Qaida won’t find India easy: Intelligence agencies

[$@rJen]

Qaida won’t find India easy: Intelligence agencies
Jayaraj Sivan,TNN | Sep 6, 2014, 02.59 AM IST
9
comments
0
inShare
Share More
A
A
READ MORE intelligence agencies|Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)|Ayman Al-Zawahiri|al-Qaida
RELATED

• 'Pakistan army, ISI stage-managing al-Qaida advance into India'
• 'Pakistan faces greater threat from Qaida wing'

CHENNAI: Ayman al-Zawahiri's threat to form al-Qaida in Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) has unnerved intelligence agencies in the country forcing them to look for possible links between some of the homegrown extremist outfits and al-Qaida.

Coming from one of the most dreaded terror outfits in the world, nobody dare take the threat lightly, but al-Qaida may not find it easy to set up base in India, say intelligence agencies. A senior official with more than two decades of experience in the Intelligence Bureau (IB) said there could be stray elements with the potential to cause trouble but India did not give them room to flourish.

A young man from Cuddalore district who was working in Singapore made for Syria and joined ISIS. Three others from Thane joined ISIS and one of them died fighting for the rebel group in Iraq. Yet, the official said, a foreign terror group cannot sink its roots in the country unless the social divide is wide enough.

Islamic Forum for the Promotion of Moderate Thought says Indian Muslims are peace loving and do not subscribe to al-Qaida's worldview. Nevertheless, the forum's secretary general, A Faizur Rahman, feels mosques in the country should use Friday sermons to counter puritanical schools of thought in accordance with the Prophetic warning against linking extremism and religion.

"Threat perception is already high in the country. Al-Qaida is currently not in a position to make it any higher," a senior police officer said. Many in the establishment feel Zawahiri's video clipping is only an attempt to raise the sagging morale of al-Qaida members who are losing visibility with the rise of ISIS.

"In Afghanistan, there is a cultural divide between Arab-dominated al-Qaida, who have lost out to the inward-looking Pushtoon-based Taliban. In neighbouring Pakistan, Lashkhar-e-Taiba and the Pakistani Taliban have overshadowed al-Qaida. The same cultural divide would be the main stumbling block for Zawahiri in India too. There is no dearth of homegrown extremist groups like al-Umma and Indian Mujahideen, but they will not want to be treated like second-grade jihadists by al-Qaida," the officer said.

Motives that drive homegrown extremists of Tamil Nadu are different from those that drive groups like al-Qaida and ISIS, a central intelligence official said. "Al-Umma has mostly targeted local Sangh Parivar leaders," he said. The feedback that fundamental elements who visit other Muslim-dominated countries bring with them is not encouraging for potential recruits. There is a perception even among extremist groups that they enjoy greater freedom in India, where they can even stage a protest against the administration, another official said.

India's economic progress is another impediment for extremist groups, said former RAW chief P K Hormis Tharakan. In the late '80s, when the Indian GDP trailed Pakistan's, separatism and terrorism gained currency in Kashmir. The situation has now reversed and extremism is on the decline in Kashmir.

"National security is not merely about thwarting terrorist attacks. It is also about economic well-being and improving standards of living of the poor," Tharakan said. Equity in distribution of wealth and opportunity reduces discontentment. When there is prosperity, there is less propensity for terror."

But he admitted that the emergence of a young breed of educated and affluent terrorists was a cause for concern.

 

[IndoUS]

RAW chief made a good point if we can sustain a good and positive economic growth then these terrorist would find it hard to rrecruit youths in return of money.

 

[Didact]

This is one of the situations where the security agencies have shown remarkable exigency, a refreshing change for a nation saddled with lethargy in each and every step. However I'd like to sound a note of caution on this one.

This vigilance against violent extremism must be tempered with a touch of sensitivity. Certain actions in the past done with the aim of curbing extremism have proved counter-productive to that very aim. It is absolutely essential that we learn and practice the right lessons from these past experiences.

In early' 90s in Kashmir, one of the methods used by CRPF & BSF in COIN was to round up entire villages and conduct a thorough search of the households. Abuse was rife.The secondary aim of these methods were to intimidate the local populace into not supporting the terrorists. The actual effect proved to be quite the opposite. Humiliation and abuse proved to be the trigger for many of the frustrated, misguided youth to join militancy.

It wasn't until the army took over the CI ops that the realization dawned that their own methods were partly fuelling the terrorism. The decisions that followed (around late '94 if my memory serves me right) would lay the foundation for the success we see in Kashmir today. (In certain cases even confirmed militants were allowed to flee from villages, as the army understood that militants killed were not worth the costs in terms of public anger and inconvenience.)

In the south, the false accusations and arrests of innocent Muslim youth by overambitious security forces would provide the radicial youth the causus belli to join the IM, SIMI & even the L&T.

In Assam and in the NE, the initial heavy handed nature of operations and later the secret killings would overturn the gains made by the security forces in operation Rhino. It wasn't until the Dhemaji blasts and the October 2008 serial blasts in Guwahati that public opinion swung categorically against violent groups.

Every wrong move of ours have undone the good work of a 100 moves. We have managed to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory, managed to degenerate a limited insurgency into a near rebellion. The saving grace for us was that these were highly restricted in terms of area and population affected. We don't have that luxury with the current threat.

We have to make our moves carefully, and even more importantly, extremely discreetly. That means IB being the lead agency and not the police. That means careful intelligence gathering and not rounding up anyone and everyone.