Project 706 - The Pakistan Atomb Bomb

[django]

What Feynmann did for the manhattan project Riazuddin did for the Pak project, yet no on ever mentions his name.

 

[syedali73]

I'm privy to a lot more, but this forum has a very low threshold for those with opposing views. this is why I troubled you. Apologies Sir.

Secondly, don't understand why posters who like to summarize things, or post to the point posts, are looked down upon. On the other hand posters even some TTA's who post pages and pages of xyz are commended.

Forget maturity, makes one wonder to the level of sanity of this forum!

جناب من, précis writing is a skill and art that neither everybody is good at nor capable of appreciating. When we were in School, we were taught this skill so we could present our view point comprehensively. Certain people do not realize that verbose (in Urdu لفاظی ) does not add any weight to the argument, in contrary, readers get bored after few lines and leave.

 

[Indus Falcon]

جناب من, précis writing is a skill and art that not everybody is god at nor capable of appreciating. When we were in School, we were taught this skill so we could present our view point comprehensively. Certain people do not realize that verbose (in Urdu لفاظی ) does not add any weight to the argument, in contrary, readers get bored after few lines and leave.

A post or an article, should ideally have an intro, a body and A conclusion. But what we get to see is Charlie went to see Smith, and Mary ran away. #to hell with logic!

 

[DESERT FIGHTER]

Bhutto zia all contribute to the developmentof Islamic bomb actually they keep their focus on development of nuclear wepons at any cost. Zia probably had the leverage due to Soviets aggrassion of Afghanistan .what would happened if Soviet didnot invade what us action would come?

Our bomb was ready by 78.. There are several reports about Pak conducting cold tests..

@Bratva This is the problem with Pakistan. You just did indulged in cheap character assasination without even forwarding any credible links. If our DG Security Nuclear Program etc were so eagle eyed then they must have been only looking in one direction while AQKhan opened a account with Ebay auctioning atom bombs like Chinese copies of Iphones.

Maybe if they had been looking in the right place they might have got the bad guy but similar to our incompetant or corrupt police who tend to nab the good guy's while the villian runs off.

About Abdus Salam that is just plain simple sordid prejudice. This is the man who laid the foundation of high science in Pakistan and nurtured an entire crop of future scientists many still alive. The tragedy of the Project 706 is those who intiated it, those who pushed for, those who were there at the start have been pushed on the sidelines because of the changing prejudices of society and politics.

While other publicity seekers have grabbed the entire limelight. Truth will come out one day.


Ps. And if they had even shred of suspicion it belies any sense, in fact it is criminal that Munir was left in his position by Zia and the rest. At this level of operations people have to be irreproachable. To my eyes the fact that Munir was left says everything. Actions speak louder than words. The fact that Munir was left in charge speaks volumes.

Sir... No matter how much people abuse ZA Bhutto .. Blame him for the break up of Pak (which u believe was inevitable - given the geographical restrains and hughe cultural and ethnic different with Bangalis (the indian conspiracy and traitors like Mujib -- whose own 6 points themselves were clearly pointing that out)...

But Bhutto was s great leader .. Yes he nationalised industries (which was a bad decision-- but a trend in those days -- bad luck with the oil industry shyt also being s cause)... But that man was great... He allied the country with China,started the Nuclear project,built our defence complexes .. A man loved by his people and hated by enemies...

Unfortunately this country also has a history of producing equally hated traitors ... The anti Heros... And has a history of destroying such people... From JINNAH to Bhutto...!

This country never had a real "leader" after him (Bhutto)...

 

[MastanKhan]

@syedali73 @MastanKhan Your comments please............?

Hi,

What a brilliant group of people they were----.

 

[Indus Falcon]

Our bomb was ready by 81-2... There are several reports about Pak conducting cold tests..


Sir... No matter how much people abuse ZA Bhutto .. Blame him for the break up of Pak (which u believe was inevitable - given the geographical restrains and hughe cultural and ethnic different with Bangalis (the indian conspiracy and traitors like Mujib -- whose own 6 points themselves were clearly pointing that out)...

But Bhutto was s great leader .. Yes he nationalised industries (which was a bad decision-- but a trend in those days -- bad luck with the oil industry shyt also being s cause)... But that man was great... He allied the country with China,started the Nuclear project,built our defence complexes .. A man loved by his people and hated by enemies...

Unfortunately this country also has a history of producing equally hated traitors ... The anti Heros... And has a history of destroying such people... From JINNAH to Bhutto...!

This country never had a real "leader" after him (Bhutto)...

78 to be exact. We perfected Bomb toss in 81.

 

[django]

78 to be exact. We perfected Bomb toss in 81.

it was 83 I believe.

 

[my2cents]

[One day despite all their flaws I hope in Islamabad they erect the statues of ZAB, Abdus Salam, Munir Akram and AQKhan. Heroes are never perfect./QUOTE]

I agree Heroes are never perfect but ZAB and AQkhan are controversial figures in your history who brought shame to your country. I don't know much about Munir Akram. So only one who deserves praise in my book is Abdus Salam.

 

[MastanKhan]

Hi,

These Pakistani scientists were a different breed----. With their PHD's from Europe and work training in the U S, Canada, Britain, France, Germany, Netherlands. Tenacious, resourceful, tactful leaders of men----and they were great sales people along with being nuclear physicists.

They developed good relationships abroad---made friends and got what was needed. The govt gave them the work environment that they were used to in Europe or in the Americas---same work hours and same days off----.

In the early 70's---most of them lived in satellite town pindi. As I saw in my uncle---there no second thoughts about commitment to the job----the goal was obvious. The fear of Israelis assassination was real---as my aunt told me that my uncle literally ran out of the U S in 1969 or 70 once his name came up as one of the top 100 nuc scientists in the world and he refused a job offer with the Israelis---actually he did not refuse it---he panicked---packed his bags and left the U S at its earliest.for Pakistan,

I met with many of these pinoeers at my uncles house while they were having tea. What a committed and sophisticated bunch of people that they were and I a teenager was clueless. Dr Mubarakmand's house was next door----and old members might remember that I entertained myself with one of his chicken that came to our yard.

I think hardly anyone knows that Shah of Iran had purchase a nuc power plant---possibly from where---I don't remember---. My uncle along with another Pakistani engineer were incharge of assembling / building that plant----but when the Shah was about to be thrown out---they came and took all their material and equipment----my uncle was holed up in a hotel room for months in iran fearing for his life from the revolutionaries----.

I have not seen my aunt in 30 years now----she must have some stories to tell. At the time of his untimely death under 50---he was a principal scientific officer and at one time been the principal of reactor school as well. God bless his soul and for the efforts and sacrifice---and God bless all the team that worked towards a goal that was like a miracle in the making---so that is why I said " what a brilliant group of people they were ".

 

[WAJsal]

President Zia, DG Security Nuclear Program, Lt.Gen Naqvi. DG counter-intelligence Brigadier Tabraiz all expressed and had their doubts about Munir ahmed khan. In there own words, Munir Ahmed khan tried to sabotage and delay the Plutonium program. He falsified/fudged data. Sensitive data was leaked/ stolen from him when he was returning to Pakistan from unidentified country who was helping Pakistan and he was transiting at some airport. ISI cast doubts on Munir ahmed and DG Counter Intelligence specifically asked Zia to remove Munir ahmed and his team from PAEC. But Zia retained his services until he retired

Americans already knew inner workings of our nuclear program. Our foriegn minister saw Abdus Salam Colluding with americans.


Whatever PAEC miracles are, it happened at the end of munir ahmed tenure mostly under the 2nd gen leaership and team of Dr.Samar mubarikmand, Sultan Bashiruddin and several other scientists whose name slipped from my mind

While AQ Khan route was shortcut and it led Pakistan create atom bomb more quickly through uranium path. So in this regard AQ khan should be given whole credit for assembling a complete team at Kahuta, KRL, playing role of manager and integrator. Assembling team of overseas Pakistanis, Foreign procurement through UAE, Kuwaiti Sheikhs companies.

Pakistan plutonium program matured only in early 2000. While Uranium program matured in early 90's. So one should not brush aside the AQ achievements no matter how much a low life he is.

Quite and amusing post, i am posting something i have done for PDF database, will post it as a thread, give it a read. Will answer all your doubts. Let me give you a short answer:
first of calling him a CIA agent or etc, etc... there isn't a bigger insult and abuse, are you stating the man who led the whole work was the one with the job to sabotage it? please, these allegations have no weight in them, made by our dear A.Q. Khan mostly.
Mera bhai, Munir Ahmed launched this program, he collaborated and gathered scientists from all over the world. Established groups like Wah group, TPG, NPG or etc, etc.... which were given tasks like trigger mechanism and other work involved. It is to note: Project 706 is only one part of a huge program, without Munirs efforts we wouldn't have a Plutonium enriched route, which is completely indigenous, BTW. And the information Khan was sending in the years 1974 to 1976, who was collaborating and doing the heavy lifting in Pakistan, i must ask you.
Bashiruddin was a nuclear scientist working in Karachi, who do you think picked him out and brought him in? Kahuta was built in collaboration with arms corpes, if i am not wrong, by PAEC. Cold test sites, even Chagai tests tunnels were made by PAEC. KRL only enriched Uranium, that too thank's to PAEC, the other steps of acquiring Uranium and certain steps were conducted by PAEC.
My answer is insufficient, wait for my thread, your post will be answered. If he was a traitor, and ISI did have credible intelligence on him, should he have not been removed.

@Bratva: Your arguments are falling on deaf ears. There are more sinister reasons for giving credit to Salam and Munir than they appear here.

There is no argument, all speculations...What Munir Ahmed did is a documented fact, no one can or does deny it, even A.Q Khan has accepted this. To most of us A.Q was everything, hell he built the weapons, everything was done by him.

While Uranium program matured in early 90's. So one should not brush aside the AQ achievements no matter how much a low life he is.

No one is, credit should be given where it is due, even in Uranium program itself, PAEC played a key role. Details will be provided, and i hope for your sake you give it a read.

Till then give this a read :
The whole truth — nuclear Pakistan - thenews.com.pk
@Atanz , give the provided link a look.

 

[Bratva]

Quite and amusing post, i am posting something i have done for PDF database, will post it as a thread, give it a read. Will answer all your doubts. Let me give you a short answer:
first of calling him a CIA agent or etc, etc... there isn't a bigger insult and abuse, are you stating the man who led the whole work was the one with the job to sabotage it? please, these allegations have no weight in them, made by our dear A.Q. Khan mostly.
Mera bhai, Munir Ahmed launched this program, he collaborated and gathered scientists from all over the world. Established groups like Wah group, TPG, NPG or etc, etc.... which were given tasks like trigger mechanism and other work involved. It is to note: Project 706 is only one part of a huge program, without Munirs efforts we wouldn't have a Plutonium enriched route, which is completely indigenous, BTW. And the information Khan was sending in the years 1974 to 1976, who was collaborating and doing the heavy lifting in Pakistan, i must ask you.
Bashiruddin was a nuclear scientist working in Karachi, who do you think picked him out and brought him in? Kahuta was built in collaboration with arms corpes, if i am not wrong, by PAEC. Cold test sites, even Chagai tests tunnels were made by PAEC. KRL only enriched Uranium, that too thank's to PAEC, the other steps of acquiring Uranium and certain steps were conducted by PAEC.
My answer is insufficient, wait for my thread, your post will be answered. If he was a traitor, and ISI did have credible intelligence on him, should he have not been removed.

There is no argument, all speculations...What Munir Ahmed did is a documented fact, no one can or does deny it, even A.Q Khan has accepted this. To most of us A.Q was everything, hell he built the weapons, everything was done by him.


No one is, credit should be given where it is due, even in Uranium program itself, PAEC played a key role. Details will be provided, and i hope for your sake you give it a read.

Till then give this a read :
The whole truth — nuclear Pakistan - thenews.com.pk
@Atanz , give the provided link a look.

Let me be clear. Munir Ahmed motives were to slow down Pakistan nuclear program. Not to sabotage it, not to make it fail. Primary purpose was to make whole program so expensive that Pakistan would abandon by its own volition


If you consider Intelligence reports as hearsay, then be my guest. Those heavyweights of Intelligence community had great apprehensions, It was General AKhtar abdur Rehman and President Zia who shielded Munir Ahmed khan and provided him support all through these so called allegations and Intelligence reports. I urge you to read the history of that era through the memoir of Professionals I mentioned earlier and have given the speculation of DG counter Intel why Munir Ahmed was kept in service despite these allegations.

You don't understand the enormity of the situation when Data from Munir ahmed was stolen on airport. It was not only munir briefcase but all of his entourage members who took different flights, there data was stolen as well. ISI and Nuclear security division was hot on the heels of Munir ahmed because he couldnt give satisfactory answers to how come highly confidential details of his complete entourage and purpose of his meeting was leaked. DG CI ISI then send a direct report to Zia to remove Munir ahmed. But Zia called DG CI ISI and asked him to drop the entire matter.

AQ Khan isnt the only one who reported such things. So like I said to atanz, if you can refute ISI, Then Nuclear Security Division reports on Munir Ahmed giving false promises of how early Pakistan can achieve bomb. I'm willing to change my mind.




Oh while we at it. Do look into supply chain AQ Khan developed while developing Uranium Program. PAEC had nothing to do with it. AQ Khan and Bhutto and afterwards Zia kept PAEC and Munir out of this supply chain.

You ask about heavy lifghting from 74-76. As per AQ khan he was stalling the progress and was making AQ khan data look like Uranium route is infeasible and only through plutonium route we can achieve our atom bomb

 

[WAJsal]

Let me be clear. Munir Ahmed motives were to slow down Pakistan nuclear program. Not to sabotage it, not to make it fail. Primary purpose was to make whole program so expensive that Pakistan would abandon by its own volition


If you consider Intelligence reports as hearsay, then be my guest. Those heavyweights of Intelligence community had great apprehensions, It was General AKhtar abdur Rehman and President Zia who shielded Munir Ahmed khan and provided him support all through these so called allegations and Intelligence reports. I urge you to read the history of that era through the memoir of Professionals I mentioned earlier and have given the speculation of DG counter Intel why Munir Ahmed was kept in service despite these allegations.

You don't understand the enormity of the situation when Data from Munir ahmed was stolen on airport. It was not only munir briefcase but all of his entourage members who took different flights, there data was stolen as well. ISI and Nuclear security division was hot on the heels of Munir ahmed because the secrecy in which munir entourage travelled to that unnamed country was leaked but the complete info of his entourage.

He should have been removed, shouldn't he have been? His role, i will not go in details, wait a couple of days.....He was the head of project, he could have easily kept the project years back, instead he brought intellects together, why would he do that or other role that he played?

Oh while we at it. Do look into supply chain AQ Khan developed while developing Uranium Program. PAEC had nothing to do with it. AQ Khan and Bhutto and afterwards Zia kept PAEC and Munir out of this supply chain.

Project 706 itself was started by PAEC, i guess.....A.Q does deserve credit, not saying that he doesn't. He brought unfinished data with him, PAEC scientist, the best of the lot, along with A.Q khan, in initial stages finished it.
Clearly you do not know what you are talking about...enrichment part was done by KRL, rest was all PAEC's doing, in initial stages all the heavy lifting was done by PAEC.
PAEC played a key role in Uranium enrichment too, KRL only enriched it, all practical things were done by PAEC.
And extract:
"Project-706 or the Kahuta project, was only one part of Pakistan's nuclear program. Only one part of the enriched uranium route to the Pakistani bomb, i.e, the gas-centrifuge project, which was itself started by PAEC before A Q Khan arrived in Pakistan.

Secondly, all other elements of the complete nuclear fuel cycle, including elements of the uranium route other than Project-706 was PAEC's work, which were developed under several other projects, like the Baghalchur-1 uranium mining and refining project and the huge Chemical Plants Complex (CPC) Project, at Dera Ghazi Khan. CPC produces several types of nuclear materials, most important of which is the uranium hexa-fluoride gas or UF6, which is the feed stock for all known commercial uranium enrichment methods, including centrifuge."

Do read this and share your thoughts on this too, seemed to have ignored it: The whole truth — nuclear Pakistan - thenews.com.pk

 

[Bratva]

He should have been removed, shouldn't he have been? His role, i will not go in details, wait a couple of days.....He was the head of project, he could have easily kept the project years back, instead he brought intellects together, why would he do that or other role that he played?

Project 706 itself was started by PAEC, i guess.....A.Q does deserve credit, not saying that he doesn't. He brought unfinished data with him, PAEC scientist, the best of the lot, along with A.Q khan, in initial stages finished it.
Clearly you do not know what you are talking about...enrichment part was done by KRL, rest was all PAEC's doing, in initial stages all the heavy lifting was done by PAEC.
PAEC played a key role in Uranium enrichment too, KRL only enriched it, all practical things were done by PAEC.
And extract:
"Project-706 or the Kahuta project, was only one part of Pakistan's nuclear program. Only one part of the enriched uranium route to the Pakistani bomb, i.e, the gas-centrifuge project, which was itself started by PAEC before A Q Khan arrived in Pakistan.

Secondly, all other elements of the complete nuclear fuel cycle, including elements of the uranium route other than Project-706 was PAEC's work, which were developed under several other projects, like the Baghalchur-1 uranium mining and refining project and the huge Chemical Plants Complex (CPC) Project, at Dera Ghazi Khan. CPC produces several types of nuclear materials, most important of which is the uranium hexa-fluoride gas or UF6, which is the feed stock for all known commercial uranium enrichment methods, including centrifuge."

Do read this and share your thoughts on this too, seemed to have ignored it: The whole truth — nuclear Pakistan - thenews.com.pk

"After imposing martial law, Gen Zia appointed his old colleague and friend from the Indian Military Academy, Dehradune days, Gen Syed Ali Zamin Naqvi, as adviser security on nuclear affairs. Gen Naqvi, an MA in English from Allahabad University, looked very much like a European – fair, light coloured hair, green eyes. He was a soft-spoken and pleasant person. He had an office at the PAEC Head Office and took Col Qamar Faruqui, director security PAEC, as his staff officer.

Within a few weeks he realised that Munir Ahmad Khan was averse to producing a nuclear bomb. When he mentioned this to me I told him that Munir had, on numerous occasions, tried to convince me that nuclear weapons were a bad thing for Pakistan. He also said that, were his wife (a European lady) to find out, all hell would break loose. This had serious but positive consequences, about which more in the next column. I personally believed, and still believe, that without nuclear deterrence we would have lost Pakistan. Statements made by Indian leaders are testimony to this.

There were many intrigues and plots against me and our nuclear programme, more so by locals than by foreigners. Now, while putting things in writing, all those events come to mind. Let me just tell you about one. A very fine, competent colleague of mine was, at that time, working in a defence organisation. He was frustrated as the head of that organisation, a former professor and a disciple of Prof Salam, had no practical experience or knowledge of defence projects. I obtained orders from Gen Zia to have him transferred to us. He turned out to be an invaluable, capable asset.

He told me that when Mr Bhutto had put pressure on Munir to explode the promised device by December 1976, Munir had discussed the matter with Prof Salam and my colleague’s boss. They decided to get about 2000 tons of explosives, put radioactive cobalt in it (obtained from X-ray machines) and explode it in a small tunnel. They would then take Mr Bhutto there and show him with a Geiger Counter that the explosion had been successful. They then informed Mr Bhutto that the explosion would take place after three or four months. To their good fortune, Mr. Bhutto announced elections and we all know what happened after that. Had their plot been successful, Mr Bhutto may very well have considered the centrifuge route redundant and Pakistan would have been put in mortal danger."



"In continuation of my previous columns on the same subject, here follow three interesting events that are not common knowledge. I had mentioned earlier that both Gen Naqvi and Col Faruqui had doubted Munir’s loyalty. Gen Zia himself had warned me to be wary and I was not to discuss any important or confidential matters with him.

The event discussed here was told to us by our foreign minister, Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, after his return from a trip to the USA. The same incident was also told to Mr Zahid Malik by the Foreign Secretary, Niaz A Naik, and included in Mr Malik’s book ‘Dr AQ Khan and the Islamic Bomb’ (1992).

Sahbizada Yaqub was in Washington with Foreign Secretary George Schultz and they were discussing matters of mutual interest. He had his team members with him. During the course of the discussions Schultz suddenly changed the topic and started talking about our nuclear programme. He threatened to stop all aid to Pakistan if we did not restrict our nuclear programme.

Yaqub tried to defend our stance and said that our programme was for peaceful purposes only. A senior official of the CIA retorted that he should not insult their intelligence as they had all details of our programme. They even had a mock-up of our nuclear device, he said. They then asked Yaqub to follow them through the corridor to another room. The officer removed a cloth that covered a table and Yaqub saw a design of a plant on it. He said that that was our Kahuta Plant.

He then went to the next table and removed a cloth from what looked like a sphere in two parts with cables, etc. and told Yaqub that it was a model of our nuclear weapon. Yaqub feigned ignorance, even though he realised it looked like what he had so often seen in Kahuta. He told them that he was not a technical man or a scientist and could not say anything about it. But if you say that is what it is, then let it be so.

Mr Schultz said that he could not fool him. They had irrefutable proof. When they left the room and walked down the corridor towards Schultz’ office, Yaqub’s sixth sense told him to look over his shoulder. He got the shock of his life when he saw a renowned Pakistani scientist coming out of the adjacent room and going straight into the room they had just left. He instantly understood the whole game. Information had been passed on to the Americans.

The second event – an important one – took place after some time in Kahuta. After ERL (Engineering Research Laboratories) had been established, I asked Gen Faiz Ali Chishti, Commander 10th Corps, Rawalpindi, to give me a good officer to look after our security matters. He sent Col Abdul Rahman, an extremely competent, efficient officer.

After having explained to him what I wanted him to take care of, he hired many observers and informants around Kahuta. One day a “shepherd” returned from a routine inspection and sat down on a medium-sized stone to rest. He thought that the stone looked a bit different and used his small axe to chip off a small piece. The stone was easily cut and underneath he could see copper. He immediately reported the matter to a subedar who, in turn, informed Col Rahman. The stone was taken to the laboratories and put in a safe place.

I was informed and told them not to do anything until the next morning after I had inspected it. Next morning, after having ascertained that it did not contain any explosives, we dismantled it. The outside layer, about 4 inches thick, consisted of resin with sand from the local area. Inside was an aluminium box in two parts screwed together. Upon removing the screws we saw a wonder of technology – a long-lasting battery, antenna, neutron counters, an air-analyser and a recording/transmitter set.

This sophisticated equipment could analyse air samples to find the concentration of enriched or natural uranium hexafluoride, neutrons (from cold and hot tests), could store this information and, on command, could transmit it in a single pulse.

It must have cost millions of dollars. It had definitely been put there at night by a Pakistani agent driving to Kahuta Town. I conveyed details of the “find” to Gen Zia and Mr Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who immediately came to see it. They highly commended the work of Col Rahman and his staff.

A few days later the notorious US ambassador, Dean Hinton, came to see Gen Zia and again harped on our nuclear programme. He boasted that the Americans knew everything about our work. On hearing that, Gen Zia said that if they were relying on that spy stone for their information, it wouldn’t do them much good as it had meanwhile been dismantled and was now non-functional. The Ambassador, visibly shaken, soon departed.

Just a few weeks earlier the US defence attache had taken aerial photos of the buildings at Kahuta and Dean Hinton had gone to the president and asked what type of facilities they were. Gen Zia did not even bother to look at the photos. He only remarked that the US had violated diplomatic norms and if any plane (it was a UN plane that used to fly to Kashmir) flew over Kahuta in future, it would be shot down.

He later conveyed these orders to the Air defence command stationed at Kahuta which had anti-aircraft guns and surface-to-air anti-aircraft missiles.

With time, news of our efforts to acquire nuclear weapons filtered through to the west and they all undertook espionage efforts. The British sent two of their most notorious journalists, Mark Tully, who could speak Urdu, and Chris Sherwell. Sherwell was tasked to cover me. He used to roam around where we lived on his motor cycle.

One night Col Rahman’s people caught him snooping, had him thoroughly thrashed and registered a case of female molestation against him. After his release some time later both he and Tully were deported. Before this episode, Tully had once tried to embarrass Ghulam Ishaq Khan by asking him how much was reserved for Kahuta.

GIK just smiled and quoted from Ghalib: “Magas ko bagh men jaane na dijeo; Keh nahaq khaun perwane ka hoga” (Don’t let the bee into the garden otherwise the poor moths will lose their lives.) Tully was baffled and asked other journalists what Khan Saheb had meant. By the time he found out the meaning of the verse, the press conference was over and Ghulam Ishaq Khan had left.




"In this column two more important events which have become part of our project history. In 1979 workers at Emerson Electronics, UK, went on strike. We had bought 30 high frequency inverters from them. Upon delivery we found that they needed some modifications.

We then ordered 100 units with these changes incorporated. On receiving such a big order, the workers demanded a Christmas bonus, which the management refused, hence the strike. The matter went to Frank Allaun, MP, who, by coincidence, was associated with the British Atomic Energy Authority and knew that inverters were used in nuclear technology. He wrote to Tony Benn, secretary of trade, and an embargo was placed on their export. The MD of Emerson later acknowledged in a press briefing that they had been sure that such sophisticated equipment would remain in their boxes and left to rot. They were, therefore, very surprised to receive a telex from us with suggestions to improve performance.

With an embargo in place, I handed over local production to Brig Azizul Haq, a competent electronics engineer. Unfortunately he died of a heart attack while on official duty in Germany. In his place came Brig Abdul Qayyum, a soft-spoken, competent, hard taskmaster, who went all out to deliver. He was helped by Dr Javed Arshad Mirza, DG Electronics, and Eng Nasim Khan, DG Control and Automation. Prototypes were produced within a few months, followed by production of all the required units. These never failed or gave us any problems.

The inverter affair caught the interest of the diplomatic community in Islamabad and their intelligence services started snooping around. To their misfortune, the French ambassador, Pol Le Gourrierec, and his first secretary, Jean Forlaut, turned out to be overzealous. They took a private car with an Islamabad number plate and drove to Kahuta. Just before Kahuta there is a road turning left to Pharwala Qila (fort). However, they did not turn left. A few hundred yards further they were stopped by Col Rahman’s security people who gave them a good thrashing. Ghulam Ishaq Khan had instructed that foreign intruders were to be taught a lesson.

After a few days the two men went to complain to Gen Zia, who had previously been briefed by Gen Naqvi. They claimed to have wanted to visit the fort. He asked them why they had gone alone in a private car. The chief of protocol would have given them an escort, he said. There are dacoits in that area and it is dangerous for foreigners. When Gen Naqvi saw Gen Zia the next day the latter smilingly said that it had been a befitting treatment. After that no foreigners dared, or were allowed, to go there.

When Iranian students stormed and occupied the US Embassy in Tehran, they found heaps of shredded paper. With great patience they glued the strips together, later published as the ‘Tehran Papers’. It came to light that Forlaut was a CIA agent reporting directly to his boss in Tehran (I have copies). In one of his dispatches he wrote: “Huge, spectacular construction is going on in Kahuta. It is definitely something secret. Contrary to Pakistan’s traditional lethargic pace of work, the speed is spectacularly fast and you can see day to day progress”. He probably spied from the Lehtrar side of the mountain with binoculars.

The second event was a mischievous plot hatched by two senior PAEC scientists working with me. I had mentioned earlier that, when given the choice, some PAEC scientists had opted to remain with ERL. When, on April 4, 1978 we succeeded in enriching UF6 to a moderate concentration, I immediately informed Ghulam Ishaq Khan in writing, clearly mentioning that it was a small but significant step in the right direction, but we still needed hard work and time to achieve our goal. The PAEC officers informed Munir. They hatched a plot to get rid of me and take possession of the project.

With the help of one of their colleagues they managed to approach Air Commodore Saleem Chaudhry, then at Peshawar. He was married to the sister of Gen Zia’s wife. They painted a horrible picture of me and managed to get an audience with Gen Zia. He very patiently listened to their diatribe, said he would have everything checked by the ISI and take appropriate action. After some days he called Gen Naqvi and me. We thought it was just a routine visit.

After the usual courtesies he asked about my colleagues. I told him they were fine and very busy with their respective jobs. Then he pointedly asked me: “Dr Sahib, how well do you know your colleagues and are they trustworthy?” I immediately felt that something was wrong. I replied: “Sir, you know that I am a refugee from Bhopal. I have returned to Pakistan after 15 years. I do not know any of them personally except for Engineer Badrul Islam, who is a dear friend and a capable and competent chartered engineer. I trust all my colleagues.”

His reply was: “Dr Sb you are a simple person. Two of your senior colleagues came to see me a few days ago and told me a lot of b… sh…; things like you being untrustworthy, have no stake in Pakistan, have a foreign wife, have lots of foreign friends and that you would one day vanish, leaving us in the lurch.” He said he had then asked them if they could do the job as their past record was not good, to which they replied: “We will lock him up in his house and take away his passport and if we encounter difficulties with the work, we will fetch him and force him help solve the problems.” “One ‘pidda’ (shorty) and the other ‘darhiyal’ (bearded) were the two” he said.

I immediately recognised them as the two who were extremely close friends and had close contacts with Munir and his right hand man. Gen Zia, quite annoyed by this time, said: “They are trying to do what the Israelis and the Indians could not achieve. They are a bunch of incompetent intriguers. Zamin Sb, tell the DG ISI to pick them up and dump then into a cell from where they will never be seen again.” I requested him not to do that as it would certainly leak out and would have a bad effect on my other colleagues. Those two belonged to PAEC and I would simply send them back. He very reluctantly agreed.

Back at the office I informed my other senior colleagues what had happened. A number of them told me that the two had tried to enlist their support. One colonel did actually join them but, on being exposed, he came to me and apologised in writing for being misled. I asked Brig Anis to immediately have him retired, which he did. The ‘bearded one’ later apologised to me and admitted the whole plot. Had they succeeded, Pakistan would never have become a nuclear power. My knowledge, practical experience and contacts with leading industrialists in Europe were the key to our success."

Pakistan Nuclear History- A Q Khan Version

 

[WAJsal]

"After imposing martial law, Gen Zia appointed his old colleague and friend from the Indian Military Academy, Dehradune days, Gen Syed Ali Zamin Naqvi, as adviser security on nuclear affairs. Gen Naqvi, an MA in English from Allahabad University, looked very much like a European – fair, light coloured hair, green eyes. He was a soft-spoken and pleasant person. He had an office at the PAEC Head Office and took Col Qamar Faruqui, director security PAEC, as his staff officer.

Within a few weeks he realised that Munir Ahmad Khan was averse to producing a nuclear bomb. When he mentioned this to me I told him that Munir had, on numerous occasions, tried to convince me that nuclear weapons were a bad thing for Pakistan. He also said that, were his wife (a European lady) to find out, all hell would break loose. This had serious but positive consequences, about which more in the next column. I personally believed, and still believe, that without nuclear deterrence we would have lost Pakistan. Statements made by Indian leaders are testimony to this.

There were many intrigues and plots against me and our nuclear programme, more so by locals than by foreigners. Now, while putting things in writing, all those events come to mind. Let me just tell you about one. A very fine, competent colleague of mine was, at that time, working in a defence organisation. He was frustrated as the head of that organisation, a former professor and a disciple of Prof Salam, had no practical experience or knowledge of defence projects. I obtained orders from Gen Zia to have him transferred to us. He turned out to be an invaluable, capable asset.

He told me that when Mr Bhutto had put pressure on Munir to explode the promised device by December 1976, Munir had discussed the matter with Prof Salam and my colleague’s boss. They decided to get about 2000 tons of explosives, put radioactive cobalt in it (obtained from X-ray machines) and explode it in a small tunnel. They would then take Mr Bhutto there and show him with a Geiger Counter that the explosion had been successful. They then informed Mr Bhutto that the explosion would take place after three or four months. To their good fortune, Mr. Bhutto announced elections and we all know what happened after that. Had their plot been successful, Mr Bhutto may very well have considered the centrifuge route redundant and Pakistan would have been put in mortal danger."



"In continuation of my previous columns on the same subject, here follow three interesting events that are not common knowledge. I had mentioned earlier that both Gen Naqvi and Col Faruqui had doubted Munir’s loyalty. Gen Zia himself had warned me to be wary and I was not to discuss any important or confidential matters with him.

The event discussed here was told to us by our foreign minister, Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, after his return from a trip to the USA. The same incident was also told to Mr Zahid Malik by the Foreign Secretary, Niaz A Naik, and included in Mr Malik’s book ‘Dr AQ Khan and the Islamic Bomb’ (1992).

Sahbizada Yaqub was in Washington with Foreign Secretary George Schultz and they were discussing matters of mutual interest. He had his team members with him. During the course of the discussions Schultz suddenly changed the topic and started talking about our nuclear programme. He threatened to stop all aid to Pakistan if we did not restrict our nuclear programme.

Yaqub tried to defend our stance and said that our programme was for peaceful purposes only. A senior official of the CIA retorted that he should not insult their intelligence as they had all details of our programme. They even had a mock-up of our nuclear device, he said. They then asked Yaqub to follow them through the corridor to another room. The officer removed a cloth that covered a table and Yaqub saw a design of a plant on it. He said that that was our Kahuta Plant.

He then went to the next table and removed a cloth from what looked like a sphere in two parts with cables, etc. and told Yaqub that it was a model of our nuclear weapon. Yaqub feigned ignorance, even though he realised it looked like what he had so often seen in Kahuta. He told them that he was not a technical man or a scientist and could not say anything about it. But if you say that is what it is, then let it be so.

Mr Schultz said that he could not fool him. They had irrefutable proof. When they left the room and walked down the corridor towards Schultz’ office, Yaqub’s sixth sense told him to look over his shoulder. He got the shock of his life when he saw a renowned Pakistani scientist coming out of the adjacent room and going straight into the room they had just left. He instantly understood the whole game. Information had been passed on to the Americans.

The second event – an important one – took place after some time in Kahuta. After ERL (Engineering Research Laboratories) had been established, I asked Gen Faiz Ali Chishti, Commander 10th Corps, Rawalpindi, to give me a good officer to look after our security matters. He sent Col Abdul Rahman, an extremely competent, efficient officer.

After having explained to him what I wanted him to take care of, he hired many observers and informants around Kahuta. One day a “shepherd” returned from a routine inspection and sat down on a medium-sized stone to rest. He thought that the stone looked a bit different and used his small axe to chip off a small piece. The stone was easily cut and underneath he could see copper. He immediately reported the matter to a subedar who, in turn, informed Col Rahman. The stone was taken to the laboratories and put in a safe place.

I was informed and told them not to do anything until the next morning after I had inspected it. Next morning, after having ascertained that it did not contain any explosives, we dismantled it. The outside layer, about 4 inches thick, consisted of resin with sand from the local area. Inside was an aluminium box in two parts screwed together. Upon removing the screws we saw a wonder of technology – a long-lasting battery, antenna, neutron counters, an air-analyser and a recording/transmitter set.

This sophisticated equipment could analyse air samples to find the concentration of enriched or natural uranium hexafluoride, neutrons (from cold and hot tests), could store this information and, on command, could transmit it in a single pulse.

It must have cost millions of dollars. It had definitely been put there at night by a Pakistani agent driving to Kahuta Town. I conveyed details of the “find” to Gen Zia and Mr Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who immediately came to see it. They highly commended the work of Col Rahman and his staff.

A few days later the notorious US ambassador, Dean Hinton, came to see Gen Zia and again harped on our nuclear programme. He boasted that the Americans knew everything about our work. On hearing that, Gen Zia said that if they were relying on that spy stone for their information, it wouldn’t do them much good as it had meanwhile been dismantled and was now non-functional. The Ambassador, visibly shaken, soon departed.

Just a few weeks earlier the US defence attache had taken aerial photos of the buildings at Kahuta and Dean Hinton had gone to the president and asked what type of facilities they were. Gen Zia did not even bother to look at the photos. He only remarked that the US had violated diplomatic norms and if any plane (it was a UN plane that used to fly to Kashmir) flew over Kahuta in future, it would be shot down.

He later conveyed these orders to the Air defence command stationed at Kahuta which had anti-aircraft guns and surface-to-air anti-aircraft missiles.

With time, news of our efforts to acquire nuclear weapons filtered through to the west and they all undertook espionage efforts. The British sent two of their most notorious journalists, Mark Tully, who could speak Urdu, and Chris Sherwell. Sherwell was tasked to cover me. He used to roam around where we lived on his motor cycle.

One night Col Rahman’s people caught him snooping, had him thoroughly thrashed and registered a case of female molestation against him. After his release some time later both he and Tully were deported. Before this episode, Tully had once tried to embarrass Ghulam Ishaq Khan by asking him how much was reserved for Kahuta.

GIK just smiled and quoted from Ghalib: “Magas ko bagh men jaane na dijeo; Keh nahaq khaun perwane ka hoga” (Don’t let the bee into the garden otherwise the poor moths will lose their lives.) Tully was baffled and asked other journalists what Khan Saheb had meant. By the time he found out the meaning of the verse, the press conference was over and Ghulam Ishaq Khan had left.




"In this column two more important events which have become part of our project history. In 1979 workers at Emerson Electronics, UK, went on strike. We had bought 30 high frequency inverters from them. Upon delivery we found that they needed some modifications.

We then ordered 100 units with these changes incorporated. On receiving such a big order, the workers demanded a Christmas bonus, which the management refused, hence the strike. The matter went to Frank Allaun, MP, who, by coincidence, was associated with the British Atomic Energy Authority and knew that inverters were used in nuclear technology. He wrote to Tony Benn, secretary of trade, and an embargo was placed on their export. The MD of Emerson later acknowledged in a press briefing that they had been sure that such sophisticated equipment would remain in their boxes and left to rot. They were, therefore, very surprised to receive a telex from us with suggestions to improve performance.

With an embargo in place, I handed over local production to Brig Azizul Haq, a competent electronics engineer. Unfortunately he died of a heart attack while on official duty in Germany. In his place came Brig Abdul Qayyum, a soft-spoken, competent, hard taskmaster, who went all out to deliver. He was helped by Dr Javed Arshad Mirza, DG Electronics, and Eng Nasim Khan, DG Control and Automation. Prototypes were produced within a few months, followed by production of all the required units. These never failed or gave us any problems.

The inverter affair caught the interest of the diplomatic community in Islamabad and their intelligence services started snooping around. To their misfortune, the French ambassador, Pol Le Gourrierec, and his first secretary, Jean Forlaut, turned out to be overzealous. They took a private car with an Islamabad number plate and drove to Kahuta. Just before Kahuta there is a road turning left to Pharwala Qila (fort). However, they did not turn left. A few hundred yards further they were stopped by Col Rahman’s security people who gave them a good thrashing. Ghulam Ishaq Khan had instructed that foreign intruders were to be taught a lesson.

After a few days the two men went to complain to Gen Zia, who had previously been briefed by Gen Naqvi. They claimed to have wanted to visit the fort. He asked them why they had gone alone in a private car. The chief of protocol would have given them an escort, he said. There are dacoits in that area and it is dangerous for foreigners. When Gen Naqvi saw Gen Zia the next day the latter smilingly said that it had been a befitting treatment. After that no foreigners dared, or were allowed, to go there.

When Iranian students stormed and occupied the US Embassy in Tehran, they found heaps of shredded paper. With great patience they glued the strips together, later published as the ‘Tehran Papers’. It came to light that Forlaut was a CIA agent reporting directly to his boss in Tehran (I have copies). In one of his dispatches he wrote: “Huge, spectacular construction is going on in Kahuta. It is definitely something secret. Contrary to Pakistan’s traditional lethargic pace of work, the speed is spectacularly fast and you can see day to day progress”. He probably spied from the Lehtrar side of the mountain with binoculars.

The second event was a mischievous plot hatched by two senior PAEC scientists working with me. I had mentioned earlier that, when given the choice, some PAEC scientists had opted to remain with ERL. When, on April 4, 1978 we succeeded in enriching UF6 to a moderate concentration, I immediately informed Ghulam Ishaq Khan in writing, clearly mentioning that it was a small but significant step in the right direction, but we still needed hard work and time to achieve our goal. The PAEC officers informed Munir. They hatched a plot to get rid of me and take possession of the project.

With the help of one of their colleagues they managed to approach Air Commodore Saleem Chaudhry, then at Peshawar. He was married to the sister of Gen Zia’s wife. They painted a horrible picture of me and managed to get an audience with Gen Zia. He very patiently listened to their diatribe, said he would have everything checked by the ISI and take appropriate action. After some days he called Gen Naqvi and me. We thought it was just a routine visit.

After the usual courtesies he asked about my colleagues. I told him they were fine and very busy with their respective jobs. Then he pointedly asked me: “Dr Sahib, how well do you know your colleagues and are they trustworthy?” I immediately felt that something was wrong. I replied: “Sir, you know that I am a refugee from Bhopal. I have returned to Pakistan after 15 years. I do not know any of them personally except for Engineer Badrul Islam, who is a dear friend and a capable and competent chartered engineer. I trust all my colleagues.”

His reply was: “Dr Sb you are a simple person. Two of your senior colleagues came to see me a few days ago and told me a lot of b… sh…; things like you being untrustworthy, have no stake in Pakistan, have a foreign wife, have lots of foreign friends and that you would one day vanish, leaving us in the lurch.” He said he had then asked them if they could do the job as their past record was not good, to which they replied: “We will lock him up in his house and take away his passport and if we encounter difficulties with the work, we will fetch him and force him help solve the problems.” “One ‘pidda’ (shorty) and the other ‘darhiyal’ (bearded) were the two” he said.

I immediately recognised them as the two who were extremely close friends and had close contacts with Munir and his right hand man. Gen Zia, quite annoyed by this time, said: “They are trying to do what the Israelis and the Indians could not achieve. They are a bunch of incompetent intriguers. Zamin Sb, tell the DG ISI to pick them up and dump then into a cell from where they will never be seen again.” I requested him not to do that as it would certainly leak out and would have a bad effect on my other colleagues. Those two belonged to PAEC and I would simply send them back. He very reluctantly agreed.

Back at the office I informed my other senior colleagues what had happened. A number of them told me that the two had tried to enlist their support. One colonel did actually join them but, on being exposed, he came to me and apologised in writing for being misled. I asked Brig Anis to immediately have him retired, which he did. The ‘bearded one’ later apologised to me and admitted the whole plot. Had they succeeded, Pakistan would never have become a nuclear power. My knowledge, practical experience and contacts with leading industrialists in Europe were the key to our success."

Pakistan Nuclear History- A Q Khan Version

Half way through, no point wasting my time reading it, A.Q. Khan is known for his retarded comments and some of the golden work that he did. Apparently Abdus Salam, Sultan Bashiruddin, Munir Ahmed, Samar Mubarakmand were CIA agents, by A.Q Khan interpretation, thought you should know. A.Q Khan simply played a key role in enriching Uranium, that too PAEC was helping it all along. Counter my post, point by point please, all of it. PAEC itself played a key role in enriching uranium, then there was assembling weapons, making weapons, trigger mechanism and other thing, who was responsible for this? counter my post, point or don't quote me at all. I can't continue posting same shit over and over again-no offense.
"Project-706 or the Kahuta project, was only one part of Pakistan's nuclear program. Only one part of the enriched uranium route to the Pakistani bomb, i.e, the gas-centrifuge project, which was itself started by PAEC before A Q Khan arrived in Pakistan.

Secondly, all other elements of the complete nuclear fuel cycle, including elements of the uranium route other than Project-706 was PAEC's work, which were developed under several other projects, like the Baghalchur-1 uranium mining and refining project and the huge Chemical Plants Complex (CPC) Project, at Dera Ghazi Khan. CPC produces several types of nuclear materials, most important of which is the uranium hexa-fluoride gas or UF6, which is the feed stock for all known commercial uranium enrichment methods, including centrifuge."
You seem to ignore this based on facts:

The whole truth — nuclear Pakistan
Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood (SI)
Tuesday, September 04, 2012
I have been associated with Pakistan’s nuclear programme and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission since 1963 and therefore I have firsthand knowledge of the various phases of the country’s nuclear quest. However the sensitive nature of the subject requires that we should be very careful while talking about it. This is what the (late) Chairman PAEC Munir Ahmad Khan impressed upon all his team members. If some self-glorified scientists/engineers have succeeded to reduce his image to the status of a villain, it is due to his modesty and not advertising his achievements in his lifetime. By awarding the posthumous Nishan-i-Imtiaz thirteen years after his death, the president has done no favour to him but has only corrected a wrong.



Soon after India’s 1974 test, the PAEC decided to adopt centrifuge technology for uranium enrichment and I was tasked by Munir Ahmad Khan to prepare a feasibility on the basis of comparative studies of different enrichment technologies. Previous to this assignment, I was commissioning engineer and incharge of troubleshooting during the commissioning phases of KANUPP. Before that, I had worked at Risley Design Centre with the UK Atomic Energy Authority who had applied two patents in my name, and published eleven technical reports in one year — a rare honour for any nuclear engineer.



The Enrichment Project, commonly known as the Kahuta Project or KRL was also started by the PAEC in October 1974 with myself as its director. I handed over charge of the project after 33 months on July 17, 1976 to Dr AQ Khan. By then, we had completed the designs for the centrifuge machine and the process plant in the shabby Second World War Army Barracks near Chaklala airport, known as the Airport Development Workshop. We had deliberately left parts of the outer side of ADW unfurnished to maintain secrecy while the inner parts were furnished as per our needs. It was our deliberate policy to give priority to procurements of essential materials and equipment, build manpower and an indigenous base and not waste time on expensive buildings and cars in the initial years.



We had also managed to procure most of the short term and long term requirements of machinery and materials for the first phase of the project as per our original plan.



Dr AQ Khan joined the project in early 1976 as Director Research. Prior to this, he was working for us in Amsterdam, Holland. The PAEC team had begun work on local development of a high-speed motor for the centrifuge and the aluminium centrifuge base.



We also started indigenous development of high frequency generators and bellows using explosive forming techniques. By July 1976, we had installed and commissioned the centrifuge rotor manufacturing machines, electron beam-welding machine, high strength magnet charging machines, and initiated work on high speed bearings, grooving and welding technologies.



These are few examples only. We had procured large quantities of high strength aluminium and maraging steel for manufacturing centrifuge rotors and other components for centrifuge machines. The team of dedicated scientists and engineers who made the project a success in the initial years and came from the PAEC, among them Dr GD Alam, Anwar Ali, Ijaz Khokhar, Dr Javed Mirza, Brig. Abdus Salam (EME), Col Rashid Ali (EME) and many more illustrious names. Many of them later rose to important positions in KRL under Dr AQ Khan.



By the time the project was separated from the PAEC, it was on its way to produce weapon-grade enriched uranium by 1980. However, once the project was separated from the PAEC, this target was met several years later and at many times the estimated budget. However, I do not wish to undermine AQ Khan’s contribution in taking the project forward from where we left in 1976.



Dr AQ Khan succeeded me as head of the Kahuta project on July 17, 1976. He accused me of procuring sub-standard maraging steel and I was later exonerated of this charge. I handed over charge of the project to AQ Khan in the presence of Agha Shahi and Munir Ahmad Khan the same day. I was transferred back to the PAEC and was assigned the job to extend its capacity of the uranium mining and refining project.



Meanwhile, Munir Ahmad Khan had launched over 20 laboratories and projects in the nuclear programme from 1972-1991, each one essential to acquire nuclear capability. Some of them are the uranium mining, refining, uranium oxide and hexafluoride UF6 production plants (the feedstock for KRL).



On the plutonium side, it was Munir Khan’s vision to develop plutonium capability for Pakistan and I was assigned the task of designing and building the 50 MW Khushab-1 Nuclear Reactor and metal fuel manufacturing project indigenously for producing plutonium in 1986. The Khushab reactor project was completed within ten years using Pakistani manpower, materials and know-how most economically. Based on this success and the team, which we trained in the PAEC, Pakistan has now expanded this capability by building similar reactors at Khushab.



It was again the PAEC, which carried out several cold tests of different nuclear weapon designs under the leadership of Munir Ahmad Khan. These tests were conducted by Dr Samar Mubarakmand and Muhammad Hafeez Qureshi. The first cold test of a working nuclear device was carried out on March 11, 1983 at Kirana Hills and President Zia was informed of the results by Munir Khan the same evening. Subsequently, 24 more cold tests were conducted by the PAEC between 1983 and the early 1990s. The second cold test in 1983 was witnessed by Ghulam Ishaq Khan, General KM Arif (Vice Chief of Army Staff) and Munir Ahmad Khan.



In addition Munir Khan also established the Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Complex, Kundian; New Laboratories Reprocessing Plant, PINSTECH; Chaghi, Kharan and Kirana Hills nuclear test sites; and laid the foundation for the 300 MW Chashma-1 Nuclear Power Plant. The Centre for Nuclear Studies (now a University PIEAS), which has produced indigenous trained manpower for Pakistan’s nuclear programme, was also his achievement. He also built several nuclear agriculture, biotechnology and medical centres across the country. Besides, Pakistan’s first gamma sterilization plant for sterilization of medical products was built in Lahore under my supervision, which is still serving the nation. These facts can be verified from Dr Samar Mubarakmand.



Pakistan became a nuclear power due to the dedicated efforts of a large team of scientists, engineers and technicians who participated in this sacred endeavour for several decades. The nuclear programme enjoyed complete support of the people, the armed forces and the politicians. There is no single hero of this success story. It has been a great national effort and if credit goes to anybody it goes to the people of Pakistan who sacrificed so much in the shape of sanctions for the success of the programme. Let’s not fight for mundane rewards and belittle each others efforts. If some energy is still left in us, it should be spent only in the service of Pakistan — our Pakistan.



The writer is former Director-General (Nuclear Power), PAEC

 

[Bratva]

@WAJsal from your own article which corroborates what I've been saying.About handing role to AQ, Plutonium role only reach maturity in late 90's early 2000's. many PAEC employees left PAEC and began working for AQ. Read the bold and underline name. These two people were punt under trail because of basing unfounded allegations against AQ Khan. Intitally they left PAEC and began work under AQ Khan. They made some startled allegations to Zia. Zia Called AQ asked him about these two peoples. Zia suggested to hang these two people but later Munir ahmed interventation saved them and they were later sent back to PAEC


Soon after India’s 1974 test, the PAEC decided to adopt centrifuge technology for uranium enrichment and I was tasked by Munir Ahmad Khan to prepare a feasibility on the basis of comparative studies of different enrichment technologies. Previous to this assignment, I was commissioning engineer and incharge of troubleshooting during the commissioning phases of KANUPP. Before that, I had worked at Risley Design Centre with the UK Atomic Energy Authority who had applied two patents in my name, and published eleven technical reports in one year — a rare honour for any nuclear engineer.



The Enrichment Project, commonly known as the Kahuta Project or KRL was also started by the PAEC in October 1974 with myself as its director. I handed over charge of the project after 33 months on July 17, 1976 to Dr AQ Khan. By then, we had completed the designs for the centrifuge machine and the process plant in the shabby Second World War Army Barracks near Chaklala airport, known as the Airport Development Workshop. We had deliberately left parts of the outer side of ADW unfurnished to maintain secrecy while the inner parts were furnished as per our needs. It was our deliberate policy to give priority to procurements of essential materials and equipment, build manpower and an indigenous base and not waste time on expensive buildings and cars in the initial years.



We had also managed to procure most of the short term and long term requirements of machinery and materials for the first phase of the project as per our original plan.



Dr AQ Khan joined the project in early 1976 as Director Research. Prior to this, he was working for us in Amsterdam, Holland. The PAEC team had begun work on local development of a high-speed motor for the centrifuge and the aluminium centrifuge base.



We also started indigenous development of high frequency generators and bellows using explosive forming techniques. By July 1976, we had installed and commissioned the centrifuge rotor manufacturing machines, electron beam-welding machine, high strength magnet charging machines, and initiated work on high speed bearings, grooving and welding technologies.



These are few examples only. We had procured large quantities of high strength aluminium and maraging steel for manufacturing centrifuge rotors and other components for centrifuge machines. The team of dedicated scientists and engineers who made the project a success in the initial years and came from the PAEC, among them Dr GD Alam, Anwar Ali, Ijaz Khokhar, Dr Javed Mirza, Brig. Abdus Salam (EME), Col Rashid Ali (EME) and many more illustrious names. Many of them later rose to important positions in KRL under Dr AQ Khan.



By the time the project was separated from the PAEC, it was on its way to produce weapon-grade enriched uranium by 1980. However, once the project was separated from the PAEC, this target was met several years later and at many times the estimated budget. However, I do not wish to undermine AQ Khan’s contribution in taking the project forward from where we left in 1976.



Dr AQ Khan succeeded me as head of the Kahuta project on July 17, 1976. He accused me of procuring sub-standard maraging steel and I was later exonerated of this charge. I handed over charge of the project to AQ Khan in the presence of Agha Shahi and Munir Ahmad Khan the same day. I was transferred back to the PAEC and was assigned the job to extend its capacity of the uranium mining and refining project.

Half way through, no point wasting my time reading it, A.Q. Khan is known for his retarded comments and some of the golden work that he did. Apparently Abdus Salam, Sultan Bashiruddin, Munir Ahmed, Samar Mubarakmand were CIA agents, by A.Q Khan interpretation, thought you should know. A.Q Khan simply played a key role in enriching Uranium, that too PAEC was helping it all along. Counter my post, point by point please, all of it. PAEC itself played a key role in enriching uranium, then there was assembling weapons, making weapons, trigger mechanism and other thing, who was responsible for this? counter my post, point or don't quote me at all. I can't continue posting same shit over and over again-no offense.
"Project-706 or the Kahuta project, was only one part of Pakistan's nuclear program. Only one part of the enriched uranium route to the Pakistani bomb, i.e, the gas-centrifuge project, which was itself started by PAEC before A Q Khan arrived in Pakistan.

Secondly, all other elements of the complete nuclear fuel cycle, including elements of the uranium route other than Project-706 was PAEC's work, which were developed under several other projects, like the Baghalchur-1 uranium mining and refining project and the huge Chemical Plants Complex (CPC) Project, at Dera Ghazi Khan. CPC produces several types of nuclear materials, most important of which is the uranium hexa-fluoride gas or UF6, which is the feed stock for all known commercial uranium enrichment methods, including centrifuge."
You seem to ignore this based on facts:

Ask yourself, Without KRL enriched uranium, Were PAEC able to put final touches to atom bomb? Was PAEC able to enrich uranium like what KRL did ? Did PAEC made centrifuges or was it KRL who made their own centrifuges? Why PAEC didn't capitialize on AQ khan data from 74-76 ?

You are blindly copy pasting the same thing again and again without understanding a simple fact , what Munir ahmed wasn't able to accomplish, that is why they brought AQ KHAN on board. They were not able to enrich neither Uranium nor Plutonium. And that's where dubious claims of Munir ahmed made his character suspicious. He claimed to make Pakistan a nuclear power with little success in plutonium process which was only perfected in early 2000.