Analysis: ASEAN finds voice over South China Sea dispute
James Hardy, London - IHS Jane's Defence Weekly
14 August 2014
PLA marines march past a monument in the Chinese base at Fiery Cross Reef in April 2010. Credit: Xinhua
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) regional forum that took place in Myanmar over the weekend of 9-10 August was the latest multilateral platform at which officials could address ongoing developments in the South China Sea dispute.
In a surprise move, on 10 August the foreign ministers of the ASEAN member nations issued a joint communiqué that highlighted their "serious concerns" over "recent developments which have increased tensions in the South China Sea". They also "reaffirmed the importance of maintaining peace, stability, maritime security as well as freedom of navigation in and over-flight above the South China Sea". Previous events inevitably ended with anodyne statements tamely reaffirming the parties' commitment to "resolve issues in the South China Sea in a peaceful manner".
This time it was different. "We urged all parties concerned to exercise self-restraint and avoid actions which would complicate the situation and undermine peace, stability, and security in the South China Sea and to settle disputes through peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force", the communiqué added.
This is an unusually forceful language from a body that has previously struggled to find common ground on the South China Sea dispute, most notably at the 2012 ASEAN summit in Phnom Penh, when the Cambodian chairman prevented the Philippine foreign minister from speaking by turning off his microphone.
So what has changed? One school of analysis suggests that more aggressive Chinese rhetoric and activities - adopted by Beijing based on the belief that it deserves the respect that great power status confers - have inspired equally strong reactions from its neighbours.
Another is that the countries most affected by China's activities in the South China Sea - Vietnam and the Philippines - persuaded their ASEAN partners that stronger rhetoric was needed after two changes to the status quo: China's moving of a large oil rig into Vietnam's exclusive economic zone in May and revelations that it is reclaiming land at a number of reefs in the Spratly Islands - in clear defiance of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.
The Chinese position is that the United States and its regional clients - the Philippines and Japan in particular - are creating a sense of crisis in the South China Sea that is not reflected in reality. This position, articulated in an editorial published by Xinhua news agency, accused US Secretary of State John Kerry of "exaggerating the maritime tensions in the region" with his call ahead of the ASEAN forum to freeze activities in the sea. It added that "Washington is further emboldening countries like the Philippines and Vietnam to take a hardline stance against China, raising suspicion over the real intention of the United States and mak[ing] an amicable solution more difficult to reach."
China's position has drawn some support in the United States, where some argue that a misplaced sense of East Asia's value to the US national interest is combining with ideological suspicion of China. Professor Christopher Layne of Texas A&M University wrote in
The Financial Times on 13 August that the "liberal assumptions embedded in American foreign policy" have led to a "spiral of animosity that threatens to culminate in a confrontation between the two countries."
Layne and others argue that the United States needs to appease China's claims to Taiwan and in the South and East China seas on purely pragmatic terms; in their argument, giving up both would have no effect on the US's long-term strategic security.
This may be correct, but it is clear that the immediate effect of such moves would be the destruction of the US alliance system and the post-war consensus. A likely consequence would be the procurement of offensive weapons by Japan - possibly including nuclear weapons - which in turn would risk all-out conflict in Northeast Asia. This may not have a direct effect on the security of the continental United States, but would undermine the international order of which the US has been the 'system administrator'.
Given the US's commitment to maintaining the post-war system, such disengagement is unlikely. However, big questions remain over how it is going to convince China to take statements such as the ASEAN communiqué into account.
The most notable change in rhetorical temperature has been the prominence given to the South China Sea in statements by Kerry and President Barack Obama, who in an interview with
The Economist published on 2 August said that issues such as "what's happening in the ASEAN countries and their concerns about the Chinese posture on maritime issues is instructive. You've seen many of those countries say, we want great relations with China, we don't want to have to choose between China and the United States; on the other hand, we don't want to be bullied just because we're small."
Noting that when dealing with China "simple appeals to international norms are insufficient," Obama added: "There have to be mechanisms, both to be tough with them when we think that they're breaching international norms, but also to show them the potential benefits over the long term."
However, until the United States can outline what these mechanisms are there is unlikely to be any major change in the US position, and by extension, a reduction in tensions in the South China Sea dispute. The only thing that has changed is that the dispute is front and centre in Sino-US relations, where previously it was an irritant that both sides preferred to leave on the sidelines.
Analysis: ASEAN finds voice over South China Sea dispute - IHS Jane's 360
