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PLA Navy: From 'Green Water' to 'Blue Water' ââ¬â Part I
Dr. Alexandr Nemets and Dr. Thomas Torda
Friday, July 26, 2002
In the first half of 2002, the attention of Western military specialists was drawn to two large-scale contracts concluded by China and Russia and aimed at PLA (People's Liberation Army) Navy modernization:
1. construction of two Sovremenny-class missile destroyers, for $1.4 billion;
2. construction of eight upgraded Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines, for $1.6 billion.
Indeed, $3 billion in six months is a huge sum of money. However, this represents only a part of the resources directed at PLA Navy (PLAN) modernization. In any case, the rate of PLAN modernization and construction is not inferior to similar rates of the PLA Air Force and air-defense network (described in recently published articles).
General Structure of the Chinese Shipbuilding Industry
Remarkably, China has a comparatively modern shipbuilding industry; this definitely facilitates PLAN development.
In July 1999, China General Shipbuilding Company was divided, for the purpose of "socialist competition" and accelerated development, into China Shipbuilding Industry Group Corp. (SIGC) and China Shipbuilding Heavy Industry Group Corp. (SHIGC).
SIGC includes several large shipbuilding plants in Shanghai and Guangzhou Shipbuilding Plant, producers of diesel engines and other equipment for vessels. SHIGC includes Dalian Shipbuilding Plant, Dalian New Shipbuilding Plant and Qingdao Shipbuilding Plant, producers of diesel engines for vessels, etc.
During the year 2000, SIGC finished construction of 112 civilian vessels, a total of about 2 million tons deadweight. The volume of production and export increased by about 45 percent from the 1999 level.
Shanghai-based Hudong Shipbuilding Plant, Shanghai-based Jiangnan Shipbuilding Plant and the Guangzhou (capital of Guangdong province) Shipbuilding Plant provided more than 80 percent of the finished deadweight. Several vessels have a deadweight of 80,000-100,000 tons each.
The same year, SHIGC finished construction of 72 civilian vessels, a total of about 1.5 million tons deadweight. Dalian Shipbuilding Plant and Dalian New Shipbuilding Plant provided at least 80 percent of the finished deadweight; this included a 300,000-ton oil tanker for Iran.
By mid-2002, total annual capacity of the two Dalian-based plants approached an estimated 5 million tons deadweight.
Together, the two companies constructed, in 2000, civilian ships of about 3.5 million tons total deadweight. This volume approached 4.5 million tons in 2001 and, by preliminary estimate, could surpass 5 million tons in 2002.
In addition, SIGC and SHIGC annually produce several hundred diesel engines of large capacity and much other equipment for vessels, including sophisticated electronics for control and navigation.
According to available data, 50 percent to 60 percent of the finished vessels are exported ââ¬â to both developing and developed countries. China's shipbuilding industry occupies third place in the world by production volume, after Japan and South Korea. The quality and technological level of Chinese-made civilian vessels are close to world levels.
Particularly powerful is the group of Shanghai-based shipbuilding plants, namely, newly constructed and very advanced Waigaoqiao Shipbuilding Corp., Jiangnan Shipbuilding Corp., Hudong Shipbuilding Corp. and Shanghai Shipbuilding Plant.
By mid-2002, the total annual shipbuilding capacity of these enterprises, belonging to SIGC, reached 3 million tons deadweight (including 1 million tons at Waigaoqiao). They are capable of producing modern tankers and large civilian vessels of all kinds.
In 2001, Jiangnan, Hudong and Shanghai Shipbuilding Plant finished construction of civilian vessels with a total deadweight of 1.8 million tons (600,000 tons more than in 2000), thus constituting 40 percent of China's civilian shipbuilding production.
The same companies are engaged in naval vessel production:
* Two enterprises of SHIGC in Dalian city (Liaoning province) are constructing destroyers. Obviously, the same enterprises are preparing now for the first Chinese aircraft carrier construction. In April 2002, the unfinished aircraft carrier Varyag (purchased by China from Ukraine) arrived in Dalian ââ¬â for re-equipping into an entertainment vessel or for another purpose? Experts estimate a 50-50 chance for either.
* SIGC enterprises in Shanghai are constructing frigates for PLAN, while SIGC plants in Shanghai, Guangzhou and Wuhan develop and construct diesel-electric submarines.
No doubt the "Dalian group" of SHIGC and the "Shanghai group" of SIGC could easily become powerful producers of modern submarines, destroyers, cruisers, even aircraft carriers ââ¬â if advanced naval technology is available. However, achievements in civilian shipbuilding cannot be easily converted into naval shipbuilding construction.
Here China still has much to learn from Russia ââ¬â particularly in low-noise engines, naval electronics and naval weapon systems of all kinds. And that's obviously what is going to take place during 2002-2005: While placing large-scale weapon orders to Russia, the Chinese side obtains broad access to the technology of this weapon manufacturing. In the framework of a $3 billion order for submarines and destroyers, Shanghai and Dalian would get the best Russian technology for naval vessel development and construction.
PLAN by 2006
Recently, the U.S. and Taiwan concluded agreements on the supply of several destroyers and diesel submarines to the Republic of China Navy. As expected, this project will be finished by 2010. However, PLAN intends to accomplish its major upgrading much earlier, by 2005-2006. The details of this transformation ââ¬â under way already ââ¬â are given below.
Nuclear submarines:
This item deserves significant attention, despite no "sensational news" in this area ââ¬â in contrast to construction or purchase of destroyers and diesel-electric submarines for PLAN emerging during the last several months. In this case, silence is dangerous.
Let's look first at Huludao Shipbuilding Plant in Liaoning province. This plant, the only producer of nuclear submarines in China, doesn't belong to SIGC or SHIGC; it is probably directly subordinated to the Chinese Defense Ministry.
Since 1999, the Huludao plant has been engaged in production of new-generation "093 project" nuclear attack submarines and "094 project" ballistic-missile (strategic) submarines. St. Petersburg-based Rubin Design Bureau and some other Russian enterprises are providing all the necessary technology to Huludao.
In summer 2001, one or two newly constructed "093 project" attack submarines participated in Dongshan maneuvers near the coast of Fujian province, about 200 km from Taiwan. By 2006, PLAN could acquire at least four "093 project" submarines, equipped by anti-ship cruise missiles with a range of up to 500 km (somewhat similar to Russia's Granit anti-ship missiles) and land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) with a range of up to 2,500 km (similar to Russia's Granat LACMs).
Simultaneously, by 2006, China could get one or, more probably, two "094 project" strategic submarines, equipped with JL (Julang or Giant Wave)-2 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with a range of 10,000 km; this is a submarine-based variety of China's DF-31 ICBM. Several successful tests of these SLBMs ââ¬â launched in the South China Sea or East China Sea and hitting targets in Xinjiang, at a distance of about 5,000 km ââ¬â took place in 2001 and in early 2002.
The question is how many Russian-made nuclear submarines will China purchase by 2006?
In June 2001, the Russian state-owned weapon monopoly Rosvoouruzheniye (transformed in late 2001 into Rosoboronexport) published, on its Web site, a large catalog of weaponry available for foreign customers. One item is of special interest (edited):
Project 971 Shuka-B (nuclear) multipurpose attack submarine is capable of striking against groups of hostile ships and against coastal installations. Designated the "Akula" class by the West, this submarine is officially designated Project 971 Shuka B (shuka is an aggressive breed of freshwater pike).
Some 110 meters long, the Akula is double-hulled with considerable distance between the outer and inner hulls to reduce the possible damage to the inner hull. The hull is constructed of low-magnetism steel, is divided into eight compartments, and features a distinctive high aft fin.
The Project 971, using a steel hull, was initiated in 1976 when it became evident that the existing industrial infrastructure was inadequate to mass-produce the expensive titanium hulls of the Project 945 Sierra class. The performance of the Project 971 boats was a close approximation to that of the Project 945 design, though the latter was significantly more expensive to build and maintain. It has 650-mm and 533-mm torpedo tubes that can use mines as well as Granat cruise missiles, anti-submarine missiles and torpedoes.
Unit Cost: $750 Million
Armament: 6x533mm torpedo tubes
Speed: 20 knots (about 36 km per hour)
Build Time: 16 months (from time of signing contract), additional time for delivery.
There were many reports regarding Akula-class submarines purchased for PLAN needs, at the shipbuilding plants in Severodvinsk (near Arkhangelsk city on the White Sea) or Komsomolsk-na-Amure (Khabarovsk region of the Russian Far East) between mid-1999 and early 2001.
Once again, silence regarding this project, in 2001-2002, could be even more dangerous than the exact information. Russian-Chinese military-technological cooperation has produced a series of shocking surprises already. In order to escape one more large-scale shocker, let's assume that, by 2006, PLAN will get two Akula-class nuclear submarines from Russia. This is a very dangerous weapon platform, and the U.S. Navy should be prepared in advance.
In 1999-2000, there were several reports that China will buy two decommissioned Typhoon-class strategic submarines in Russia. However, the authors are inclined to consider this a bluff: The PLA doesn't like old second-hand weapons. Even if Moscow made a corresponding proposal, the Beijing response probably was negative.
Read Part II of this article.
Dr. Alexandr V. Nemets is co-author of "Chinese-Russian Military Relations, Fate of Taiwan and New Geopolitics."
Thomas J. Torda is a Chinese defense technology and language consultant with a Northern Virginia firm.
You may contact Dr. Torda at ThomasJTorda@cs.com.
Dr. Alexandr Nemets and Dr. Thomas Torda
Friday, July 26, 2002
In the first half of 2002, the attention of Western military specialists was drawn to two large-scale contracts concluded by China and Russia and aimed at PLA (People's Liberation Army) Navy modernization:
1. construction of two Sovremenny-class missile destroyers, for $1.4 billion;
2. construction of eight upgraded Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines, for $1.6 billion.
Indeed, $3 billion in six months is a huge sum of money. However, this represents only a part of the resources directed at PLA Navy (PLAN) modernization. In any case, the rate of PLAN modernization and construction is not inferior to similar rates of the PLA Air Force and air-defense network (described in recently published articles).
General Structure of the Chinese Shipbuilding Industry
Remarkably, China has a comparatively modern shipbuilding industry; this definitely facilitates PLAN development.
In July 1999, China General Shipbuilding Company was divided, for the purpose of "socialist competition" and accelerated development, into China Shipbuilding Industry Group Corp. (SIGC) and China Shipbuilding Heavy Industry Group Corp. (SHIGC).
SIGC includes several large shipbuilding plants in Shanghai and Guangzhou Shipbuilding Plant, producers of diesel engines and other equipment for vessels. SHIGC includes Dalian Shipbuilding Plant, Dalian New Shipbuilding Plant and Qingdao Shipbuilding Plant, producers of diesel engines for vessels, etc.
During the year 2000, SIGC finished construction of 112 civilian vessels, a total of about 2 million tons deadweight. The volume of production and export increased by about 45 percent from the 1999 level.
Shanghai-based Hudong Shipbuilding Plant, Shanghai-based Jiangnan Shipbuilding Plant and the Guangzhou (capital of Guangdong province) Shipbuilding Plant provided more than 80 percent of the finished deadweight. Several vessels have a deadweight of 80,000-100,000 tons each.
The same year, SHIGC finished construction of 72 civilian vessels, a total of about 1.5 million tons deadweight. Dalian Shipbuilding Plant and Dalian New Shipbuilding Plant provided at least 80 percent of the finished deadweight; this included a 300,000-ton oil tanker for Iran.
By mid-2002, total annual capacity of the two Dalian-based plants approached an estimated 5 million tons deadweight.
Together, the two companies constructed, in 2000, civilian ships of about 3.5 million tons total deadweight. This volume approached 4.5 million tons in 2001 and, by preliminary estimate, could surpass 5 million tons in 2002.
In addition, SIGC and SHIGC annually produce several hundred diesel engines of large capacity and much other equipment for vessels, including sophisticated electronics for control and navigation.
According to available data, 50 percent to 60 percent of the finished vessels are exported ââ¬â to both developing and developed countries. China's shipbuilding industry occupies third place in the world by production volume, after Japan and South Korea. The quality and technological level of Chinese-made civilian vessels are close to world levels.
Particularly powerful is the group of Shanghai-based shipbuilding plants, namely, newly constructed and very advanced Waigaoqiao Shipbuilding Corp., Jiangnan Shipbuilding Corp., Hudong Shipbuilding Corp. and Shanghai Shipbuilding Plant.
By mid-2002, the total annual shipbuilding capacity of these enterprises, belonging to SIGC, reached 3 million tons deadweight (including 1 million tons at Waigaoqiao). They are capable of producing modern tankers and large civilian vessels of all kinds.
In 2001, Jiangnan, Hudong and Shanghai Shipbuilding Plant finished construction of civilian vessels with a total deadweight of 1.8 million tons (600,000 tons more than in 2000), thus constituting 40 percent of China's civilian shipbuilding production.
The same companies are engaged in naval vessel production:
* Two enterprises of SHIGC in Dalian city (Liaoning province) are constructing destroyers. Obviously, the same enterprises are preparing now for the first Chinese aircraft carrier construction. In April 2002, the unfinished aircraft carrier Varyag (purchased by China from Ukraine) arrived in Dalian ââ¬â for re-equipping into an entertainment vessel or for another purpose? Experts estimate a 50-50 chance for either.
* SIGC enterprises in Shanghai are constructing frigates for PLAN, while SIGC plants in Shanghai, Guangzhou and Wuhan develop and construct diesel-electric submarines.
No doubt the "Dalian group" of SHIGC and the "Shanghai group" of SIGC could easily become powerful producers of modern submarines, destroyers, cruisers, even aircraft carriers ââ¬â if advanced naval technology is available. However, achievements in civilian shipbuilding cannot be easily converted into naval shipbuilding construction.
Here China still has much to learn from Russia ââ¬â particularly in low-noise engines, naval electronics and naval weapon systems of all kinds. And that's obviously what is going to take place during 2002-2005: While placing large-scale weapon orders to Russia, the Chinese side obtains broad access to the technology of this weapon manufacturing. In the framework of a $3 billion order for submarines and destroyers, Shanghai and Dalian would get the best Russian technology for naval vessel development and construction.
PLAN by 2006
Recently, the U.S. and Taiwan concluded agreements on the supply of several destroyers and diesel submarines to the Republic of China Navy. As expected, this project will be finished by 2010. However, PLAN intends to accomplish its major upgrading much earlier, by 2005-2006. The details of this transformation ââ¬â under way already ââ¬â are given below.
Nuclear submarines:
This item deserves significant attention, despite no "sensational news" in this area ââ¬â in contrast to construction or purchase of destroyers and diesel-electric submarines for PLAN emerging during the last several months. In this case, silence is dangerous.
Let's look first at Huludao Shipbuilding Plant in Liaoning province. This plant, the only producer of nuclear submarines in China, doesn't belong to SIGC or SHIGC; it is probably directly subordinated to the Chinese Defense Ministry.
Since 1999, the Huludao plant has been engaged in production of new-generation "093 project" nuclear attack submarines and "094 project" ballistic-missile (strategic) submarines. St. Petersburg-based Rubin Design Bureau and some other Russian enterprises are providing all the necessary technology to Huludao.
In summer 2001, one or two newly constructed "093 project" attack submarines participated in Dongshan maneuvers near the coast of Fujian province, about 200 km from Taiwan. By 2006, PLAN could acquire at least four "093 project" submarines, equipped by anti-ship cruise missiles with a range of up to 500 km (somewhat similar to Russia's Granit anti-ship missiles) and land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) with a range of up to 2,500 km (similar to Russia's Granat LACMs).
Simultaneously, by 2006, China could get one or, more probably, two "094 project" strategic submarines, equipped with JL (Julang or Giant Wave)-2 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with a range of 10,000 km; this is a submarine-based variety of China's DF-31 ICBM. Several successful tests of these SLBMs ââ¬â launched in the South China Sea or East China Sea and hitting targets in Xinjiang, at a distance of about 5,000 km ââ¬â took place in 2001 and in early 2002.
The question is how many Russian-made nuclear submarines will China purchase by 2006?
In June 2001, the Russian state-owned weapon monopoly Rosvoouruzheniye (transformed in late 2001 into Rosoboronexport) published, on its Web site, a large catalog of weaponry available for foreign customers. One item is of special interest (edited):
Project 971 Shuka-B (nuclear) multipurpose attack submarine is capable of striking against groups of hostile ships and against coastal installations. Designated the "Akula" class by the West, this submarine is officially designated Project 971 Shuka B (shuka is an aggressive breed of freshwater pike).
Some 110 meters long, the Akula is double-hulled with considerable distance between the outer and inner hulls to reduce the possible damage to the inner hull. The hull is constructed of low-magnetism steel, is divided into eight compartments, and features a distinctive high aft fin.
The Project 971, using a steel hull, was initiated in 1976 when it became evident that the existing industrial infrastructure was inadequate to mass-produce the expensive titanium hulls of the Project 945 Sierra class. The performance of the Project 971 boats was a close approximation to that of the Project 945 design, though the latter was significantly more expensive to build and maintain. It has 650-mm and 533-mm torpedo tubes that can use mines as well as Granat cruise missiles, anti-submarine missiles and torpedoes.
Unit Cost: $750 Million
Armament: 6x533mm torpedo tubes
Speed: 20 knots (about 36 km per hour)
Build Time: 16 months (from time of signing contract), additional time for delivery.
There were many reports regarding Akula-class submarines purchased for PLAN needs, at the shipbuilding plants in Severodvinsk (near Arkhangelsk city on the White Sea) or Komsomolsk-na-Amure (Khabarovsk region of the Russian Far East) between mid-1999 and early 2001.
Once again, silence regarding this project, in 2001-2002, could be even more dangerous than the exact information. Russian-Chinese military-technological cooperation has produced a series of shocking surprises already. In order to escape one more large-scale shocker, let's assume that, by 2006, PLAN will get two Akula-class nuclear submarines from Russia. This is a very dangerous weapon platform, and the U.S. Navy should be prepared in advance.
In 1999-2000, there were several reports that China will buy two decommissioned Typhoon-class strategic submarines in Russia. However, the authors are inclined to consider this a bluff: The PLA doesn't like old second-hand weapons. Even if Moscow made a corresponding proposal, the Beijing response probably was negative.
Read Part II of this article.
Dr. Alexandr V. Nemets is co-author of "Chinese-Russian Military Relations, Fate of Taiwan and New Geopolitics."
Thomas J. Torda is a Chinese defense technology and language consultant with a Northern Virginia firm.
You may contact Dr. Torda at ThomasJTorda@cs.com.
