I am not expert and i dont want to start again what you did on 27th Feb. But to claim that you are up against some ragtag Air force and bring it down on any given day is an overstatement.
What makes a formation rag-tag are few things which were seen by IAF that day - level of training, communication, coordination and operational execution. All these factors failed and i will describe them very briefly.
1. Level of training - that a wing commander (equivalent to Lt Col, able to command at least 2-3 Fighter squadrons forming one wing), was sent in one of the oldest fighters of IAF, while he had been qualified on SU-30 MKI. With such experience and a command level behind him, sending him in the air on Mig-21 was a mistake which proved embarrassingly deadly that day. Secondly, downing of own Mi-17 shows the confused level of training during combat, which translates that even real live fire exercises and simulations would be prone to accidents. No wonder, there is a high crash rate in IAF already. Thirdly, IAF fell for the oldest trick in the book - an ambush laid by PAF during return journey of JF-17s and Mirage-III/V. Now considering that PAF could have fallen for the same trap a day earlier, which it didnt, what made IAF's Mig-21 blindly flying towards LOC is what im going to tell next.
2. Communication was thoroughly jammed for IAF, there was PAF EW aircraft in the air which was providing EW cover to PAF fighters in the region, further backed up by 1-2 AWACS, probably Erieye since F-16s were on CAP. For jamming, the bigger transmitter, the better. Probably for this reason and maybe other reasons, PAF didnt choose a fighter jet but a category of transport plane to have a full crew of EW specialists (housing 8-12 staff) on board rather can just a pilot and WSO, along with a full array of related EW sensors. Abhinandan admitted that there was too much noise and he couldn't understand instructions from control tower. Now IAF is on the road to revamp their communication radios - this was a big loop in communication. However, let me assure you that even secure radios can be jammed while IAF was using un-secure radios.
3. Coordination was in disarray. IAF CAPs should have intercepted PAF jets, IAF AWACS should have picked them up, even the AD radars should have picked up PAF fighters and targeted them through SAMs. PAF crossed over LOC at a few places and since a retaliation from PAF was expected just like the official statement from ISPR had been publicised all over media and news channels, IAF should have had hunter-killer flights of 3-4 SU30MKIs or Mig-29s or Mirage-2000 or Mig-21s in place to deter PAF from carrying out a surface attack. There are 240-270 SU30MKI in service, whats the use of buying such hundreds of heavy strike aircrafts then ?
4. Lastly, by the end of the day, IAF had lost 2 x fighter aircrafts, 1 x SAR heli, 1 x pilot captured, 2 x pilots killed and 6 x uniformed personnel along with 1 x civilian killed. The trophy that IAF could produce were parts of an AIM120C5 missile and 1 x crow killed a day earlier. The figures themselves speak about the Ops preparedness of IAF.
And after that the focus shifted on - Rafale.