Regiments of the Pakistan Army
- Thread starter Xeric
- Start date
Sinnerman108
ELITE MEMBER
- Joined
- Jul 20, 2009
- Messages
- 8,994
- Reaction score
- -3
- Country
- Location
MCS runs degree courses, TE & BESE.
TE or EE as it was called has been going on since a long time.
BESE was started after NUST moved in.
The YOs are enrolled in TE / BESE programs mostly, along with Cadets (TCC).
Jr staff course is a course between YO's and MCC, right ? NO.
fatman17
PDF THINK TANK: CONSULTANT
- Joined
- Apr 24, 2007
- Messages
- 32,563
- Reaction score
- 98
- Country
- Location
Pakistan Army Tanks
At odds with its neighbor India, Pakistan has been keen in maintaining a healthy stock of capable combat tanks through the decades.
1942-1952 – M4 Sherman (Medium Tank, M4).
The Sherman lived a long and productive combat life thanks to the spate of global conflicts dotting the cold war years. These included the Greek civil war, The Arab-Israeli war, The Suez Crisis, The Indo-Pak Conflict of 1965, The Six Day war, The Indo – Pak Conflict of 1971, and the Yom Kippur War.
1944-1954 – M24 Chaffee(Light Tank, M24).
Though appearing in the latter years of WW2, the light tank M24 Chaffee found its true calling in the Korean War.
1949 – 1959 - T-54 Medium Tank / MBT.
The T-54/55 can lay claim to be one of the most experienced combat tanks in the history of mechanized warfare – the system seeing action across Africa, the Balkans, throughout the Middle East and Asia. Soviet production of the T-54/55 lasted until 1981.
1951-1961 – M47 (Patton II) Medium Tank.
The Military Assistance Program (MAP) of the cold war era ensured that the tank lived a hearty existence within the ranks of NATO allies throughout the 50’s. the Pakistani Army unleashed the M47 on India in the Indo-Pak War of 1965.
1952-1962 – M48 Patton Medium Tank.
The M48 Patton was utilized to good effect in the Vietnam War by the US Army, despite the foreign terrain. War was never far from the M48 for she also contended with enemies in the Six Day War of 1967, The Indo-Pak Wars of 1965 and 1971 and the brutal Iran-Iraq Wars of the 1980’s.
M48’s in the Indo-Pak War of 1965.
The Indian –Pakistani War of 65 was in fact the first use of the M-48 in ‘tank-versus-tank’ duels. The M48 was fielded by the Pakistani Army against the Centurion and M4 Sherman of the Indian Army. From the out-set, the M48 proved a valuable tool through brute force and coordinated attacks. They were equally useful in repelling Indian offensives in turn. However, the Battle of Asel Utter saw some 50 Pakistani tanks lost in one battle, many of them M48’s. post battle reviews signified that Pakistani tactics were largely to blame, though other reviews found fault with the M48’s armour protection against even an 84mm main gun.
The follow-up Indo-Pak War of 1971 saw more of the same in terms of pitched battles between the two powers. However by this time the M48 was largely out of touch with the modern battlefield and results were not so positive as they were in 1965. Captured Pakistani tanks were put on display by the Indians in the Khemkaran District – the memorial named Patton Nagar or Patton City.
1958-1968 – T-55 Medium Tank / MBT.
The T-55 MBT was a further upgrade of the T-54 series. The T-55 was widely exported to Soviet allies and nation states.
1959-1969 – Type 59 MBT.
The Type 59 was nothing more than a Chinese copy of the Soviet T-54 MBT. The NORINCO produced Type 59 was actually based on the purchase and subsequent licensed local production of the Soviet T-54 MBT.
1963-1973 – Type 63 (WZ211) Amphibious Light Tanks.
The Chinese Army Type 63 is a light amphibious tank design based on Soviet origin. The Chinese NORINCO built Type 63 is in many ways a relative to the Soviet designed and built PT-76 troop carrier.
1969-1979 – Type 69 MBT.
The Chinese produced Type 69 has seen good export numbers. The NORINCO produced Type 69 is a further indigenous development based on previous Soviet hardware purchases.
1976-1986 T-80 MBT.
The T-80 MBT tried to improve upon the T-64 and the T-72 MBT’s. T-80 holds the distinction of being the first Russian tank to be powered by a gas turbine. While the Soviet Union/Russia was – at one point – the most notable operator of the T-80, the system inevitably found its way into the inventories of supporting allies or satellite states. Chinese examples were transferred to Pakistan.
1985 – 1995 – Type 85 – II MBT.
The NORINCO produced Type 85 – II is a further development of the Type 80 MBT but offers up a host of improvements over its predecessor. Type 85 – IIAP is a Pakistani produced variant.
1999-2009 Type 84 MBT.
The T-84 is a much improved development of the original Soviet era T-80 MBT. The initial T-84 production was designated simply as the T-84 while based on the Soviet T-80UD design. Pakistan signed a procurement deal for 320 T-84’s.
2001 – 2011 – HIT AL-Khalid (MBT 2000) MBT.
The Al Khalid is nothing more than the NORINCO brand Type 90 – IIM MBT developed to suit Pakistani Army requirements. The Al Khalid is essentially a hybrid tank design with systems, armament and subsystems originating from a variety of global resources, though the tank system itself, as a whole are a locally produced product native to Pakistan. Additionally engines are of Ukrainian origin while production is handled within Pakistan. In most respects the Al Khalid can be viewed as the ‘ultimate’ evolution of the T-54 MBT. As of this writing 320 examples of the Al Khalid have been delivered out of a eventual production run of 1,200. The Al Khalid I represents a proposed upgraded model with revised systems, engine, autoloader and armour as well as the ability to fire KOMBAT ATGM’s for increased lethality.
Variants;
Al Khalid – initial production model
Al Khalid I – improved Al Khalid, improved subsystems (fire control, jammers), increased main gun ammo to 49 rounds.
Al Khalid – II – improved Al Khalid under development, modular armour kit, revised armour formula, 1,500 hp diesel engine.
2004-present – HIT AL Zarrar MBT.
With Ukrainian assistance, Pakistan developed the Al Zarrar MBT based on the Chinese Type 59 series. The Type 59 began to show its limitations through age and constantly changing battlefield technologies. As such Pakistani Type 59 stocks were selected for a refit program that sought to upgrade the fleet to produce a more modern end-product suitable for use on the modern battlefield. Full scale serial production of the new tank began in 2003 as the system was adapted into Pakistan Army service as the ‘Al Zarrar’. First deliveries took place in 2004 and continue as of this writing (2012). To date nearly 350 Pakistan Army Type 59’s have been upgraded to the newer Al Zarrar standard.
The Al Zarrar series has been actively utilized in the fighting in and around Swat and Malakand against entrenched militants. One example survived multiple suicide bombing attacks to which the tank was eventually put out of commission but its entire crew surviving.
MT
At odds with its neighbor India, Pakistan has been keen in maintaining a healthy stock of capable combat tanks through the decades.
1942-1952 – M4 Sherman (Medium Tank, M4).
The Sherman lived a long and productive combat life thanks to the spate of global conflicts dotting the cold war years. These included the Greek civil war, The Arab-Israeli war, The Suez Crisis, The Indo-Pak Conflict of 1965, The Six Day war, The Indo – Pak Conflict of 1971, and the Yom Kippur War.
1944-1954 – M24 Chaffee(Light Tank, M24).
Though appearing in the latter years of WW2, the light tank M24 Chaffee found its true calling in the Korean War.
1949 – 1959 - T-54 Medium Tank / MBT.
The T-54/55 can lay claim to be one of the most experienced combat tanks in the history of mechanized warfare – the system seeing action across Africa, the Balkans, throughout the Middle East and Asia. Soviet production of the T-54/55 lasted until 1981.
1951-1961 – M47 (Patton II) Medium Tank.
The Military Assistance Program (MAP) of the cold war era ensured that the tank lived a hearty existence within the ranks of NATO allies throughout the 50’s. the Pakistani Army unleashed the M47 on India in the Indo-Pak War of 1965.
1952-1962 – M48 Patton Medium Tank.
The M48 Patton was utilized to good effect in the Vietnam War by the US Army, despite the foreign terrain. War was never far from the M48 for she also contended with enemies in the Six Day War of 1967, The Indo-Pak Wars of 1965 and 1971 and the brutal Iran-Iraq Wars of the 1980’s.
M48’s in the Indo-Pak War of 1965.
The Indian –Pakistani War of 65 was in fact the first use of the M-48 in ‘tank-versus-tank’ duels. The M48 was fielded by the Pakistani Army against the Centurion and M4 Sherman of the Indian Army. From the out-set, the M48 proved a valuable tool through brute force and coordinated attacks. They were equally useful in repelling Indian offensives in turn. However, the Battle of Asel Utter saw some 50 Pakistani tanks lost in one battle, many of them M48’s. post battle reviews signified that Pakistani tactics were largely to blame, though other reviews found fault with the M48’s armour protection against even an 84mm main gun.
The follow-up Indo-Pak War of 1971 saw more of the same in terms of pitched battles between the two powers. However by this time the M48 was largely out of touch with the modern battlefield and results were not so positive as they were in 1965. Captured Pakistani tanks were put on display by the Indians in the Khemkaran District – the memorial named Patton Nagar or Patton City.
1958-1968 – T-55 Medium Tank / MBT.
The T-55 MBT was a further upgrade of the T-54 series. The T-55 was widely exported to Soviet allies and nation states.
1959-1969 – Type 59 MBT.
The Type 59 was nothing more than a Chinese copy of the Soviet T-54 MBT. The NORINCO produced Type 59 was actually based on the purchase and subsequent licensed local production of the Soviet T-54 MBT.
1963-1973 – Type 63 (WZ211) Amphibious Light Tanks.
The Chinese Army Type 63 is a light amphibious tank design based on Soviet origin. The Chinese NORINCO built Type 63 is in many ways a relative to the Soviet designed and built PT-76 troop carrier.
1969-1979 – Type 69 MBT.
The Chinese produced Type 69 has seen good export numbers. The NORINCO produced Type 69 is a further indigenous development based on previous Soviet hardware purchases.
1976-1986 T-80 MBT.
The T-80 MBT tried to improve upon the T-64 and the T-72 MBT’s. T-80 holds the distinction of being the first Russian tank to be powered by a gas turbine. While the Soviet Union/Russia was – at one point – the most notable operator of the T-80, the system inevitably found its way into the inventories of supporting allies or satellite states. Chinese examples were transferred to Pakistan.
1985 – 1995 – Type 85 – II MBT.
The NORINCO produced Type 85 – II is a further development of the Type 80 MBT but offers up a host of improvements over its predecessor. Type 85 – IIAP is a Pakistani produced variant.
1999-2009 Type 84 MBT.
The T-84 is a much improved development of the original Soviet era T-80 MBT. The initial T-84 production was designated simply as the T-84 while based on the Soviet T-80UD design. Pakistan signed a procurement deal for 320 T-84’s.
2001 – 2011 – HIT AL-Khalid (MBT 2000) MBT.
The Al Khalid is nothing more than the NORINCO brand Type 90 – IIM MBT developed to suit Pakistani Army requirements. The Al Khalid is essentially a hybrid tank design with systems, armament and subsystems originating from a variety of global resources, though the tank system itself, as a whole are a locally produced product native to Pakistan. Additionally engines are of Ukrainian origin while production is handled within Pakistan. In most respects the Al Khalid can be viewed as the ‘ultimate’ evolution of the T-54 MBT. As of this writing 320 examples of the Al Khalid have been delivered out of a eventual production run of 1,200. The Al Khalid I represents a proposed upgraded model with revised systems, engine, autoloader and armour as well as the ability to fire KOMBAT ATGM’s for increased lethality.
Variants;
Al Khalid – initial production model
Al Khalid I – improved Al Khalid, improved subsystems (fire control, jammers), increased main gun ammo to 49 rounds.
Al Khalid – II – improved Al Khalid under development, modular armour kit, revised armour formula, 1,500 hp diesel engine.
2004-present – HIT AL Zarrar MBT.
With Ukrainian assistance, Pakistan developed the Al Zarrar MBT based on the Chinese Type 59 series. The Type 59 began to show its limitations through age and constantly changing battlefield technologies. As such Pakistani Type 59 stocks were selected for a refit program that sought to upgrade the fleet to produce a more modern end-product suitable for use on the modern battlefield. Full scale serial production of the new tank began in 2003 as the system was adapted into Pakistan Army service as the ‘Al Zarrar’. First deliveries took place in 2004 and continue as of this writing (2012). To date nearly 350 Pakistan Army Type 59’s have been upgraded to the newer Al Zarrar standard.
The Al Zarrar series has been actively utilized in the fighting in and around Swat and Malakand against entrenched militants. One example survived multiple suicide bombing attacks to which the tank was eventually put out of commission but its entire crew surviving.
MT
fatman17
PDF THINK TANK: CONSULTANT
- Joined
- Apr 24, 2007
- Messages
- 32,563
- Reaction score
- 98
- Country
- Location
Friday, December 07, 2012
Frontier Force Regiment observes ‘Shabbir Day’ with solemnity
LAHORE: A battalion of the Frontier Force Regiment (FFR) paid homage on Thursday to Major Shabbir Sharif, a valiant warrior who displayed unparallel courage while defending the motherland and embraced martyrdom on December 6 at Sulemanki Sector during 1971 war. He earned the highest gallantry award of Nishan-e-Haider.
The battalion in which Major Shabbir Sharif was commissioned celebrated ‘Shabbir Day’ annually with great solemnity and gratitude. A contingent of the Regiment performed honour guard duties to pay homage at the grave of martyr at Miani Sahib Graveyard. Battalion Colonel Major General Sajjad Ali Khan and General Officer Commanding Major General Amir Riaz laid floral wreath and offered fateha. Senior Officers of the Piffers group, sister and son of the Shabbir were also present on the occasion.
Major General (r) Zahoor Malik and Major General (r) Ghaziuddin Rana laid floral wreath on behalf of the Piffers, while wreaths were also laid on behalf of the Commanding officer and all ranks of the unit. It may be mentioned here that Major Shabbir Sharif Shaheed is one of the most decorated soldier of Pakistan Army. He enjoys the unique honour of being the proud recipient of Sword of Honour, Sitar-e-Jurrat and Nishan-e-Haider the three most coveted awards of Pakistan Army. pr
Frontier Force Regiment observes ‘Shabbir Day’ with solemnity
LAHORE: A battalion of the Frontier Force Regiment (FFR) paid homage on Thursday to Major Shabbir Sharif, a valiant warrior who displayed unparallel courage while defending the motherland and embraced martyrdom on December 6 at Sulemanki Sector during 1971 war. He earned the highest gallantry award of Nishan-e-Haider.
The battalion in which Major Shabbir Sharif was commissioned celebrated ‘Shabbir Day’ annually with great solemnity and gratitude. A contingent of the Regiment performed honour guard duties to pay homage at the grave of martyr at Miani Sahib Graveyard. Battalion Colonel Major General Sajjad Ali Khan and General Officer Commanding Major General Amir Riaz laid floral wreath and offered fateha. Senior Officers of the Piffers group, sister and son of the Shabbir were also present on the occasion.
Major General (r) Zahoor Malik and Major General (r) Ghaziuddin Rana laid floral wreath on behalf of the Piffers, while wreaths were also laid on behalf of the Commanding officer and all ranks of the unit. It may be mentioned here that Major Shabbir Sharif Shaheed is one of the most decorated soldier of Pakistan Army. He enjoys the unique honour of being the proud recipient of Sword of Honour, Sitar-e-Jurrat and Nishan-e-Haider the three most coveted awards of Pakistan Army. pr
fatman17
PDF THINK TANK: CONSULTANT
- Joined
- Apr 24, 2007
- Messages
- 32,563
- Reaction score
- 98
- Country
- Location
M47 & M48 Patton in Pakistani Service
The first real test of the Patton tank came in 1965 during the short Indo-Pakistan War. In the mid-1950s, Pakistan's cavalry regiments began receiving some 230 M47s and 202 M48s, and many tank officers were sent to the US Army Training Centre at Ft. Knox. At the outbreak of war in 1965Pakistan had about 15 armoured cavalry regiments, each with about 45 tanks in three squadrons. Besides the Pattons, there were about 200 M4 Shermans re-armed with 76mm guns, 150 M24 Chaffee light tank and a few independent squadrons of M36B1 tank destroyers. Most of these regiments served in Pakistan's two armoured divisions, the 1st and 6th Armoured divisions - the latter being in the process of formation.
The Indian Army of the time possessed 17 cavalry regiments, and in the 1950s had begun modernizing them by the acquisition of 164 AMX-13 light tanks and 188 Centurions. The remainders of the cavalry units were equipped with M4 Shermans and a small number of M3A3 Stuart light tanks. India had only a single armoured division, the 1st 'Black Elephant' Armoured Division, also called 'Fakhr I Hind' ('Pride of India'), which consisted of the 17th cavalry Poona Horse, the 4th Hodson's Horse, the 16th 'Black Elephant' Cavalry, the 7th Light Cavalry, the 2nd Royal Lancers, the 18th Cavalry and the 62nd Cavalry, the two first named being equipped with Centurions,. There was also the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade, one of whose three regiments, the 3rd Cavalry, was also equipped with Centurions.
Objective assessment of the 1965 war are as yet largely unavailable, and what Indian and Pakistani accounts do exist are as often as not poisoned by propaganda and highly suspect.
Particularly contentious are the various claims for enemy tanks destroyed and so forth. The ostensible cause of the war was continuing friction over the Jammu and Kashmir section of the north-east India. The Pakistani Army had been training and equipping Muslim guerrillas in the area, leading India to respond by probing attacks along the border. In late August 1965 India seized the strategic Haji Pir Pass, and the escalating border incidents reached a crescendo on 1 September when the Pakistani Army, including elements of the 6th Armoured Division, advanced into the Chhamb-Akhnur area. The Pakistanis hoped to lure the nearby Indian 1st Armoured Division into the region between the border and the Chenab River so that the Indians would have to fight with the mile-wide river to their back. The Indians had no intentions of accepting this fool's errand, and decided instead to launch a series of blows against Pakistan; the main attacks being in the Lahore and Sialkot sectors.
Although not successful on the Lahore front, M47s of the Pakistani 6th Armoured Division proved very effective in the fighting in Chhamb and in the Sialkot sector during the 1965 war. (Col. M.A. Durrani)
The thrust against Lahore consisted of the 1st Infantry Division supported by the three tank regiments of the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade: they quickly advanced across the border, reaching the Ichhogil (BRB) Canal by 6 September. The Pakistani Army held the bridges over the canal or blew up those it could not hold, effectively stalling any further advance by the Indians on Lahore. Sensing an opportunity to envelop and destroy the Indian formations, the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division was sent to the area south of the main Indian incursion around Kasur with the aim of advancing along the rear of the Indian's left flank, trapping them against the BRB Canal. The Pakistani advance was hampered by the necessity for elaborate bridging operations over the canal and the Rohi Nala River, with the lead elements of the division arriving at Khem Karan on 7 September. The Pakistanis immediately began probing attacks against the Indian positions, which were not executed with any particular vigour and were brushed back. A reconnaissance in force by Pattons and Chaffees towards Mahmudpura on 8 September was ambushed, and several were lost in a flooded plain. The scope of the probes made it clear to the Indians that a major attack was forth coming, but realising that the terrain favoured the defender, they withdrew under light pressure to prepare a trap.
The area north of Khem Karan consists of well-irrigated plains crossed by many waterways, dykes and other channels. The fields were high in sugar cane and other crops, and the plains could easily be flooded by breaching irrigation canals to render the terrain unsuitable foe mechanised advance. Four Centurion and Sherman squadrons were positioned to cover key roadways and approaches, forming a horseshoe into which the Indians expected the Pakistanis to march. The other squadrons were broken up into troops, with two troops assigned to the bridges over the Rohi Nala in the north in case the probes by the Pakistani 12th Cavalry should prove to be more than feints, and another troop allotted to the 4th Infantry Division, which formed the first line of defence in the village of Asal Uttar. The 4th Infantry Division was well equipped with jeep-mounted 106mm recoilless rifles, bazookas and other close-range anti-tank weapons, and the area to the division's rear was well covered by both artillery and the tank squadrons. The commander of the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade, Brig. Thang Raj, issued strict instructions to his tank crew to wait until the Pakistani tanks had approached quite close to their hull-down positions before opening fire so as to take advantage of the concealment offered by the thick sugar cane crop.
Pakistani efforts until 9 September had been desultory and ineffective as the division awaited the arrival of the last of its troops. Indian air attacks failed to destroy many tanks, but succeeded in destroying a supply train which left most of the Pattons with only 30 rounds of ammunition and limited fuel for the forthcoming offensive. On Friday 10 September 1965, Maj. Gen. Nasir Ahmed Khan ordered his 5th Armoured Brigade forward. Indian artillery and small arms fire clipped away what little infantry support the Pakistani Pattons had, leaving the tanks exposed to the Indian anti-tank teams. The Pattons were visible to Indian recoilless rifle and tank crews who could see the swaying of the cane as the enemy approached and the upper works of the Pattons' turrets. The Indians soon began to exact a heavy toll from the Pakistani tanks, striking them from the front and side. As casualties mounted, one Pakistani regiment tried to skirt the defences by attacking the town from the east, but soon found itself bogged down in a plain flooded by a breached nullah. What Pattons did fight their way through the village found themselves faced by a cordon of stationary, concealed tanks and artillery and were quickly decimated. By 1330hrs the 5th Armoured Brigade attack had petered out with terrible losses.
The 4thh Armoured Brigade was ordered to attack the Indian right flank by a drive on Mahmudpura, but the Indians had foreseen this move and had flooded the area. The Pakistani attack bogged down and came under intense artillery and tank fire. The Indians intercepted the following communication between the brigade's commander (BC) and the divisional commander (GOC):
BC: 'It's not possible for us to advance any further due to stiff resistance. Heavy enemy shelling has completely pinned us down.'
GOC: 'It is most important that the advance is continued. Therefore, in the name of Islam, Pakistan and Hillale Jurat, I command you get up and go forward.'
BC: 'I will do my best but as things are I do not know how the hell I am going to do that. This bloody enemy artillery is knocking the hell out of us and I am afraid at the moment that I can't do any better then this.'
GOC: 'Move forward to your objectives forthwith.'
BC: 'I cannot move; Indians are ahead of me.'
GOC: 'Come and see me immediately.'
BC: 'Where do I come? I don't know.'
GOC: 'Move straight on and turn right.'
BC: 'Do you know where I am? If I turn left the Indians get me, if I turn right the artillery gets me. Where do I come and how?'
GOC: 'Turn right till you hit the road, follow it and you will find me at milpost 36.'
The brigadier never found him, but a pair of jeep mounted recoilless of the Indian Army did, destroying the tank of Maj. Gen. N. A. Khan and killing all its crew. By nightfall the ten squares miles around the Khem Karan-Asal Uttar battlefield were littered with 97 Pakistani tanks, more that 65 of which were M47 and M48 Pattons. The area became known as the 'Patton Nagar'-'Patton Graveyard'. Besides the heavy losses in equipment, the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division lost its commanding general, one brigadier and six regimental commanders either dead or captured. The Indians claim to have lost only 12 tanks during the fighting on 10 September 1965.
The crushing defeat of the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division and the inability of the Indian Army to vault the BRB Canal stalemated the Lahore front. The Indians turned their attention to the main thrust, called Operation 'Nepal', in the Sialkot sector. The aim of the attack was to seize the key Grand Trunk Road around Wazirabad. The striking force of the Indian 1st Corps was the 1st Armoured Division supported by the 14th Infantry and 6thh Mountain divisions. The infantry seized the border area on 7 September: realising the threat, the Pakistani rushed two regiments of their 6th Armoured Division from Chhamb to the Sialkot sector to support the Pakistani 7th Infantry Division there. These units, plus an independent tank destroyer squadron, amounted to 135 tanks; 24 M47 and M48 Pattons, about 15 M36B1s and the remainder Shermans. The majority of the Pattons belonged to the new 25th Cavalry commanded by Lt. Col. Nisar, which was sent to the Chawinda area.
The Indian plan was to drive a wedge between Sialkot and the 6th Armoured Division, which it believed was stationed around Chawinda. In fact there was only a single regiment there at the time. The Indian 1st Armoured Division's drive quickly divided, with the 43rd Lorried Infantry Brigade supported by a tank regiment attacking Gat, while the main blow of the 1st Armoured Brigade was hurled against Phillaura. Pakistani air attacks caused moderate damage to the tank columns, but exacted a heavier toll on the lorry columns and infantry. The terrain features of the area were very different from those around Lahore, being quite dusty, and the approach of the Indian attack was evident to the 25th Cavalry by the rising dust columns on the Charwah-Phillaura road.
The lead elements of the Indian drive fought their way into Phillaura, but were pushed back out towards Gadgor for a loss of 15 tanks. Both sides licked their wounds for two days, engaging in sporadic infantry forays and artillery duels. The next attack on 11 September was spearheaded by the 17th Poona Horse commanded by Lt. Col. Tarapore. The Centurions were bought under fire by recoilless rifles and tanks, and he command tank was knocked out. The skirmished between the 25th Cavalry and the Poona Horse lasted 12 hours, and in the dust and chaos it became difficult to distinguish one side from the other. The Indians made the ludicrous claim of 67 Pakistani tanks destroyed, which was well in excess of the total number in the area at the time. The outnumbered Pakistani forces were obliged to withdraw to Chawinda, where they awaited the next attack. On 13 September, the Poona Horse and Hodson's Horse began combined infantry-tank attacks against Jassoran. The engagements lasted for two days, with the climactic battle being fought on 16 September, when the Poona Horse supported a Gharwal Infantry Battalion attacking the small village of Butur Dograndi. The Indian attack was broken up by Maj. Raza Khan's 'C' Sqn, 25th Cavalry supported by Pakistani anti-tank teams firing Cobra missiles. The commander of the 17th Poona Horse, Lt. Col. A.B. Tarapore, was killed when his second command tank was hit, and the attack faltered. Both sides had suffered heavy losses in the fighting, and confined their attacks to infantry and artillery barrages until the ceasefire on 23 September. Two British journalists who visited one of the Patton squadrons of the 25the Cavalry after the ceasefire counted 25 burned-out Centurions in a three-mile stretch near Chawinda even after the Indians had begun retrieving destroyed vehicles. Of these, 11 were in a field no more than 800 yards across - a grim testimony to the intensity of these encounters. The Pakistanis admitted losing 44 tanks in the Sialkot sector, but claimed 120 Indian tanks, and the British journalists saw no reason to doubt them.
Following the war India admitted losing 128 tanks, and this probably consisted of about a dozen in the Lahore sector, a similar number in the Chhamb area, and the remainder in the Sialkot sector. The Pakistanis admitted losing 165 tanks, more than half of which were knocked out in the debacle at Asal Uttar. These losses are probably on the low side, but many tanks damaged in combat were later retrieved and put back into action. Both sides claimed in excess of 400 tank kills on the ground and about 100 from the air attacks, which is clearly excessive.
The Patton emerged from the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 with a tarnished reputation. The fiasco at Asal Uttar was the source of the disparagement, though a contributory factor was the exaggerated esteem in which the Patton had been held by both the Indian and Pakistani soldier before the war. Yet no vehicle, whatever its technical merits, can survive the kind of gross tactical bungling which characterised the Pakistani charge into the tank trap at Asal Uttar. Much attention has been paid to the supposed advantages of the Centurion over the Patton in these encounters, ignoring the fact that the majority of Patton causalities were caused by recoilless rifles, artillery and anti-tank guns, and that a third of the Pattons lost were simply abandoned due to lack of fuel and ammunition. In the Sialkot sector outnumbered Pattons performed exceedingly well in the hands of the 25th Cavalry and other regiments of the 6th Armoured Division, which exacted a disproportionately heavy toll of Centurions from the Poona Horse and Hodson's Horse. The Indian Army has made much of the fact that some of its Centurions survived repeated hits; yet have failed to point out that the majority of tanks in the Sialkot sector were Shermans whose guns were inadequate even in 1944. Neither the Indian nor Pakistani Army showed any great facility in the use of armoured formations in offensive operations, whether the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division at Asal Uttar or the Indian 1st Armoured Division at Chawinda. In contrast, both proved adept with smaller forces in a defensive role such as the 2nd Armoured Brigade at Asal Uttar and the 25th Cavalry at Chawinda, where they defeated their better equipped but clumsier foes. The M47 and M48 did not play a major role in the 1971 war.
(Source: The M47 and M48 Patton Tanks by Steven J. Zaloga)
The first real test of the Patton tank came in 1965 during the short Indo-Pakistan War. In the mid-1950s, Pakistan's cavalry regiments began receiving some 230 M47s and 202 M48s, and many tank officers were sent to the US Army Training Centre at Ft. Knox. At the outbreak of war in 1965Pakistan had about 15 armoured cavalry regiments, each with about 45 tanks in three squadrons. Besides the Pattons, there were about 200 M4 Shermans re-armed with 76mm guns, 150 M24 Chaffee light tank and a few independent squadrons of M36B1 tank destroyers. Most of these regiments served in Pakistan's two armoured divisions, the 1st and 6th Armoured divisions - the latter being in the process of formation.
The Indian Army of the time possessed 17 cavalry regiments, and in the 1950s had begun modernizing them by the acquisition of 164 AMX-13 light tanks and 188 Centurions. The remainders of the cavalry units were equipped with M4 Shermans and a small number of M3A3 Stuart light tanks. India had only a single armoured division, the 1st 'Black Elephant' Armoured Division, also called 'Fakhr I Hind' ('Pride of India'), which consisted of the 17th cavalry Poona Horse, the 4th Hodson's Horse, the 16th 'Black Elephant' Cavalry, the 7th Light Cavalry, the 2nd Royal Lancers, the 18th Cavalry and the 62nd Cavalry, the two first named being equipped with Centurions,. There was also the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade, one of whose three regiments, the 3rd Cavalry, was also equipped with Centurions.
Objective assessment of the 1965 war are as yet largely unavailable, and what Indian and Pakistani accounts do exist are as often as not poisoned by propaganda and highly suspect.
Particularly contentious are the various claims for enemy tanks destroyed and so forth. The ostensible cause of the war was continuing friction over the Jammu and Kashmir section of the north-east India. The Pakistani Army had been training and equipping Muslim guerrillas in the area, leading India to respond by probing attacks along the border. In late August 1965 India seized the strategic Haji Pir Pass, and the escalating border incidents reached a crescendo on 1 September when the Pakistani Army, including elements of the 6th Armoured Division, advanced into the Chhamb-Akhnur area. The Pakistanis hoped to lure the nearby Indian 1st Armoured Division into the region between the border and the Chenab River so that the Indians would have to fight with the mile-wide river to their back. The Indians had no intentions of accepting this fool's errand, and decided instead to launch a series of blows against Pakistan; the main attacks being in the Lahore and Sialkot sectors.
Although not successful on the Lahore front, M47s of the Pakistani 6th Armoured Division proved very effective in the fighting in Chhamb and in the Sialkot sector during the 1965 war. (Col. M.A. Durrani)
The thrust against Lahore consisted of the 1st Infantry Division supported by the three tank regiments of the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade: they quickly advanced across the border, reaching the Ichhogil (BRB) Canal by 6 September. The Pakistani Army held the bridges over the canal or blew up those it could not hold, effectively stalling any further advance by the Indians on Lahore. Sensing an opportunity to envelop and destroy the Indian formations, the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division was sent to the area south of the main Indian incursion around Kasur with the aim of advancing along the rear of the Indian's left flank, trapping them against the BRB Canal. The Pakistani advance was hampered by the necessity for elaborate bridging operations over the canal and the Rohi Nala River, with the lead elements of the division arriving at Khem Karan on 7 September. The Pakistanis immediately began probing attacks against the Indian positions, which were not executed with any particular vigour and were brushed back. A reconnaissance in force by Pattons and Chaffees towards Mahmudpura on 8 September was ambushed, and several were lost in a flooded plain. The scope of the probes made it clear to the Indians that a major attack was forth coming, but realising that the terrain favoured the defender, they withdrew under light pressure to prepare a trap.
The area north of Khem Karan consists of well-irrigated plains crossed by many waterways, dykes and other channels. The fields were high in sugar cane and other crops, and the plains could easily be flooded by breaching irrigation canals to render the terrain unsuitable foe mechanised advance. Four Centurion and Sherman squadrons were positioned to cover key roadways and approaches, forming a horseshoe into which the Indians expected the Pakistanis to march. The other squadrons were broken up into troops, with two troops assigned to the bridges over the Rohi Nala in the north in case the probes by the Pakistani 12th Cavalry should prove to be more than feints, and another troop allotted to the 4th Infantry Division, which formed the first line of defence in the village of Asal Uttar. The 4th Infantry Division was well equipped with jeep-mounted 106mm recoilless rifles, bazookas and other close-range anti-tank weapons, and the area to the division's rear was well covered by both artillery and the tank squadrons. The commander of the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade, Brig. Thang Raj, issued strict instructions to his tank crew to wait until the Pakistani tanks had approached quite close to their hull-down positions before opening fire so as to take advantage of the concealment offered by the thick sugar cane crop.
Pakistani efforts until 9 September had been desultory and ineffective as the division awaited the arrival of the last of its troops. Indian air attacks failed to destroy many tanks, but succeeded in destroying a supply train which left most of the Pattons with only 30 rounds of ammunition and limited fuel for the forthcoming offensive. On Friday 10 September 1965, Maj. Gen. Nasir Ahmed Khan ordered his 5th Armoured Brigade forward. Indian artillery and small arms fire clipped away what little infantry support the Pakistani Pattons had, leaving the tanks exposed to the Indian anti-tank teams. The Pattons were visible to Indian recoilless rifle and tank crews who could see the swaying of the cane as the enemy approached and the upper works of the Pattons' turrets. The Indians soon began to exact a heavy toll from the Pakistani tanks, striking them from the front and side. As casualties mounted, one Pakistani regiment tried to skirt the defences by attacking the town from the east, but soon found itself bogged down in a plain flooded by a breached nullah. What Pattons did fight their way through the village found themselves faced by a cordon of stationary, concealed tanks and artillery and were quickly decimated. By 1330hrs the 5th Armoured Brigade attack had petered out with terrible losses.
The 4thh Armoured Brigade was ordered to attack the Indian right flank by a drive on Mahmudpura, but the Indians had foreseen this move and had flooded the area. The Pakistani attack bogged down and came under intense artillery and tank fire. The Indians intercepted the following communication between the brigade's commander (BC) and the divisional commander (GOC):
BC: 'It's not possible for us to advance any further due to stiff resistance. Heavy enemy shelling has completely pinned us down.'
GOC: 'It is most important that the advance is continued. Therefore, in the name of Islam, Pakistan and Hillale Jurat, I command you get up and go forward.'
BC: 'I will do my best but as things are I do not know how the hell I am going to do that. This bloody enemy artillery is knocking the hell out of us and I am afraid at the moment that I can't do any better then this.'
GOC: 'Move forward to your objectives forthwith.'
BC: 'I cannot move; Indians are ahead of me.'
GOC: 'Come and see me immediately.'
BC: 'Where do I come? I don't know.'
GOC: 'Move straight on and turn right.'
BC: 'Do you know where I am? If I turn left the Indians get me, if I turn right the artillery gets me. Where do I come and how?'
GOC: 'Turn right till you hit the road, follow it and you will find me at milpost 36.'
The brigadier never found him, but a pair of jeep mounted recoilless of the Indian Army did, destroying the tank of Maj. Gen. N. A. Khan and killing all its crew. By nightfall the ten squares miles around the Khem Karan-Asal Uttar battlefield were littered with 97 Pakistani tanks, more that 65 of which were M47 and M48 Pattons. The area became known as the 'Patton Nagar'-'Patton Graveyard'. Besides the heavy losses in equipment, the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division lost its commanding general, one brigadier and six regimental commanders either dead or captured. The Indians claim to have lost only 12 tanks during the fighting on 10 September 1965.
The crushing defeat of the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division and the inability of the Indian Army to vault the BRB Canal stalemated the Lahore front. The Indians turned their attention to the main thrust, called Operation 'Nepal', in the Sialkot sector. The aim of the attack was to seize the key Grand Trunk Road around Wazirabad. The striking force of the Indian 1st Corps was the 1st Armoured Division supported by the 14th Infantry and 6thh Mountain divisions. The infantry seized the border area on 7 September: realising the threat, the Pakistani rushed two regiments of their 6th Armoured Division from Chhamb to the Sialkot sector to support the Pakistani 7th Infantry Division there. These units, plus an independent tank destroyer squadron, amounted to 135 tanks; 24 M47 and M48 Pattons, about 15 M36B1s and the remainder Shermans. The majority of the Pattons belonged to the new 25th Cavalry commanded by Lt. Col. Nisar, which was sent to the Chawinda area.
The Indian plan was to drive a wedge between Sialkot and the 6th Armoured Division, which it believed was stationed around Chawinda. In fact there was only a single regiment there at the time. The Indian 1st Armoured Division's drive quickly divided, with the 43rd Lorried Infantry Brigade supported by a tank regiment attacking Gat, while the main blow of the 1st Armoured Brigade was hurled against Phillaura. Pakistani air attacks caused moderate damage to the tank columns, but exacted a heavier toll on the lorry columns and infantry. The terrain features of the area were very different from those around Lahore, being quite dusty, and the approach of the Indian attack was evident to the 25th Cavalry by the rising dust columns on the Charwah-Phillaura road.
The lead elements of the Indian drive fought their way into Phillaura, but were pushed back out towards Gadgor for a loss of 15 tanks. Both sides licked their wounds for two days, engaging in sporadic infantry forays and artillery duels. The next attack on 11 September was spearheaded by the 17th Poona Horse commanded by Lt. Col. Tarapore. The Centurions were bought under fire by recoilless rifles and tanks, and he command tank was knocked out. The skirmished between the 25th Cavalry and the Poona Horse lasted 12 hours, and in the dust and chaos it became difficult to distinguish one side from the other. The Indians made the ludicrous claim of 67 Pakistani tanks destroyed, which was well in excess of the total number in the area at the time. The outnumbered Pakistani forces were obliged to withdraw to Chawinda, where they awaited the next attack. On 13 September, the Poona Horse and Hodson's Horse began combined infantry-tank attacks against Jassoran. The engagements lasted for two days, with the climactic battle being fought on 16 September, when the Poona Horse supported a Gharwal Infantry Battalion attacking the small village of Butur Dograndi. The Indian attack was broken up by Maj. Raza Khan's 'C' Sqn, 25th Cavalry supported by Pakistani anti-tank teams firing Cobra missiles. The commander of the 17th Poona Horse, Lt. Col. A.B. Tarapore, was killed when his second command tank was hit, and the attack faltered. Both sides had suffered heavy losses in the fighting, and confined their attacks to infantry and artillery barrages until the ceasefire on 23 September. Two British journalists who visited one of the Patton squadrons of the 25the Cavalry after the ceasefire counted 25 burned-out Centurions in a three-mile stretch near Chawinda even after the Indians had begun retrieving destroyed vehicles. Of these, 11 were in a field no more than 800 yards across - a grim testimony to the intensity of these encounters. The Pakistanis admitted losing 44 tanks in the Sialkot sector, but claimed 120 Indian tanks, and the British journalists saw no reason to doubt them.
Following the war India admitted losing 128 tanks, and this probably consisted of about a dozen in the Lahore sector, a similar number in the Chhamb area, and the remainder in the Sialkot sector. The Pakistanis admitted losing 165 tanks, more than half of which were knocked out in the debacle at Asal Uttar. These losses are probably on the low side, but many tanks damaged in combat were later retrieved and put back into action. Both sides claimed in excess of 400 tank kills on the ground and about 100 from the air attacks, which is clearly excessive.
The Patton emerged from the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 with a tarnished reputation. The fiasco at Asal Uttar was the source of the disparagement, though a contributory factor was the exaggerated esteem in which the Patton had been held by both the Indian and Pakistani soldier before the war. Yet no vehicle, whatever its technical merits, can survive the kind of gross tactical bungling which characterised the Pakistani charge into the tank trap at Asal Uttar. Much attention has been paid to the supposed advantages of the Centurion over the Patton in these encounters, ignoring the fact that the majority of Patton causalities were caused by recoilless rifles, artillery and anti-tank guns, and that a third of the Pattons lost were simply abandoned due to lack of fuel and ammunition. In the Sialkot sector outnumbered Pattons performed exceedingly well in the hands of the 25th Cavalry and other regiments of the 6th Armoured Division, which exacted a disproportionately heavy toll of Centurions from the Poona Horse and Hodson's Horse. The Indian Army has made much of the fact that some of its Centurions survived repeated hits; yet have failed to point out that the majority of tanks in the Sialkot sector were Shermans whose guns were inadequate even in 1944. Neither the Indian nor Pakistani Army showed any great facility in the use of armoured formations in offensive operations, whether the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division at Asal Uttar or the Indian 1st Armoured Division at Chawinda. In contrast, both proved adept with smaller forces in a defensive role such as the 2nd Armoured Brigade at Asal Uttar and the 25th Cavalry at Chawinda, where they defeated their better equipped but clumsier foes. The M47 and M48 did not play a major role in the 1971 war.
(Source: The M47 and M48 Patton Tanks by Steven J. Zaloga)
One factual error among other things, esp. in the purported Indian capture of Pakistani comm. In the 1965 war, the senior most Pakistani casualty was that of Brig A.R. Shaami who was the Divisional Artillery Commander. Not sure how and when the Indians conjured up killing a Maj Gen of the Pakistan Army inside of a tank and that too with a name of N. A. Khan.
fatman17
PDF THINK TANK: CONSULTANT
- Joined
- Apr 24, 2007
- Messages
- 32,563
- Reaction score
- 98
- Country
- Location
i happen to know this being true as at the end of hostilities, my late father assumed the duties of Brig. Shami Shaheed for a period of time.
alibaz
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Nov 26, 2007
- Messages
- 4,254
- Reaction score
- 0
- Country
- Location
third eye
ELITE MEMBER
- Joined
- Aug 24, 2008
- Messages
- 18,519
- Reaction score
- 13
- Country
- Location
Not Available Khan
Are you referring to Post No 51 ?
Thats not an Indian account.
Gentelman
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Nov 21, 2012
- Messages
- 2,307
- Reaction score
- 1
- Country
- Location
I too noticed that but I think PA have but it is classified maybe but I never saw any proof but SSG too was classified 1st
well in general SSW and SSG have paratrooping capability
hey anyone else have news on any paratrooping capability???
Joe Shearer
PROFESSIONAL
- Joined
- Apr 19, 2009
- Messages
- 27,493
- Reaction score
- 162
- Country
- Location
Probably because the great General and Jang-i-Lat Sawnama was not in command. He would have defeated the Indian forces, the Afghan forces and also the US forces all at one go. Pity.
GHOST RIDER
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Jul 27, 2010
- Messages
- 3,039
- Reaction score
- 0
- Country
- Location
My question is
every soldier in the Army should belong to a regiment?
and
Is it the soldiers choice which regiment he wants to be a part of ? or they are apointed?
@nuclearpak @fatman17 @TaimiKhan
every soldier in the Army should belong to a regiment?
and
Is it the soldiers choice which regiment he wants to be a part of ? or they are apointed?
@nuclearpak @fatman17 @TaimiKhan
Last edited by a moderator:
Similar threads
