It is beyond the logic of a normal human being to think that the infrastructure build-up on the Chinese side of the Sino-Hindu border serves the sole purpose of military operations in the unlikely event of a war。For God's sake，China is in the midst of a nation-wide all-out effort to lay a solid foundation for future economic development。Infrastructure is just one of the many pillars that are crucial to the well-being of a nation。Education is another，hence the creations of so many establishments of learning in China each year。If anything，Tibet is THE region that has received the least attention in this regard so far。China will continue its investment drive in Tibet；India should do the same in her border regions。
Reasonably argued; the infrastructure build-up does not serve the
sole purpose of military operations.
However, it does fit in with the needs of the PLA and of the PLAAF to a remarkable degree. Perhaps that is inevitable; better logistics has both civilian and military pay-offs.
On the other hand, before going further, consider the point of view from across the border.
Development expenditure can take place most conveniently along the east-west running Brahmaputra Valley. It is under-equipped with roads, rail and even river navigation facilities. It is possible to spend all the available money for development in these aras, and in building branches and spurs off these, for a foreseeable decade or so, without the time or the money to do anything else.
Military needs do not coincide with this easy option. The terrain does not permit the kind of development possible on the Tibetan side. On that side, you have a high, flat plateau. On this side, there is broken mountain terrain, sometimes running east to west, sometimes running north to south. There is no consistent grain to plan a consistent transport network.
Therefore the PLA can keep itself concentrated in one or two well-secured reserve concentrations, focussed on acclimatisation of the troops from lower-lying areas, able to move out at short notice to any point along the border. It has a wide array of airfields and air-strips which neutralize high altitude aerial operations handicaps. It has an extensive and growing network of sensors, terrestrial and otherwise, and can afford to reduce the sickeningly brutal methods by which it controls the escape of Tibetans across the borders, as well as detect activity in the air on the other side. It can increasingly leave border monitoring in remote areas to these sensors, and concentrate personnel on hot spots, where it wishes to have a presence and to continue to exert pressure.
None of these are possible for the Indian Army or for the Indian Air Force. It is not possible to build a network parallel to the border, however invaluable that will be for development, because of the terrain. The kind of network that is possible runs into the hilly terrain from a multitude of access points on the plains in the river valley, and to use such a network, currently being developed, implies a people-intensive strategy. Instead of the PLA measure of concentrating troops and distributing sensors, it is necessary to have troops available at many points of response on the plains, and not to leave any large stretch unstaffed.
These troops have to be in two different structures and formations. There has to be a certain minimum amount of staffing unfixed positions, unfortunately. Military history has taught us, twice, brutally, that leaving any significant stretch of mountainous borders unpatrolled is a recipe for disaster. We are also not in a position to depend entirely on sensors because of the very different philosophies which govern the policies of our two hostile neighbours. While the PLA and the PA may more or less count on the IA being a military wing of a status quo power, and to expect that it will not make any aggressive moves, that expectation is not available reciprocally. Whether in occupying and building on Aksai Chin unilaterally, before any attempt at discussing different perceptions, or in the pre-emotive moves in Kashmir, or the recent incident at Kargil, the Indian Army, because of the nature of the Indian state, has found itself restricted in action at the outset, and asked to perform miracles after the mismanagement of the international situation has led to a failure of political options.
That is the reason for the two mountain divisions. They are intended to hold a limited number of key points and geographical features, and prevent the PLA from hopping and skipping down to the plains. We do not want to see the administration in Tezpore burning state documents a second time. They are not intended, however, to penalize an attack. That task was to be left to a strike corps. The idea is simple; two mountain divisions are nowhere near sufficient to achieve coverage of vulnerable points
and leave sufficient troops free to counter-attack to relieve pressure. Even full coverage of vulnerable points alone would soak up many more divisions. What is being sought initially is coverage of at least the key areas, for which two divisions is a beginning, nowhere near an end.
Adding to the problem faced by military planners is the problem of the nature of mountain warfare and the difficulties they face with a stop-go policy from the political side. But that is another story.
...so keep whining 
