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An internal British Army document released under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 in 2007 stated an expert opinion that the British Army had failed to defeat the IRA by force of arms but also claims to have "shown the IRA that it could not achieve its ends through violence".The report examined 37 years of British troop deployment and was compiled following a six-month study by a team of three officers carried out in early 2006 for General Sir Mike Jackson, the British Army's Chief of the General Staff. The military assessment describes the IRA as "professional, dedicated, highly skilled and resilient".
The paper divides the IRA activity and tactics in two main periods: The "insurgency" phase (1971–1972), and the "terrorist" phase (1972–1997).The British Army claims to have curbed the IRA insurgency by 1972, after Operation Motorman. The IRA then reemerged as a cell-structured organisation.The report also asserts that the government efforts by the 1980s were aimed to destroy the IRA, rather than negotiate a political solution and that the British campaign produced no final victory "in any recognisable way". One of the conclusions from the paper reveals the failure of the British Army to engage the IRA at strategic level and the lack of a single campaign authority and plan.
On the other hand, some authors, like Patrick McCarthy, Peter Taylor and Brendan O'Brien, also concluded that, unlike previous IRA campaigns, the provisionals were not defeated.According to O'Brien the IRA "could end its armed campaign from a avowed position of strength, discipline and military capacity. They had not been defeated.
The paper divides the IRA activity and tactics in two main periods: The "insurgency" phase (1971–1972), and the "terrorist" phase (1972–1997).The British Army claims to have curbed the IRA insurgency by 1972, after Operation Motorman. The IRA then reemerged as a cell-structured organisation.The report also asserts that the government efforts by the 1980s were aimed to destroy the IRA, rather than negotiate a political solution and that the British campaign produced no final victory "in any recognisable way". One of the conclusions from the paper reveals the failure of the British Army to engage the IRA at strategic level and the lack of a single campaign authority and plan.
On the other hand, some authors, like Patrick McCarthy, Peter Taylor and Brendan O'Brien, also concluded that, unlike previous IRA campaigns, the provisionals were not defeated.According to O'Brien the IRA "could end its armed campaign from a avowed position of strength, discipline and military capacity. They had not been defeated.
