FaujHistorian
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It appears, without any explicit 'smoking gun' kind of proof being available, that the racist and bigoted mentality that stemmed from the defective and distorted version of the 'narrative of Pakistan' that was current in those years influenced the strategic planning of Pakistani military planners to a significant extent in 1965. Here, it needs to be pointed out that the original, keystone strategy was Operation Gibraltar. It appears that Operation Grand Slam was a contingency plan drawn up at divisional level by the division commander, with the full approval of the high command, of Ayub, but without the participation of the rest of the Army. What follows is this paraphrase of the thought that drove the campaign:
"The timid and fearful Hindus will be intimidated when a small handful of dedicated and zealous professionals mount a violent attack on them, and they will abandon their prepared positions and retreat in panic."
This was at the Army level; at Division level, the argument continued:
"Just in case things go wrong, because they rush more troops in, we have another opportunity for victory, with the bloated extra mass of troops in Kashmir fed by only one roadway. If we cut the roadway, the Indians will have to surrender because of hunger."
It appears, in contrast to the first, there was no religious or religion-born misplaced assessment of strategic outcomes in the second plan. This second plan, Grand Slam, was far more professional in approach, inasmuch as it took into account only the numbers and probabilities into account, not a hidden additional capability inculcated by religious fanaticism.
However, this was an individual commander's plan, not that of the Army. The strategic planning of the Army tolerated this variation on its theme within the overall context of disparaging the 'timid, Hindu' response of the Indians, which did not see a reaction outside the boundaries of Kashmir as a possibility. This strategic blindness displays two, not just one of the ill-effects of the religious influence on strategic planning. At its core, it demonstrated the wholly-mistaken force equation of 1 Pakistani equalling 10 Hindus; outside that core, there is the mistaken notion that the whole of India, colony and princely India alike, were partitioned by the British between Muslim and Hindu before they left. This is a stupid and ill-educated notion that has been mentioned even by seemingly knowledgeable commentators, and arises, in my opinion, from the fact, that with the untimely deaths of Jinnah and Liaqat Ali close together much of the informed knowledge that they would have brought to the understanding of the situation. Instead the entire field was left to the dulled and insensitive discourse of the religious right.
In strategic terms, having been misled by their own assessments, the strategic staff made no attempt at all to consider an Indian counter-attack elsewhere, along the international boundary, and it is possibly due to
- an ill-concealed contempt for Indian courage and fighting spirit of the 'Hindu' Indian;
- an unshakeable belief that partition was not over until Pakistan had achieved all her own objectives, based on the mistaken notion that all Muslim-majority areas within and without the direct and indirect control of the British belonged to Pakistan, never mind what others thought;
These are the ways in which religion infuses nationalism and that in turn infuses the thinking of decision makers, military and foreign service alike.
Joe yaar.
Please go easy on us. OK. You are the last person I'd expect to see a bit carried away.
My reference to religious stuff was for the "historians" that are the focus of this thread.
Believe you me, Pakistani officers are not blinded (at least not totally) by the religious mumbo jumbo. How could they? Pak officers and Indian officers in 65 mostly came from the same stock. Many of the seniors had already fought side by side in WWII, in Wazirastan, and other places. They knew each others' innies and outies.
So let's not try to destroy the whole of Pakistani nationalism, otherwise you too will be getting into Mullah trap, that I have begged to be avoided.
Where we get hit is the amount of money, and as a result amount of weapons that we have.
What Pakistan did in Kashmir was very similar to what Indian army did in the states of deccan, and Junagarh, and E. Bengal.
So let's not get too emotional. We have plenty of other threads to do pak-india chest thumping.
Thank you.