Straight shooting on the 1965 war.
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This article raises many questions about the capabilities of our armed forces (at that time) and the particular role of leadership at the top.
The real questions are.
Why was the final thrust at akhnur stopped by change of leadership?
70 years on and we still search for those answers but the answer is very simple and every common Pakistani knows this.... , the leadership of ayub and zulfiqar Bhutto waged this war to gain political goals and there were politically motivated decisions by generals that brought defeat in the war at decisive moments which also happened In 47 1971 and 1999 kargil , this is what happens when an army makes issues about political victories rather than military victories.
Why war plans by previous Air Marshal dismissed in 1965?
Having the element of surprise why we're Indian air bases attacked in the last stages of the war ?
Why did PA allow India to come 8 kilometeres close to Lahore on GT road?
Why did officers of armored columns charged into muddy fields and at certain offensives moved into enemy fire without air cover.
Why was there a failed assessment of Indian invasion when there were previously the kutch skirmishes along the international boundary this dismisses the argument that we Pakistanis present that India forcefully invaded us by crossing the line of control.
I see where the propaganda is going , we celebrate a war and mark it as a defence day when it was originally planned to be a victory day with so many questions to which answers never given.
Even Herr Goebells would give the nazi salute to this pathetic state propaganda.
We continue to feed and do the opposite to what should be said and done.
The real questions are.
Why was the final thrust at akhnur stopped by change of leadership?
70 years on and we still search for those answers but the answer is very simple and every common Pakistani knows this.... , the leadership of ayub and zulfiqar Bhutto waged this war to gain political goals and there were politically motivated decisions by generals that brought defeat in the war at decisive moments which also happened In 47 1971 and 1999 kargil , this is what happens when an army makes issues about political victories rather than military victories.
Why war plans by previous Air Marshal dismissed in 1965?
Having the element of surprise why we're Indian air bases attacked in the last stages of the war ?
Why did PA allow India to come 8 kilometeres close to Lahore on GT road?
Why did officers of armored columns charged into muddy fields and at certain offensives moved into enemy fire without air cover.
Why was there a failed assessment of Indian invasion when there were previously the kutch skirmishes along the international boundary this dismisses the argument that we Pakistanis present that India forcefully invaded us by crossing the line of control.
I see where the propaganda is going , we celebrate a war and mark it as a defence day when it was originally planned to be a victory day with so many questions to which answers never given.
Even Herr Goebells would give the nazi salute to this pathetic state propaganda.
We continue to feed and do the opposite to what should be said and done.
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django
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A total outsider's point of view. Comments below are purely from the military point of view; there are aspects that are not appropriate for such an outsider to take up.
In spite of what Yahya Khan said to a course instructor at Quetta after the war, I don't think he was told to hold back from capturing Akhnur. I believe that it was simply the wish of Ayub Khan to promote his interests over Akhtar Hussain Malik that caused the battlefield replacement that amazed everybody.
The alternative theory is that it was Ayub's mistaken belief that attacking at Akhnur would restrict the fighting to Kashmir. This would be a strange belief to hold; Pakistan had just handled Indian forces, border police and Army alike, roughly in the preliminary skirmishes in Kutch, in Gujarat, and had themselves fought it out across an international boundary.
On balance, it seems to have been the wish to promote his favourite that caused this debacle.
It is not clear that such plans were dismissed. Nur Khan took over just before the war broke out. Neither he nor his eminent predecessor were briefed about Gibraltar or Grand Slam. So Asghar Khan's war plans could not be implemented by Nur Khan; the Air Force was never told what was about to begin, and had no time to bring out and activate the old plans, whatever they were.
It is not clear that there was an element of opposition to the war plans, whatever they were, although the anecdotal account that we have all read in this thread says that one or two of the mid-range commanders - presumably base commanders - sabotaged the plan by refusing to act. Maybe, maybe not; these commanders are not named, their lack of action is not mentioned and is not measurable against any general level of action by the rest involved.
I thought they were attacked right at the beginning. There are eye-witness accounts by Indian air chiefs who were front-line pilots in the 65 how their planes were neatly lined up on the tarmac and destroyed by PAF raids right at the outset.
10th Div was specifically instructed that they need not bother to go to an alert status and escalate the Indian responses. As a result, when Harbaksh decided to relieve the pressure on him at Akhnur by attacking further south in two places, one being the Amritsar-Lahore axis, there was nobody to oppose them.
Simply no coordination. The Air Force command structure was rarely, if ever, informed about ground support requirements, and the Army and the Air Force essentially fought two different wars, touching at some points.
Truly a command failure, as well as a political failure, even political sabotage, by advisors who argued very forcefully that a limited adventure in Kashmir would not be escalated.
In spite of what Yahya Khan said to a course instructor at Quetta after the war, I don't think he was told to hold back from capturing Akhnur. I believe that it was simply the wish of Ayub Khan to promote his interests over Akhtar Hussain Malik that caused the battlefield replacement that amazed everybody.
The alternative theory is that it was Ayub's mistaken belief that attacking at Akhnur would restrict the fighting to Kashmir. This would be a strange belief to hold; Pakistan had just handled Indian forces, border police and Army alike, roughly in the preliminary skirmishes in Kutch, in Gujarat, and had themselves fought it out across an international boundary.
On balance, it seems to have been the wish to promote his favourite that caused this debacle.
It is not clear that such plans were dismissed. Nur Khan took over just before the war broke out. Neither he nor his eminent predecessor were briefed about Gibraltar or Grand Slam. So Asghar Khan's war plans could not be implemented by Nur Khan; the Air Force was never told what was about to begin, and had no time to bring out and activate the old plans, whatever they were.
It is not clear that there was an element of opposition to the war plans, whatever they were, although the anecdotal account that we have all read in this thread says that one or two of the mid-range commanders - presumably base commanders - sabotaged the plan by refusing to act. Maybe, maybe not; these commanders are not named, their lack of action is not mentioned and is not measurable against any general level of action by the rest involved.
I thought they were attacked right at the beginning. There are eye-witness accounts by Indian air chiefs who were front-line pilots in the 65 how their planes were neatly lined up on the tarmac and destroyed by PAF raids right at the outset.
10th Div was specifically instructed that they need not bother to go to an alert status and escalate the Indian responses. As a result, when Harbaksh decided to relieve the pressure on him at Akhnur by attacking further south in two places, one being the Amritsar-Lahore axis, there was nobody to oppose them.
Simply no coordination. The Air Force command structure was rarely, if ever, informed about ground support requirements, and the Army and the Air Force essentially fought two different wars, touching at some points.
Truly a command failure, as well as a political failure, even political sabotage, by advisors who argued very forcefully that a limited adventure in Kashmir would not be escalated.
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