Surface To Air Missiles | Terror in the Sky.

[qsaark]

SAM System Mobility Russian and PLA Air Defence System Vehicles

Dr Carlo Kopp

Background:

The subject of Air Defence System Transporter Erector Launcher and Radar (TELAR), Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) and TransLoader (TL) vehicles receives far less attention in defence analysis than it merits.

Perhaps the most famous quote by Generaloberst Heinz Wilhelm 'Schnelle Heinz' Guderian is: "Der Motor des Panzers ist ebenso seine Waffe wie die Kanone" i.e. "The engine of a tank is as much a weapon as the cannon". The corollary of Guderian's saying is simply that "the mobility of a SAM or SPAAG system is as important as the lethality of its missile or gun system".

Mobility matters for two reasons, the first being battlespace mobility or the ability of the system to "shoot and scoot" evading defence suppression weapons, and the second being the system's deployability or ability to redeploy locally, across a theatre, or between theatres.

Unlike Integrated Air Defence Systems (IADS) of the past which relied heavily on fixed communications landlines, or fixed microwave repeater links, modern systems are linked by radiofrequency, typically microwave or VHF/UHF, datalinks or indeed networks. The principal determinant of the system's mobility and deployability is then the design of the vehicles carrying the system.

Broadly air defence weapons can be divided into fixed, semi-mobile, and mobile systems.

Fixed systems are typically installed on concrete pads or other hardened or semihardened structures. This strategy of air defence weapon deployment is largely extinct due to the lethality of anti-radiation missiles and other weapons deployed by SEAD/DEAD tasked combat aircraft.

Semi-mobile systems are typically moved by road, with launchers and other components carried by trailers, or built as trailers. Such systems will take between 30 minutes and several hours to deploy or stow, and are characteristic of 1960s technology Soviet PVO weapons. Like fixed systems, their survivability has proven to be poor, as evidenced by losses in Vietnam, the Middle East, Operation Desert Storm and Operation Allied Force. Nevertheless, the large number of legacy Soviet systems in use indicates that such weapons will still be encountered.

Fully mobile systems may be road mobile, or off-road mobile, the former using wheeled vehicles, the latter wheeled or tracked vehicles. In general tracked vehicles have better survivability than wheeled vehicles against the full range of air delivered weapons, and land force weapons.

In general tracked vehicles provide by far the best off road mobility, due to the low surface loading of tracks, the ability to perform pivot turns, and the ability to scale obstacles and cross ditches. The drawbacks of tracked vehicles are often considerably higher operating costs, longer time to repair a broken track compared to a punctured wheel, and usually lower roadspeed. Often tracked vehicles will be heavier than their wheeled counterparts, limiting options in airlift.

Where off road mobility is not regarded to be critical, military trucks and tow tractors in the 10 to 20 tonne class have been used most frequently for this purpose, often towing the air defence weapon in a semitrailer or trailer arrangement.

The compromise between tracked and standard truck based systems are specialised high off road mobility vehicles purposed designed for the carriage of missiles. The 8 x 8 and 6 x 6 vehicles produced by MAZ/MZKT over the last five decades represent the best example.

The MAZ-543 family of 8 x 8 heavy trucks has been used to carry ballistic missiles, ground launched strategic cruise missiles, antiship cruise missiles, air defence gun systems, air defence missile systems, as well as the Soviet High Energy Laser Directed Energy Weapon system. It has also been used to carry or tow a number of different radar systems, and associated mast systems.

These webpages are intended to provide a basic reference covering the most widely used vehicles in this application.

Please continue here:SAM System Mobility / Russian and PLA Air Defence System Vehicles

 

[qsaark]

Warsaw Pact / Russian Air Defence Command Posts
by Dr Carlo Kopp

Background:

A topic which receives far too little attention in the air power debate is that of command posts, especially mobile command posts. These often less than conspicuous components of air defence systems and missile batteries account for the "Integrated" in any Integrated Air Defence System.

The Soviets had a number of designs which have since evolved heavily, especially with the infusion of COTS digital computer technology. Contemporary production designs make full use of large LCD panel display technology and digital processing.

The page is primarily a compilation of Russian and ByeloRussian manufacturer's data and imagery.

Please continue here:Warsaw Pact / Russian Air Defence Command Posts

 

[qsaark]

Warsaw Pact / Russian / PLA Emitter Locating Systems / ELINT Systems

by Dr Carlo Kopp

Background:

A topic which appears to crop up with monotonous regularity in the overseas press is that of alleged sales or smuggling to nations hostile to the US of former Warsaw Pact equipment "capable of detecting stealth aircraft". These claims invariably involve either the Czech designed and built Tesla-Pardubice KRTP-86 Tamara or ERA Vera Emitter Locating Systems, or the Ukrainian designed and built Topaz Kolchuga series of Emitter Locating Systems. More than often this equipment is described as 'anti-stealth radar', 'radar' or 'passive radar', all of which are completely incorrect.

The purpose of this analysis is to provide some technical discussion of these equipment types and their basic capabilities.

Both the Tamara/Vera series, their predecessor the Ramona, and the Kolchuga are passive Electronic Support Measures (ESM) systems built to provide an Emitter Locating System (ELS) capability against airborne targets emitting radio frequency signals. In this sense they are functional analogues of US, French, Israeli and other types of equipment designed to collect, identify, track and locate RF signals emitted by airborne targets.

These systems were developed during the last two decades of the Cold War to bolster Warsaw Pact air defence capabilities in the high density European Theatre, where it was expected that the US would heavily jam all surveillance, acquisition and engagement radars used in the Integrated Air Defence System (IADS). The intent behind these passive sensors was to provide a capability to passively detect, locate and track US and NATO aircraft using their RF emissions, to cue other IADS elements to an engagement.

The Czechs made the most progress in this area, developing the Ramona and Tamara systems using the quite sophisticated DTOA (Time Difference Of Arrival) technique, one which did not become widely used in Western ELS equipment until much later.

The Kolchuga, Vega/Orion and Avtobaza are more conventional Direction Finding (DF) systems, with two or more stations they use multiple bearing measurements to fix the target emitter.

The widely propagated public claims that DTOA Emitter Locating Systems are 'passive anti-stealth radars' is difficult to fathom. All DTOA ELS systems are most effective at detecting and tracking omnidirectional emitters. For the DTOA ELS to function, at least three of the widely spaced antenna/receiver systems must detect the very same emission from the target. This is why the Warsaw Pact's Ramona/Tamara family of DTOA systems was used primarily to track IFF, SSR, VOR/DME, Tacan,JTIDS/Link-16 and other omni emission sources from NATO aircraft. A narrow and low sidelobe pencil beam emission from an X/Ku-band radar is even under the most favourable geometrical conditions not going to concurrently illuminate three or more DTOA ELS stations, spaced tens of miles apart, so the DTOA system cannot perform its geolocating function. With low gain antennas needed to properly cover the required angular extent, the notion that DTOA systems can lock on to and track sidelobes from X/Ku-band AESAs is simply not supportable from a basic radio physics perspective. The only possible scenario in which such a DTOA ELS could track a VLO aircraft is where the aircraft is transmitting via an omni antenna JTIDS/Link-16 terminal while penetrating hostile airspace. This is so unlikely that it cannot be considered seriously.

The only other possible scenario which might be contemplated by those arguing 'anti-stealth' capabilities for DTOA or DF ELS equipment is their use as the receiver component in a multi-static radar system, which assumes the volume of airspace in which the VLO aircraft is operating is also being floodlit by a very high power pulsed emitter in the UHF/VHF/L-bands. The difficulty then confronted, especially by a DTOA ELS network, is the power-aperture problem. As the angular coverage of the DTOA ELS stations must be large, this is at the expense of antenna gain. To achieve a given power-aperture product in the multi-static system, the gain and emitted power at the floodlighting emitter end of the system must be exceptionally large, to compensate for the low gain of the receiver components.

Claims that conventional DF systems like the Kolchuga can readily detect and track VLO aircraft also defy analysis. While they have higher gain antennas compared to the DTOA ELS designs, they are confronting the probability of intercept problem against a very low sidelobe AESA, which is power managed, and highly frequency agile. They can only detect and track the emitter if the station is sitting inside the mainlobe of the AESA, and pointing at it when it is emitting. The only scenario where this is feasible is if three or more such DF systems are closely clustered around the target to be attacked, and all are pointed along the threat axis. Were this true, the DF systems then confront a geometrical dilution of precision (GDOP) problem, which will severely impair range accuracy. The claimed use of DTOA techniques in the Kolchuga is unlikely to correct this problem due to the very short DTOA baseline.

The claim that DTOA or conventional DF Emitter Locating Systems provide a useful capability against VLO aircraft is simply not credible. Its continuing popularity appears to fit in the same category as claims that the B-2A's stealth paint washes off in the rain.

Please continue here: Warsaw Pact / Russian Emitter Locating Systems / ELINT Systems

 

[qsaark]

Russian / PLA Low Band Surveillance Radars (Counter Low Observable Technology Radars)

Updated January, 2009
by Dr Carlo Kopp

Background:

Prior to the rout of Saddam's extensive IADS in the 1991 Desert Storm campaign, the Soviets did not take US stealth technology seriously. Desert Storm changed that entirely, and the Soviets launched an effort to develop capabilities to detect VLO aircraft. With the collapse of the USSR funding dried up, but Russian design bureaus including NNIIRT, well known for their line of P-18 Spoon Rest VHF band radars, continued developing new systems operating in the lower bands - from VHF through UHF to L-band.

Most stealth design features are intended to scatter incoming illumination in a controlled fashion, evidenced by the use of edge alignment, faceting and other geometrical shaping features, supplemented by the use of absorbent materials. All of these techniques are intended to defeat radars operating in the geometrical optics and less frequently, resonance regimes of scattering. The precondition for this to work is that the wavelength be much shorter than the cardinal dimensions of the shaping feature of interest. An edge aligned engine inlet of typical dimensions will perform best in the centimetric Ku- and X-bands, and less so with increasing radar wavelength.

The Russian approach has been to invest in the further development of low band radars, especially operating in the VHF band. With wavelengths of the order of a metre or more, only very large stealth aircraft (e.g. B-2A) satisfy the physics requirement for geometrical optics regime scattering. A fighter sized aircraft such as the JSF will see most of its carefully designed shaping features fall into the resonance or Raleigh scattering regions, where shaping is of little or no import, and skin depth penetration of the induced electrical surface currents defeats most absorbent coatings or laminates.

Please continue here: Russian / PLA Low Band Surveillance Radar Systems (Counter Low Observable Technology Radars)

 

[qsaark]

PLA Air Defence Radars: Excerpted from Chinese Radars

January 2009
by John C. Wise, J.C. Wise and Associates

Please continue here: PLA Air Defence Radars / Excerpted from "Chinese Radars"

 

[qsaark]

Russian Air Defence Systems Multimedia Supplement

by Dr Carlo Kopp

Some very interesting movie clips here:
Russian Air Defence Systems

 

[batmannow]

December 2008
Updated January 2009
by Dr Carlo Kopp
Text, Line Art © 2008, 2009 Carlo Kopp

Surface to Air Missile System Radars

double posting, dear sir!

 

[Arsalan]

do anyone here have the details of the opening of some SPADA missile facility in Pakistan?? is there any such thing or had i miss understood the news!!!

 

[Arsalan]

here is the pic i got from another thread!

can anyone kindly guide other members about this event! what was it?? and have we got the SPADA operational!!

 

[saiko]

The only problem with SAMs is that for them to be truly effective you need a really large investment. Otherwise, they're worthwhile to help deter attacks against critical facilities, but I would think Pakistan would be better off improving its air force than spending a lot of money on a modern IADS.

 

[Arsalan]

The only problem with SAMs is that for them to be truly effective you need a really large investment. Otherwise, they're worthwhile to help deter attacks against critical facilities, but I would think Pakistan would be better off improving its air force than spending a lot of money on a modern IADS.

this is not the case dear!!

getting an operational squadron of SAMs may cost equal or even slightly higher than getting a squadron of jets, but why are you neglecting the operating cost, the jets will be consuming millions of dollars in fuel and mainatinance, for a country like ours the SAM are the better option. ofcourse we are not neglecting the importance of airforce jets but they need to be supported from ground by SAMs

i hope this helps you!!

 

[saiko]

this is not the case dear!!

getting an operational squadron of SAMs may cost equal or even slightly higher than getting a squadron of jets, but why are you neglecting the operating cost, the jets will be consuming millions of dollars in fuel and mainatinance, for a country like ours the SAM are the better option. ofcourse we are not neglecting the importance of airforce jets but they need to be supported from ground by SAMs

i hope this helps you!!

you are right that operational costs are higher in the air force but what i mean is that air defence systems do not increase air defence effectiveness with each new system purchased arithmetically. the effectiveness of 2 sam launchers is not 50% of having 4 sam launchers. you really need to go all out in building a modern IADS to make it worthwhile.

and that is expensive. i don't think pakistan can maintain an effective air force relative to india if they start investing very heavily in this area which is why i think that money would be better spent on the PAF.

 

[Arsalan]

you are right that operational costs are higher in the air force but what i mean is that air defence systems do not increase air defence effectiveness with each new system purchased arithmetically. the effectiveness of 2 sam launchers is not 50% of having 4 sam launchers. you really need to go all out in building a modern IADS to make it worthwhile.

and that is expensive. i don't think pakistan can maintain an effective air force relative to india if they start investing very heavily in this area which is why i think that money would be better spent on the PAF.

fine with the argument, but dont you think that we are heavily outnumbred airforce (compared to indianz) and the gap never seems to be filled up. so i think against our key assets the SAMs must serve as a second line of defence. also do not neglect the fact that SAM will serve multipurpose! they will not only retaliate a massive airforce but will also be good against the missile threat!

now a system with so many plus points need not just be rejected because we need money for the Jets! they are equally important i guess. whats your say !!

 

[saiko]

fine with the argument, but dont you think that we are heavily outnumbred airforce (compared to indianz) and the gap never seems to be filled up. so i think against our key assets the SAMs must serve as a second line of defence. also do not neglect the fact that SAM will serve multipurpose! they will not only retaliate a massive airforce but will also be good against the missile threat!

now a system with so many plus points need not just be rejected because we need money for the Jets! they are equally important i guess. whats your say !!

Fair enough. I mean it can't hurt to have a small number of effective, modern SAM batteries in any case to help compliate Indian air missions in crucial areas. But SEAD missions are very effective against air defence systems that lack considerable depth and you would end up having to have SAM batteries to protect SAM batteries (in particular, low-altitude SAM systems protecting your theater SAMs).

If you look at Saddam's air defence network during the first Gulf War - it was medium to medium-high tech at the time and more dense/redundant/overlapping than most anything found anywhere else in the world short of in the Soviet bloc at the time... and the coalition lost something like 75 aircraft in total to all causes (some were air to air). It's a tough sell, though the S-300/S-400 system in particular is supposed to leapyears ahead in capability. So maybe get a few S-300 batteries and some Tor-M1 (or whatever the success to that its) to protect them from lo-alt attack.

 

[Myth_buster_1]

Fair enough. I mean it can't hurt to have a small number of effective, modern SAM batteries in any case to help compliate Indian air missions in crucial areas. But SEAD missions are very effective against air defence systems that lack considerable depth and you would end up having to have SAM batteries to protect SAM batteries (in particular, low-altitude SAM systems protecting your theater SAMs).

By the end of 2011 we will have 10 batteries of Speda-2000 plus which is well capable of intercepting just about any none stealth flying object within 20-25 km range meaning it ca defend for its self.