Taliban Tightens grip on Karachi

[American Eagle]

What was the background of your deployment anyway?

I was a early 20s Second then First Lieutenant, filling a Lt. Colonel, USAF billet as Commander, Det. 2, 6937th Communications Group with offices inside the US Embassy. My working title was "USAF Liaison Officer" and I was responsible for movement of all personnel and material up country and down and out of country for my higher HQ at Badabur, nearby Peshawar, which is often mistakenly referred to as the old "U-2" Base. I did support operationally two RB-576Fs uniquely built for the use of the PAF free of charge, which displaced use of old U-2s. I covered USAF and on rare occasions allied airlift ops to and thru then West Pakistan at Karachi under CENTO and SEATO pacts. My desk ultimately was located inside the CIA section in the US Embassy after the 1965 India-Pakistan War started flaring up in late Dec. 1964, January 1965 (when I was blown up) and in the Spring of 1965. I PCSed back to the States first of June, 1965, while the India-Pakistan War was more totally raging. One last major additional duty was writing and starting to implement the evacuation plan for the Badabur USAF Base civilians and family air evacuations. We did have a few high level Indian Air Force bomber raids on Karachi but nothing serious. From summer of 1964 and my men also picked up a growing walking wounded RON of our troops dating from and thereafter the Gulf of Tonkin.

It was all very hectic and a good thing I was young to handle all that!

Everything I did in Pakistan came under the National Security Agency, the CIA and my USAF outfit, now referred to as USAF Electronic Security Command, back then referred to as USAF Security Service (ie, communications intelligence).

I was not and am not a pilot. I retired reserve wise from HQ USSOCOM in Tampa, FL, as the Reserve "back fill" for the slot of Assistant Chief of Staff for J-4, with overlap into J-5, War Plans and computerized wargamming, worldwide. Etc.

 

[American Pakistani]

Yes, I do have some slides and a few color snap shots around. Will look for them and post what I can next week, if possible.

Cheers.

It will be so nice of you Sir. I would love to see old pictures of the city i was born in.

I was a early 20s Second then First Lieutenant, filling a Lt. Colonel, USAF billet as Commander, Det. 2, 6937th Communications Group with offices inside the US Embassy. My working title was "USAF Liaison Officer" and I was responsible for movement of all personnel and material up country and down and out of country for my higher HQ at Badabur, nearby Peshawar, which is often mistakenly referred to as the old "U-2" Base. I did support operationally two RB-576Fs uniquely built for the use of the PAF free of charge, which displaced use of old U-2s. I covered USAF and on rare occasions allied airlift ops to and thru then West Pakistan at Karachi under CENTO and SEATO pacts. My desk ultimately was located inside the CIA section in the US Embassy after the 1965 India-Pakistan War started flaring up in late Dec. 1964, January 1965 (when I was blown up) and in the Spring of 1965. I PCSed back to the States first of June, 1965, while the India-Pakistan War was more totally raging. One last major additional duty was writing and starting to implement the evacuation plan for the Badabur USAF Base civilians and family air evacuations. We did have a few high level Indian Air Force bomber raids on Karachi but nothing serious. From summer of 1964 and my men also picked up a growing walking wounded RON of our troops dating from and thereafter the Gulf of Tonkin.

It was all very hectic and a good thing I was young to handle all that!

Everything I did in Pakistan came under the National Security Agency, the CIA and my USAF outfit, now referred to as USAF Electronic Security Command, back then referred to as USAF Security Service (ie, communications intelligence).

I was not and am not a pilot. I retired reserve wise from HQ USSOCOM in Tampa, FL, as the Reserve "back fill" for the slot of Assistant Chief of Staff for J-4, with overlap into J-5, War Plans and computerized wargamming, worldwide. Etc.

Very detailed & interesting to read. Deep respects to you, Sir.

 

[American Eagle]

It will be so nice of you Sir. I would love to see old pictures of the city i was born in.



Very detailed & interesting to read. Deep respects to you, Sir.

Thanks for your kind remarks. When we were really young officers I suppose much of our duties and responsibilities were "added on" without consideration as to whether we could swim with them all, or not. Lucily for me I had a first class Master Sergeant, USAF, since deceased, as well as a large number of retired Pakistani military officers and blue collar hire, all of whom were outstanding in their daily tasks, no matter what I and we asked them to do.

"Routine" did not describe all of what we did every day. Maybe over time it shrunk to about 1/3 of what we did. The rest of our work was clearly non-routine!

Cheers and have a good new week.

 

[Slav Defence]

I was a early 20s Second then First Lieutenant, filling a Lt. Colonel, USAF billet as Commander, Det. 2, 6937th Communications Group with offices inside the US Embassy. My working title was "USAF Liaison Officer" and I was responsible for movement of all personnel and material up country and down and out of country for my higher HQ at Badabur, nearby Peshawar, which is often mistakenly referred to as the old "U-2" Base. I did support operationally two RB-576Fs uniquely built for the use of the PAF free of charge, which displaced use of old U-2s. I covered USAF and on rare occasions allied airlift ops to and thru then West Pakistan at Karachi under CENTO and SEATO pacts. My desk ultimately was located inside the CIA section in the US Embassy after the 1965 India-Pakistan War started flaring up in late Dec. 1964, January 1965 (when I was blown up) and in the Spring of 1965. I PCSed back to the States first of June, 1965, while the India-Pakistan War was more totally raging. One last major additional duty was writing and starting to implement the evacuation plan for the Badabur USAF Base civilians and family air evacuations. We did have a few high level Indian Air Force bomber raids on Karachi but nothing serious. From summer of 1964 and my men also picked up a growing walking wounded RON of our troops dating from and thereafter the Gulf of Tonkin.

It was all very hectic and a good thing I was young to handle all that!

Everything I did in Pakistan came under the National Security Agency, the CIA and my USAF outfit, now referred to as USAF Electronic Security Command, back then referred to as USAF Security Service (ie, communications intelligence).

I was not and am not a pilot. I retired reserve wise from HQ USSOCOM in Tampa, FL, as the Reserve "back fill" for the slot of Assistant Chief of Staff for J-4, with overlap into J-5, War Plans and computerized wargamming, worldwide. Etc.

Well..it means that you must be possessing steel nerves and bravery to tackle all that,it is appreciating to have you on board.I am astonished to see that why we didn't give you an official welcome as professional,maybe because we all went busy with our daily lives and routine.So,first of all I give you a very warm welcome.We are lucky to have another intellect on board and another important part of axis vertebra of PDF professionals.
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On serious note,I have observed that you are still having old sketches in your mind about Karachi city.It is a lot improved and it's infrastructure is much developed under Mr.Mustafa Kamal's administration in Mr.Musharraf's era.Where as far as TTP scenario is concerned.I have already given my analysis that best strategy right now is to do selective operations against TTP.The key to Karachi's problem lies in N.Waziristan.Proper,well-planned operation at that point will destroy their supply lines and bases.
-Regards

 

[Dillinger]

@Oscar @Secur

There's control and then there's CONTROL.

I think that we are dealing with the former. That is to say that Taliban is present in these areas, probably tapping into the local criminal outfits for sources of revenue (trade hub, black market, extortion) and perhaps ammunition (the folks at Lyari were well armed). Anyone got eyes on the ground? Don't tell me they are running ground dominance patrols...need more data.

 

[SQ8]

@Oscar @Secur

There's control and then there's CONTROL.

I think that we are dealing with the former. That is to say that Taliban is present in these areas, probably tapping into the local criminal outfits for sources of revenue (trade hub, black market, extortion) and perhaps ammunition (the folks at Lyari were well armed). Anyone got eyes on the ground? Don't tell me they are running ground dominance patrols...need more data.

There are areas where they are running dominance patrols but these are in connivance with local criminal elements from the same area of origin.

 

[Dillinger]

There are areas where they are running dominance patrols but these are in connivance with local criminal elements from the same area of origin.

They entrench and that is perfect terrain for asymmetrical warfare. If some interested party were to ensure (will elaborate upon my opinion on that later) that uprooting them turned into a heavy ordinance op in the middle of populated neighborhoods (Homs, Syria) then you could be catching some serious flak.

 

[Khan_patriot]

Unhappily there is lots of truth to terrorists inside Karachi in recent years (plural). During 2013 Taliban in Karachi brazenly shot their way into the Karachi main Navy Base, killing several sailor guards, wounding many more, but failing to get their suicide bombers to tied up Pak Navy ships, their intended end target.

I "suspect" the Pak Navy is birthing more warships out in the harbor, using crew boats and captain's gig to move personnel back and forth.

I understand where you are coming from, the Taliban are an existential threat to both Karachi and the country, what I meant when I said that their influence is nonexistent was that they dont have any permanent writ in any area, I am sure as that as a professional you must understand that there are no rigid fronts of influence in an asymmetric war, the fronts are highly elastic and can change from day to day or even hour to hour, the presence of Taliban in any area does not mean their absolute control in the area, the area is under government control and the Taliban, just like any guerrilla force choose to hide rather than declare their presence.....

 

[Slayer786]

Let the MQM, Lyari gangs and other parties at the taliban. Terror might kill terror and then pardon all the anti-taliban terrorists. Atleast those terrorists are not fundamentalists like the taliban. Just sit back and watch. Let them kill each other.

No, too extreme. OK then what?

 

[Secur]

@Oscar @Secur

There's control and then there's CONTROL.

I think that we are dealing with the former. That is to say that Taliban is present in these areas, probably tapping into the local criminal outfits for sources of revenue (trade hub, black market, extortion) and perhaps ammunition (the folks at Lyari were well armed). Anyone got eyes on the ground? Don't tell me they are running ground dominance patrols...need more data.

TTP dominates 33 of Karachi's 178 administrative units—known as union councils— security officials said. These tend to be the larger, peripheral, districts, with ever expanding shanty settlements that eat into the surrounding desert. The militants are also now getting more educated recruits, including non-Pashtuns, and spreading to neighboring areas outside Karachi, including Hub to the west and Jamshoro to the northeast.

In the areas it controls, TTP is levying a tax on residents and businesses, said a businessman in Sohrab Goth, a Taliban-run neighborhood just north of the city center.

The militant group has set up courts in neighborhoods to resolve disputes, which give written judgments, handling matters that include disagreements over land ownership and regulating levels of theft from power lines that they allow, residents said.

For instance, on a monthly income of 40,000 rupees ($380), TTP takes a levy of 1,000 rupees. Concentrate blocks made for use in construction—a major business in the Pashtun areas—are sold for 18 rupees each, of which three rupees goes to the Taliban. The businessman said TTP's hold had hardened over the past year.

What to make of that , now ? Trust me , there are now areas in the financial hub of Pakistan which are a no-go for law enforcement agencies and people of other ethnicity . Initially , they were merely funding their " righteous cause " , today if the GOP fails to act at the right time once again , it will develop into a Swat like situation very quickly . Act now or lament it forever - as I always say .

 

[Amaa'n]

if we look at the Map; most of the areas where TTP is present are mostly on the outskirts of the city, hence moving In & Out of the city is very easy, black market trade is run very easily.
As said by many above, there had been no go areas in the past too being run by Criminal outfits and local gangs. People had been paying the protection money, the only difference is now the hands collecting the money are changed......

 

[American Pakistani]

What i understand from the article is that TTP is generating money mostly by milking Karachi. All the extortion, mobile snatching, robberies, kidnapping for ransom, etc generates money for their activities all over Pakistan. TTP receive 3PKR on each building block - just think about it how much money they generate just by this. Where is Pak Army? As MQM minister Waseem Akhter said that people of Karachi are not looking towards provincial or federal govt(because they know that these govts are biased & just like TTP they wanna control the city too) they are now looking towards Pak Army. Unfortunately non-Karachitie Pakistanis are acting like ostriches & don't wanna accept the reality...they just are so blind in racism that they will blame everything on MQM.

 

[waz]

Martial law, send in the army, kill every member of the Taliban, lift martial law and let the city prosper.

After reading the above, I don't know what else can work.

 

[acid rain]

^^^

Sending in army into a city....not a very good idea. An army isnt built to fight in an urban setting.

 

[Slayer786]

^^^

Sending in army into a city....not a very good idea. An army isnt built to fight in an urban setting.

Aray bhai taliban lato kay booth hain, baato say nahi mantain.

They need a kick up their as.s from the army.