Saudi Arabia's Missile Messaging

[Bubblegum Crisis]

Quote 1 :

Saudi Arabia's Missile Messaging

Simon Henderson
April 29, 2014

The inclusion of long-range Chinese-made missiles in a Saudi military parade is likely a diplomatic signal to Iran and the United States.

Earlier today, at Saudi Arabia's northeastern military base of Hafr al-Batin, the kingdom's armed forces held a massive military parade to mark the conclusion of a major exercise codenamed "Abdullah's Sword." A surprise feature of the parade was the inclusion of two Chinese DF-3 missiles, known as the CSS-2 in NATO nomenclature. These missiles were supplied to Saudi Arabia in 1987 and have long been based in the mountainous desert well south of Riyadh, from where they can target Iran. Today is the first time they have been seen in public.

The main guest at the parade was Crown Prince Salman, the Saudi defense minister; other top guests included King Hamad of Bahrain and Sheikh Muhammad bin Zayed, the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, the lead emirate of the UAE. Also present was Pakistani army chief Gen. Raheel Sharif, who sat next to Prince Mitab, the minister of the Saudi National Guard and senior son of the king.

Amid the Persian Gulf's prevailing diplomatic atmosphere -- dominated by concern that ongoing international negotiations will leave Iran as a threshold nuclear weapon state -- the missile display signals Saudi Arabia's determination to counter Tehran's growing strength, as well as its readiness to act independently of the United States. In particular, the presence of Pakistan's top military commander will reawaken speculation that Riyadh may seek to acquire nuclear warheads from Islamabad to match Iran's potential.

Apart from reflecting Saudi suspicions of Iran, the parade and guest list offer still more evidence of Riyadh's lack of confidence in U.S. foreign policy. Reports from last month's summit between President Obama and King Abdullah indicate it was a difficult meeting. Prince Muqrin, the newly appointed deputy crown prince, later told an American visitor that Obama's trip provided "the opportunity to clarify a number of important issues," a formulation that suggests there was little agreement.

When the liquid-fueled DF-3s were delivered in 1987, Riyadh assured Washington that the relatively inaccurate missiles were not equipped with nuclear warheads. Last year, reports emerged that the kingdom had bolstered its strategic missile force with more modern Chinese solid-fueled DF-21s; Washington agreed to allow the deal so long as various components enabling the missiles to carry nuclear warheads were removed. Today's parade did not include DF-21s, though some of the support vehicles trailing the DF-3s may have been more suited to the newer missiles. Both Saudi missile systems could probably be adapted relatively easily to carry Pakistani nuclear warheads.

Using military displays to send diplomatic messages can spur responses in kind from other states. But for Iran, any counter-display could prompt more pressure to include the regime's much larger missile force in the nuclear negotiations. For Washington, the Saudi display is a reminder that Riyadh remains profoundly concerned about the course of events in the region. As the dominance of U.S.-supplied equipment in the parade indicated, Washington is still the kingdom's preferred security partner, but the relationship continues to show signs of being frayed.

Simon Henderson is the Baker Fellow and director of the Gulf and Energy Policy Program at The Washington Institute.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP)


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Quote 2 :

Threat to Mideast Military Balance : U.S. Caught Napping by Sino-Saudi Missile Deal

May 04, 1988|JIM MANN | Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — One day in early March, a U.S. official working in a special government office that keeps track of the construction of airstrips around the world looked at a reconnaissance photo of the Saudi Arabian desert and noticed something extraordinary about a newly constructed airfield.

"Doesn't that look like what the Chinese do with their missile sites?" he asked. Puzzled, he took the picture to some American experts on the Chinese military, who agreed with him.

Within 48 hours, Mideast specialists working in U.S. reconnaissance programs checked and confirmed the first official's alarming suspicions: Saudi Arabia was in the process of installing Chinese CSS-2 intermediate-range missiles.

The discovery of the missile site has reverberated throughout the U.S. government, forcing a painful reexamination of U.S. intelligence-gathering capabilities and raising questions about both the military balance in the Persian Gulf and Chinese intentions around the world.

Nearly two years had elapsed between the Saudi agreement to purchase the Chinese weapons and the discovery of the deal by U.S. intelligence officials poring over photos of the Arabian desert.

U.S. officials now acknowledge that they missed early clues to the weapons sale and were not watching closely enough what the Saudis were doing. They had not been paying much attention to the deserts of Saudi Arabia since the United States sent its warships into the Persian Gulf last summer to escort U.S.-registered oil tankers.

The new missiles now threaten to alter the military balance in the Middle East. The Chinese missiles have a range of nearly 2,000 miles and were originally designed to carry nuclear warheads.


Chinese, Saudi Pledges

Both Chinese and Saudi officials have told the United States that the missiles will carry conventional, not nuclear, warheads. Saudi Arabia recently underlined that assurance by announcing that it would sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and thus pledge not to develop nuclear weapons.

Yet the accuracy of the new missiles is so poor that they are considered of limited use with only conventional explosives. A State Department official wondered: "How can we be sure these missiles will only have conventional warheads?"

Another State Department official pointed out that Saudi Arabia has denied the United States permission to see the missile site and the missiles. "We would like to have had access to them," he said.

Apart from the missiles' impact on the Middle East, they have created new jitters within the U.S. government over China's arms sales.

Even China's sales of Silkworm anti-ship missiles to Iran was not so serious, U.S. officials said. U.S. objections to the Silkworms were based not on the nature of the weapons system but on their threat to U.S. ships in the Persian Gulf. By contrast, U.S. officials say, they objected to China's selling intermediate-range missiles to any country, whether U.S. interests were threatened or not.


'Crossing a Firebreak'

"No other country in the world has ever sought to transfer a weapon like that," said one official. "The Chinese were really crossing a firebreak by selling that kind of weapon to the Saudis."

What follows is the story of China's unprecedented sale of intermediate-range missiles and of the belated U.S. discovery of it. It is based on interviews with U.S. officials, some of whom spoke only on condition that neither their names nor their agencies would be identified.

The sale dates to July, 1985, when Prince Bandar ibn Sultan, the Saudi ambassador to the United States, made a surprise visit to China.

That trip attracted some attention because the Saudi regime is one of the 22 remaining governments that recognize Taiwan's Nationalist regime as the legitimate government of China. There was speculation in Beijing that China and Saudi Arabia were exploring the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations.

But this speculation was off the mark. The prince wanted to talk about arms, not diplomacy.

At the time, Congress had just rejected the Saudis' request for new U.S. arms, including F-15 planes and short-range Lance missiles. U.S. analysts now believe that while in Beijing, the prince reached an agreement in principle from Chinese leaders to purchase China's intermediate-range CSS-2 missiles.


'Really Big Bucks' Involved

"Bucks were a factor, really big bucks, multibillion dollars in one sale," said one U.S. analyst who asked not to be identified. "In addition, this was part of a pattern of Chinese foreign policy, of wanting to play a major role throughout the world."

U.S. officials say China has shown a particular desire for influence in the Middle East, where it has sought to cultivate relationships with virtually every country in the region. China has had recent arms deals with Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Syria and Israel, they say.

Yet never before had the Chinese sold intermediate-range missiles. U.S. officials say they are not sure whether Prince Bandar went to China seeking the CSS-2 missiles or whether Chinese officials took the initiative.

"A decision like that had to be made at the highest levels (in China)," said one U.S. expert. "Maybe no more than eight or 10 people in China knew what was happening." U.S. officials believe that only Chinese military officials, and China's paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping, knew about the discussions.

U.S. government analysts believe China and Saudi Arabia ironed out the details and struck a final deal on the sale of the missiles in 1986. Soon afterward, some Saudi personnel began traveling to China for secret training on the missiles.


Work Begun Last Year

Construction of the missile site is thought to have started some time last year about 60 miles south of Riyadh. One U.S. source suggested the Saudis may have used a private construction crew from a third country, but other government experts said Chinese workers were imported.

China is thought to have produced no more than 100 of the CSS-2 missiles in their original version, which was first made operational in 1971. U.S. officials say they believe Saudi Arabia purchased between 20 and 24 of these missiles.

What U.S. officials finally uncovered in early March was "a training center," said one U.S. government expert. The Saudis were preparing to train crews to man the missile sites.

The Saudi missile site presented U.S. policy-makers with an awkward problem. Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian was about to arrive in Washington in March for a long-awaited official visit, which the United States hoped would ease a series of recent strains in Sino-American relations.

"It was a bad time for the China hands," said one U.S. official. "Wu was coming to town the next day. All the policy people were saying, 'Don't give us another problem.' "


State Department Disclaimer

A State Department official involved in the policy discussions insisted this was not true. "There wasn't any disinclination to address this issue," he said.

U.S. officials led by Secretary of State George P. Shultz raised the subject of the missile sale during the talks with Wu. Asked whether the United States was satisfied with China's response, a State Department official replied: "No, but we're satisfied that if we want to pursue this, we have the means for doing it."

In early April, Wu publicly confirmed the sale of the missiles to Saudi Arabia. But he said the Saudis had promised China the missiles would not be transferred to other countries and would be used only for defensive purposes. The sale of the missiles "will help stabilize the situation in that country and in the Middle East in general," Wu asserted.

The discovery of the missiles by U.S. officials produced a quick examination of how U.S. intelligence agencies had failed to detect the missile sale. U.S. agencies prepared a Special National Intelligence Estimate, an internal intelligence report, reviewing the transaction, but the report is classified and could not be obtained.

One official familiar with this review said the United States had failed to uncover the sale at the time the deal was made. He said there were some "early indications" that China was shipping arms to Saudi Arabia, but U.S. analysts mistakenly believed that Saudi Arabia was merely being used as a transshipment point for Chinese weapons sales elsewhere in the Mideast.


'Looking at the Desert'

The other problem, this official said, was that U.S. intelligence analysts were not paying enough attention to Saudi Arabia, a nation with which the United States has long enjoyed close relations. "Analysts were focused on the gulf and Iran," he said. "They were not focused on the desert. . . . Now it's a high priority, and our people are looking at the desert."

U.S. officials in the executive branch described the discovery of the missile site in March as stemming from aerial or satellite reconnaissance. A source on Capitol Hill said that while this might be true, he believed U.S. intelligence officials might have first received a tip from a human source.

Throughout the summer and fall of 1987, the United States and China were at odds over China's sales of Silkworm anti-ship missiles to Iran. The regime of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini had installed the Silkworms near the entrance to the Persian Gulf, and U.S. officials had became concerned that the Chinese missiles could be used against U.S. ships.

U.S. officials say the sale of intermediate-range missiles was different from the Silkworm sale--in some ways less serious, in other ways more so.

"The Saudi missile problem falls into a different realm," said one State Department expert. "No U.S. territory was threatened. It was sold to a friendly country. It raised concerns about Israel's security, but in all probability, the reason the Saudis bought them had nothing to do with Israel."


Protection Against Iran

The Saudi regime wanted the missiles as protection against Iran, this official said. Last month, Saudi King Fahd warned in a newspaper interview that his country would not hesitate to use the Chinese missiles in defense against Iran.

But apart from being unprecedented, the sale of intermediate-range missiles introduced a new weapons system into the Mideast, perhaps the most volatile region in the world, raising the question of whether other nations in the region would seek to acquire similar missiles.

"This says a lot about Chinese priorities, about their views on nuclear proliferation and their role in the world," said one U.S. analyst. "They seem to have different views of what is responsible behavior in the international arena than we have in the West, or even the Soviet Union."

The principal unanswered question is whether Saudi Arabia intended the CSS-2 missiles to carry nuclear warheads.

U.S. officials say the Chinese missiles are so inaccurate that they seem to be of little use in carrying conventional weapons. A nuclear warhead would ensure destruction of a target even if a missile fell far from where it was intended.


Missile Not Accurate Enough

"You can't make that (missile) accurate enough to be useful" with a conventional warhead, one U.S. official said. Still, he added, Saudi Arabia's recent signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has helped persuade him that the Saudis had bought the missile for use with a conventional warhead.

One American analyst said the Saudis might have sought to develop a nuclear program in an unprecedented, backward fashion. "Others build a bomb and then obtain the delivery vehicle," he said. "The Saudis seem to have bought the vehicles, and maybe they hope the team (to develop a nuclear bomb) will come later."

If China and Saudi Arabia are telling the truth and the missiles were never intended to carry nuclear weapons, then why did the Saudis buy them? One Capitol Hill source raised the possibility that the missiles could be used with poison gas.

But U.S. officials say there is another explanation--that the Saudis actually intended from the start to use the inaccurate missile with a conventional warhead.

"Maybe the Chinese pulled off the caper of the century," one expert said. "They took these old missiles they're probably phasing out anyway, put conventional warheads on them and sold them to the Saudis for use against Tehran."


Los Angeles Times


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[Bubblegum Crisis]

Quote 3 :

Fear and Loathing in the Kingdom

How Washington stabbed the Saudis in the back, and why the Iran deal will start a nuclear arms race in the Persian Gulf.

BY John Hannah
NOVEMBER 29, 2013

Pundits and policymakers are missing the big worry about the Obama administration's Iranian nuclear deal: its greatest impact is not ensuring that Iran doesn't get the bomb, but that the Saudis will.

Indeed, the risk of arms race in the Middle East -- on a nuclear hair trigger -- just went up rather dramatically. And it increasingly looks like the coming Sunni-Shiite war will be nuclearized.

Two aspects of the agreement, in particular, will consolidate Saudi fears that an Iranian bomb is now almost certainly coming to a theater near them. First, the pre-emptive concession that the comprehensive solution still to be negotiated will leave Iran with a permanent capability to enrich uranium -- the key component of any program to develop nuclear weapons. In the blink of an eye, and without adequate notice or explanation to key allies who believe their national existence hangs in the balance, the United States appears to have fatally compromised the long-standing, legally-binding requirements of at least five United Nations Security Council resolutions. If the Saudis needed any confirmation that last month's rejection of a Security Council seat was merited -- on grounds that U.S. retrenchment has rendered the organization not just irrelevant, but increasingly dangerous to the kingdom's core interests -- they just got it, in spades.

Second, the agreement suggests that even the comprehensive solution will be time-limited. In other words, whatever restrictions are eventually imposed on Iran's nuclear program won't be permanent. The implication is quite clear: At a point in time still to be negotiated (three years, five, ten?) and long after the international sanctions regime has been dismantled, the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear program will be left unshackled, free to enjoy the same rights under the Non-Proliferation Treaty as any other member in good standing. That looks an awful lot like a license to one day build an industrial-size nuclear program, if Iran so chooses, with largely unlimited ability to enrich uranium and reprocess plutonium, a la Japan.

But of course Iran is not Japan -- a peaceful, stable democracy aligned with the West. It is a bloody-minded, terror-sponsoring, hegemony-seeking revisionist power that has serially violated its non-proliferation commitments and which aims to destroy Israel, drive America out of the Middle East, and bring down the House of Saud.

Whether or not President Obama fully appreciates that distinction, the Saudis most definitely do.

Of course, Saudi concerns extend well beyond the four corners of last week's agreement. For Riyadh, Iran's march toward the bomb is only the most dangerous element -- the coup de grace in its expanding arsenal, if you will -- of an ongoing, region-wide campaign to overturn the Middle East's existing order in favor of one dominated by Tehran. The destabilization and weakening of Saudi Arabia is absolutely central to that project, and in Saudi eyes has been manifested in a systematic effort by Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to extend its influence and tentacles near and far, by sowing violence, sabotage, terror, and insurrection -- in Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and most destructively of all, in the IRGC's massive intervention to abet the slaughter in Syria and salvage the regime of Bashar al-Assad.

Fairly or not, from the Saudi perspective, the nuclear deal not only ignores these central elements of the existential challenge that Iran poses to the kingdom's well-being, it threatens to greatly exacerbate them by elevating and legitimizing the Islamic Republic's claim to great power status. As surely as Obama's chemical weapons deal with Syria implicitly green-lighted the intensification of the Assad regime's murder machine, so, too, the Saudis fear, a nuclear deal with the mullahs will grant a free hand -- if not an implicit American imprimatur -- to the long-standing Iranian quest for regional supremacy that, to Saudi minds, won't end until it reaches Mecca and Medina.

It should be said that Saudi paranoia about being sacrificed on the altar of a U.S.-Iranian deal is nothing new. But the fact is that, today, the Saudis look around and believe they've got more reasons than ever before to think that they're largely on their own.

As the saying goes, even paranoids have enemies. On one issue after another that they've deemed absolutely vital to their interests -- Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and now Iran -- the Saudis view the Obama administration as having been at best indifferent to their most urgent concerns, and at worst openly hostile. To Saudi minds, a very clear and dangerous pattern has now been conclusively established. And its defining characteristic is not pretty at all to behold: the selling out of longtime allies, even betrayal. Indeed, the Saudi listen to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rail against the Iran deal and realize that even Israel, by leaps and bounds America's foremost friend in the Middle East, is not immune. And they wonder where in the world does that leave them. How do you say "screwed" in Arabic?

The crisis of confidence in the reliability, purposes, and competence of American power has reached an all-time high. The Saudis have taken due note of National Security Advisor Susan Rice's declaration that "there's a whole world out there" beyond the Middle East that needs attention, and her predecessor's lament that the United States had "over-invested" in the region. The kingdom has become increasingly convinced that there's a method to Obama's madness, a systematic effort to reduce America's exposure and involvement in the region's conflicts, to downsize Washington's role and leadership, to retrench and, yes, to retreat.

Whatever the reason -- a weak and unprincipled president, a tired and fed up population, a broken economy and dysfunctional politics, growing energy independence (the Saudis cite all these and more) -- there's a growing conviction in Riyadh that the United States has run dangerously short of breath when it comes to standing by its allies in the Middle East. Obama wants out. Face-saving deals on issues like Syria and Iran that are designed not to resolve the region's most dangerous problems, but rather to defer them from exploding until he's safely out of office are the order of the day -- Saudi vital interests be damned ... or so they fear.

It must be noted that the breach in trust has become intensely personal. The Saudi dismay with Obama and his chief lieutenants is hard to overstate at this point. Secretary of State John Kerry in particular has become a target of derision. In the days immediately following the Assad regime's Aug. 21 chemical weapons attack, the phone calls between Kerry and senior Saudi leaders apparently ran fast and furious. Proof that Syria had smashed Obama's red line on chemical weapons was overwhelming, Kerry assured his interlocutors. A U.S. attack to punish the Assad regime was a sure thing. The Saudis were ecstatic, convinced that at long last Obama was prepared to get off the sidelines and decisively shift the conflict's trajectory in favor of the West and against Iran. Intelligence, war planning and targeting information were allegedly exchanged. Hints abound that the Saudis were ginned up not only to help finance the operation, but to participate actively with planes and bombs of their own. King Abdullah is rumored to have ordered relevant ministries to prepare to go to the Saudi equivalent of DEFCON 2, the level just short of war.

Then, on Aug. 31, the Saudis turned on CNN, expecting to watch President Obama announce the imminent enforcement of his red-line -- only to see him flinch by handing the decision off to Congress. The Saudis were enraged, dumbfounded, and convinced that Kerry had deliberately deceived and misled them. Told that Kerry himself had been caught largely unaware by Obama's decision, the Saudis were hardly mollified. A liar or an irrelevancy? Either one was disastrous from their perspective.

Unfortunately, the routine has repeated itself several times since -- on one issue after another considered critical to Saudi interests. Hence: Riyadh learned about the U.S.-Russia deal on Syria's chemical weapons from CNN. Riyadh learned about Obama's decision to suspend large chunks of military assistance to Egypt from CNN. And two weeks ago, Riyadh learned that the P5+1 was on the verge of signing an initial (and from its perspective, very bad) deal with Iran from CNN -- even though Kerry had just been in Saudi Arabia earlier that week in an effort to contain at least some of the fallout from the Syria fiasco. Instead, he ended up doubling down on the breach. Detailed revelations in recent days that for the better part of a year, the Obama administration has been engaged in secret bilateral talks with Iran that it sought to keep hidden from its allies -- while merely adding detail to what the Saudis had already suspected from their own sources -- will no doubt only further stoke the kingdom's fears that the fix is in between Washington and the mullahs.

An atmosphere this poisonous is dangerous, to say the least. The incentive for the Saudis to engage in all kinds of self-help that Washington would find less than beneficial, even destructive, is significant and rising. Driven into a corner, feeling largely abandoned by their traditional superpower patron, no one should doubt that the Saudis will do what they believe is necessary to ensure their survival. It would be a mistake to underestimate their capacity to deliver some very unpleasant surprises: from the groups they feel compelled to support in their escalating proxy war with Iran, to the price of oil, to their sponsorship (and bankrolling) of a much expanded regional role for Russia and China at America's expense. Convincing ourselves that the Saudis will bitch and moan, but in the end prove powerless to act in ways that harm key U.S. interests would be a very risky strategy.

Which brings us to the question of the Saudi bomb. King Abdullah has been unequivocal with a series of high-level interlocutors going back several years: If Iran gets the bomb, we get the bomb. There's not much artifice to the man. He's been clear. He's been consistent. He's not known to bluff. And I believe him.

Whether or not all the stories about the longstanding arrangements with the Pakistani nuclear program are true, there's enough of a link there that no one should be too shocked if we wake up next week, next month, or next year to discover that a small nuclear arsenal has suddenly shown up in the Saudi order of battle. If the prospect of an Israel-Iran nuclear standoff doesn't quite get your pulse to racing, how do you feel about adding a Saudi-Iran standoff to the mix?

Think of two nuclear powers eyeball to eyeball across the Strait of Hormuz -- with religious hatreds boiling over, ballistic missile flight times measured in minutes, and command and control protocols, well, less than robust. Even short of a nuclear exchange, what do you think that would do to the price premium on a barrel of oil? Can anyone say "instant global recession"?

That's clearly the direction we're headed, and it's my hunch that the Iran deal has pushed the day of reckoning dangerously closer. I don't know if it's possible at this late date to walk the Saudis back from the ledge. But the Obama administration should try. I think the place to start, and rapidly, is with the Saudi national security advisor and intelligence chief, Prince Bandar bin Sultan. Formerly Riyadh's ambassador to Washington, Bandar is now clearly the tip of the spear in King Abdullah's efforts to combat the Iranian threat around the region -- not to mention the principal point of contact in the kingdom's thick relationship with Pakistan's military and intelligence establishment. He's been in virtually every major international capital in recent months -- with the notable exception of Washington. That alone speaks volumes of how much the situation has deteriorated. President Obama personally needs to get Bandar in the Oval Office as quickly as possible for a very frank discussion about the strategic situation in all its complexities -- and what the United States and Saudi Arabia, together, can do about it. At this point, no one else but the commander-in-chief stands a chance of convincing the Saudis that more desperate measures are not called for.

Exactly what Obama would have to say to make the sale is another matter. On the nuclear deal, he'd have to be able to guarantee that any follow-on agreement would, at a minimum, see Iran compelled to accept a massive roll-back of its existing capabilities -- as close to zero as possible -- as well as a specially-designed, highly-intrusive verification regime. And should Iran reject that bottom-line, the president would have to be equally convincing that he's prepared to walk away from a bad deal and use force decisively to dismantle the most dangerous elements of the Iranian program. Should it come to that, and as a mark of his seriousness, he might broach the range of important contributions the Saudis could make to such an effort -- including managing global oil markets and Arab public opinion, basing and over-flight rights, financing, and direct military participation.

On the broader Iranian regional challenge, Syria is absolutely central for the Saudis. The president would need to be able to say something new and compelling about a genuine shift in U.S. strategy, one seriously committed to working with the kingdom to change the balance of power on the ground against the Assad regime and its Iranian backers, while marginalizing al Qaeda. Obama also be well-served by a serious discussion of Saudi regional priorities, and ways that Washington is prepared to cooperate with Riyadh in a sustained and careful way to advance our common interests -- in weakening Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthi rebellion in Yemen, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and Iran's influence in Iraq.

The chances that President Obama will be prepared to do any of this, I admit, are slim to none. Doing what comes as second-nature to Iran's leaders -- fighting and negotiating with your enemy at the same -- is just not in his DNA. Moreover, it would be completely contrary to his broader strategic purpose of extricating the United States from what he sees as the Middle East morass. The fact is that Obama thinks he's on the right track. If that makes the Saudis uncomfortable, if it forces them to adjust and take matters more into their own hands, so be it. To his mind, there's really not much that they can do without shooting themselves in the foot. At the end of the day, Obama believes, the Saudis know that they need us far more than we need them, and will act accordingly. At most, a pat on the head, a few vague reassurances that we take their concerns seriously, and a promise to consult more frequently on key issues will suffice to keep them quiet and in line.

I hope he's right. But I strongly suspect that he may be wrong and that we all could be in for a rude awakening at some point. My fear is that in a few years time, we will look back and conclude that President Obama -- who came to office with the lofty ambition of restoring America's standing with the Arab world and strengthening the global non-proliferation regime -- has instead done extensive damage to both causes that will be difficult, if not impossible, to repair in short order, and will come at a very, very high price in blood, treasure, and U.S. interests. If that's the case, we're in for a very rocky road, indeed. Buckle up.


Foreign Policy

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Continue... See old links :

Why does Saudi Arabia need nuclear power? | Page 7


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[Kompromat]

As a show of strength it has value, tactically not so much. DF-3, DF-21 and Shahab III cannot do more damage than a few artillery shells fired in a volley. These missiles if used in a conventional war between KSA and Iran won't offer much tactical advantage over each other (Both Saudi and Iranian) as they are not designed for high accuracy but for delivering WMDs. Since none of the states are going into a nuclear war these missiles only have significance as shock and awe weapons.

Unlikely as it is, any war between KSA and Iran might see Iran using its Ballistic Missiles first and often since their air force simply is incapable of doing any damage to the KSA. They will opt for stand off strikes using Ballistic Missiles while KSA will seek to mount air strikes with its F-15SA, Typhoon flying cover while Tornados doing the pounding with Ballistic Missiles used as a fear factor or not used to extract international support.

 

[MOHSENAM]

As a show of strength it has value, tactically not so much. DF-3, DF-21 and Shahab III cannot do more damage than a few artillery shells fired in a volley. These missiles if used in a conventional war between KSA and Iran won't offer much tactical advantage over each other (Both Saudi and Iranian) as they are not designed for high accuracy but for delivering WMDs. Since none of the states are going into a nuclear war these missiles only have significance as shock and awe weapons.

Unlikely as it is, any war between KSA and Iran might see Iran using its Ballistic Missiles first and often since their air force simply is incapable of doing any damage to the KSA. They will opt for stand off strikes using Ballistic Missiles while KSA will seek to mount air strikes with its F-15SA, Typhoon flying cover while Tornados doing the pounding with Ballistic Missiles used as a fear factor or not used to extract international support.

you are thinking too ultra on some saudi playthings planes.
in less than one weak all of arab princes will run away to UAE .

 

[Arabian Legend]

you are thinking too ultra on some saudi playthings planes.
in less than one weak all of arab princes will run away to UAE .

Could you please expand your thought from a technical point of view.

 

[Informant]

you are thinking too ultra on some saudi playthings planes.
in less than one weak all of arab princes will run away to UAE .

Militarily Saudi will crush Iran. It's common knowledge. RSAF is a mighty mighty force. Plus their AWACs support and Missile defence shields will make it impenetrable for Iran to actually cause damage.

 

[Al Bhatti]

As a show of strength it has value, tactically not so much. DF-3, DF-21 and Shahab III cannot do more damage than a few artillery shells fired in a volley. These missiles if used in a conventional war between KSA and Iran won't offer much tactical advantage over each other (Both Saudi and Iranian) as they are not designed for high accuracy but for delivering WMDs. Since none of the states are going into a nuclear war these missiles only have significance as shock and awe weapons.

Unlikely as it is, any war between KSA and Iran might see Iran using its Ballistic Missiles first and often since their air force simply is incapable of doing any damage to the KSA. They will opt for stand off strikes using Ballistic Missiles while KSA will seek to mount air strikes with its F-15SA, Typhoon flying cover while Tornados doing the pounding with Ballistic Missiles used as a fear factor or not used to extract international support.

Iranian Airforce is incapable for attacking any target on UAE mainland keeping in mind that UAE is nearer to Iran than KSA is to Iran. KSA is just too far for them.

 

[SALMAN F]

Who cares about al salol the gambling losers criminal family

 

[Saad Huzaifa]

Saudi Messile

 

[Yzd Khalifa]

We've already upgraded the DF-3 for the sole purpose of retaliation.

In addition to the DF-3s, we do operate several platforms.

Speaking of launching a ballistic-missile-attack against an opponent, I do think that the only possibility of launching such an attack will only be used against an aggressor enemy. In other word, KSA won't be using these kind of platforms preemptively under any circumstances.

Iran's missile arsenal poses a minimal threat though, but it has already been dealt with, thanks to the Peace Shield.

As a show of strength it has value, tactically not so much. DF-3, DF-21 and Shahab III cannot do more damage than a few artillery shells fired in a volley. These missiles if used in a conventional war between KSA and Iran won't offer much tactical advantage over each other (Both Saudi and Iranian) as they are not designed for high accuracy but for delivering WMDs. Since none of the states are going into a nuclear war these missiles only have significance as shock and awe weapons.

Unlikely as it is, any war between KSA and Iran might see Iran using its Ballistic Missiles first and often since their air force simply is incapable of doing any damage to the KSA. They will opt for stand off strikes using Ballistic Missiles while KSA will seek to mount air strikes with its F-15SA, Typhoon flying cover while Tornados doing the pounding with Ballistic Missiles used as a fear factor or not used to extract international support.

you are thinking too ultra on some saudi playthings planes.
in less than one weak all of arab princes will run away to UAE .

Yeah, it will be more like of the same thing that happened between you and Iraq.

If it won't be for the RSAF's countermeasures, then it should go for this Saudi Arabia - Peace Shield

 

[Kompromat]

Employing Ballistic Missiles in a conventional war where balance of power doesn't exist at least in airpower would be a stupid idea.

 

[Abii]

Missiles have a shelf life. The fuel is almost certainly expired and the integrity of the missile itself is very questionable.

In any case though, ballistic missiles with conventional warheads are essentially artillery shells with a bigger blast radius. Useless weapons for the most part.

 

[p e r petuall i o n]

Sms it next time ...

 

[doritos]

Missiles have a shelf life. The fuel is almost certainly expired and the integrity of the missile itself is very questionable.

In any case though, ballistic missiles with conventional warheads are essentially artillery shells with a bigger blast radius. Useless weapons for the most part.

Even when Iran and Iraq were producing their own ballistic missiles in large quantities they made little difference in the war.

 

[Abii]

Even when Iran and Iraq were producing their own ballistic missiles in large quantities they made little difference in the war.

They're essentially terror weapons designed to lower morale (if you use them on indiscriminately on civilian areas). Unless they're being used as a WMD carrier, they're the world's most costly artillery shells.