The 1947-48 Kashmir War

[third eye]

Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan

View: The 1947-48 Kashmir War —Ishtiaq Ahmed


I was quite intrigued by the convoluted reasoning underpinning Riaz Shahid’s op-ed, ‘Reassessing Liaquat Ali Khan’s role’ (Daily Times, February 15, 2010). In it he assailed Liaquat Ali Khan for a number of wrong decisions, among which one that generated controversy was the allegation that he appointed Ayub Khan as Pakistan’s army chief when the latter had allegedly been given very bad references for timidity and lack of leadership during World War II when he was posted on the Burmese Front; more damning than that was, according to Riaz Shahid, Ayub’s absence from the Kashmir War. The lack of battle experience, argues the author, rendered him unfit to be promoted as the highest soldier of Pakistan.

Since I am in the process of completing a book on the role of the Pakistan military in Pakistani politics, I have had to go through the literature on the Kashmir War as well. I must say that with or without Ayub Khan’s participation, initiating hostilities in Kashmir cost us that state. Mian Iftikharuddin, Faiz Ahmed Faiz and Dr MD Taseer had been tasked to woo Sheikh Abdullah over to the Pakistani point of view on Kashmir. They gave up in despair when scores of tribal warriors backed by Pakistani regulars and irregulars entered Kashmir in the last week of October to liberate it from Dogra rule.

The tribal warriors quickly forgot the mission they were supposed to achieve, and succumbed prey to a vice deeply rooted in their culture and history — looting, pillaging and raping. Among their victims were some European nuns, presumably engaged in meditation and helping the poor. Why some of our senior officers could not keep such characters under control is of course another matter, but Kashmiri opinion quickly turned against the infiltrators. The rape of the nuns brought along international disapprobation and condemnation.

The tribal warriors had no clue that something called the Accession Bill privileged the rulers of princely states to determine their state’s relationship with India and Pakistan. That Pakistani officers and jawans were also oblivious of the same is rather astounding. The fact is that even Quaid-e-Azam did not realise the great folly in going into Kashmir. There is overwhelming evidence to suggest that he had instructed a number of ministers to help the ‘freedom fighters’ whereas Liaquat and some others were lukewarm in their support. This difference of opinion in the central cabinet comes out clearly in Major (retd) Agha Humayun Amin’s book on the Pakistan Army to which Riaz Shahid has referred in his above-mentioned essay.

But here are some arguments to prove that the Kashmir War actually set in motion a process that diminished our claim on Kashmir. Maharaja Hari Singh Dogra had no intention of merging his state with either India or Pakistan. The Pakistan-sponsored insurgency forced him to choose sides. The Indian emissary, VP Menon, arrived in Srinagar with a document that stipulated Indian military help only if the Maharaja signed the Accession Bill. There is some dispute as to the actual date on which it was signed, but the document that the Indians have in their possession gives October 26 as the date on which it was signed.

At that time the British officers were holding commanding positions on both sides. The only reason some of them stayed behind was to ensure that these two states were not dragged into an armed conflict with each other; another reason was to train and groom them to become part of the grand Commonwealth reservoir of troops, which Britain deluded itself into believing will still be its role in South Asia for a long, long time to come. It is clearly stated in the 12th and last volume (1983) of the Transfer of Power that the British government has released on the partition of India that British officers who agreed to serve in India and Pakistan were under clear instructions not to fight in case war broke out between these two states.

Even more importantly, it is now time to wonder if our leaders acted responsibly in opening a front in Kashmir when more than 14 million people had been uprooted, some 1-2 million killed — of which at least half of the fatalities were that of Muslims — in the rioting, and hundreds of thousands of women abducted by men from the ‘enemy religions’. Pakistan was on the verge of bankruptcy. In 1948, the Pakistani international border with India was as vulnerable — in fact infinitely much more — as in 1965.

Take up any book published in Pakistan on the division of the common assets of the Indian Royal Armed Forces and you will find Pakistan, justifiably, claiming that it was not given a fair share of the tanks, guns and ammunition and so on. Had the Indians opened the front at Lahore or Sialkot in 1948 as they did in 1965, our bluff would have been called forthwith.

The fact remains that the British Acting Commander-in-Chief, General Gracey (the C-in-C General Messervy was away on leave) did not let down Pakistan by dissuading Jinnah to let the conflict escalate. He did a favour. This does not sound very patriotic, but as a scholar I must speak the truth. The 1947-48 Kashmir was a much more irresponsible adventure than the one that was initiated in 1965.

In August 1965, infiltrators were despatched into India. They were able to report some spectacular successes though the evidence now tells a story of both advances and reverses. The Indians opened the front along the Punjab border on September 6. For a few days our armed forces fought with great courage and determination, but so did the Indians. After a few days, we had run out of spare parts, ammunition and armaments. The situation on the other side was perhaps not any better.

On our side this happened even when for almost a decade we had been recipients of state-of-the-art US military aid and training. In 1948 we were poorly armed and proper training and organisation were absent. It would have not made an iota of a difference if Ayub had fought in 1947-48 and gained battle hardiness. Such romantic phraseology is totally unwarranted. It only perpetuates a vain myth that the Pakistan military is some invincible fighting machine and the fault lies in some generals.

 

[RobbieS]

what a dumb f** who wrote this piece of garbage

What part of the article made you say that? The part where it said the Pakistanis sent in tribals as proxies or the part where the Tribals committed atrocities against the Kashmiri population.

The fact that this was written by a Pakistani would act as an eye opener for many people here brought up on propaganda of Tribal freedom fighters trying to liberate the Muslim Kashmiris . The atrocities that they committed are conveniently swept under the carpet by Pakistani history books.

On a separate note, the failure of the 47-48 invasion and the '65 Op Gibraltar shows how the common Kashmiris weren't as alienated with the Indian polity as they are now. If anything they were totally unwilling to side with the foreign Pakistani invaders irrespective of the commonality in religion. We certainly lost the plot after the 70's.

 

[Renegade]

Its all lies, its obvious he is pro-Indian thus this article is of no importance.

Read 'The History of the Pakistan Army' by Brain Colughly, Oxford Publications. He pretty much says the same thing as mentioned by the author of the above article.

Brain Colughly's closeness to the PA is well documented, so he cant be alleged to be biased against Pakistan (in my opinion he as pro Pakistan as his western education will allow him to be).

These revelations will surely come as a surprise, from what you have been made to read or understan till date.

 

[harun786]

Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan

View: The 1947-48 Kashmir War —Ishtiaq Ahmed


I was quite intrigued by the convoluted reasoning underpinning Riaz Shahid’s op-ed, ‘Reassessing Liaquat Ali Khan’s role’ (Daily Times, February 15, 2010). In it he assailed Liaquat Ali Khan for a number of wrong decisions, among which one that generated controversy was the allegation that he appointed Ayub Khan as Pakistan’s army chief when the latter had allegedly been given very bad references for timidity and lack of leadership during World War II when he was posted on the Burmese Front; more damning than that was, according to Riaz Shahid, Ayub’s absence from the Kashmir War. The lack of battle experience, argues the author, rendered him unfit to be promoted as the highest soldier of Pakistan.

Since I am in the process of completing a book on the role of the Pakistan military in Pakistani politics, I have had to go through the literature on the Kashmir War as well. I must say that with or without Ayub Khan’s participation, initiating hostilities in Kashmir cost us that state. Mian Iftikharuddin, Faiz Ahmed Faiz and Dr MD Taseer had been tasked to woo Sheikh Abdullah over to the Pakistani point of view on Kashmir. They gave up in despair when scores of tribal warriors backed by Pakistani regulars and irregulars entered Kashmir in the last week of October to liberate it from Dogra rule.

The tribal warriors quickly forgot the mission they were supposed to achieve, and succumbed prey to a vice deeply rooted in their culture and history — looting, pillaging and raping. Among their victims were some European nuns, presumably engaged in meditation and helping the poor. Why some of our senior officers could not keep such characters under control is of course another matter, but Kashmiri opinion quickly turned against the infiltrators. The rape of the nuns brought along international disapprobation and condemnation.

The tribal warriors had no clue that something called the Accession Bill privileged the rulers of princely states to determine their state’s relationship with India and Pakistan. That Pakistani officers and jawans were also oblivious of the same is rather astounding. The fact is that even Quaid-e-Azam did not realise the great folly in going into Kashmir. There is overwhelming evidence to suggest that he had instructed a number of ministers to help the ‘freedom fighters’ whereas Liaquat and some others were lukewarm in their support. This difference of opinion in the central cabinet comes out clearly in Major (retd) Agha Humayun Amin’s book on the Pakistan Army to which Riaz Shahid has referred in his above-mentioned essay.

But here are some arguments to prove that the Kashmir War actually set in motion a process that diminished our claim on Kashmir. Maharaja Hari Singh Dogra had no intention of merging his state with either India or Pakistan. The Pakistan-sponsored insurgency forced him to choose sides. The Indian emissary, VP Menon, arrived in Srinagar with a document that stipulated Indian military help only if the Maharaja signed the Accession Bill. There is some dispute as to the actual date on which it was signed, but the document that the Indians have in their possession gives October 26 as the date on which it was signed.

At that time the British officers were holding commanding positions on both sides. The only reason some of them stayed behind was to ensure that these two states were not dragged into an armed conflict with each other; another reason was to train and groom them to become part of the grand Commonwealth reservoir of troops, which Britain deluded itself into believing will still be its role in South Asia for a long, long time to come. It is clearly stated in the 12th and last volume (1983) of the Transfer of Power that the British government has released on the partition of India that British officers who agreed to serve in India and Pakistan were under clear instructions not to fight in case war broke out between these two states.

Even more importantly, it is now time to wonder if our leaders acted responsibly in opening a front in Kashmir when more than 14 million people had been uprooted, some 1-2 million killed — of which at least half of the fatalities were that of Muslims — in the rioting, and hundreds of thousands of women abducted by men from the ‘enemy religions’. Pakistan was on the verge of bankruptcy. In 1948, the Pakistani international border with India was as vulnerable — in fact infinitely much more — as in 1965.

Take up any book published in Pakistan on the division of the common assets of the Indian Royal Armed Forces and you will find Pakistan, justifiably, claiming that it was not given a fair share of the tanks, guns and ammunition and so on. Had the Indians opened the front at Lahore or Sialkot in 1948 as they did in 1965, our bluff would have been called forthwith.

The fact remains that the British Acting Commander-in-Chief, General Gracey (the C-in-C General Messervy was away on leave) did not let down Pakistan by dissuading Jinnah to let the conflict escalate. He did a favour. This does not sound very patriotic, but as a scholar I must speak the truth. The 1947-48 Kashmir was a much more irresponsible adventure than the one that was initiated in 1965.

In August 1965, infiltrators were despatched into India. They were able to report some spectacular successes though the evidence now tells a story of both advances and reverses. The Indians opened the front along the Punjab border on September 6. For a few days our armed forces fought with great courage and determination, but so did the Indians. After a few days, we had run out of spare parts, ammunition and armaments. The situation on the other side was perhaps not any better.

On our side this happened even when for almost a decade we had been recipients of state-of-the-art US military aid and training. In 1948 we were poorly armed and proper training and organisation were absent. It would have not made an iota of a difference if Ayub had fought in 1947-48 and gained battle hardiness. Such romantic phraseology is totally unwarranted. It only perpetuates a vain myth that the Pakistan military is some invincible fighting machine and the fault lies in some generals.

Hi,

the book seems to be very informative, I would not say it is Biased because i don't know what really happened.

I can't say it is all fake, because the reality is that Kashmir is in dispute, and with respect to the issues we had in 1965 of running out of parts may be true because I don't trust the Americans.

I would like to read this book, can you please provide the name.

thanks

H

 

[toxic_pus]

Its all lies, its obvious he is pro-Indian thus this article is of no importance.

Yes everything is a lie. Here is one example of glory deeds of the 'liberators'.

"The City had been stripped of its wealth and young women before the tribesmen fled in terror at midnight, Friday, before the advancing Indian Army. Surviving residents estimate that 3,000 of their fellow townsmen, including four Europeans and a retired British Army Officer, known only as Colonel Dykes, and his pregnant wife, were slain. When the raiders rushed into town on 26th October, witnesses said: 'One party of Masud tribesmen immediately scaled the walls of Saint Joseph's Franciscan Convent compound, and stormed the Convent Hospital and the little church. Four nuns and Colonel Dykes and his wife were shot immediately. The Raiders' greed triumphed over their blood lust'. A former town official said: 'The raiders forced 350 local Hindus into a house, with the intention of burning it down. The group of 100 raiders is said to be holding another five, as hostages, on a high mountain, barely visible from the town. Toda, twenty-four hours after the Indian army entered Baramula, only 1,000 were left of a normal population of about 14,000"

-Robert Trumbull, New York Times, 10 Nov, 1947; reporting from Baramulla [UN doc # S/PV.762/Add.1/Annex 1/No. 26]

The raid of the convent is narrated in even gory details by Father Shanks, one of the fortunate survivors and the anonymous 'witnesses' in the above report.

"The tribesmen-great, wild, black beasts they were-came shooting their way down from the hills on both sides of the town. They climbed over the hospital walls from all sides. The first group burst into a ward firing at the patients. A 20 year old Indian nurse, Philomena, tried to protect a Moslem patient whose baby had just been born. She was shot dead first. The Patient was next. Mother Superior Aldetude rushed into the ward, knelt over Philomena and was at once attacked and robbed. The Assistant Mother, Teresalina, saw a tribesman point a rifle at Mother Aldetrude and jumped in front of her. A bullet went through Teresalina's heart. At the moment Colonel Dykes, who had assured us we would not be attacked, raced from his room a few yards along the terrace to get the Mother Superior out of danger, shouting at the tribesmen as be ran. But the Mother Superior fell shot, and Colonel Dykes collapsed beside her with a bullet in the stomach. Mrs. Dykes ran from her husband's room to help him. She too was shot dead.

While this went on Mr. Gee Boretto, an Anglo-Indian, was killed in the garden before nine nuns. Then the nuns were lined up before a firing squad. As the tribesmen raised their rifles a young Afridi Officer, who once studied in a Convent School at Peshawar, rushed in and stopped them. At least there are living features of human quality in these incidents. He had been told his men were raiding a Convent, and had run all the way from the town. That saved all our lives by a few seconds.

We did not find Mrs. Dykes until the following day. She had been thrown down a well.

- Father Shank of the Convent [UN doc # S/PV.762/Add.1/Annex 1/No. 27]

"Their buses and trucks, loaded with booty, arrived every other day and took more Pathans to Kashmir. Ostensibly they wanted to liberate their Kashmir Muslim brothers, but their primary objective was to riot and loot. In this they made no distinction between Hindu, Sikhs and Muslims. The raiders advanced in Baramulla, the biggest commercial centre of the region with a population of 11,000 until they were only and hour away from Srinagar. For the next three days they were engaged in massive plunder , rioting and rape. No one was spared. Even members of the St. Joseph's Mission Hospital were brutally massacred."

- 'Half Way to Freedom' by Margaret Bourke-White

 

[niaz]

I was very young at that time. We were in Sialkot and packed off to Sargodha just before the start of the hostilities. I have however, since read many accounts of this war. Kashmir is very close to Pakistani heart and my late father had a collection of newspaper cuttings from before partition up to 1951. Regret to say that he died when I was in UK and by the time I reached home, many of his things had been misplaced including the newspaper cuttings. What I can gather is as follows:

Maharaja Hari Sing Dogra would probably have preferred to remain independent. However Sardar Abdul Qayyum had started a Kashmir liberation movement and raised AK army just after the partition. The movement was a success as majority of the population wanted to join Pakistan. Simultaneously militia of the Northern areas; then part of the Kashmir State threw out their Dogra officers and petitioned Pakistan to send their army to take over.

Qayyum’s AK battalion was quite successful. Maj. Gen Akbar Khan (then Brigadier and himself as Pashtun)) who was commanding the PA Brigade near Kashmir border was instrumental in getting Pashtun irregulars to join the fight.

Now the controversy begins.

Commonly held perception as portrayed by India is that on the verge of defeat by the combined forces of AK battalions and pathan irregulars, apparently at the behest of Sh. Abdullah; his Chief Minister; Hari Sing Dogra wrote a letter to Mountbatten, Gov. General of India, on 26/10/ 1947 asking for help and attaching an instrument of accession dated October 26, 1947. Indian forces landed on Sri Nagar Airport on morning of October 27, 1947 in response to Raja’s request.

Quaid e Azam asked Gen Gracy, CinC Pakistan to send Pakistan Army to help the Kashmiri fighters. Gen Akbar was commanding these forces. After a stalemate India approached UN claiming Pakistan as invader of part of India and there was the famous UN Resolution.

My personal version is that war actually started on Oct 21, 1947. AK battalion led by Sardar Abdul Qayyum was leading. On October 22, 1947 Pashtun Mujahideen decide to help the Kashmiri freedom fighters and joined the fight. Maharaja fled Sri Nagar for Jammu on October 25th 1947. Due to bad roads and poor flying conditions, it would have been physically impossible for Raja to write letter on Oct 26th and Mountbatten receive it the same day and also reply the same day; order Indian troops to get ready and land at Sri Nagar the next morning.

Nehru, who was PM of India and a Kashmiri, had a plan to take over Kashmir. He had ordered troops to be ready and was waiting for the right moment. Mountbatten actually acted at the behest of Nehru who was afraid that any further delay would make India lose Kashmir to Pakistan. The Raja; having been presented with a ‘fait accompli’ was forced to sign a predated instrument of accession. This was actually done much later, mainly to regularize the justification of Indian occupation of Kashmir for the benefit of the UN in 1948. UN Resolution is noted below for those who have not read it.

Quote.

U.N.Resolution August 13, 1948.
This is the most significant resolution passed by the UN on the state of Jammu & Kashmir. It clearly states that Pakistan was to vacate its troops from the whole of the state. It also mentions, albeit indirectly, that Pakistan had consistently lied on the question of whether or not its troops were involved in the fighting in Jammu & Kashmir. Once the then Pakistani Prime Minister conceded that Pakistani troops were indeed involved, the UN had no option but to ask for their withdrawal. That the withdrawal never took place, is another story.
________________________________________
The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan.
Having given careful consideration to the points of view expressed by the representatives of India and Pakistan regarding the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir; and
Being of the opinion that the prompt cessation of hostilities and the correction of conditions the continuance of which is likely to endanger international peace and security are essential to implementation of its endeavors to assist the Governments of India and Pakistan in effecting a final settlement of the situation;
Resolves to submit simultaneously to the Governments of India and Pakistan the following proposal:
PART I: CEASE-FIRE ORDER
A. The Governments of India and Pakistan agree that their respective High Commands will issue separately and simultaneously a cease-fire order to apply to all forces under their control and in the State of Jammu and Kashmir as of the earliest practicable date or dates to be mutually agreed upon within four days after these proposals have been accepted by both Governments.
B.The High Commands of the Indian and Pakistani forces agree to refrain from taking any measures that might augment the military potential of the forces under their control in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. (For the purpose of these proposals forces under their control shall be considered to include all forces, organized and unorganized, fighting or participating in hostilities on their respective sides.
C. The Commanders-in-Chief of the forces of India and Pakistan shall promptly confer regarding any necessary local changes in present dispositions which may facilitate the cease-fire.
D. In its discretion and as the Commission may find practicable, the Commission will appoint military observers who, under the authority of the Commission and with the co-operation of both Commands, will supervise the observance of the cease-fire order.
E. The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan agree to appeal to their respective peoples to assist in creating and maintaining an atmosphere favorable to the promotion of further negotiations.
PART II: TRUCE AGREEMENT
Simultaneously with the acceptance of the proposal for the immediate cessation of hostilities as outlined in Part I, both the Governments accept the following principles as a basis for the formulation of a truce agreement, the details of which shall be worked out in discussion between their representatives and the Commission.
A.
1. As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State.
2. The Government of Pakistan will use its best endeavor to secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting.
3. Pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistani troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the commission.
B.
1.When the commission shall have notified the Government of India that the tribesmen and Pakistani nationals referred to in Part II, A, 2, hereof have withdrawn, thereby terminating the situation which was represented by the Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further, that the Pakistani forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces from that State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission.
2. Pending the acceptance of the conditions for a final settlement of the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian Government will maintain within the lines existing at the moment of the cease-fire the minimum strength of its forces which in agreement with the commission are considered necessary to assist local authorities in the observance of law and order. The Commission will have observers stationed where it deems necessary.
3. The Government of India will undertake to ensure that the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will take all measures within its powers to make it publicly known that peace, law and order will be safeguarded and that all human political rights will be granted.
4. Upon signature, the full text of the truce agreement or a communiqué containing the principles thereof as agreed upon between the two Governments and the Commission will be made public.
PART III
The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan reaffirm their wish that the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people and to that end, upon acceptance of the truce agreement, both Governments agree to enter into consultations with the Commission to determine fair and equitable conditions whereby such free expression will be assured.

Unquote

Whatever the historians write after the event. Fact remains that PA was by then still commanded by the British officers whose loyalty could not be guaranteed. Governor General of India was Mountbatten, who had also been Commander of all British Forces on the Eastern Front. Therefore British Officers of Pakistan Army would have obeyed his command rather than that of Liaqat Ali Khan. (Quaid e Azam was very sick by then and died on 11th Sept 1948).

Who knows what was the real capability of PA at that time. Could a continuation of fighting risk the occupation of all the Kashmir by the Indian Army?

I leave the readers to decide whether it is okay for two bit journalists to criticize decision of Pakistan’s first Prime Minister 60 years after the event

 

[DeathGod]

Good Stuff

Here is what I think:

What Pakistan did wrong:

1. Instrument of accession is not honored by Pakistan .

2. Pakistan forces invaded a sovereign land which is wrong.

3. Pakistan didn't respect the UN resolution

4. Years later Pakistan fought wars over Kashmir leading to deteriment of India and herself.

5. Pakistan still supports terrorism in the region whose after-effects have been felt across India and the World ( more specifically Pakistan these days)

What India did wrong:

1. Nehru pledged a plebictie which has never occurred. Though the condition to hold one were never in place we can call it a minor mistake.Who knows if Pakistan would have withdrawn its forces , the plebisite may have been held.

2. Sadly, Pakistan let India into making the mistake of heavily militaralizing the state of Kashmir. ( Jammu,Leh etc have always been and will always be a part of India)

3. Very less development , which has left Kashmiris disenchanted.

This is my look at the situation.

To whom will Kashmir go?

Well I think the most feasible solution is to make LOC an international border.

 

[Renegade]

@Niaz

The version of events you provide are not backed by neutral & credible sources. In my opinion they are largely biased, puting forward only one argument and that too twisted one.

Relying on neutral sources we can infer the following points:
1. Tribes men from the NWFP invaded Kashmir under the direction of the Pakistan Governmet. PA officers were leading these men.
2. They indulged in Rape, Pillage, Arson & Murder
3. Indian forces moved into Kahmir in response to this invasion & on the request of the ligitimate governmnet of J&K.

One of the major conditions that had to be stisfied for a peblicite to be held was the withdrwal of all Pakistani forces, which has never happened.

Please provide credible sources the accuracy of which can be safely established. Grandfather stories (no offence intended) hardly hold any merit in arguments of such nature.

 

[niaz]

@Niaz

The version of events you provide are not backed by neutral & credible sources. In my opinion they are largely biased, puting forward only one argument and that too twisted one.

Relying on neutral sources we can infer the following points:
1. Tribes men from the NWFP invaded Kashmir under the direction of the Pakistan Governmet. PA officers were leading these men.
2. They indulged in Rape, Pillage, Arson & Murder
3. Indian forces moved into Kahmir in response to this invasion & on the request of the ligitimate governmnet of J&K.

One of the major conditions that had to be stisfied for a peblicite to be held was the withdrwal of all Pakistani forces, which has never happened.

Please provide credible sources the accuracy of which can be safely established. Grandfather stories (no offence intended) hardly hold any merit in arguments of such nature.

My dear Sir,

There are two points here:

Invasion of tribesmen:

I have mentioned that Brig. Akbar Khan was instrumental in organizing these. If you call it GOP, you may. But GOP structure was very loose. Independence was only 7 days old! Army was commanded by the British. CinC was also an officer of the British Army. A large part of the army and air force equipment was still lying at the bases which were under control. Indians on the other hand had every thing unchanged. Did Pathan tribesmen indulge in looting and rape? Without doubt they did. This was certainly not with the connivance of the PA. Actually this harmed Pakistan’s cause more than any thing else.

Version of events.

What do you call “Reliable”? Main point is whether instrument of accession was signed before the Indian troops landed at Kashmir or after?

Being an Indian, I would not think that you would accept my version. I have however read many news paper reports from that time as well as had the honor of listen to the version of events from Mujahid Awwal (Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan) himself.

It is not rocket science to realize that army actions need some kind of preparation. No one with rational thinking will claim that out of the blue; the Maharaja of Kashmir writes a letter to Mountbatten on 26th and next morning Indian forces are landing at Sri Nagar. It stands to reason to assume that Nehru had ordered IA be ready for Kashmir take over as soon as insurgency led by Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan started ( October 21, 1947). He was waiting for the right moment. As soon as it was known that the Maharaja had fled his capital, Indian Army was order to move. It took about 24 hours (normal for forces on standby) for IA to land at Sri Nagar. Getting the Maharaja to sign the Instrument of Accession after the event was a piece of cake.

Both versions are available in the literature if you research, but it is your choice what to believe.

 

[RobbieS]

Niaz bhai - You would probably be right about the "Nehru waiting for the right moment"

Kashmir's Maharaja was dilly-dallying and it would have been stupid of Nehru to leave everything to political means. Having said that, being prepared for battle and entering into battle are two very different things. The opportunity was presented to Nehru by Pak's proxy Tribal invasion and Nehru (I would rather say Patel as he turned out to be the realist of the two) took it.

 

[ice_man]

The tribal warriors quickly forgot the mission they were supposed to achieve, and succumbed prey to a vice deeply rooted in their culture and history — looting, pillaging and raping. Among their victims were some European nuns, presumably engaged in meditation and helping the poor.

SURE go tell a pathan it is in deeply rooted in your culture to rape women! what crap!!

& i think we were over this theory about pakistani tribals invaded kashmir AFTER the indians had annexed junagadh!

 

[k_n]

What amazes me most is the claim made by Pakistanis that Lord MOUNTBATTEN acted on Nehru's behest .
Besides , its not hidden and was absolutely politically correct for Pt. Nehru and Sardar Patel to ensure Princely states accede to India . Any Pakistani considering Nehru and Patel's ambition of creating a united and modern Indian state by making sure the princely states accede ( spl. Kashmir and Hyderabad ) as a FLAW in their intentions towards Muslims in general or Pakistan in particular is mistaken .

Why do the Pakistanis forget that Gilgit - Baltistan fell into Pakistani hands because of the English and that too in quick time , that is a strategically important land mass which covered almost 20 % of the land area of the state of Kashmir .

 

[toxic_pus]

Invasion of tribesmen:

I have mentioned that Brig. Akbar Khan was instrumental in organizing these. If you call it GOP, you may. But GOP structure was very loose. Independence was only 7 days old! Army was commanded by the British. CinC was also an officer of the British Army. A large part of the army and air force equipment was still lying at the bases which were under control. Indians on the other hand had every thing unchanged. Did Pathan tribesmen indulge in looting and rape? Without doubt they did. This was certainly not with the connivance of the PA. Actually this harmed Pakistan’s cause more than any thing else.

Akbar Khan’s Raiders in Kashmir (unfortunately I no longer possess the book and hence can’t quote from it), makes it very clear that the highest authority was aware of what was happening in Kashmir and that a section of PA was directly involved in this right from the beginning. Apparently, accordingly to Akbar Khan, he was specifically chosen by PA, for such clandestine operation. It is true however, that no body knows who took the decision to infiltrate into Kashmir, just days after independence. PA provided some rudimentary training, transport, fuel, arms and ammunition - although Khan rued that it was not in enough quantity - and pushed the Pathans into Kashmir. While this was happening, most of the leadership just pretended to look the other way. There were calls for jihad throughout NWFP, where recruitment was going on openly. Arms were being distributed like charity. The Maharaja’s government had repeatedly and formally protested with the government of NWFP against these infiltrations and occasional infringement of Kashmir’s boundaries by PA. (These telegrams were filed by India as evidence, at the UN) It is inconceivable that the highest authority of Pakistan didn’t know this or was not in a position to put an immediate end to this.

Further, on 18th September 1947, on direct orders from Jinnah, Pakistan severed railway connection with Kashmir. Then in October, Pakistan stopped trucks carrying supplies like salt, fuel etc. into Kashmir on the plea of lack of security. If there was any ‘spontaneous’ rebellion in Poonch, Pakistan ensured that the situation went out of Maharaja’s hands.

On 1st November, 1947, just days after the IA had started recapturing Kashmir, Lord Mountbatten met with Jinnah. Alan Campbell, the press advisor to Mountbatten, was present at the meeting. According to him, when Mountbatten asked what guarantee would Jinnah give that if IA was withdrawn, the infiltrators would be withdrawn too, Jinnah had responded by, ‘If you do it I will call the whole thing off’. In a momentary lapse of reason, Jinnah had given away, that the ‘whole thing’ of infiltration was very much controllable by the Pakistani authority and if they wished they could have put an end to it.

Curiously, George Cunningham, the then governor of NWFP, noted in his diary that ‘[a]pparently Jinnah himself first heard of what was going on about 15 days ago, but said, ''Don't tell me anything about it. My conscience must be clear"’. In the middle of all that carnage, Jinnah’s only worry was his own ‘conscience’.

However, you are right that the barbaric behavior of the infiltrators had damaged not only Pakistan’s image, it had actually cost them the Srinagar airport. If those Pathans were not busy looting, pillaging, raping and burning villages, they could have taken over Srinagar airport and that would have changed history. Then again you can’t expect anything more from a bunch of goons whose only motivation to be in Kashmir was Kashmir’s treasury. According to Akbar Khan, the infiltrators were assured that they would be allowed to loot the treasury when they reached there.

The excuse that 'GOP structure was very loose' just doesn't fly. All it needed was some 'non state actors' and collusion and connivance of state actors.

Version of events.

What do you call “Reliable”? Main point is whether instrument of accession was signed before the Indian troops landed at Kashmir or after?

Being an Indian, I would not think that you would accept my version. I have however read many news paper reports from that time as well as had the honor of listen to the version of events from Mujahid Awwal (Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan) himself.

It is not rocket science to realize that army actions need some kind of preparation. No one with rational thinking will claim that out of the blue; the Maharaja of Kashmir writes a letter to Mountbatten on 26th and next morning Indian forces are landing at Sri Nagar. It stands to reason to assume that Nehru had ordered IA be ready for Kashmir take over as soon as insurgency led by Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan started ( October 21, 1947). He was waiting for the right moment. As soon as it was known that the Maharaja had fled his capital, Indian Army was order to move. It took about 24 hours (normal for forces on standby) for IA to land at Sri Nagar. Getting the Maharaja to sign the Instrument of Accession after the event was a piece of cake.

Both versions are available in the literature if you research, but it is your choice what to believe.

Firstly, the letter was written by Maharaja on 24th Oct and delivered by his deputy Prime Minister on that day, and not 26th. Therefore, India got more than adequate time to land '300 men' (1st batch of soldiers) in Srinagar. Secondly, it is irrelevant if the accession document was signed before or after the IA had landed in Srinagar, because ‘the Maharaja had agreed to accession in principle upon the terms outlined by Mountbatten’, long before the IA had landed in Srinagar.

The best place for the likes of Alastair Lamb is garbage can, not book self.

 

[Renegade]

My dear Sir,

There are two points here:

Invasion of tribesmen:

I have mentioned that Brig. Akbar Khan was instrumental in organizing these. If you call it GOP, you may. But GOP structure was very loose. Independence was only 7 days old! Army was commanded by the British. CinC was also an officer of the British Army. A large part of the army and air force equipment was still lying at the bases which were under control. Indians on the other hand had every thing unchanged. Did Pathan tribesmen indulge in looting and rape? Without doubt they did. This was certainly not with the connivance of the PA. Actually this harmed Pakistan’s cause more than any thing else.

Sir,

I request you to read 'A History of the Pakistan Army' by Brain Colughly. In which he makes the following points:

1. The tribal invasion of Kashmir was organised under the direct guidance of Pakistan. PA offices from the very begining were a part of the operation, though their numbers increased greatly as the invasion progressed. They were also provided equipment by the PA.

2. As for your point that the PA was commanded by the British, indeed true. For this very reason the PA initially could not involve itself in active participation of the invasion, so they limited it to deputing Pakistani officers and providing material support.

3. Later when Jinnah could pressure the British commander to get the PA actively involved, the PA went in as a professional force.

4. As for your point that the tribesmen indulged in arson & rape but not with the active connivance of the PA, there might be some merit in that argument. But trbesmen were under the control of PA officers and the invasion itself progresse with the blessings of the Pakistan Government, the blame cant be just removed. But the moral dimention of the whole invasion rests on the shoulders of Pakistan.

I can quote statements from the book to vidicate my points. However, i would prefer if you could do read it yourself.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Here is what I think:

What Pakistan did wrong:

1. Instrument of accession is not honored by Pakistan .

The authenticity, validity and relevance of the Instrument of Accession, because of the reasons Niaz mentioned, Mountbatten's conditioning of it to a plebiscite, and the UNSC resolutions that were agreed and committed to by India, Pakistan and the international community, are suspect.

2. Pakistan forces invaded a sovereign land which is wrong.

And what did India do in Junagadh and Hyderabad?

3. Pakistan didn't respect the UN resolution

We did respect the UNSC resolutions - they call for tripartite negotiations between India, Pakistan and a UN representative to determine the details and process of demilitarization, details over which the two sides could never come to agreement.

The UNSC resolutions did not call for an unconditional, unilateral withdrawal on the part of Pakistan.

India, however, did not respect the UNSC resolutions when she chose to unilaterally violate her commitment to them in the 1950's, and looked to converting the LoC into the International Border.

4. Years later Pakistan fought wars over Kashmir leading to deteriment of India and herself.

India violated her commitment to a mutually agreed upon course of dispute resolution under the UNSC resolutions, and then moved to annex J&K and integrate it into India through her constitution - India closed the doors on dialog, which meant Pakistan started looking at military solutions.

5. Pakistan still supports terrorism in the region whose after-effects have been felt across India and the World ( more specifically Pakistan these days)

A blatant lie - Pakistan does not support terrorism in the region and has not supported terrorism in the region.