@
Reashot Xigwin
sorry, but I don´t need your advice, it is just stupid and your thinkings are based on some wrong facts. If you want to
give up some of Indonesian territory to China or Vietnam, pls let me know.
Maybe Reashot was trying to give you an understanding about soft-steel diplomacy, projecting military power as a quite warning. Anyway, Indonesia's Natuna Island was one of a disputed area between Indonesia and China, the tension reached its highest level 1990's.
FYI Indonesia was the only country in ASEAN that had been demonstrating military power and presence in S.C.S without mongering for war and dragging other countries outside ASEAN to be involved into the problem as well as using diplomatic power to deal with Chinese's claim over Natuna. That's why now China is no longer claiming Natuna Island and respecting Indonesia's ZEE line.
I copied some certain histories about how Indonesia handled China's claim without mongering for war and getting anybody killed.
Indonesia has maintained its
tradition of quiet diplomacy when dealing with
its ASEAN partners. Indonesia also recently showed dramatically that it
does not need to hide behind "Mother ASEAN" to protect its sovereignty. In
an act of uncharacteristically "loud" diplomacy,
Indonesia recently
conducted its largest combined military exercise in four years; over 19,500
servicemen, fifty warships, and forty combat aircraft participated. The
exercise was
entirely centered on the Natuna Islands. Officially, the
exercise's purpose was to test and improve service interoperability in
meeting external threats. Indonesian officials stated that the exercise was
not intended as a show of force. Nor was it "based on considerations of a
perceived threat from a particular place." However, Lieutenant General
Wiranto declared that he "could not help it" if there were "observers who
[chose] to see it that way." (21) John McBeth, "Exercising Sovereignty," Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 September 1996, 17.
Another "loud" move (although it is questionable whether it was intended
to be loud or dead quiet) was t
he visit of Foreign Minister John Chang of
Taiwan to Jakarta to meet with his counterpart Alatas on 4 September 1996.
When China first confronted Jakarta with this report, the Indonesians said
that the visit had not taken place. But when the visit was reported by
Indonesia's own press,
China expressed its "serious concern."(22) Although
the visit was not openly publicized, it is possible that it was intended to
be detected by the Chinese. In conjunction with its two military exercises,
Indonesia might have been signaling Beijing that it would not be cowed by
China and should not be handled either like an isolated Vietnam of the late
1970s and '80s, or like a peripheral ASEAN state such as the Philippines.
A more effective and concrete deterrent to China than Indonesia' s
demonstrations of force may be the grandiose plan that
Indonesia has
proposed for the development of the Natunas. Under the direction of the
state minister for research and technology, B. J. Habibie, Indonesia has
raised the stakes on the Natunas by announcing plans of economic
development for the islands that would dramatically increase their worth to
Indonesia, and therefore increase the cost of China' s claiming--not to
mention taking--the islands. If the Natunas should become an integral part
of the Indonesian economy, Indonesia and its ASEAN partners (and very
likely the United States) would become
less apt to tolerate Chinese claims
to them. John McBeth, "Deep Background," Far Eastern Economic Review, 5
September 1996,54-55.
Indonesia's relationship with China is increasingly precarious, but to
date, no great changes in regional relations have resulted. ASEAN cohesion
has neither greatly benefited from Indonesia's inclusion in the South China
Sea fray, nor has it been shaken.
The plan to make the Thais beneficiaries
of Natuna's liquefied natural gas is likely to help to avoid any future
division between the littoral ASEAN states and ASEAN's northern continental
states centered on Thailand. If Thailand is offered this additional power
source, which
could be used for leverage in negotiations with the Chinese
over hydroelectric power generated from the Mekong River, Thailand might be
more free to support its ASEAN partners facing China in the South China Sea.
Nor has there been a change in Indonesia's foreign policy since the
revelation of the Chinese claims.
Indonesia has attempted, and will
continue to attempt, to distance itself from its awkward inclusion in the
disputes of the South China Sea and thereby maintain its role as "honest
broker" to the area. It is important to note that Alatas' s policy of
publicly ignoring China's claims has worked insofar as Indonesia's Surabaya
workshop of 1993 was not its last.
Indonesia wishes to preserve its role as
mediator and also maintain its image
as a nation that cannot be pushed
around. London,
U.K.: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993).
Vietnam and Philippines shouldn't be dragging countries like India, Japan, and the U.S to deal with China's claim over S.C.S and start to consolidate your own firepower "massively" into the disputed area as well as increasing your presence there by building a clear economic roadmap such as new town, air port, harbor, and power generators. And transmigrate your people to settle in the core Islands in S.C.S. It will leverage your bargaining power toward the Chinese because you have proven that those islands and waterspace worth everything to your country.
Meanwhile, Vietnam and Philippines should be able to make your neighbors supporting your claim and making your countries to be the center of opposition in ASEAN. That means, your countries will not be standing alone in the neighborhood. If you can't make countries like Cambodia to side with you, how can you win the bargaining game with China? To do that, Vietnam and Philippines have to take Indonesia's role as the core of ASEAN to leverage your diplomatic power with the other ASEAN members, but as we can see the facts from the recent ASEAN meetings, Indonesia still had to come in handy after Cambodia's shocking move to support China's claim, that proves that even until now, neither of the claimants from ASEAN have the power to bargain with their own neighboring countries.
I, in the other hand, disagree with the idea of "war" that may destabilize the stable condition in ASEAN and our relation with China. Quite diplomacy was proven effective by Indonesia when it had to take west papua and to defend Natuna island, also was proven effective by Malaysia when it had to take Sipadan and Ligitan Islands from Indonesia.
