Some points to ponder in this article:
A new regime change model? - Newspaper - DAWN.COM
A new regime change model?
By
Babar Sattar
The unfortunate reality is that no one seems willing to learn anything from the mess our power elite has landed us in. We are unable to get out of the vicious cycle because we don’t want to.
Despite its failure multiple times, every 10 years or so we rehash the same khaki-backed saviour programme to address our multifarious challenges.
As Raza Rabbani candidly acknowledged in parliament,
what we are witnessing is another manifestation of the perennial conflict for ascendancy within our power elite.
Cynics speculated that the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) and the Pakistan Awami Tehreek (PAT) marches must be khaki-inspired (even before Javed Hashmi spoke) because khaki intervention was the only means available for overthrowing the PML-N regime and bringing in the ‘revolution’.
During the ’90s, multiple factors allowed khakis the top slot within the power pyramid: 58(2b) and a president who could sack a government for corruption or breakdown of constitutional machinery; a judiciary that would sign on the dotted line; and easy to manufacture forward blocs.
Much has changed since the ’90s: 58(2b) is gone and the prime minister dissolving the National Assembly is the only constitutional route to mid-term polls; with Article 63-A (that disqualifies a parliamentarian who defects during a vote of confidence etc) and a national consensus against turncoats, manufacturing forward blocs isn’t as easy or useful; the judiciary survived a coup (or emergency-plus, if you like) in 2007 and since then ‘PCO judge’ has come to be recognised as a four-letter word; and the vibrant 24/7 electronic media shaping opinion is hard to control.
Our mainstream parties essentially concluded in the Charter of Democracy that even while playing dirty they would stop short of sleeping with the khakis to overthrow a government. The PPP imposed governor’s rule in Punjab in 2009 and the PML-N ignited the ‘memogate’ affair, but the khakis were kept at bay.
The joint parliamentary session is also meant to reaffirm allegiance to the same ‘code’. What has created a window for the khakis is that PTI, a party that didn’t partake in the ’90s politics, probably finds this code an undue restraint on its ambition.
For simplicity, let’s distinguish the three stages of influence or control by the khakis: Stage 1 where the khakis retain monopoly over key areas of state policies from behind the curtain; Stage 2 where regime change can be effected without direct intervention; and Stage 3 where the khakis assume direct control of the state.
Under Gen Kayani, the khakis seemed content with Stage 1 presence: absolute control over national security and foreign policy, while allowing civilians to make hay within their limited domestic political domain.
Let us recall that the PPP regime also had ideas about fixing the civil-military imbalance at first. Post-Mumbai we saw the scuffle over ISI’s control and then the skies caving in over Kerry-Lugar’s content.
Things stabilised once the areas of control, influence and interest of the khakis and civilian government became relatively well-defined and respected.
Even later in the day, Hussain Haqqani had to be sacrificed during memogate when the khakis felt he had strayed past the ring-fenced civilian domain.
With the Musharraf trial, independent ideas about Pakistan’s foreign policy towards India, Afghanistan and Middle East and the attempt to rein in the ISI using Geo, Nawaz Sharif not only threatened to disturb the Stage 1 equilibrium but also committed the unforgivable sin of creating an impression that khaki leadership is no longer ‘untouchable’.
This generated anger and probably also cultivated the sense that securing Stage 1 equilibrium with the Nawaz regime might not be possible without acquiring Stage 2 capability.
But how do you effect regime change without enabling constitutional provisions or an obliging judiciary ready to endorse a Bangladesh Model? Fellow columnist Abbas Nasir wonders if dharnas are the new 58(2b). They probably are, with two provisos.
One, agitators must have such overwhelming numbers that it can be claimed with some credibility that citizens have spoken against the regime and repressing them through use of force might ignite civil war. And two, the general in charge must be willing to move to Stage 3 if the threat of use of force doesn’t work.
Had PTI and PAT been able to bring even half a million people to parade on Constitution Avenue and attack buildings at will, Nawaz Sharif might have been history.
Had Javed Hashmi not added to the speculation that PTI/PAT are fomenting an ‘on-demand revolution’, Nawaz Sharif might have been history.
Had there been a general at the helm with the inclination, ambition and nerve to overthrow the government, suspend the Constitution, dismiss the judges, shut down the media and repress civil society, Nawaz Sharif might have been history.
Five to ten thousand baton-wielding revolutionaries pose no existential threat to a government, unless the arm of the government meant to enforce the government’s writ assigns to itself the task of creating a level playing field between the government and the street protesters challenging it.
Post the corps commanders’ conference, ISPR seemed to be saying that if the government didn’t heed the protesters’ demands and used force against them, the military might need to intervene to satisfy ‘national aspirations’.
The real problem posed by a new mob-led and khaki-backed regime change model is not just that it contravenes black letter law, but also that it regurgitates a tried, tested and failed idea. This is no grand conspiracy theory.
Our generals (past and present) who have contributed to our prevalent notion of national interest must have believed that they were/are pursuing the best interest of Pakistan and its citizens.
But they have been proven wrong by our own history and the experience of other comparable states.
A country run on the basis of transient emotion can go nowhere. Our deeply entrenched civil-military conflict continues to polarise and consume us.
If over a span of 60 years our khaki-run political incubator couldn’t produce decent leadership, how will the next time be any different?
Our problems of governance, justice, tolerance and integrity can’t be sorted overnight and will keep throwing up opportunities for ‘saviours’.
Is there a way to convince the saviours that we don’t deserve to be saved?
The writer is a lawyer.
sattar@post.harvard.edu
Twitter:
@babar_sattar
Published in Dawn, September 8th, 2014
