Taliban seem to abandon guerrilla tactics in Pakistan conflict

[jeypore]

I am surprised that The Long War Journal is not considered a credible source, so i am posting something in similiar lines and tonned down on the redaric. I was not looking for a specific agenda for the fight against the talibs, but found that article which was interesting. It does pose a question after reading that the numbers army is quoting is accurate or not. It is not for me to judge.

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan -- Taliban insurgents in Pakistan's Swat valley may be preparing to fight the army on the streets of the scenic district's main city, as soldiers and guerrillas adopt surprising conventional war tactics.

Follow up:

The army appears poised to enter Mingora city, lifting a curfew Friday to allow thousands of its remaining residents to flee. Whereas classic guerrillas would melt away into the hills, the Taliban in Mingora, puzzlingly, seemed to be waiting to take on the advancing troops.

The Pakistan army itself hasn't committed the number of troops that experts think would be required for counterinsurgency operations, and the high level of Taliban deaths the military has claimed would be unlikely if the Islamic extremists were using guerrilla tactics.

Officials in Washington, which has backed the Swat offensive, fear that key ally Pakistan risks excessive civilian casualties with its current approach, as thousands of residents remain trapped in the valley.

"If they (the Taliban) try to fight the army in Mingora or some other town, they don't stand a chance against the superior numbers which the army can assemble and the firepower the army can deliver," said analyst Javed Husain, a retired army brigadier who served in Pakistan's Special Services Group commando unit.

So far, the nine-day-old army offensive in Swat - which is 100 miles from Islamabad, Pakistan's capital - hasn't moved into the valley's towns. Those who managed to escape Mingora, where five headless bodies were found this week, warned that the army would face tough resistance from deeply entrenched Taliban in the city.

Shaukat Saleem, a Mingora resident who escaped from Swat on Friday, said the Taliban had blocked roads in the city with trees and boulders. They've mined the streets, dug trenches, made bunkers and occupied many civilian homes, he said. He said that he saw "lots" of Taliban as he was leaving the city, who stopped him for questioning at 10 to 12 of their checkpoints.

"Mingora is completely in Taliban hands," said Saleem, who's now a refugee at the Jalozai camp near Peshawar with his wife and son. "On the streets you only see Taliban and stray dogs."

The army estimated earlier this week that as many as 200,000 civilians were still in Mingora, and it was unknown how many remained there after Friday's exodus. The army said that it had cleared the area that leads to Mingora from the south as far as Udigram, a village on the outskirts of the city.

"We allowed the civilians to move out of Mingora city. We relaxed the curfew," said Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas, the army's chief spokesman.

Abbas declined to comment on the timing of a Mingora operation and whether the army would wait for all the residents to evacuate. It seems likely that thousands of them remain in the city, leading to fears that the Taliban might use them as "human shields."

It's taken years for the Pakistani public to back operations against the Taliban, and that support could evaporate easily.

Ali Dayan Hasan, a South Asia researcher at Human Rights Watch, a U.S.-based advocacy group, warned that the Taliban could be "luring" the army into a fight in Mingora.

"If there are lots of dead civilians and lots of dead soldiers (in Mingora), it could do morale-sapping damage," Hasan said. "If we hear of 2,000 civilians dying, say, it's all over."

The U.S. military has encouraged its Pakistani allies to embrace counterinsurgency tactics, which call for winning civilian support, not just killing the enemy and seizing ground. Some U.S. officials, however, worry that the Pakistani army isn't willing or able to move away from traditional war-fighting tactics.

"If you talk to the (Pakistani) military leadership, they say they get it, but do they understand it the way we understand it?" a senior U.S. military official told McClatchy, speaking on the condition of anonymity in order to be more candid. "Often their definition of counterinsurgency is warning a village before an attack. That's it."

The Pakistani army claims to have killed well more than 800 Taliban in Swat so far, including 200 at a training camp that was bombed from the air. Guerrilla tactics would have had the insurgents mounting hit-and-run operations and ambushes in small groups. If the high death toll is correct, that would suggest that the militants were fighting pitched battles with the army, but assembling 200 Taliban at one spot would violate guerrilla instincts, analyst Husain said.
The Pakistani army has said that it's deployed as many as 15,000 men against a Taliban force it estimates at 4,000 to 5,000, in a war that's being fought in mountainous terrain. The standard counterinsurgency manual suggests that an army should outnumber a guerrilla enemy by 10 to 1 or more.

"Fifteen thousand is not enough at all. That's only enough to secure the operational area," Husain said. "They need more, and for that they would have to pull out troops from the eastern border."

To the frustration of Washington and other Western allies, Pakistan continues to deploy most of its army on its eastern border to safeguard against its traditional enemy, India, which it fears might attack while it's fighting the Taliban on its western border.

Taliban seem to abandon guerrilla tactics in Pakistan conflict

 

[Conscientious objector]

^^

On the face of it the above analysis makes sense.But as they say the first casualty of war is the truth

 

[Slides]

And mad Ravi is thinking of invading pakistan and taking over. Complete bullshit from longwarjournal and it's indian sources. It's all part of their information warfare. It even contradicts what Gen Conway and Petraeus have said about the Swat operation.

See Ravi's bull **** "analysis" here orbat(dot).com

 

[Kasrkin]

This is outdated. As it turns out the militants didn't offer much of a fight in Mingora and withdrew from the majority of the positions they had occupied in the town. Secondly, the Taliban are indeed indulging in hit and run tactics but the army has altered its tactics too and now they're not moving in large formations, clearing the mountain positions with aircraft, etc. So yeah an OK article but no need to make a big deal out of it.

 

[PAFAce]

The Pakistani army claims to have killed well more than 800 Taliban in Swat so far, including 200 at a training camp that was bombed from the air. Guerrilla tactics would have had the insurgents mounting hit-and-run operations and ambushes in small groups. If the high death toll is correct, that would suggest that the militants were fighting pitched battles with the army, but assembling 200 Taliban at one spot would violate guerrilla instincts, analyst Husain said.

This argument is flawed. It assumes the Army is re-active, not pro-active. If you follow the news, few militants have been killed or captured while ambushing or attacking the security forces. Most have been killed in aerial bombardment and military raids in high militant concentration areas. Normally, the militants would mix with the population until the time came to "hit-and-run", but the mass migration of the civillian population out of the areas has allowed the Army to conduct operations much more freely. I believe that the Pakistan Army's success is confounding a few "intellectuals", and so instead of admitting that there is something wrong with the theoretical "COIN doctrine", they have resorted to claims of "this is not a classical insurgency". It is a classical insurgency, but largely deprived of clasical insurgency tools.

The Ninja is dangerous until he is hidden. After that, the Samurai wins.

This form of warfare is so new that most of its understandings are largely theoretical and untested. Also, due to the fact that US and NATO forces in Afghanistan have not been as successful in this new type of warfare as they had hoped, some find it tough believe that anyone else could achieve better results. I think that the fact that Pakistan is fighting on its own territory, and not thousands of miles away from its frontiers, tips the scale in their favour. Add to that the fact that the local populace is largely coopertive and supportive, and has willingly stepped out of the way, and it equals unprecedented circumstances. And herein lies the answer to the Army's success. The success so far was unpredictable and unexplainable, primarily because it is unprecedented. Ofcourse, with success comes the extra baggage of sustaining the success. It will all be for nothing if the area is not brought under government control and held, which is why everyone with half-a-brain or more has argued that this is just the beginning, much more has to come.

The Pakistani army has said that it's deployed as many as 15,000 men against a Taliban force it estimates at 4,000 to 5,000, in a war that's being fought in mountainous terrain. The standard counterinsurgency manual suggests that an army should outnumber a guerrilla enemy by 10 to 1 or more.

"Fifteen thousand is not enough at all. That's only enough to secure the operational area," Husain said. "They need more, and for that they would have to pull out troops from the eastern border."

There are far more soldiers than 15,000 in the region, that is simply the number of troops actively involved in the op. Also, the lack of civillian population has allowed Pakistan Army to deploy a reasonable ratio of troops for frontline ops.

To the frustration of Washington and other Western allies, Pakistan continues to deploy most of its army on its eastern border to safeguard against its traditional enemy, India, which it fears might attack while it's fighting the Taliban on its western border.

Their frustration is understandable, but so is our position. India is a credible threat until it does something to prove otherwise. It is a credible threat until it backs the rhetoric and truly joins the global war on terrorism.

 

[muse]

This seems likke a motivated piece of reporting, unfortunately Mr. Roggio brings no honor to Long war. But lets see what we can do with the substance of the argument AKA not enough troops - OK, says who? How are needed? Is success in Swat a suggestion that more are required there to defeat an enemy already defeated?

Anyway, it is silly - not classic COIN? Classic?? Who dat? Is Pakistan's strategy in COIN operations different from those promoted byh the US army? Yes, FOr trhe FAUJ, the best way to end an insurgency is to bring "end" (death) to the insurgent, where as U.S COIN brings death to the insurgent more slowly and with considerably more cost, one size fits all, does not mean that a measure of customizing isn't practiced .

Not enough troops for Wazirstan? Time will tell.

 

[jeypore]

This seems likke a motivated piece of reporting, unfortunately Mr. Roggio brings no honor to Long war.

Not trying to depend Mr. roggio, but he did pose speculate questioning based on Armys figures. Since there is no media allowed that's all one can do anyways. His major questioning is how Pakistan Army is creating such results (killing massives amounts of talibans) in days, while Americans still struggling. Hence the talibans have changed there guerrilla tactics to conventional. But like you say Mr. Muse time will tell!

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

His major questioning is how Pakistan Army is creating such results (killing massives amounts of talibans) in days, while Americans still struggling.

The majority of the 1000+ were killed in the early days of the conflict, in attacks such as the one on the camp in Shangla.

The reason NATO is not seeing such results is because the insurgents in Afghanistan have shifted to a more 'traditional' insurgency approach, whereas in Swat they initially operated in larger concentrations, and tried to operate out of the camps and HQ's they had built.

The early phase of the current Swat ops woudl be better compared to the initial invasion of Afghanistan by NATO. There were similarly large Taliban casualties then.

If you have been following Swat, you will notice that now the casualties inflicted upon the militants are much lower then they were earlier. This indicates that after the initial heavy losses, the militants have switched to 'traditional' guerrilla warfare.

 

[TruthSeeker]

This seems like a motivated piece of reporting, unfortunately Mr. Roggio brings no honor to Long war.

Muse, Sir,

I don't understand the "rap" on Roggio and "The Long War Journal". I look at the LWJ all the time for a summary of the latest occurrences in Pakistan and Afghanistan. He seems to be very current, sometimes ahead of Pak newspapers. What about the LWJ is dishonorable? AM also objected to this source but I cannot see (with my American eyes) the bias and/or dishonor that you see. Please help me understand your POV on the LWJ and why I should not trust it. Thanks.

 

[wtf]

The majority of the 1000+ were killed in the early days of the conflict, in attacks such as the one on the camp in Shangla.

The reason NATO is not seeing such results is because the insurgents in Afghanistan have shifted to a more 'traditional' insurgency approach, whereas in Swat they initially operated in larger concentrations, and tried to operate out of the camps and HQ's they had built.

The early phase of the current Swat ops woudl be better compared to the initial invasion of Afghanistan by NATO. There were similarly large Taliban casualties then.

If you have been following Swat, you will notice that now the casualties inflicted upon the militants are much lower then they were earlier. This indicates that after the initial heavy losses, the militants have switched to 'traditional' guerrilla warfare.

I think PAFce gave a very nice explanation. In Afghanistan, the Taliban are fighting in the midst of people and US forces can't distinguish between them.
In Swat, most civilians have left so now Taliban has to fight a straight war. They can't hide behind civilians.

I think we may have seen something similar in Sri Lanka, where civilians left the Area before Army went in.

Might be a useful tactic for Afghan towns too- surround a town, move all the civilians out (check for guns and weaponry) and arrest whoever remains. Not sure it will work on villages though, which are spread out.

(Another tactic that worked for Russians in Chechnya - just bomb the heck out of the towns where there are enemies. Also shoot any press reporters in the vicinity who use the word "collateral damage" ).

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Muse, Sir,

I don't understand the "rap" on Roggio and "The Long War Journal". I look at the LWJ all the time for a summary of the latest occurrences in Pakistan and Afghanistan. He seems to be very current, sometimes ahead of Pak newspapers. What about the LWJ is dishonorable? AM also objected to this source but I cannot see (with my American eyes) the bias and/or dishonor that you see. Please help me understand your POV on the LWJ and why I should not trust it. Thanks.

Roggio's accumulation of sources is fine IMO - however the conclusions he draws are extremely biased and anti-Pakistan.

For example he concluded a while back that the PA was a lying sack of sht (paraphrasing) because some PA officials stated they had killed certain AQ and Taliban leaders, who later resurfaced alive. Now the US Military has done exactly the same sort of thing - said it killed XYZ and they turned up alive, but the standards Roggio applies to the PA are apparently different.

Intelligence in this war is shifty and just because the PA announced it had killed XYZ on the basis of its intelligence reports (that turned out to be wrong) does not make the PA a lying, deceiving entity - but that is how Roggio routinely projects the PA.

In one of his recent posts he wrote that the PA has claimed no civilian casualties have been inflicted by it in the current Swat operation. That is an out and out lie since the DG ISPR himself apologized for civilian casualties that may have occurred.

The whole 'spin' Roggio puts on his blog is to project that PA as some sort of 'evil deceiving entity'. In terms of his collation of various sources, he is alright.

 

[Slides]

Correct. And Roggio's big argument for the PA being liars is that they didn't issue English press releases that he could read that retracted earlier statements of AQ/Taliban leaders killed. Since he can't understand Urdu and has no access to ISPR press briefings, he relies on his false gut instinct here.