Myth_buster_1
BANNED
- Joined
- Mar 17, 2008
- Messages
- 9,016
- Reaction score
- -1
- Country
- Location
International Assessment and Strategy Center > Research > The Flanker Fleet -The PLA's 'Big Stick'
The most important news to emerge from the Euronaval weapons show at Le Bourget field near Paris, October 23-27, was word that Russia had agreed to sell China two Sukhoi Su-33 carrier-based fighters, with the possibility of selling up to 48 or 50 of these fighters. These would arm the three carrier battle groups that, according to Chinese press reports, are on track to be ready in a little more than a decade.
Should these fighters receive a maximum Russian upgrade, then the PLA Navy could possess fighters that in important respects would be superior the U.S. Navy F/A-18E/F, the dominant U.S. Navy combat aircraft for the foreseeable future.
In addition, China would have more carriers available for operations within a thousand miles of her shores than would the U.S. plus her allies. Carriers, with their ability to create local air superiority and sea denial, may be particularly effective in attacks on island territories belonging to such states as Korea (Socotra island) or Japan (the Senkakus) or the Philippines (who already have a Chinese presence on Mischief Reef) or Indonesia (the Natuna group) or even Taiwan --Taiping island, the most important strategic position in the South China Sea.
The best response will be submarines, which Japan has in limited numbers and Korea is building, but which are otherwise not widely possessed by American allies, as well as advanced anti-ship missiles and air power of a sort that, absent some improvements, will be no match for the Sukhois.
But the Sukhois may represent the limit of what Russia can do; they have a 5th generation fighter program but with uncertain prospects for success. Moscow lacks the most advanced technologies, the sorts that have the greatest potential to destabilize the region, such as stealth. So Beijing is now looking to Europe for that next input of know-how.
Euronaval heard new calls by the French government on October 25, 2006 to lift the 1989 European Union (EU) arms embargo on China. New European naval platform and weapons technologies revealed at Euronaval ensure that once the EU embargo is lifted, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will seek to move quickly to gain access and cement industrial relationships. China clearly is looking to the EU to provide "next-generation" military technologies increasingly unavailable from Russia’s weapons combine, which is still struggling to recover from the demise of their well-funded Soviet customer
Sukhoi Su-33 Sale To PLA
Russian press reports about the sale of Suhkoi Su-33 naval fighters to China offer further confirmation of China’s ambition to develop carrier aviation. At the 2005 Moscow Airshow Russian sources had initially disclosed that China was interested in the Su-33, a much-modified carrier compatible version of the basic Su-27 heavy fighter.[1] At Moscow the Russian also demonstrated the larger twin-seat Su-33UB training and attack fighter for a PLA delegation. But in late October 2006 Russian reports in Kommersant and elsewhere revealed that China has made an initial purchase of two Su-33 fighters for evaluation, likely to be followed by an order for 12, and the possibility of additional sales that could lead to a total of 48 to 50 of these fighters, for about $2.5 billion.[2] If acquired, such numbers might outfit two regiments of the PLA Naval Air Force.
Sukhoi Su-33 Naval Fighter: On display at the 2005 Moscow Airshow, China may buy 2 and then up to 50 of these fighters to equip PLA Naval Air Force regiments to operate from new aircraft carriers. Credit: RD Fisher
A regiment of 24 to 25 would also be enough to outfit a Russian style carrier like the Varyag, which is now undergoing refurbishment in Dalian harbor. In Moscow one Russian source noted that purchased fighters would not equip the Varyag, but a carrier to be built in the future, so the purchase of two regiments might be an indication that China intends to build two more carriers about the same size as the Varyag. However, such can only be speculation; Russia is now developing a new class of aircraft carrier that it hopes to launch later in the next decade. While little is known about their new carrier design, concepts from the mid-1990s suggest Russian consideration of a much larger hull incorporating catapults for the first time, which would also support heavier aircraft like naval AWACS. As the PLA is also known to be developing at least one carrier AWACS aircraft design, it stands to reason that it would also be very interested in Russia’s new carrier design.
Russian Carrier Designs: China is consulting with Russia regarding future carrier designs, though these are previous designs from the 1980s and 1990s that could be guiding China-Russia consultations. Credit: Russian Internet
As for the Varyag itself, some in the U.S. Intelligence Community and others view it as a possible "transitional" ship to develop PLA carrier aviation, but with potential military applications as well.[3] The purchase of 2 to 12 Su-33s to start would be consistent with the more limited goal of assessing the aircraft and obtaining initial experience with carrier aircraft operations. Also, a Varyag with 12 Su-33s, a small number of Su-33UBs and supporting helicopters, would pose a formidable political symbol of Chinese strategic ascendance to Asian allies of the United States already wary of its declining influence vis-à-vis China. A Varyag so equipped would also allow the PLA to more quickly develop difficult combined-arms operations between PLA Navy, Air Force, Second Artillery and space forces to better combat U.S. aircraft carrier groups.
Sukhoi Su-30UB: Demonstrated to PLA visitors to the 2005 Moscow Airshow, this unique Russian fighter could be developed into an electronic warfare version capable of electronic attack, information attack and jamming missions. Credit: RD Fisher
But the purchase of just a small number of Su-33s may convey other intentions when considering another Russian revelation from the Russian press that China had managed to acquire from the Ukraine one of the T-10K prototypes for the Su-33.[4] This may indicate that while purchasing some Su-33s, the PLA’s real intention is to obtain the ability to produce their own version of the Su-33, to be based on the Su-27/J-11 now under co-production at the Shenyang Aircraft Company. Shenyang and KnAAPO, the maker of the PLA’s Su-27 and Su-30 fighters, have been at loggerheads since 2004 over the Shenyang’s desire to build a much-modified J-11 that would vastly reduce Russian content and potentially allow China to market their own version of yet another Russian fighter. KnAAPO and its parent company Sukhoi would like maximize their profits from future upgrade or modifications Shenyang may make to its J-11s. KnAAPO has also produced all of the Russian Navy’s Su-33s and would likely want to retain this business.
At Moscow in 2005 a Russian source was rather confident that China could not master all of the necessary modifications to turn their J-11s into carrier capable fighters like the Su-33. Compared to the basic Su-27, the Su-33 has a strengthened airframe covered with corrosion-resistant materials, much strengthened landing gear, the addition of "canard" lift devices and larger wing flaps to lower landing speed, folding wings, an aerial refueling probe, and a landing system that automatically controls the aircraft to land on the carrier deck.[5] The Su-33UB contains further aerodynamic refinements, uses more stealthy composite materials, and can carry a larger radar for attack missions. The Su-33UB has also been proposed for AWACS missions with the addition of a phased arrary radar atop the dorsal spine or under the fuselage. The Su-33UB demonstrated for the PLA in 2005 had also been modified with thrust-vectoring engines which greatly improve maneuverability.
But a year later it is possible to conclude that perhaps as far back as the late 1990s the PLA has been trying to develop an indigenous carrier capable J-11. Such a fighter may also benefit from Shenyang’s indigenized land-based J-11 program, which will likely incorporate new 13,200 to 13,600kg thrust WS-10A "Taishan" turbofan engines, new advanced PLA-developed radar and PLA-developed PL-12 advanced air-to-air missiles and new precision-guided ground attack weapons. A navalized J-11 based on this program would be decidedly superior to the Su-33 now in service with the Russian Navy.
Shenyang’s J-11 Ambitions: It is possible that for a number of years that Shenyang has been developing a carrier capable version of it J-11, benefiting from its program to create a new multi-role version of the J-11. Credit: Chinese Internet
To head off this program, and to appeal for future Russian Navy orders, Sukhoi is promoting upgrades for the Su-33. These will likely benefit from an upgraded version of the Su-35 that was marketed at the recent 2006 Zhuhai Airshow.[6] One major upgrade will be replacing the 12,500kg thrust AL-31F engines with 13,500kg thrust AL-31-F-M1 engines, which will allow for more rapid take-offs and larger weapons carriage. And while funding constraints have prevented radar and weapon upgrades, it is now possible to envision new Su-33s being equipped with new active electronic scanning array (AESA) radar like the Phazotron Zhuk-MFSE revealed in 2005. This radar can simultaneously track 30 aerial targets, two ground targets simultaneously, and locate naval targets out to 300km. Russian radar maker NIIP is also working on AESA radar. With additional development such phased array radar can themselves become weapons for delivering a range of electromagnetic attacks into enemy electronics. The Su-33UB’s ability to carry a much larger active array makes more attractive for such electronic weapons. The Su-33 can also be expected to carry the full range of Russian weapons, such as the Vympel R-77 active-guided BVR AAM, the 300km range Novator KS-172, the Kh-31 supersonic anti-radar/anti-ship, the Raduga 300km Kh-59MK anti-ship missile, and soon, air launched version of the unique 200km range Novator 3M-54E anti-ship missile and the 300km range 3M-14E land-attack cruise missile.
Phazotron AESA Radar: Revealed at the 2005 Moscow Airshow, the Phazotron Zhuk MFE is now undergoing testing. Credit: RD Fisher
Should China instead opt to fund a maximum Russian upgrade for the Su-33 instead of developing their own version, the PLA Navy could begin limited carrier operations by the middle of the next decade with a fighter competitive to, if not superior in some respects, to the U.S. Navy Boeing F/A-18E/F fighter bomber. In terms of range and maneuverability, it appears that the larger Su-33 with lower wing loading and higher thrust engines, will dominate the F/A-18E/F.[7] This advantage will multiply should the new Su-33 use thrust-vectoring engines. Such platform advantages may be regarded as obsolete considering the U.S. use of long-range off-board sensors like AWACS, UAVs and even satellites, plus the ability of new Helmet Mounted Displays for reducing the advantages of platform maneuverability. However, the Russian and Chinese investment in counter AWACS and anti-satellite systems could revive requirements for platform superiority, especially when both sides have Helmet Display systems.
Boeing F/A-18E/F and the Raytheon AN/APG-79 ASEA radar: The U.S. Navy is betting this combination will sustain the superiority of its carrier combat fighters, but an upgraded Su-33 could radically alter this projection. Credit: RD Fisher
In terms of electronic systems, the U.S. Navy is leading by fitting current and future F/A-18E/Fs with the Raytheon AN/APG-79 active electronic array radar (AESA), but Russian AESA radar may soon be available for the Su-33. Regarding weapons there may be rough parity, with the Su-33 having access to more and longer-range anti-ship missiles than the F/A-18E/F. While it is due to be supplemented by the stealthy attack mission oriented Lockheed-Martin F-35C in the next decade, the F/A-18E/F will remain the numerically dominant U.S. Navy combat aircraft for the foreseeable future. Although the U.S. would retain a commendable advantage accrued from generations of professional carrier operations and development, it would be an unwelcome development for PLA to begin its carrier aviation era with a combat aircraft competitive to superior to the F/A-18E/F.
Strategic Impact of the PLA Flanker
The configuration of in service PLA Flankers should not be seen as the end state of fleet capability. With modest flying hours accrued, the fleet has a useful service life – driven by structural fatigue and corrosion – into the 2030-2040 period. The high fraction of titanium alloys will guarantee longevity. By 2015 a good fraction of the fleet will be due for mid life upgrades.
The Flanker is a large and robust airframe, with good internal volume, and considerable capacity for avionics power and cooling. As its history to date demonstrates, technology insertion upgrades incur little difficulty. Therefore a PLA Flanker in 2015-2020 is likely to be significantly different in engine and avionics technology to current variants.
There are a number of candidate upgrades which can be predicted with a high level of confidence, given known development activity in Russian industry:
1. Supersonic cruise 40,000 lbf class AL-41F engines replacing the AL-31F. A derated AL-41F was being trailed in a Russian Su-27 in 2004.
2. Thrust vectoring (TVC) engine nozzles with 2D or 3D capability. Indian Su-30MKI is equipped with a TVC nozzle.
3. Digital Flight Control System (DFCS). Trialled in the 1990s Su-37 and later supplied to India, this technology will become standard for late build Flankers. The Su-37 included redundant sidestick controls for the pilot.
4. Canard foreplanes for enhanced high alpha agility. Production hardware on Su-33 and Su-30MKI.
5. An active phased array (AESA) fire control radar replacing the N-001 series. Russian industry has supplied the hybrid array N-011M to India, built AESA prototypes, and given availability of GaAs MMIC technology globally, will have no difficulty in manufacturing an AESA over the next decade.
6. A two color band FLIR/IRST sensor replacing the OLS-30, using QWIP imaging array technology. Russian industry has been negotiating to licence EU QWIP technology, which is based on mass production GaAs MMIC technology.
7. COTS based computer hardware running COTS based software. Given the use of this technology in the current N-001VEP upgrade, we can expect its use to extend across all systems over the next decade.
8. A Helmet Mounted Display with FLIR projection capability. Such an upgrade was being discussed some years ago, and would be easily accommodated with a FLIR/IRST sensor.
9. Full glass cockpit based on digital technology. Given the current delivery of first generation glass cockpits in Su-30MK and Su-27SKM, this is a natural progression.
10. Heatseeking and anti radiation variants of the R-77 Amraamski, and extended range ramjet powered variants of the R-77. All are in advanced development and actively being marketed.
11. Advanced digital variants of the R-73/74 Archer close-in air to air missile. These have been actively marketed.
12. AWACS killer long range missiles in the 160 to 200 nautical mile range category. The R-37/AA-X-13 Arrow remains in development for the Su-35, the R-172 was recently reported as the subject of licence negotiations with India. Su-35 upgrade marketing literature depicts the use of such missiles.
13. Cruise missiles for standoff attacks. China acquired Kh-55SM/AS-15 Kent cruise missiles from the Ukraine, and is manufacturing indigenous designs.
14. Advanced jam resistant fighter to fighter and fighter to AWACS datalinks and networks. India used the Russian TKS-2 datalink to effect in the Cope India exercise against the F-15C. Further evolution of protocol software will see this technology grow to match current US capabilities.
15. Radar absorbent materials for radar observables reduction. Numerous Russian unclassified papers detail a range of technologies for surface wave suppression and edge signature reduction, with a specific aim of reducing legacy aircraft observables.
16. Aerial refuelling probes, pylon plumbing for drop tanks, and buddy refuelling stores. Production hardware available off the shelf.
These technologies will appear over the next decade on PLA Flankers, either as upgrades or as part of new build aircraft. It is a 'when' question rather than an 'if' question, and any analytical predictions which devalue the PLA Flanker on the basis of the limitations of the early build Su-27SK/J-11 deny the reality that Russian industry and the PLA are following the US pattern of ongoing continuous technology insertion.
It is illustrative to compare a notional 'Flanker-2015' configuration, equipped with these upgrades, against representative aircraft operated by the US or US aligned Pacrim nations.
A) Boeing F-15 Eagle variants (Air Force, Japan, South Korea, Singapore). All will be matched or incrementally outclassed by the 'Flanker-2015'. While the latest AESA equipped F-15SG currently outclasses in service Su-27/30 by virtue of the AESA and newer avionics, this gap vanishes. In range payload, supersonic and agility performance, the 'Flanker-2015' outclasses the F-15.
B) Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet (Navy/Marines). The AESA equipped F/A-18E/F has 4,000 lb more internal fuel over the F/A-18C, more pylons and better avionics, but retains the basic agility and performance limitations of the F/A-18C. It will be outclassed by the 'Flanker-2015' in all cardinal parameters, especially payload range. The author flew an F/A-18F in 2001, the aircraft being equipped with the APG-73 radar and then latest block of the DFCS software. The aircraft exhibited excellent high alpha manoeuvre performance and handling, competitive against reported Su-27 capabilities. Principal limitations observed were in clean supersonic acceleration, limited by the wing design, and radar footprint, limited by power aperture performance.
C) LM Joint Strike Fighter (Australia). The JSF will be outclassed in all cardinal parameters by the 'Flanker-2015'. The only clear advantage the JSF will hold will be in observables, with the caveat that Flanker support by lower band AWACS and GCI radars, and good FLIR/IRST capabilities will significantly narrow any margin of survivability produced by the JSF's reduced observables. While the JSF is being marketed as a Very Low Observable (VLO) design, its actual design indicates that at best it has potential for VLO performance in the forward hemisphere, and at best Low Observable capability in the aft hemisphere. The serrated circular engine nozzle is band limited in effect, and the absence of canopy frame serrations suggests that VLO performance in the forward hemisphere is borderline at best.
D) LM F-22A Raptor (Air Force). The F-22A is the only US combat aircraft with a clear margin of superiority over the Sukhoi in all cardinal parameters, with the additional advantage of excellent wideband all aspect stealth capability, and sustained supersonic cruise capability.
The most important news to emerge from the Euronaval weapons show at Le Bourget field near Paris, October 23-27, was word that Russia had agreed to sell China two Sukhoi Su-33 carrier-based fighters, with the possibility of selling up to 48 or 50 of these fighters. These would arm the three carrier battle groups that, according to Chinese press reports, are on track to be ready in a little more than a decade.
Should these fighters receive a maximum Russian upgrade, then the PLA Navy could possess fighters that in important respects would be superior the U.S. Navy F/A-18E/F, the dominant U.S. Navy combat aircraft for the foreseeable future.
In addition, China would have more carriers available for operations within a thousand miles of her shores than would the U.S. plus her allies. Carriers, with their ability to create local air superiority and sea denial, may be particularly effective in attacks on island territories belonging to such states as Korea (Socotra island) or Japan (the Senkakus) or the Philippines (who already have a Chinese presence on Mischief Reef) or Indonesia (the Natuna group) or even Taiwan --Taiping island, the most important strategic position in the South China Sea.
The best response will be submarines, which Japan has in limited numbers and Korea is building, but which are otherwise not widely possessed by American allies, as well as advanced anti-ship missiles and air power of a sort that, absent some improvements, will be no match for the Sukhois.
But the Sukhois may represent the limit of what Russia can do; they have a 5th generation fighter program but with uncertain prospects for success. Moscow lacks the most advanced technologies, the sorts that have the greatest potential to destabilize the region, such as stealth. So Beijing is now looking to Europe for that next input of know-how.
Euronaval heard new calls by the French government on October 25, 2006 to lift the 1989 European Union (EU) arms embargo on China. New European naval platform and weapons technologies revealed at Euronaval ensure that once the EU embargo is lifted, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will seek to move quickly to gain access and cement industrial relationships. China clearly is looking to the EU to provide "next-generation" military technologies increasingly unavailable from Russia’s weapons combine, which is still struggling to recover from the demise of their well-funded Soviet customer
Sukhoi Su-33 Sale To PLA
Russian press reports about the sale of Suhkoi Su-33 naval fighters to China offer further confirmation of China’s ambition to develop carrier aviation. At the 2005 Moscow Airshow Russian sources had initially disclosed that China was interested in the Su-33, a much-modified carrier compatible version of the basic Su-27 heavy fighter.[1] At Moscow the Russian also demonstrated the larger twin-seat Su-33UB training and attack fighter for a PLA delegation. But in late October 2006 Russian reports in Kommersant and elsewhere revealed that China has made an initial purchase of two Su-33 fighters for evaluation, likely to be followed by an order for 12, and the possibility of additional sales that could lead to a total of 48 to 50 of these fighters, for about $2.5 billion.[2] If acquired, such numbers might outfit two regiments of the PLA Naval Air Force.
Sukhoi Su-33 Naval Fighter: On display at the 2005 Moscow Airshow, China may buy 2 and then up to 50 of these fighters to equip PLA Naval Air Force regiments to operate from new aircraft carriers. Credit: RD Fisher
A regiment of 24 to 25 would also be enough to outfit a Russian style carrier like the Varyag, which is now undergoing refurbishment in Dalian harbor. In Moscow one Russian source noted that purchased fighters would not equip the Varyag, but a carrier to be built in the future, so the purchase of two regiments might be an indication that China intends to build two more carriers about the same size as the Varyag. However, such can only be speculation; Russia is now developing a new class of aircraft carrier that it hopes to launch later in the next decade. While little is known about their new carrier design, concepts from the mid-1990s suggest Russian consideration of a much larger hull incorporating catapults for the first time, which would also support heavier aircraft like naval AWACS. As the PLA is also known to be developing at least one carrier AWACS aircraft design, it stands to reason that it would also be very interested in Russia’s new carrier design.
Russian Carrier Designs: China is consulting with Russia regarding future carrier designs, though these are previous designs from the 1980s and 1990s that could be guiding China-Russia consultations. Credit: Russian Internet
As for the Varyag itself, some in the U.S. Intelligence Community and others view it as a possible "transitional" ship to develop PLA carrier aviation, but with potential military applications as well.[3] The purchase of 2 to 12 Su-33s to start would be consistent with the more limited goal of assessing the aircraft and obtaining initial experience with carrier aircraft operations. Also, a Varyag with 12 Su-33s, a small number of Su-33UBs and supporting helicopters, would pose a formidable political symbol of Chinese strategic ascendance to Asian allies of the United States already wary of its declining influence vis-à-vis China. A Varyag so equipped would also allow the PLA to more quickly develop difficult combined-arms operations between PLA Navy, Air Force, Second Artillery and space forces to better combat U.S. aircraft carrier groups.
Sukhoi Su-30UB: Demonstrated to PLA visitors to the 2005 Moscow Airshow, this unique Russian fighter could be developed into an electronic warfare version capable of electronic attack, information attack and jamming missions. Credit: RD Fisher
But the purchase of just a small number of Su-33s may convey other intentions when considering another Russian revelation from the Russian press that China had managed to acquire from the Ukraine one of the T-10K prototypes for the Su-33.[4] This may indicate that while purchasing some Su-33s, the PLA’s real intention is to obtain the ability to produce their own version of the Su-33, to be based on the Su-27/J-11 now under co-production at the Shenyang Aircraft Company. Shenyang and KnAAPO, the maker of the PLA’s Su-27 and Su-30 fighters, have been at loggerheads since 2004 over the Shenyang’s desire to build a much-modified J-11 that would vastly reduce Russian content and potentially allow China to market their own version of yet another Russian fighter. KnAAPO and its parent company Sukhoi would like maximize their profits from future upgrade or modifications Shenyang may make to its J-11s. KnAAPO has also produced all of the Russian Navy’s Su-33s and would likely want to retain this business.
At Moscow in 2005 a Russian source was rather confident that China could not master all of the necessary modifications to turn their J-11s into carrier capable fighters like the Su-33. Compared to the basic Su-27, the Su-33 has a strengthened airframe covered with corrosion-resistant materials, much strengthened landing gear, the addition of "canard" lift devices and larger wing flaps to lower landing speed, folding wings, an aerial refueling probe, and a landing system that automatically controls the aircraft to land on the carrier deck.[5] The Su-33UB contains further aerodynamic refinements, uses more stealthy composite materials, and can carry a larger radar for attack missions. The Su-33UB has also been proposed for AWACS missions with the addition of a phased arrary radar atop the dorsal spine or under the fuselage. The Su-33UB demonstrated for the PLA in 2005 had also been modified with thrust-vectoring engines which greatly improve maneuverability.
But a year later it is possible to conclude that perhaps as far back as the late 1990s the PLA has been trying to develop an indigenous carrier capable J-11. Such a fighter may also benefit from Shenyang’s indigenized land-based J-11 program, which will likely incorporate new 13,200 to 13,600kg thrust WS-10A "Taishan" turbofan engines, new advanced PLA-developed radar and PLA-developed PL-12 advanced air-to-air missiles and new precision-guided ground attack weapons. A navalized J-11 based on this program would be decidedly superior to the Su-33 now in service with the Russian Navy.
Shenyang’s J-11 Ambitions: It is possible that for a number of years that Shenyang has been developing a carrier capable version of it J-11, benefiting from its program to create a new multi-role version of the J-11. Credit: Chinese Internet
To head off this program, and to appeal for future Russian Navy orders, Sukhoi is promoting upgrades for the Su-33. These will likely benefit from an upgraded version of the Su-35 that was marketed at the recent 2006 Zhuhai Airshow.[6] One major upgrade will be replacing the 12,500kg thrust AL-31F engines with 13,500kg thrust AL-31-F-M1 engines, which will allow for more rapid take-offs and larger weapons carriage. And while funding constraints have prevented radar and weapon upgrades, it is now possible to envision new Su-33s being equipped with new active electronic scanning array (AESA) radar like the Phazotron Zhuk-MFSE revealed in 2005. This radar can simultaneously track 30 aerial targets, two ground targets simultaneously, and locate naval targets out to 300km. Russian radar maker NIIP is also working on AESA radar. With additional development such phased array radar can themselves become weapons for delivering a range of electromagnetic attacks into enemy electronics. The Su-33UB’s ability to carry a much larger active array makes more attractive for such electronic weapons. The Su-33 can also be expected to carry the full range of Russian weapons, such as the Vympel R-77 active-guided BVR AAM, the 300km range Novator KS-172, the Kh-31 supersonic anti-radar/anti-ship, the Raduga 300km Kh-59MK anti-ship missile, and soon, air launched version of the unique 200km range Novator 3M-54E anti-ship missile and the 300km range 3M-14E land-attack cruise missile.
Phazotron AESA Radar: Revealed at the 2005 Moscow Airshow, the Phazotron Zhuk MFE is now undergoing testing. Credit: RD Fisher
Should China instead opt to fund a maximum Russian upgrade for the Su-33 instead of developing their own version, the PLA Navy could begin limited carrier operations by the middle of the next decade with a fighter competitive to, if not superior in some respects, to the U.S. Navy Boeing F/A-18E/F fighter bomber. In terms of range and maneuverability, it appears that the larger Su-33 with lower wing loading and higher thrust engines, will dominate the F/A-18E/F.[7] This advantage will multiply should the new Su-33 use thrust-vectoring engines. Such platform advantages may be regarded as obsolete considering the U.S. use of long-range off-board sensors like AWACS, UAVs and even satellites, plus the ability of new Helmet Mounted Displays for reducing the advantages of platform maneuverability. However, the Russian and Chinese investment in counter AWACS and anti-satellite systems could revive requirements for platform superiority, especially when both sides have Helmet Display systems.
Boeing F/A-18E/F and the Raytheon AN/APG-79 ASEA radar: The U.S. Navy is betting this combination will sustain the superiority of its carrier combat fighters, but an upgraded Su-33 could radically alter this projection. Credit: RD Fisher
In terms of electronic systems, the U.S. Navy is leading by fitting current and future F/A-18E/Fs with the Raytheon AN/APG-79 active electronic array radar (AESA), but Russian AESA radar may soon be available for the Su-33. Regarding weapons there may be rough parity, with the Su-33 having access to more and longer-range anti-ship missiles than the F/A-18E/F. While it is due to be supplemented by the stealthy attack mission oriented Lockheed-Martin F-35C in the next decade, the F/A-18E/F will remain the numerically dominant U.S. Navy combat aircraft for the foreseeable future. Although the U.S. would retain a commendable advantage accrued from generations of professional carrier operations and development, it would be an unwelcome development for PLA to begin its carrier aviation era with a combat aircraft competitive to superior to the F/A-18E/F.
Strategic Impact of the PLA Flanker
The configuration of in service PLA Flankers should not be seen as the end state of fleet capability. With modest flying hours accrued, the fleet has a useful service life – driven by structural fatigue and corrosion – into the 2030-2040 period. The high fraction of titanium alloys will guarantee longevity. By 2015 a good fraction of the fleet will be due for mid life upgrades.
The Flanker is a large and robust airframe, with good internal volume, and considerable capacity for avionics power and cooling. As its history to date demonstrates, technology insertion upgrades incur little difficulty. Therefore a PLA Flanker in 2015-2020 is likely to be significantly different in engine and avionics technology to current variants.
There are a number of candidate upgrades which can be predicted with a high level of confidence, given known development activity in Russian industry:
1. Supersonic cruise 40,000 lbf class AL-41F engines replacing the AL-31F. A derated AL-41F was being trailed in a Russian Su-27 in 2004.
2. Thrust vectoring (TVC) engine nozzles with 2D or 3D capability. Indian Su-30MKI is equipped with a TVC nozzle.
3. Digital Flight Control System (DFCS). Trialled in the 1990s Su-37 and later supplied to India, this technology will become standard for late build Flankers. The Su-37 included redundant sidestick controls for the pilot.
4. Canard foreplanes for enhanced high alpha agility. Production hardware on Su-33 and Su-30MKI.
5. An active phased array (AESA) fire control radar replacing the N-001 series. Russian industry has supplied the hybrid array N-011M to India, built AESA prototypes, and given availability of GaAs MMIC technology globally, will have no difficulty in manufacturing an AESA over the next decade.
6. A two color band FLIR/IRST sensor replacing the OLS-30, using QWIP imaging array technology. Russian industry has been negotiating to licence EU QWIP technology, which is based on mass production GaAs MMIC technology.
7. COTS based computer hardware running COTS based software. Given the use of this technology in the current N-001VEP upgrade, we can expect its use to extend across all systems over the next decade.
8. A Helmet Mounted Display with FLIR projection capability. Such an upgrade was being discussed some years ago, and would be easily accommodated with a FLIR/IRST sensor.
9. Full glass cockpit based on digital technology. Given the current delivery of first generation glass cockpits in Su-30MK and Su-27SKM, this is a natural progression.
10. Heatseeking and anti radiation variants of the R-77 Amraamski, and extended range ramjet powered variants of the R-77. All are in advanced development and actively being marketed.
11. Advanced digital variants of the R-73/74 Archer close-in air to air missile. These have been actively marketed.
12. AWACS killer long range missiles in the 160 to 200 nautical mile range category. The R-37/AA-X-13 Arrow remains in development for the Su-35, the R-172 was recently reported as the subject of licence negotiations with India. Su-35 upgrade marketing literature depicts the use of such missiles.
13. Cruise missiles for standoff attacks. China acquired Kh-55SM/AS-15 Kent cruise missiles from the Ukraine, and is manufacturing indigenous designs.
14. Advanced jam resistant fighter to fighter and fighter to AWACS datalinks and networks. India used the Russian TKS-2 datalink to effect in the Cope India exercise against the F-15C. Further evolution of protocol software will see this technology grow to match current US capabilities.
15. Radar absorbent materials for radar observables reduction. Numerous Russian unclassified papers detail a range of technologies for surface wave suppression and edge signature reduction, with a specific aim of reducing legacy aircraft observables.
16. Aerial refuelling probes, pylon plumbing for drop tanks, and buddy refuelling stores. Production hardware available off the shelf.
These technologies will appear over the next decade on PLA Flankers, either as upgrades or as part of new build aircraft. It is a 'when' question rather than an 'if' question, and any analytical predictions which devalue the PLA Flanker on the basis of the limitations of the early build Su-27SK/J-11 deny the reality that Russian industry and the PLA are following the US pattern of ongoing continuous technology insertion.
It is illustrative to compare a notional 'Flanker-2015' configuration, equipped with these upgrades, against representative aircraft operated by the US or US aligned Pacrim nations.
A) Boeing F-15 Eagle variants (Air Force, Japan, South Korea, Singapore). All will be matched or incrementally outclassed by the 'Flanker-2015'. While the latest AESA equipped F-15SG currently outclasses in service Su-27/30 by virtue of the AESA and newer avionics, this gap vanishes. In range payload, supersonic and agility performance, the 'Flanker-2015' outclasses the F-15.
B) Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet (Navy/Marines). The AESA equipped F/A-18E/F has 4,000 lb more internal fuel over the F/A-18C, more pylons and better avionics, but retains the basic agility and performance limitations of the F/A-18C. It will be outclassed by the 'Flanker-2015' in all cardinal parameters, especially payload range. The author flew an F/A-18F in 2001, the aircraft being equipped with the APG-73 radar and then latest block of the DFCS software. The aircraft exhibited excellent high alpha manoeuvre performance and handling, competitive against reported Su-27 capabilities. Principal limitations observed were in clean supersonic acceleration, limited by the wing design, and radar footprint, limited by power aperture performance.
C) LM Joint Strike Fighter (Australia). The JSF will be outclassed in all cardinal parameters by the 'Flanker-2015'. The only clear advantage the JSF will hold will be in observables, with the caveat that Flanker support by lower band AWACS and GCI radars, and good FLIR/IRST capabilities will significantly narrow any margin of survivability produced by the JSF's reduced observables. While the JSF is being marketed as a Very Low Observable (VLO) design, its actual design indicates that at best it has potential for VLO performance in the forward hemisphere, and at best Low Observable capability in the aft hemisphere. The serrated circular engine nozzle is band limited in effect, and the absence of canopy frame serrations suggests that VLO performance in the forward hemisphere is borderline at best.
D) LM F-22A Raptor (Air Force). The F-22A is the only US combat aircraft with a clear margin of superiority over the Sukhoi in all cardinal parameters, with the additional advantage of excellent wideband all aspect stealth capability, and sustained supersonic cruise capability.
)
