Policing Afghanistan

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Policing Afghanistan​

An ethnic-minority force enters a Taliban stronghold.
by Graeme Wood December 8, 2008

Afghan National Police commander Muhammad Khan. Photograph by Louie Palu.
​

In late 2007, in Pashmul, a tiny cluster of villages in southern Afghanistan, Muhammad Khan began his tenure as the police commander by torching all the hemp in a farmer’s field. Farmers in the area had grown plants up to seven feet tall, and, being teetotallers, like many Afghans, they smoked hashish constantly. Afghan soldiers and policemen in the area also smoked, to the exasperation of the NATO troops who were training them. But Khan wasn’t from Pashmul and he didn’t smoke. He ordered his men to set the harvest ablaze, moved upwind, then turned his back and left, with an expression of indifference.

Khan and his police officers are members of Afghanistan’s Hazara minority, identifiable among Afghans because of their Asiatic features; the population they patrol is Pashtun. Hazaras are mostly Shia, with a history of ties to Iran, whereas most Pashtuns are Sunni and have turned to Pakistan for support. Over the past century, the two peoples have fought periodically, and the Hazaras, who are thought to make up between nine and nineteen per cent of Afghanistan’s population—the Pashtuns make up nearly half—have usually lost. On the border between the Hazara heartland, in the country’s mountainous and impoverished center, and the Pashtun plains in the south and east, conflicts over grazing land are common. But, working alongside NATO soldiers, Hazara police units are now operating far to the south of these traditional battlegrounds and deep into Pashtun territory.

The Pashmul base is just outside the city of Kandahar, in one of Afghanistan’s most dangerous regions. Last year, the Taliban all but wiped out the Afghan National Police, or A.N.P., squads there. Deploying Hazaras in this region is a risky move, and comes at a time when Taliban bombings and assassinations are making clear the failure of the U.S.-led NATO coalition and the Afghan government to secure the country. Recently, a draft of a National Intelligence Estimate said that increasingly effective insurgent attacks and widespread corruption in President Hamid Karzai’s government have eroded the government’s authority, and concluded that the country is in a “downward spiral.” And a leaked diplomatic cable quoted the British Ambassador as saying that “the presence of the coalition, in particular its military presence, is part of the problem, not part of its solution.” If the coalition were to leave, the country would be left with the ragtag Afghan National Army, or A.N.A., which deploys wherever it is needed to fight the Taliban in counter-insurgency battles, and the A.N.P., which is responsible for street-level law enforcement and now bears the brunt of the Taliban insurgency. (Last year, nearly four times as many Afghan police were killed as soldiers.) Among Afghans, the A.N.P. has become known for incompetence and corruption. Units like Khan’s, made up of a despised minority with an unsparing attitude toward those they police, embody many of the paradoxes involved in trying to bring order to Afghanistan’s ethnically fissured society.

In July, I visited Pashmul’s police base, a small installation about twice as large as a tennis court and surrounded by ditches and razor wire. Nearby are crumbling Pashtun villages of mud-brick homes, sprinkled with trash and unexploded ordnance. Pashmul is ideal terrain for an insurgency. The main sources of livelihood, other than hemp and poppies, are grapes and pomegranates, and, during the summer fighting season, foliage in fields and orchards provides cover for insurgents. Because farmers are too poor to use wooden frames in their vineyards, their grapevines are supported by deep furrows cut in the earth; thus in an apparently empty field hundreds of Taliban may be hidden. Grape huts, scattered around the fields, have mud walls thick enough to stop bullets, and narrow ventilation slits that can accommodate rifle barrels. Fighting has caused many Pashmul residents to flee to a temporary camp in the desert, from which they trek several miles each morning to cultivate the fields.

Khan’s police unit patrols a war zone, and the men often do the work of soldiers rather than of normal beat police officers. Although the Army lends support when the police encounter armed resistance, the soldiers then retreat to a base outside Pashmul. On most days, the police patrol the alleys alone, except for a few Canadian soldiers whom NATO has assigned to train and mentor them. Taliban snipers routinely fire at the base’s wooden guard towers, and the Hazara policemen fire back. They watch the rickety pickups that pass on a paved road along the base’s eastern edge, on the lookout for suicide bombers. Khan’s men know the faces in each village, but they remain an alien presence. One man, who sold goats to the Hazara policemen, would say hello to the patrol when it walked past his home; his corpse later turned up in the next village.

Now in his late twenties, Muhammad Khan has an intense manner and an unsettling stare. When I met him, he gave me an appraising look, his glare landing on the book in my hand, Paul Theroux’s “My Secret History.” Khan asked me, in Persian, what I was reading, and, struggling to recall the word for “novel,” I said it was “a book.” He gave me the same suspicious look I later saw when he confronted frightened farmers about insurgents in their fields. “That much I can see,” he said. “Is it a novel?”

Khan’s directness enables him to work efficiently with his Canadian supervisors—particularly Mike Vollick, a warrant officer stationed at Khan’s police base. An infantryman, Vollick is thirty-seven and of medium height, with sturdy arms that, when I met him, five months after his arrival in Pashmul, were scabby from dozens of sand-fly bites. The Canadians and the Hazaras communicate reasonably well, although they mostly use a translator and don’t have more than a few dozen words in common, most of which describe military equipment. Vollick considers Khan the most effective Afghan police commander he has seen, and an ideal candidate for district police chief, although, given Khan’s inability to speak Pashto, the local language, and the strength of Pashtun prejudice, this would be an unlikely appointment.



-----------------------------------

The rest of the article:

Letter from Pashmul: Policing Afghanistan: Reporting & Essays: The New Yorker

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

While the men spoke, Khan rolled his eyes in operatic boredom and instructed his men to search the building and to frisk every passerby. The villagers obviously regarded Khan and Vollick as equally foreign. They denied any knowledge of Taliban activity, but, as Khan’s aggressiveness and suspicion grew, they gave Vollick more and more desperate excuses for not coöperating—they were afraid, they said, and hadn’t seen any insurgents anyway. Two other men and a teen-ager looked at us over the walls, perhaps close enough to report back to insurgents on what was said...

...Abbas stayed silent nearby. When Khan and Vollick left for dinner, he told me that he had another four or five months left before his next ten-day leave. He seldom talks to his wife and daughter, because his hundred-dollar monthly salary won’t pay for a calling card. “Afghanistan’s broken,” he said. The weak economy, he told me, had driven him to join the A.N.P. As for relations between Pashtuns and Hazaras, he said, “We like Pashtuns, but the Pashtuns don’t like us. We’d like Persian people and Pashtuns to get along, but they don’t want it.”

I'm not very hopeful of Afghanistan returning to anything resembling normalcy anytime soon.

Even if the insurgent threat is neutralized completely (and thats a huge if), the ethnic rift is huge, and is rooted in hundreds of years of suspicion, hate, persecution and atrocities.

A strong government, and strong military loyal to the State and no other, might help the transition, but I see little signs of that at this point.

 

[S-2]

Read this elsewhere and it's incredibly instructive.

I recall the childish Soviet notion that their invasion could be facilitated by the use of "fellow central asians". Thus regular Soviet units largely manned by Uzbeks and turkomen dominated the initial push. Whoops.

That was a choice. Here, the options are less so. Pashtu drawn from the south, aside from cultural affinity to their kin, appear less than clear-eyed and unmotivated.

Commander Khan's forces are not. Perhaps living amidst their historical enemies sharpens their focus and discipline but, at least from this article, they take seriously their work even should it not be it's intended purpose-policing. That's not Khan's fault nor his men. That's a reflection of the dysfunctional nature of ANA and ANP units drawn locally from a demoralized and stoned populace and a story any Brit, Canadian, or Dutch soldier could easily relate amidst a virulent insurgency that transcends the mundane work of a street cop on a beat.

The ultimate answer, as always, are leaders of integrity and allegiance to the nat'l writ-not tribal affiliated mandates, combined with troops integrated from all walks, rural and urban, and all tribes. Khan may be one of those even should his unit not reflect the desired ethno-tribal mix.

At the salary cost of about $100 per month quoted here, those additional 1,000 hazara would cost $100,000 per month. Long term that's no solution. Short term-I'd take my chances with more men as these given good rapport with the NATO mentors. Khan and WO Vollick have a strong rapport. The police show a remarkably high aptitude and uniform eagerness not commonly found.

Not perfect, obviously, but far better than the alternatives.

Good catch, A.M.

 

[Cheetah786]

Only solutions to Afghanistan is to let them kill each other if islam couldnt show them the light nothing will.

 

[Kharian_Beast]

"strong government" and "loyalty" are not recognized words up there, AM mate.

 

[fatman17]

The Aimless War

By JOE KLEIN Joe Klein –

Thu Dec 11,

… "Things have gotten a bit hairy," admitted British Lieut. Colonel Graeme Armour as we sat in a dusty, bunkered NATO fortress just outside the city of Lashkar Gah in Helmand province, a deadly piece of turf along Afghanistan's southern border with Pakistan. A day earlier, two Danish soldiers had been killed and two Brits seriously wounded by roadside bombs. The casualties were coming almost daily now.

And then there were the daily frustrations of Armour's job: training Afghan police officers. Almost all the recruits were illiterate. "They've had no experience at learning," Armour said. "You sit them in a room and try to teach them about police procedures - they start gabbing and knocking about. You talk to them about the rights of women, and they just laugh." A week earlier, five Afghan police officers trained by Armour were murdered in their beds while defending a nearby checkpoint - possibly by other police officers. Their weapons and ammunition were stolen. "We're not sure of the motivation," Armour said. "They may have gone to join the Taliban or sold the guns in the market." See pictures of Training Afghanistan's Police Force.

The war in Afghanistan - the war that President-elect Barack Obama pledged to fight and win - has become an aimless absurdity. It began with a specific target. Afghanistan was where Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda lived, harbored by the Islamic extremist Taliban government. But the enemy escaped into Pakistan, and for the past seven years, Afghanistan has been a slow bleed against an array of mostly indigenous narco-jihadi-tribal guerrilla forces that we continue to call the "Taliban." These ragtag bands are funded by opium profits and led by assorted religious extremists and druglords, many of whom have safe havens in Pakistan.

In some ways, Helmand province - which I visited with the German general Egon Ramms, commander of NATO's Allied Joint Force Command - is a perfect metaphor for the broader war. The soldiers from NATO's International Security Assistance Force are doing what they can against difficult odds. The language and tactics of counter-insurgency warfare are universal here: secure the population, help them build their communities. There are occasional victories: the Taliban leader of Musa Qala, in northern Helmand, switched sides and has become an effective local governor. But the incremental successes are reversible - schools are burned by the Taliban, police officers are murdered - because of a monstrous structural problem that defines the current struggle in Afghanistan.

The British troops in Helmand are fighting with both hands tied behind their backs. They cannot go after the leadership of the Taliban - still led by the reclusive Mullah Omar - which operates openly in the Pakistani city of Quetta, just across the border. They also can't go after the drug trade that funds the insurgency, in part because some of the proceeds are also skimmed by the friends, officials and perhaps family members of the stupendously corrupt government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai. Helmand province is mostly desert, but it produces half the world's opium supply along a narrow strip of irrigated land that straddles the Helmand River. The drug trade - Afghanistan provides more than 90% of the world's opium - permeates everything. A former governor, Sher Mohammed Akhundzada, was caught with nine tons of opium, enough to force him out of office, but not enough to put him in jail, since he enjoys - according to U.S. military sources - a close relationship with the Karzai government. Indeed, Akhundzada and Karzai's brother Ahmed Wali - who operates in Kandahar, the next province over - are considered the shadow rulers of the region (along with Mullah Omar). "You should understand," a British commander said, "the fight here isn't really about religion. It's about money."

Another thing you should understand: thousands of U.S. troops are expected to be deployed to Helmand and Kandahar provinces next spring. They will be fighting under the same limitations as the British, Canadian, Danish and Dutch forces currently holding the fort, which means they will be spinning their wheels. And that raises a long-term question crucial to the success of the Obama Administration: What are we doing in Afghanistan? What is the mission? We know what the mission used to be - to kill or capture Osama bin Laden and destroy his al-Qaeda command. But once bin Laden slipped away, the mission morphed into a vast, messy nation - building effort to support the allegedly democratic Karzai government. There was a certain logic to that. The Taliban and al-Qaeda can't base themselves in Afghanistan if something resembling a stable, secure nation-state exists there. But the mission was also historically implausible: Afghanistan has never had a strong central government. It has been governed for thousands of years by local and regional tribal coalitions. The tribes have often been at one another's throats - a good part of the current "Taliban" uprising is nothing more than standard tribal rivalries juiced by Western arms and opium profits - except when foreigners have invaded the area, in which case the Afghans have united and slowly humiliated conquerors from Alexander the Great to the Soviets.

The current Western presence is the most benign intrusion in Afghan history, and the rationale of building stability remains a logical one - but this war has become something of a sideshow in South Asia. The far more serious problem is Pakistan, a flimsy state with illogical borders, nuclear weapons and a mortal religious enmity toward India, its neighbor to the south. Pakistan is where bin Laden now lives, if he lives. The Bush Administration chose to coddle Pakistan's military leadership, which promised to help in the fight against al-Qaeda - but it hasn't helped much, although there are signs that the fragile new government of President Asif Ali Zardari may be more cooperative. Still, the Pakistani intelligence service helped create the Taliban and other Islamic extremist groups - including the terrorists who attacked Mumbai - as a way of keeping India at bay, and Pakistan continues to protect the Afghan Taliban in Quetta. In his initial statements, Obama has seemed more sophisticated about Afghanistan than Bush. In an interview with me in late October, Obama said Afghanistan should be seen as part of a regional problem, and he suggested that he might dispatch a special envoy, perhaps Bill Clinton, to work on the Indo-Afghan-Pakistani dilemma. Clinton seems a less likely prospect since his wife was named Secretary of State. The current speculation is that Richard Holbrooke may be selected for the job, which would be a very good idea. Holbrooke is a great negotiator, but he's also a great intimidator, and the first step toward resolving the war in Afghanistan is to lay down the law in both Islamabad and Kabul. The message should be the same in both cases: The unsupervised splurge of American aid is over. The Pakistanis will have to stop giving tacit support and protection to terrorists, especially the Afghan Taliban. The Karzai government will have to end its corruption and close down the drug trade. There are plenty of other reforms necessary - the international humanitarian effort is a shabby, self-righteous mess; some of our NATO allies aren't carrying their share of the military burden - but the war will remain a bloody stalemate at best as long as jihadis come across the border from Pakistan and the drug trade flourishes.

I flew by helicopter from Helmand to the enormous NATO base outside Kandahar to learn that three Canadian soldiers had been killed that morning in an ambush. I stood in a small, bare concrete plaza as the Canadian flag was raised, then lowered to half-staff. Next the Danish flag and finally the NATO flag were raised and left to rest at half-staff. A small group of soldiers from assorted countries stood at attention and saluted as the flags rose and fell. There were no American flags this day, but there soon will be. Before he sends another U.S. soldier off to die or be maimed in Afghanistan,

President-elect Obama needs to deliver the blunt message to the leaders of Pakistan and Afghanistan that we will no longer tolerate their complicity in the deaths of Americans and our allies, a slaughter that began on the morning of Sept. 11, 2001, and continues to this day. Obama will soon own this aimless war if he does not somehow change that dynamic.

View this article on Time.com

and the hits keep on coming!!!

 

[JK!]

Having read about the ANP/ANA in 3 Para by Patrtick Bishop I jold little to no hope for either to become and effective institution.

 

[fatman17]

U.S. General: Many in Afghanistan 'Don't Feel Secure'

Gen. David McKiernan says efforts to improve security depend on more troops arriving quickly

Posted December 12, 2008

Gen. David McKiernan, who in June became the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, has been vocal about the urgent need for more U.S. troops there. In particular, he and others have been concerned that U.S. troop levels might not be high enough to defeat a stubborn, multipronged insurgency.

McKiernan spoke to a roundtable of journalists traveling with Defense Secretary Robert Gates, including U.S. News Defense Correspondent Anna Mulrine. Excerpts:

On growing levels of violence throughout Afghanistan: I think there's first of all a change in the tactics of insurgent or criminal groups, where more and more they operate in smaller, more asymmetric, complex attacks against targets such as convoys, such as government targets, such as police, and less and less against international forces or Afghan National Army targets. I also see the fact that we have increased security capabilities in this country this year as compared to last year. The Army's larger, the international force presence is larger.

We are operating in extending security into areas of this country that we weren't in a year ago, and with that is going to come contact with insurgent or criminal groups. I also see a historic level of militant sanctuaries in the tribal areas of Pakistan that have fueled the insurgency not only on the Afghan side of the border but the Pakistani side of the border. And while there is some reason to be cautiously optimistic that the Pakistanis, with support from the international community, are beginning to deal with those militant sanctuary areas, that has accounted for a heightened level of violence in Afghanistan. You put those three things together, and people quite frankly in many areas of Afghanistan don't feel secure.

On whether the U.S. troops currently slated to head to Afghanistan will be enough to establish security in the country: To ask a military commander if that's enough is like me predicting who's going to win the World Series next year. I don't know if it's enough. I know it's what I can foresee is a requirement to improve security to allow other lines of operation in this country, like governance and socioeconomic programs, to continue to progress.

On hopes that 7,000 to 10,000 additional U.S. troops will arrive in Afghanistan by the summer of 2009: Additional security capabilities coming by the summer is important this year in Afghanistan because it's a year of elections. It's a year of continued campaign against an insurgency. It's a year where we see some reasons to be cautiously optimistic with collaboration and coordination with the Pakistanis along a very long border, so there's a lot of reasons to get forces here sooner rather than later. So I'm hopeful that we can provide additional forces by the summertime.

On the toughest area in Afghanistan: I think the area that we need to increase our security presence the most is the south and southwestern part of Afghanistan. I think you'll see some reinforcement down in this area.

On how long the war will last: To put it in historical perspective, this country has been at war for the last 30 years. That's not going to stop overnight. So if your question is might it get worse before it gets better, yes, it might. Until we get to this tipping point where there's sufficient security capabilities in Afghanistan, there will probably continue to be a degree of insurgent violence in this country. Absolutely.

It's going to take us another three to four years to develop the [Afghan] Army and continue to work on reforming and developing the police to have less reliance on international forces. But make no mistake about it, the security line of operations cannot work without governance and without development. They all have to work together to defeat this insurgency and build a better future for Afghanistan.

US News & World Report - Breaking News, World News, Business News, and America's Best Colleges - USNews.com

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Merging threads because they cover similar subjects ..

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

woops - wrong threads merged

 

[pkpatriotic]

Afghans and U.S. Plan to Recruit Local Militias
By DEXTER FILKINS
Published: December 23, 2008

KABUL, Afghanistan — Taking a page from the successful experiment in Iraq, American commanders and Afghan leaders are preparing to arm local militias to help in the fight against a resurgent Taliban. But along with hope, the move is raising fears here that the new armed groups could push the country into a deeper bloodletting.

French soldiers in an Afghan village in Wardak Province, where militia allies are expected to begin operating early next year.

The militias will be deployed to help American and Afghan security forces, which are stretched far and wide across this mountainous country. The first of the local defense forces are scheduled to begin operating early next year in Wardak Province, an area just outside the capital where the Taliban have overrun most government authority.

If the experiment proves successful, similar militias will be set up rapidly across the country, senior American and Afghan officials said.

The formation of Afghan militias comes on the heels of a similar undertaking in Iraq, where 100,000 Sunni gunmen, many of them former insurgents, have been placed on the government payroll. The Awakening Councils, as they are known, are credited by American officials as one of the main catalysts behind the steep reduction in violence there.

But the plan is causing deep unease among many Afghans, who fear that Pashtun-dominated militias could get out of control, terrorize local populations and turn against the government. The Afghan government, aided by the Americans, has carried out several ambitious campaigns since 2001 to disarm militants and gather up their guns. A proposal to field local militias was defeated in the Afghan Senate in the fall.

“There will be fighting between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns,” said Salih Mohammad Registani, a member of the Afghan Parliament and an ethnic Tajik. Mr. Registani raised the specter of the Arbaki, a Pashtun-dominated militia turned loose on other Afghans early in the 20th century.

“A civil war will start very soon,” he said.

The plan for the militias, approved this month by President Hamid Karzai, is being pushed forward anyway, to help stem the deteriorating security situation here. The proposal to field what amounts to lightly trained gunmen reflects the sense of urgency surrounding the fight against the Taliban, who were removed from power after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, but who have staged a remarkable resurgence in recent years.

American commanders say that while they would prefer to field Afghan Army and police forces, they are simply not available.

“We don’t have enough police,” said Maj. Gen. Michael S. Tucker, the deputy commander of American forces in the country. “We don’t have time to get the police ready.”

One survey, by the International Council on Security and Development, found that the Taliban had established a permanent presence in 72 percent of Afghanistan, up from 54 percent a year ago.

In recent months, the Taliban have moved into the provinces around Kabul, including Wardak to its west. In addition to setting up the first local Afghan militias there, American commanders are sending several hundred American soldiers to the province, the first of which have already arrived. Wardak Province is bisected by the country’s national highway, which has been the scene of numerous ambushes of supply convoys by Taliban insurgents.

The plan for the militias coincides with the arrival of Gen. David H. Petraeus, who presided over the reduction in violence in Iraq and who has since become overall commander for American forces in Afghanistan and the rest of the region. The Americans are sending 20,000 to 30,000 troops over the next year, in addition to the nearly 70,000 American and NATO troops who are already here. President-elect Barack Obama has declared that he will redouble America’s efforts to win.

The formation of the militias is at least a partial answer to the question of how American commanders intend to wrest back the initiative from the Taliban over the next 12 months. While some elected officials in the United States have suggested that the Americans and Afghans might try to exploit fissures in the Taliban, possibly breaking off some groups that can be reconciled, the plan for the militias — coupled with the influx of fresh American forces — suggests that American commanders intend to squeeze the Taliban first.

American and Afghan officials say they intend to set up local militias of 100 to 200 fighters in each provincial district, with the fighters being drawn from the villages where they live. (Wardak has eight districts.)

To help ensure the dependability of each fighter, the Americans and Afghans are planning to rely on local leaders, like tribal chiefs and clerics, to choose the militiamen for them. Those militiamen will be given a brief period of training, along with weapons like assault rifles and grenade launchers, and communication gear, said Abdul Rahim Wardak, the Afghan defense minister.

In Iraq, American commanders relied almost exclusively on tribal leaders to put Sunni gunmen at their disposal. But in Afghanistan, 30 years of war has left the tribes scattered and attenuated. American and Afghan leaders say they are instead trying to cobble together councils made up of a wider range of leaders.

American and Afghan officials say that they are confident they can keep the militias under control and that the militias can carry out a range of duties, like providing intelligence on Taliban movements that American and Afghan forces can act on.

“We don’t know when bad people move into town,” General Tucker said. “But the local people know. They know everything.”

One tribal leader from Wardak Province said that while the Taliban were deeply unpopular in his province, people were worried that local militias could make the situation worse.

In an interview, Mohammed Naim Haqmal, a leader of the Nuri tribe, said the Taliban controlled about 80 percent of Wardak Province — essentially everything except the centers of each district. At night, Mr. Haqmal said, the Taliban range freely, setting up checkpoints and laying bombs for American convoys traveling on the highway from Kabul to Kandahar.

But for all that, Mr. Haqmal said, the Taliban are unpopular in Wardak, mainly because their constant attacks prevent people from leading normal lives. Two months ago, Mr. Haqmal said, a group of villagers from the Jagatoo district rioted when the Taliban blocked a local road in order to stage an attack on some American forces. Taliban fighters opened fire on the villagers, killing five.

“The Taliban want to fight, and that causes problems for the people,” Mr. Haqmal said. “People just want to live their lives.”

Still, Mr. Haqmal said he was skeptical that the government-backed militias could succeed because the Afghan and American officials were bypassing the traditional leaders of the province. So far, he said, they had selected leaders in the community who lacked credibility with the local people. Moreover, Mr. Haqmal said he was worried that the militias would fail to receive proper support and guidance from the government, and end up starting tribal feuds with members of the Taliban.

“We already have the Afghan Army and police — they should stick with them,” Mr. Haqmal said.

A Taliban commander based in Wardak Province, who spoke on the condition of anonymity for fear that he would become a target, predicted that the government militias would find it hard to put down roots in the area, if only because the Taliban had already done so.

“We are living in the districts, in the villages — we are not living in the mountains,” the Taliban chief said. “The people are with us.”

QUOTE:

Ahmmm... after a failure of 8 years afghan war, now the western forces are adopting the new strategy "Divide and Rule".... they are trying to establish "civil war" for clashes /bloodshades of Afghan nationals by Afghans..

 

[Lockheed F-16]

I see how Afghanistan is going down more and more. The American Strategy has failed and now the NATO is trying to leave Afghanistan in a bloodshed so they can't come up. Recruiting militias is pretty dangerous if you keep in mind that they are only loyal to their tribes...

 

[Awesome]

I've known afghanis of quite a few ethnicities. Not one of them wants to co-exist. They'd say it to your face. They're like we're superior, and the others need to live under us. Minority, majority, it just doesn't matter. Each group wants to dominate the other one.

You know how people negotiate and then come to common ground? For them its a big deal that they would just let the other ethnicity live and for each of them the discussion starts from the notion that "we are superior and should be dominant in Afghanistan".

Nato n all have only fueled this fight by just somehow subjugating the majority since around this time they were anti-Nato...

 

[Goodperson]

I'm not very hopeful of Afghanistan returning to anything resembling normalcy anytime soon.

Even if the insurgent threat is neutralized completely (and thats a huge if), the ethnic rift is huge, and is rooted in hundreds of years of suspicion, hate, persecution and atrocities.

A strong government, and strong military loyal to the State and no other, might help the transition, but I see little signs of that at this point.

I feel even if after say 5-10 years Afghan people manage to end the conflict it will still remain a landlocked under developed country, Given the nature of tribes and how easily they mingle with Pakistanis, Pakistan may bear huge brunt of underdeveloped Afghanistan as people do migrate to comparatively greener zones.
So stable Afghanistan with opportunities within are in its neighbor countries interest.

 

[RedBaron]

Let me play Devil's Advocate here. Hiring and equipping local militias may not be ideal but in the current scenario it may be the only way to reduce the risk of capitulation to the Taliban. Why? As other forum members have pointed out in this thread, for Afghans, tribal/sectarian ties matter more than national ones. (Actually, this is the case in India and Pakistan too - otherwise we would not have sectarian strife in the subcontinent, but both India and Pak often gloat over it as it does not pose a direct threat to national unity)

In this scenario, arming local militias would provide a bulwark against the Taliban while avoiding friction with the local populace. One could put in place a mechanism by which a body within Afghan Central Govt could monitor local militias and continue/cancel funding based on performance and loyalty towards national agenda.

On the overall situation, remember that Afghanistan was relatively peaceful in the Zahir Shah years.

...But the Zahir Shah years were characterized by a lengthy span of rare peace. This tranquillity is recalled now by many in the country with immense nostalgia. On the other hand, peace was not accompanied by prosperity, and the king is faulted for failing to develop the economy...
Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/23/world/asia/23cnd-shah.html


The US policy-makers would do well to analyse how peace was maintained during that era, even when the economy was not prospering....