Re-Organization of FCNA

[Cuirassier]

Currently the FCNA is a designated two star formation ( division equivalent), with 5 brigades under it.

Considering that the last conflict with India occured in the AOR of FCNA, i was wondering if the Army could reinforce the formation and enhance it's status to Corps-level.

Ever since both nations have been declared nuclear states with capabilities to strike each other regardless, i believe the chances of a full scale war across the Punjab and Sindh have significantly reduced, despite all the talk on the Cold Start Doctrine or the New Concept Of War Fighting, in reality both sides know the consequences of armed offensives across the IB or WB. The 2002 and 2008 standoffs and their outcomes are a proof of this.

I would suggest that FCNA should constitute of 2 Divisions, one formed by the present brigades, whereas the new troops will be fished from the ARN
Since it's a mountain terrain, we would need infantry and artillery units. The following divisions can be earmarked for this:

8th Infantry Division
15th Infantry Division
2nd Artillery Division
10th Infantry Division
11th Infantry Division

If we fish out 1 brigade each from these divisions we'll have sufficient formations to raise another division in GB

These Divisons are part of the Holding Corps in the Army Reserve North and i believe defence is easier with lesser troops available rather than offense.
The troop levels in ARNs Strike Formation will not change thus it's offensive power will remain.

These new redirected brigades will need acclimatization and mountain equipment so that they are ready for their new roles.

The new ORBAT of the FCNA can then be:

FCNA HQ (Gilgit)
1st Mountain Division (Gilgit)
10th Mountain Division (Skardu)

FCNA will be independent of X Corps and this will strengthen our hold on GB and ability for operations in that terrain.
Since the current threat that persists is of small scale/low intensity warfare, these deployments can help our defence where it really is threatened.

What do you suggest ?

 

[Gryphon]

Currently the FCNA is a designated two star formation ( division equivalent), with 5 brigades under it.

Considering that the last conflict with India occured in the AOR of FCNA, i was wondering if the Army could reinforce the formation and enhance it's status to Corps-level.

Ever since both nations have been declared nuclear states with capabilities to strike each other regardless, i believe the chances of a full scale war across the Punjab and Sindh have significantly reduced, despite all the talk on the Cold Start Doctrine or the New Concept Of War Fighting, in reality both sides know the consequences of armed offensives across the IB or WB. The 2002 and 2008 standoffs and their outcomes are a proof of this.

I would suggest that FCNA should constitute of 2 Divisions, one formed by the present brigades, whereas the new troops will be fished from the ARN
Since it's a mountain terrain, we would need infantry and artillery units. The following divisions can be earmarked for this:

8th Infantry Division
15th Infantry Division
2nd Artillery Division
10th Infantry Division
11th Infantry Division

If we fish out 1 brigade each from these divisions we'll have sufficient formations to raise another division in GB

These Divisons are part of the Holding Corps in the Army Reserve North and i believe defence is easier with lesser troops available rather than offense.
The troop levels in ARNs Strike Formation will not change thus it's offensive power will remain.

These new redirected brigades will need acclimatization and mountain equipment so that they are ready for their new roles.

The new ORBAT of the FCNA can then be:

FCNA HQ (Gilgit)
1st Mountain Division (Gilgit)
10th Mountain Division (Skardu)

FCNA will be independent of X Corps and this will strengthen our hold on GB and ability for operations in that terrain.
Since the current threat that persists is of small scale/low intensity warfare, these deployments can help our defence where it really is threatened.

What do you suggest ?

It is totally impractical to trim XXX Corps and IV Corps formations for raising a new mountain infantry division in the north. (Note that these two Corps don't constitute ARN, which is the rarely used name for I Strike Corps, HQ Mangla)

XXX Corps, as per my assessment, maintains 2x IABG with a tank-passable AOR extending from Gujrat upto Narowal.

Mech. Infantry is required to assist these IABG's and the Armd regiments of the Inf. Div's. If you remove two infantry brigades from its two infantry divisions, they will be left under strength (less foot/motorized/mechanized infantry) and obviously lose effectiveness.

Same is the case with IV Corps AOR, where you can't afford to have understrength infantry divisions defend a provincial capital which is just some miles from the border.

However, I do recognize the need for slicing the oversized X Corps into two, with the present HQ commanding 19 ID, 23 ID and 34 LID and a new Corps HQ around Gilgit, commanding the 12 ID, FCNA and a new ID west of Skardu.

 

[Cuirassier]

It is totally impractical to trim XXX Corps and IV Corps formations for raising a new mountain infantry division in the north. (Note that these two Corps don't constitute ARN, which is the rarely used name for I Strike Corps, HQ Mangla)

XXX Corps, as per my assessment, maintains 2x IABG with a tank-passable AOR extending from Gujrat upto Narowal.

Mech. Infantry is required to assist these IABG's and the Armd regiments of the Inf. Div's. If you remove two infantry brigades from its two infantry divisions, they will be left under strength (less foot/motorized/mechanized infantry) and obviously lose effectiveness.

Same is the case with IV Corps AOR, where you can't afford to have understrength infantry divisions defend a provincial capital which is just some miles from the border.

However, I do recognize the need for slicing the oversized X Corps into two, with the present HQ commanding 19 ID, 23 ID and 34 LID and a new Corps HQ around Gilgit, commanding the 12 ID, FCNA and a new ID west of Skardu.

Armoured Brigades have mech battalions attached, XXX and IV aren't going to advance miles into enemy territory, plus a major factor of fishing brigades from these corps is that future IndoPak conflicts will most likely be concerned with the LoC region.

Attacking forces need a larger force to overrun defenders, thus it is more safe to reduce troops from holding formations and instead focus on rapid strike corps mobilization to launch an offensive of your own when the enemy attacks.

10th ID and an Ad Hoc 11th ID managed to keep 3 IA Divisions at bay despite element of surprise, back in 65. How you utilize the terrain for defence also helps.

The 34th LID is HQd at Kohistan I believe and honestly it seems that it's actual role isn't entirely CPEC security but rather it is a strategic reserve against IAs 28th Mountain Division at Gurez opposing the vulnerable Neelum Valley

Since X Corps deals with the LoC itself i think it should retain command over the 34th LID, while as suggested the FCNA should consist of 2 divisions, like the IA has, one at Dras near the LoC and the other in rear reserve.

Raising more troops will be hard so fishing out troops from soft areas is the way if we want to strengthen our hold in GB.

 

[Armchair]

One factor that PA and IA have ignored to some extent, is that such terrain requires natives more than others. For instance, the NLI functioned far better than other units in the conditions it fought Kargil on. Perhaps expanding locally raised forces would be the best way to effectively defend the northerly areas.

Questions about changing force structures have almost always been dealt with in an ad hoc manner. And there seems to be a lot of ancillary independent brigades and Rangers / FC. Perhaps a systematic rethink is needed.

My own, somewhat fanciful ideas can be found here for the latter: https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/a-vision-of-a-new-combined-arms-philosophy-doctrine.561888/

 

[bananarepublic]

One factor that PA and IA have ignored to some extent, is that such terrain requires natives more than others. For instance, the NLI functioned far better than other units in the conditions it fought Kargil on. Perhaps expanding locally raised forces would be the best way to effectively defend the northerly areas.

Questions about changing force structures have almost always been dealt with in an ad hoc manner. And there seems to be a lot of ancillary independent brigades and Rangers / FC. Perhaps a systematic rethink is needed.

My own, somewhat fanciful ideas can be found here for the latter: https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/a-vision-of-a-new-combined-arms-philosophy-doctrine.561888/

One problem is that india has a more larger pool of people from such mountain regions to recruit while Pakistan is limited to areas of GB and kpk so the best way to use the current resources Pakistan has it to be on the defensive posture in these areas as in holding the High ground while moving the soliders on the lower ground back such a tactic makes it near impossible for any enemy to break through granted that the supply lines are maintained .
If we analyze the kargil fiasco we see that india tried to use their numerical superiority by sending hordes of soilder against Pakistani strong points but utterly failing as these kind of tactics don't work in such environments.
My way if reforming FCNA would be to form small commado like units to harass enemy strong points while also using them to occupy territories such a similar tactic was used by the locals during the gilgit independence war and proved very successful till reaching Srinagar where inida had deployed tanks and artillery which the local soilder of GB could not counter .

 

[Indus Pakistan]

i believe the chances of a full scale war across the Punjab and Sindh have significantly reduced, despite all the talk on the Cold Start Doctrine or the New Concept Of War Fighting, in reality both sides know the consequences of armed offensives across the IB or WB.

Wow. Is this what they thought in 1965? The adage "expect the unexpected" was ignored. Do so with peril !

 

[Armchair]

One problem is that india has a more larger pool of people from such mountain regions to recruit while Pakistan is limited to areas of GB and kpk so the best way to use the current resources Pakistan has it to be on the defensive posture in these areas as in holding the High ground while moving the soliders on the lower ground back such a tactic makes it near impossible for any enemy to break through granted that the supply lines are maintained .
If we analyze the kargil fiasco we see that india tried to use their numerical superiority by sending hordes of soilder against Pakistani strong points but utterly failing as these kind of tactics don't work in such environments.
My way if reforming FCNA would be to form small commado like units to harass enemy strong points while also using them to occupy territories such a similar tactic was used by the locals during the gilgit independence war and proved very successful till reaching Srinagar where inida had deployed tanks and artillery which the local soilder of GB could not counter .

I think Pakistan at this point has more battle-hardened mountain warriors than any force on this planet. But that's just me. I think the TTP has beaten the PA into shape, beyond measure. IOK civilians will never be a meaningful recruitment pool for IA. Nepal has recently banned India from recruiting Gurkhas. And the NE Indians would feel alien fighting in Kashmir.

That leaves the Sikhs, who are met equally by the Pakistani Punjabis. And then there are the hoards of Pakistani Pashtuns India has to deal with. Equation should have become even better had Pakistan not shot itself in the foot via the Khalistan strategy. If only that strategy can be brought back into play,... India would be at a disadvantage.

Regarding numbers, overall numbers, I have a bunch of ideas. Here are some: https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/a-vi...ilosophy-doctrine.561888/page-2#post-10559787

 

[Signalian]

Currently the FCNA is a designated two star formation ( division equivalent), with 5 brigades under it.

Considering that the last conflict with India occured in the AOR of FCNA, i was wondering if the Army could reinforce the formation and enhance it's status to Corps-level.

Ever since both nations have been declared nuclear states with capabilities to strike each other regardless, i believe the chances of a full scale war across the Punjab and Sindh have significantly reduced, despite all the talk on the Cold Start Doctrine or the New Concept Of War Fighting, in reality both sides know the consequences of armed offensives across the IB or WB. The 2002 and 2008 standoffs and their outcomes are a proof of this.

I would suggest that FCNA should constitute of 2 Divisions, one formed by the present brigades, whereas the new troops will be fished from the ARN
Since it's a mountain terrain, we would need infantry and artillery units. The following divisions can be earmarked for this:

8th Infantry Division
15th Infantry Division
2nd Artillery Division
10th Infantry Division
11th Infantry Division

If we fish out 1 brigade each from these divisions we'll have sufficient formations to raise another division in GB

These Divisons are part of the Holding Corps in the Army Reserve North and i believe defence is easier with lesser troops available rather than offense.
The troop levels in ARNs Strike Formation will not change thus it's offensive power will remain.

These new redirected brigades will need acclimatization and mountain equipment so that they are ready for their new roles.

The new ORBAT of the FCNA can then be:

FCNA HQ (Gilgit)
1st Mountain Division (Gilgit)
10th Mountain Division (Skardu)

FCNA will be independent of X Corps and this will strengthen our hold on GB and ability for operations in that terrain.
Since the current threat that persists is of small scale/low intensity warfare, these deployments can help our defence where it really is threatened.

What do you suggest ?

I would not go with the idea of thinning out existing formations in Punjab. You have to look at the terrain where FCNA is deployed. In mountain warfare, holding peaks is important to have a clear view of the valley ahead and in surroundings, you don't need to deploy infantry on a mountain from bottom to top to defend a peak. This negates the need for a larger mountain force, but for a mountain formation to be effective and used in offensive Ops, air mobility is required and for that raising airborne/air assault units in FCNA should be considered. The terrain in mountains is tedious and time taking, vehicles cannot be used on mountains especially heavily forested mountains or mountains with no road setup. So the fastest way to occupy a peak before the enemy does is through helicopters, fastest way to replenish, support, reinforce etc is also through helicopters in mountains.

 

[Signalian]

FCNA HQ (Gilgit)
1st Mountain Division (Gilgit)
10th Mountain Division (Skardu)

What do you suggest ?

Airborne/Air assault Formation in mountains for all types of Ops.

 

[iby32]

We can't afford to thin the defences on ib or loc and there is no chance to trim down xxx corps as they hold loc. Infact we need to raise an entire new Division either by recruitment of new soliders and or transfer men from FC to raise units as fc is near enough trained for mountain warfare by having experience of war with TTP.

Need of airborn troops is very important so we can speed up our operations in GB and on LOC if need arises

 

[Gryphon]

One year forward, 10 Corps has been trimmed with the Mangla-based 19th Infantry Division made subordinate to the co-located 1 Corps.

Rawalpindi-based 34th Light Infantry Division is the infantry reserve for FCNA, with its brigades placed near/within its AOR.

The re-organization now appears complete in the north, with army focusing on the huge gap between Bahawalpur-based 31 Corps and Karachi-based 5 Corps.

 

[Cuirassier]

One year forward, 10 Corps has been trimmed with the Mangla-based 19th Infantry Division made subordinate to the co-located 1 Corps.

Rawalpindi-based 34th Light Infantry Division is the infantry reserve for FCNA, with its brigades placed near/within its AOR.

The re-organization now appears complete in the north, with army focusing on the huge gap between Bahawalpur-based 31 Corps and Karachi-based 5 Corps.

19th Div with 1 Corps? That's shocking considering it's a reserve formation with 7 AK Brigade at Jarikass to support the gap between the 3rd and 4th AK Brigades at Kotli and Bhimber respectively.

 

[Cuirassier]

We can't afford new troops/ increasing the size of the forces rn. Our economy is in sh*t creek and we're already spending low per soldier. There won't be no aggression on the IB. Only along WB/LC as the recent encounter proved.

We can't afford to thin the defences on ib or loc and there is no chance to trim down xxx corps as they hold loc. Infact we need to raise an entire new Division either by recruitment of new soliders and or transfer men from FC to raise units as fc is near enough trained for mountain warfare by having experience of war with TTP.

Need of airborn troops is very important so we can speed up our operations in GB and on LOC if need arises

 

[Gryphon]

19th Div with 1 Corps? That's shocking considering it's a reserve formation with 7 AK Brigade at Jarikass to support the gap between the 3rd and 4th AK Brigades at Kotli and Bhimber respectively.

19th Inf Div deployments were pulled back from LOC decades back, and not so long ago, it was made subordinate to 1 Corps < Central Command.

Kotli-Bhimber is 23rd Inf Div AOR and units from loc as far as Gujranwala arrive to exercise their shoot-and-scoot capability on enemy posts, whenever the need arises.

 

[Cuirassier]

Doesn't make sense, I know it's not at LC but with an AK Brigade (which is tasked with defensive duties exclusively inside AJK) alloting it to a strike formation sounds unnecessary.

19th Inf Div deployments were pulled back from LOC decades back, and not so long ago, it was made subordinate to 1 Corps < Central Command.

Kotli-Bhimber is 23rd Inf Div AOR and units from loc as far as Gujranwala arrive to exercise their shoot-and-scoot capability on enemy posts, whenever the need arises.