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Saudi Arabia’s nuclear ambitions
Nick Butler | Feb 15 12:00 |
Saudi Arabia's newly appointed King Salman meets with US President Barack Obama © SAUL LOEB/AFP/Getty Images
A new study, to be published by the International Centre for Security Analysis (ICSA) at King’s College London and based on research gathered from open sources across the web and social media demonstrates that the Kingdom is pressing ahead with plans to add 16GW by the early 2030s.
In terms of energy policy the Saudi move is unsurprising. The country now uses 3m barrels a day of oil — more per capita than any other country on earth — to meet the bulk of its energy requirements, including power generation. With total production of some 9.5 mbd, that means that a third of total output is absorbed locally, reducing the level of potential exports. The limited export level also constrains the ability of the country to act as a swing producer — something we have seen over the past six months. The rate of demand growth, backed by population growth (according to the official Saudi Government numbers) of 2.1 per cent per year, could easily push that figure up above 4 mbd within the decade if nothing else changes.
Recent moves suggest both that there is serious concern about this over dependence on oil, and also, implicitly acknowledge that the long proclaimed plans to develop natural gas as a substitute for oil have failed. The Saudis claim to hold some 290 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves but despite repeated exploration efforts actual gas production remains limited, raising questions about the reliability of this estimate and that for the oil reserves (298bn bbl). Since 1982 the Saudis have withheld detailed data and have given external analysts no opportunity to test the claim.
The shift to nuclear therefore has some logic behind it. Saudi Arabia can afford the capital cost and by using nuclear can avoid the pitfalls of dependence on other countries for imported gas. General terms for partnerships with potential suppliers have been signed and there will now no doubt be a frenzied competition for the multibillion dollar contracts. The decisions on who will get the contracts will be a fascinating indication of Saudi foreign policy priorities under King Salman.
Although there is inevitably scope for serious scepticism about whether 16GW (and another 40GW of solar power capacity) will actually be built and commissioned by the early 2030s. Despite a Royal Decree published in 2010, very little actual progress has been made. A number of sites have been provisionally earmarked, in Jabail, Tabuk and Jizan, but no construction has taken place. However there are signs that the plans are being given new impetus. In one of his first acts, King Salman has dismissed the entire Supreme Council of the King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy (KA-CARE). The King has made no statement on nuclear policy since coming to power but was notably involved in the signing of a nuclear co-operation agreement with Japan in 2010.
The pace of development may still be uncertain, but what matters more is the direction of policy. The decision to go for nuclear power may be eminently logical in energy policy terms but it will also, unavoidably, raise concerns about a potential arms race in the region.
Publicly, Saudi denies any intention of developing nuclear weapons capability, but KA-CARE made clear that the country’s intention is to oversee a large proportion of the fuel cycle domestically from the outset and to be 65 per cent self reliant by 2032. Such an aspiration is valid under the terms of the Non Proliferation Treaty but will inevitably provoke scrutiny. The decision contrasts with the choice by the UAE — another state developing nuclear power capacity — to buy from outside rather than seeking a fuel cycle capability of its own.
Regional circumstances raise the possibility that the Saudis could at some point feel that nuclear weapons capability was a necessary part of their defence strategy. Despite the obvious desire of President Obama to conclude a deal which would stop Iran developing any form of nuclear weapons capability, no agreement has been reached and it is not clear if negotiations will continue or not beyond the end of June. The reluctance of the US to engage actively in support of its regional allies causes concern, not just in Israel but also among Iran’s neighbours in the Gulf. The Israelis clearly have the ability to defend themselves and to deter aggression and threats. Others do not. Trust is low and, in a rough neighbourhood, the mood is that every state has to look after itself. Saudi Arabia would not be alone in considering that, if Iran was allowed to continue with its nuclear programme, some countervailing deterrence was necessary. Proliferation of nuclear weapons is notonlya concern when rogue states are involved.
As Henry Kissinger noted in congressional testimony a few weeks ago, “if other countries in the region conclude that America has approved the development of an enrichment capability [which would allow the development of nuclear weapons within 12 months], and if they then insist on building the same capability, we will live in a proliferated world in which everybody . . . will be very close to the trigger point”
http://blogs.ft.com/nick-butler/2015/02/15/saudi-arabias-nuclear-ambitions/
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