pro-Soviet as opposed to pro-western. Their 'anti-Imperialism' leanings were routinely exploited by the USSR in the UN. So no, the Soviet supplies and spares were wide open to India.
Political advantage .... getting Kashmir ..... you failed in your basic objective ... so you lost ........ simple .... we didnt win ... but you sure lost ...
No we didn’t get Kashmir, but you didn’t get Punjab either. Punjab is larger and you expended more lives and resources in the hopes of battering the Pakistan Army into submission there and acquiring the latter. So yup it was a draw. But you can go ahead and believe what you want…
P.S. Impartial commentators observe that the reason Pakistan won the Rann of Kutch was because of superior tactics, and little else. You can believe it was because of 'bad luck', etc but then dont pretend you're not looking at things in a biased way.