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State TV says Russia could turn US to 'radioactive ash'

As a NATO country you will be also in the middle of the Action. ;)

As long as you don't attack first, we will be ok... Then watch how US handle you with one hand... It could be the fastest resulted war in history
 
China must enlarge its nuclear arsenal by a factor of 100 in the shortest time possible。
 
You are the canon fodder, mate. :enjoy:
Fifth wheel of the Nato will be used as canon fodder in WW3.
Turkey will be canon fodder of World War 3.
Fifth Wheel of the NATO and propably canon fodder of WW3.
I love sexy canon fodders :cheesy: :azn:
I can't live without canon fodder


ok ok last 2 were fabricated but seriously what's this canon fodder thing you obsessed with? :) I really have no idea.. You mean cannon with double "N"? and the term used for unuseful units? and you use this for one of the best armies on planet earth... oh boy..
 
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ok ok last 2 were fabricated but seriously what's this canon fodder thing you obsessed with? :) I really have no idea.. You mean cannon with double "N"? and the term used for unuseful units? and you use this for one of the best armies on planet earth... oh boy..

For US Army turkish troops are cannon fodder. Its like Korea. US Units stood back and used their artilery while turkish infanterists run into chinese mashine gun salvos.

Know your role in the NATO community. :enjoy:
 
For US Army turkish troops are cannon fodder. Its like Korea. US Units stood back and used their artilery while turkish infanterists run into chinese mashine gun salvos.
Know your role in the NATO community.
:enjoy:

slow progress but you learn, good boy
 
China must enlarge its nuclear arsenal by a factor of 100 in the shortest time possible。

From what I gathered reading Martian's post, I think he may be right that China has a lot more thermonukes than what the US and China want the world to believe. But f course you are right, they still need to build more!
China has the world's biggest manufacturng base, building nukes would not be a problem considering there are so many fanboys that think japan can build 3000 nuclear warheads in three months with a much smaller manufacturing capabilities.
 
I heard somewhere that there is a nuclear bomb inside the Russian Embassy in U.S :lol:
 
No, China can not yet. China does not have enough missiles to guarantee breakthrough U.S. missile defense.
Not really. How many nukes do you need to guarantee breakthrough US missile defense? Our nuclear arsenal is a mystery but I trust our general that stated we have enough nuke to take out every major cities in the US.

China must enlarge its nuclear arsenal by a factor of 100 in the shortest time possible。
Our leaders are not that dumb to not assure MAD in case of a nuclear exchange with the US. I personally confident we have enough to knock out the US. Our policy is consistent with pragmatic. We always kept enough to assure MAD but not boasting overwhelming nuke for political reasons.
 
Not really. How many nukes do you need to guarantee breakthrough US missile defense? Our nuclear arsenal is a mystery but I trust our general that stated we have enough nuke to take out every major cities in the US.
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As far as I know, you need about a hundred modern-day missles.
 
As far as I know, you need about a hundred modern-day missles.
Our compatriot Martian2's estimate nuclear arsenal is in the few hundred at the very least. 2,000 is a very real guess in my estimation. Check out Martian2's post.

China's 294 megatons of thermonuclear deterrence | Page 23
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You are asking one of the most important questions in modern military affairs. I have been intentionally staying away from this complex question. However, since you asked it, I will give you my best answer.

Firstly, I believe the United States has a very good classified estimate of China's nuclear forces (through spy satellites, electronic intercepts, spies, counting ICBMs as they leave the factory, etc.). That is why the U.S. government always refuses to officially comment on Chinese ICBM launches. The U.S. government knows what's going on, but won't tell the public.

Secondly, unless a person is an idiot, it should be obvious that China has a lot more than the 200-400 warheads that the Pentagon has been claiming since 1985 (which was 30 years ago).

A quick estimate shows the ridiculousness of the Pentagon's low-ball estimate.

China has at least three brigades of DF-5 missiles. Assuming all three brigades have been modernized, that's 360 thermonuclear warheads with a half-megaton on each warhead.

3 brigades DF-5B ICBM x 12 missiles per brigade x 10 MIRVs per missile = 360 thermonuclear warheads carried on DF-5B ICBMs

7 brigades DF-31A ICBM (since 2007 introduction and adding one brigade per year) x 12 missiles per brigade x 3 MIRVs = 252 thermonuclear warheads carried on DF-31A ICBMs (assuming NO RELOAD missile per TEL; if you assume ONE reload missile per TEL then you double the number of warheads to 504 thermonuclear warheads)

The first known/reported DF-41 ICBM launch was on July 24, 2012. It has been 17 months since the first known launch. Assuming a production rate of two DF-41 ICBMs per month (which roughly matches the 20 annual Long March rocket launches), China should have 34 DF-41 ICBMs.

34 DF-41 ICBMs x 10 MIRVs per missile = 340 thermonuclear warheads carried on DF-41 ICBMs

There are three important caveats. It is more effective to build one reload missile per TEL. This means the number of DF-41 ICBMs could be 68. Also, the military in every country is usually very well funded compared to the civilian sector. Thus, we would not be surprised at a DF-41 production rate that is double or triple the production of Long March rockets.

Finally, there is a huge uncertainty over the initial date of production of DF-41 ICBMs. I started my estimate on July 24, 2012. However, the earliest picture of the DF-41 ICBM is dated March 21, 2007. If China started production of DF-41 ICBMs years earlier then the Chinese DF-41 ICBM force is considerably larger.

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Now, I will answer your question directly.

The best guess is that the United States is trying to force China to announce/confirm the massive size of the Chinese thermonuclear arsenal. The strategic goal of the United States is to use worldwide public pressure to force China into the strategic arms reduction negotiations and sign a treaty.

There is no way China will ever permit foreign inspectors to examine every Chinese nuclear facility and count the ICBMs. That's not going to happen.

Thus, we live in the strange limbo of today. The United States pretends China's massive thermonuclear arsenal doesn't exist and is at the level of 1985. China won't agree to foreign verification of the Chinese thermonuclear arsenal. China will not permit a foreign expert to examine the secret 3,000-mile Underground Great Wall. This leaves China with leaks by its generals to wipe out the United States in a thermonuclear strike/retaliation.

Another important reason that China can't announce the real size of its thermonuclear arsenal is it would scare everyone around the world. This is a problem for China's business reputation. First and foremost, China is a business-oriented country and exports over $2 trillion of goods each year. Customers worldwide might be scared if they learn the true size of the Chinese thermonuclear arsenal.

In conclusion, China knows the United States is aware of China's real thermonuclear arsenal size. However, due to business considerations and to protect its secret facilities, China cannot reveal the size of its thermonuclear arsenal. Having the freedom to build as many warheads as it likes is in China's strategic interest and a good reason to stay out of arms reduction talks.

The islands in the East and South China Sea are small potatoes. They have historic and emotional interest to China, but they are not important. China is doing the right thing by staying secretive and protecting its strategic interests in a closely-guarded Chinese thermonuclear capability.
 
Our compatriot Martian2's estimate nuclear arsenal is in the few hundred at the very least. 2,000 is a very real guess in my estimation. Check out Martian2's post.

China's 294 megatons of thermonuclear deterrence | Page 23
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I have no idea how these figures correspond to reality. If China has at least 100 modern ICBM - then he is able to break through the U.S. missile defense system.
 
I have no idea how these figures correspond to reality. If China has at least 100 modern ICBM - then he is able to break through the U.S. missile defense system.
If that is the case, we have much more than 100.

You can read further more to page 24 and 25 when Martian2 provided his assessment.

China's 294 megatons of thermonuclear deterrence | Page 24

Thinking about China’s nuclear weapons
30Apr 2013
By Benjamin Schreer
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At a recent ‘track 2’ meeting between Americans and Australians, China’s nuclear arsenal was the subject of considerable debate. In the view of one participant, Beijing’s actual number of strategic nuclear weapons is much higher than the official US intelligence estimate of 300 and could be as much as 1,300. He based his claim on the much-reported 2011 Georgetown University project led by Professor Philipp Karber which concluded that China could have as many 3,000 nuclear weapons hidden in its vast ‘underground great wall’.

When Beijing recently released a new Defence White Paper (DWP), the New York Times ran anop-ed which argued that China had abandoned its long-standing nuclear ‘no first-use’ (NFU) policy because it didn’t get a mentioning in the document. If correct, such assessments would signal a major shift in China’s nuclear strategy. A Chinese arsenal of over 1,000 strategic warheads would basically lead to a Cold War-type situation of mutual assured destruction (MAD) in China’s nuclear relationship with the US and also in its dealings with Russia. A change in its nuclear doctrine would signal to the US and the rest of the region that Beijing now assigns nuclear weapons a major priority in its foreign, security and defence policy. It would also display Chinese anxieties about the heightened possibility of a preemptive strike by the US, with either conventional or nuclear weapons, against its nuclear forces.

To be sure, China has worked to improve the survivability of its nuclear strike capability, including the development of a new generation of nuclear-capable submarines. It’s also entirely possible that the number of its nuclear warheads is higher than official estimates. And Chinese strategists have repeatedly argued that there might contingencies when a strict adherence to ‘no first use’ would have to be reconsidered.

Nevertheless, just as we should analyse the PLA’s conventional modernisation in a cool-headed fashion, we should avoid alarmism about China’s nuclear capabilities. Speculation about the true numbers of Chinese strategic warheads is just that: speculation. In other words, Western analyses should avoid turning ‘could’ into ‘is’, as if we learned nothing from the Iraq WMD assessments. Otherwise we run the risk of replaying Cold War threat assessments in which the Soviets were said to be developing all sorts of magic weaponry which never saw the light of day. While it makes perfect sense from a Chinese perspective to improve its nuclear forces, particularly in the face of overwhelming US conventional strike capability, the survivability of its nuclear deterrent will probably depend much more on investments in infrastructure such as secure command and control systems than achieving ‘strategic parity’ with US and Russian nuclear forces in terms of warhead numbers.

Moreover, as analysts have convincingly argued, the omission of the ‘no first-use’ policy in China’s latest DWP doesn’t prove that Beijing’s nuclear doctrine has changed. On 8 April, the Chinese delegation to the UN Conference on Disarmament reiterated Beijing’s NFU pledge. Indeed, it’s hard to see why it would be in Beijing’s interest to unsettle the international community at a time when every PLA development is analysed through the lens of a changing strategic balance in Asia. In fact, the more confident China becomes in its second strike capability, the less the need for a change in its nuclear doctrine.

All good then? Not necessarily. China modernising its nuclear forces could seriously complicate relations with the United States and Asian neighbours. That’s because nuclear weapons rarely exist in a vacuum but are tied to power balances. Recent scholarship points out that Beijing appears increasingly assured about its nuclear second-strike capability at a time when it has made considerable progress in projecting conventional military power in its ‘Near Seas’. In combination with a lack of comprehensive Sino-US dialogue on the nuclear balance, the emergence of a so-called ‘stability-instability paradox’ in East Asia looms large. That is, (over-) confidence in its ability to deter US military engagement through the threat of nuclear escalation to encourage the Chinese leadership to conduct conventional campaigns to change the status quo.

Unaddressed, there’s a growing danger of US-Sino crisis instability. From a US perspective, China’s nuclear weapons will become more critical in the emerging strategic competition for leadership in Asia. Note that in January this year, President Obama signed a new National Defense Authorization Act (NDDA) which orders the Commander of the US Strategic Command (STRATCOM) to submit a report by mid-August on the ‘underground tunnel network used by the People’s Republic of China with respect to the capability of the United States to use conventional and nuclear forces to neutralise such tunnels and what is stored within such tunnels’.

Further, allies in East Asia will look to their American ally to provide more visible nuclear extended deterrence commitments. While they’ll point to North Korea’s nuclear program, China’s new mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities will increasingly concern them. This suggests that nuclear weapons in Asia will be of growing not decreasing importance. Moreover, China, the US and its allies need to engage in serious dialogue at the political, military and academic level about what ‘strategic stability’ means in 21st century. Like it or not, some Cold War concepts and debate related to nuclear strategy, such as the question of whether and how nuclear war can be controlled, will make a surprising comeback.

Benjamin Schreer is a senior analyst at ASPI. Image courtesy of Flickr user Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
 
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