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Supping with the Taliban
By Irfan Husain
Saturday, 31 Jul, 2010
The British prime minister would probably not have used the same words had he been in London.
Recently, the Guardian carried a story on the alleged ISI links with the Taliban based on the Wikileaks bombshell. Written by Declan Walsh, the report bore the headline: Whose side is Pakistan on?
I doubt if the reporter a friend and a very well-informed journalist wrote the headline because the answer to the question is self-evident: Pakistan is on its own side, as is every country in the world.
While Wikileaks has detailed these alleged covert links between Pakistans premier intelligence agency and the Taliban, it has not really told us anything we did not know, apart from retired Gen Hamid Guls supposedly hyper-active efforts to guide the Taliban and sundry extremists. While he is, as Declan Walsh reports, an avid publicity hound, I doubt if he has retained the clout and the contacts his leadership of the ISI over 20 years ago would have given him at the time.
Another reply to the Guardians question comes from Stratfor, the respected intelligence and security website, which came to the conclusion that since the Pakistanis did not envision a defeat for the Taliban and would not want trouble in Afghanistan, they would maintain close links with the militant group. It went on to indicate that this would not be Pakistans public stance since it could exert pressure on India only through the US. This had forced Pakistan to publicly oppose the Taliban while retaining secret support for the militants.
Speaking in Bangalore, David Cameron said that this two-faced policy was unacceptable. The British prime minister would probably not have used the same words had he been in London. Indeed, a Downing Street spokeswoman quickly watered down her bosss words by issuing a clarification: The PM is not saying the Pakistani government is a sponsor of terrorism the Pakistani government needs to do more to shut terror groups down.
Such words go in through one ear at Pakistans GHQ, and out the other. Similar strictures have been sent to Islamabad in numerous letters and through a long succession of emissaries. But mostly, they are for public consumption. The reality is that the West needs whatever help it can get from the Pakistan Army, and cannot afford to cut Pakistan off, given its long common border with Afghanistan. Our military planners know this.
They also know that sooner rather than later, western forces will be pulling out of Afghanistan, and we will have to contend with the turbulent situation that will ensue. Although Nato will try and effect a tidy hand-over of power, I doubt very much if Hamid Karzais administration will survive very long. Even if the Taliban give any kind of assurances, these will not endure for a moment after the allies leave.
For Pakistani military planners, fixated as they are by the perceived Indian threat, the worst-case scenario is an alliance between their traditional foe and Afghanistan. To prevent this encirclement, they need a powerful player in place. Who better than the Taliban, the force nurtured by the ISI since its inception in the mid-1990s?
Many people, myself included, have questioned and criticised this double game as immoral and dangerous. But morality does not figure when spooks and soldiers invoke national security to justify the most hazardous policies. It is widely believed that our security establishment has been following this path ever since Musharraf executed his famous U-turn on Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11, and officially disowned the Taliban.
Americans and Brits are understandably upset at a supposed ally acting in this devious manner. In Pakistans defence, government spokesmen in Islamabad and our diplomats ask critics if it makes sense for the ISI to be helping the very terrorists who are killing our soldiers and citizens. The widespread belief in the West is that that the ISI is probably playing footsies with Mullah Omars Taliban and Jalaluddin Haqqanis outfit as these are the major groups operating in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the army is trying to stamp out home-grown terror groups that target Pakistanis.
I have long maintained that it is not possible to draw any meaningful distinction between these groups. They merge and mutate with bewildering frequency, but share a common ideology. Nevertheless, our intelligence agencies continue making common cause with primarily Afghan groups.
In the vortex that is Afghanistan today, there are no easy answers or quick fixes. In a sense, it was always a restless hotbed of competing tribes, ethnicities and criminal enterprises. The king mediated between these power centres, but after the 1973 coup and the 1979 Soviet invasion, the glue holding the fragile state together has slowly dissolved.
Unlike Iraq, there are virtually no institutions to rebuild. The stark reality is that whether the world likes it or not and I certainly dont the Taliban are the only viable force that can keep the country together. Had Al Qaeda not launched its attacks on America nearly nine years ago, I have little doubt the Taliban would still have been in power in Kabul, busily dragging their benighted country back to the seventh century. And nobody in Washington or London would have really cared.
The alternative to the Taliban is for western forces to stay in Afghanistan indefinitely, something the voters back home understandably have no stomach for. The third and best option is for regional states to keep a stabilising force in the country. However, given the bitter rivalry between India and Pakistan, this is clearly a non-starter.
So with the kind of end-game that is beginning to play itself out, there are few strategic choices for Pakistan to pick from. I am sure even our generals would not willingly wish to cosy up to Mullah Omar and Jalaluddin Haqqani, but in our tough neighbourhood, they see themselves being pushed into the Taliban corner.
In an imperfect world, there are no perfect solutions. But speaking personally, I recoil from the notion of having any truck with the Taliban.
irfanhusain@gmail.com
By Irfan Husain
Saturday, 31 Jul, 2010
The British prime minister would probably not have used the same words had he been in London.
Recently, the Guardian carried a story on the alleged ISI links with the Taliban based on the Wikileaks bombshell. Written by Declan Walsh, the report bore the headline: Whose side is Pakistan on?
I doubt if the reporter a friend and a very well-informed journalist wrote the headline because the answer to the question is self-evident: Pakistan is on its own side, as is every country in the world.
While Wikileaks has detailed these alleged covert links between Pakistans premier intelligence agency and the Taliban, it has not really told us anything we did not know, apart from retired Gen Hamid Guls supposedly hyper-active efforts to guide the Taliban and sundry extremists. While he is, as Declan Walsh reports, an avid publicity hound, I doubt if he has retained the clout and the contacts his leadership of the ISI over 20 years ago would have given him at the time.
Another reply to the Guardians question comes from Stratfor, the respected intelligence and security website, which came to the conclusion that since the Pakistanis did not envision a defeat for the Taliban and would not want trouble in Afghanistan, they would maintain close links with the militant group. It went on to indicate that this would not be Pakistans public stance since it could exert pressure on India only through the US. This had forced Pakistan to publicly oppose the Taliban while retaining secret support for the militants.
Speaking in Bangalore, David Cameron said that this two-faced policy was unacceptable. The British prime minister would probably not have used the same words had he been in London. Indeed, a Downing Street spokeswoman quickly watered down her bosss words by issuing a clarification: The PM is not saying the Pakistani government is a sponsor of terrorism the Pakistani government needs to do more to shut terror groups down.
Such words go in through one ear at Pakistans GHQ, and out the other. Similar strictures have been sent to Islamabad in numerous letters and through a long succession of emissaries. But mostly, they are for public consumption. The reality is that the West needs whatever help it can get from the Pakistan Army, and cannot afford to cut Pakistan off, given its long common border with Afghanistan. Our military planners know this.
They also know that sooner rather than later, western forces will be pulling out of Afghanistan, and we will have to contend with the turbulent situation that will ensue. Although Nato will try and effect a tidy hand-over of power, I doubt very much if Hamid Karzais administration will survive very long. Even if the Taliban give any kind of assurances, these will not endure for a moment after the allies leave.
For Pakistani military planners, fixated as they are by the perceived Indian threat, the worst-case scenario is an alliance between their traditional foe and Afghanistan. To prevent this encirclement, they need a powerful player in place. Who better than the Taliban, the force nurtured by the ISI since its inception in the mid-1990s?
Many people, myself included, have questioned and criticised this double game as immoral and dangerous. But morality does not figure when spooks and soldiers invoke national security to justify the most hazardous policies. It is widely believed that our security establishment has been following this path ever since Musharraf executed his famous U-turn on Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11, and officially disowned the Taliban.
Americans and Brits are understandably upset at a supposed ally acting in this devious manner. In Pakistans defence, government spokesmen in Islamabad and our diplomats ask critics if it makes sense for the ISI to be helping the very terrorists who are killing our soldiers and citizens. The widespread belief in the West is that that the ISI is probably playing footsies with Mullah Omars Taliban and Jalaluddin Haqqanis outfit as these are the major groups operating in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the army is trying to stamp out home-grown terror groups that target Pakistanis.
I have long maintained that it is not possible to draw any meaningful distinction between these groups. They merge and mutate with bewildering frequency, but share a common ideology. Nevertheless, our intelligence agencies continue making common cause with primarily Afghan groups.
In the vortex that is Afghanistan today, there are no easy answers or quick fixes. In a sense, it was always a restless hotbed of competing tribes, ethnicities and criminal enterprises. The king mediated between these power centres, but after the 1973 coup and the 1979 Soviet invasion, the glue holding the fragile state together has slowly dissolved.
Unlike Iraq, there are virtually no institutions to rebuild. The stark reality is that whether the world likes it or not and I certainly dont the Taliban are the only viable force that can keep the country together. Had Al Qaeda not launched its attacks on America nearly nine years ago, I have little doubt the Taliban would still have been in power in Kabul, busily dragging their benighted country back to the seventh century. And nobody in Washington or London would have really cared.
The alternative to the Taliban is for western forces to stay in Afghanistan indefinitely, something the voters back home understandably have no stomach for. The third and best option is for regional states to keep a stabilising force in the country. However, given the bitter rivalry between India and Pakistan, this is clearly a non-starter.
So with the kind of end-game that is beginning to play itself out, there are few strategic choices for Pakistan to pick from. I am sure even our generals would not willingly wish to cosy up to Mullah Omar and Jalaluddin Haqqani, but in our tough neighbourhood, they see themselves being pushed into the Taliban corner.
In an imperfect world, there are no perfect solutions. But speaking personally, I recoil from the notion of having any truck with the Taliban.
irfanhusain@gmail.com
