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Parsis and Hindutva's Ethnic Nationalism in India

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Remembering stories of loyalty and disloyalty

As Jaffrelot and others have argued, Hindutva actors use an historical argument to differentiate between the Hindu majority and minorities, but this is not the case for a differential relationship between minorities which is established by the requirements of the present and by a remembered story. That is, history establishes the relationship between the majority and minorities but it is not used to differentiate minorities into a hierarchy. Rather for Hindutva, it is the memory of the relationship; it is the rermembered past that differentiates between minorities. Memory is malleable to the requirements of the present; it is a mythical organisation of the past. Contemporary relationships are projected back in time rather than understanding the present in terms of an evolving past. Parsis and Muslims are differentiated by comparing two stories, a Parsi story of coexistence and a Muslim story of invasion, a Parsi story of acculturation and loyalty with a Muslim story of forcible conversion of Hindus to Islam and disloyalty. It is a comparison of mythical pasts as if they were historical pasts.

Comparing mythical stories denies the unique historical relationship each community has had with Hindus. Muslims ruled much of South Asia in the centuries before being deposed by the British. Muslims developed a set of strategies for coexisting with Hindus that was premised upon Muslim control of the polity. Parsis have not ruled anywhere since their 655CE defeat in Iran that precipitated their flight to India. In India they have always been a tiny community who have had to negotiate with the ruling community and polity. They have had to supplicate themselves before Hindu, Muslim and British rulers in order to negotiate their elite status. Their position is premised upon deft negotiations with another community who are politically and militarily more powerful. Parsis have developed a highly successful set of strategies for these negotiations in which the questioning of their loyalty is not a denial but an expression of their agency.

These strategies are encapsulated in a multivalent Parsi story that remembers the munificence of the political elite. Hindutva actors draw upon that remembered story and rework it for their own benefit. The remembering of a story of Parsi loyalty and Muslim disloyalty has its own historical development. The story by Golwalkar that began this article is a revision of a Parsi story that was first written in a 1599CE poem known as the Qesse-ye Sanjan, or the Story of Sanjan. For a translation of the poem into English see Williams (2009). Over many centuries Parsis have narrated various versions of a story that describes a first encounter with Hindus that trade’s asylum for a profession of loyalty, commonality and acculturation. All versions of the story recount an exodus from Iran due to religious persecution and an arrival by boat in a Gujarati village. The dominant contemporary Parsi version of the story is the 'Sugar in the Milk'. It narrates a meeting between a Hindu king and Parsis in which the king presents the Parsis with a glass full of milk to symbolise that the land has no room for them. A Parsi stirs sugar into the milk to symbolise that they will mix in and sweeten the society without displacing the milk. It is most commonly narrated orally but also appears in scholarly narratives, historical novels and films, children's books, paintings, poems and websites (Kamerkar and Dhunjisha 2002, 27; Nanavutty 1980, 40–1; Sidhwa 1991, 46–9; Khan and Metha 1998; Shroff and Mehta 2011; J. Patel, n.d.; Joshi 2003; Cama 2014).

Parsis and Hindus use the encounter and the conditions of asylum to negotiate, guide and elucidate the contemporary similarities and differences between the two communities. The pact for asylum explains to contemporary Parsis their syncretic fusion of Zoroastrian, Iranian and Hindu practices. Axelrod (1980) and Williams (2009) read the story as a myth that guides the Parsis. The past is invoked to guide a mutually beneficial relationship in the present. It is a morality tale, a myth where the meaning changes depending upon the context and requirements of the present. Whereas Parsis invoke a mythical past to negotiate their survival, Golwalkar, Savarkar and Modi have a different moral purpose. They use the past in order to bring about a Hindutva vision of India as a hierarchically plural Hindu nation.

From the Qesse-ye Sanjan until today the questioning of Parsi loyalty is pluralistic in its inclusiveness of the community. Questioning loyalty is rhetorical as Parsis can never profess anything but loyalty. In the Qesse-ye Sanjan a Parsi priest affirms their loyalty to the Hindu King saying 'We are all friendly to the land of Hend (India), we’ll slash your enemies in all directions.' (Williams 2009, 87 Verse 163) Later in the poem, Parsis join forces with Hindus against an invasion by Muslims. During colonial rule Parsis professed loyalty to the British. In the first work of modern Parsi history that was produced in the year following the 1857 rebellion against British rule the author wrote, 'Throughout the rebellion in the East the Parsees have maintained an unshaken loyalty to the British.' (Karaka 1858, x) In 2011, Modi prodded the Parsis to return to Iran, to which a Parsi replied, 'We don't want to go to Iran. We like India. We want to be here. It is our country.' (Mehta 2011) Although the loyalty of the Parsis shifts, they are publicly understood to be loyal. It is not that Parsis are loyal, rather it is the public remembering of loyalty in the form of a story.

The demand that a community profess loyalty and acculturate is not necessarily exclusionary when it is and has always been answered in the affirmative and is a story that expresses that community’s agency. For Parsis, the question of loyalty enables difference; it negotiates the meeting points and distinctness of Parsis and Hindus. The question of loyalty is not asked of people whose ancestors have assimilated and become Hindus, because they are no longer a distinct people. The Parsis were not the first Iranian Zoroastrians to migrate to India. Pre-Parsi migrants from Iran became a Hindu caste and ceased to be identifiably Zoroastrian or Iranian. They are known as Maga Brahmins (Kamerkar and Dhunjisha 2002, 8). It is only scholars who have uncovered the Maga Brahmins’ Iranian ancestry. Their loyalty is not questioned because they are Hindus. If Parsis had ceased to be Zoroastrian and distinct from Hindus, there would be no Indian Zoroastrians. The question of their loyalty is not only symptomatic of their difference but also constitutive. It enables them to be simultaneously Parsi, Zoroastrian and Indian.

Whereas the story about Parsis remembers them as loyal, the story about Muslims remembers them as disloyal. For Muslims the rhetorical question of their loyalty to post-colonial India is answered with denial because of a remembered story of disloyalty. Their loyalty has previously been denied. Muslims are imagined as repeatedly invading Hindu India and destroying temples (Thapar, 2005). The final chapter in their disloyalty to India is their role Partition. Pandey (1999) argues that the contemporary question of Muslim loyalty is tied to the existence of Pakistan and the idea of Muslim and Hindu nations. With the 1947 partition of British India into Pakistan and India, the question of the loyalty of Muslims who remained in India and largely supported the creation of Pakistan comes into question. A Muslim in India is forever responsible for the actions of his ancestors, who may or may not have been members of the Muslim League's campaign for Pakistan. The individual becomes responsible for the actions of their co-religionists. The charge of loyalty to Pakistan and disloyalty to India is one that Indian Muslims can never adequately counter. For Muslims the question of loyalty can only be answered with a denial of Islam, a denial of loyalty, or at best equivocal support.

The story of Muslim disloyalty denies their historical experience in India. They have not always been imagined as disloyal. In the period where Muslims were the sovereigns there was no question of their loyalty or disloyalty. British colonial power was primarily supplanting Muslim rule across much of North India and following their conquest they sought a profession of loyalty. It is with the 1857 uprising against British rule by Hindus and Muslims that Muslims are first imagined as disloyal. This uprising was opposed by the Parsis. For the British, the Parsis were loyal and Muslims were disloyal and it is this colonial era imagination of both that Savarkar drew upon.

To be continued ...

Brilliant. Even if I say so myself.

I am reading as I go along, and posting.

Cheers, Doc
There are some people who are resistant and will not convert out of Hinduism, and there are others who may. People who have already converted to Buddhism were not resistant enough. So it is natural that some of them will move on to other religions.
Instead of getting provocated by the outcome, society needs to address the root cause of conversion. What is making them disillusioned enough to convert? Thats because of deep-rooted casteism in rural areas (as seen in the 'Hathras' episode). If we dont eradicate the ills of casteism, we cant blame the oppressed who seek other alternatives.

This was me leading you to what I was saying.

Not the bit about self introspection etc. Hindus have a proven track record of being liberal, open minded, and having the ability to recognise wrongs and righting them free of doctrine and hardened stances.

Cheers, Doc
 
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Yogi is a nationalist. Not a patriot.

There is a difference, if you care to appreciate it.

Please explain.

I have told you before, regardless of where we launch, and when, India will remain our homeland.

For me too India is a homeland despite me of birth culture of Islam ( which is a world religion ) and me being a communist ( which is also a world movement ).

Buddy, out of 9 Atash Behram fires (the highest grade of Fire, including the Atash Padshah at Iranshah that comes from the original fire we came here with) 8 are in India.

A matter of practicality. This is the Wikipedia page about the atashgah of Baku in Central Asia ( I have not read the page fully ).

It is absurd of you to say Parsis are anything but an Indian community.

Your problem is that you are confusing religion and ethnicity.

Parsis are a religious ethnicity of India.

Zoroastrians are followers of a world religion. Some (not even the majority) of whom are Parsi.

I know that Parsis are Zoroastrians who were emigres to India.
 
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Hindus are fearful of 2 kinds of minorities
1. Who can lead to a further breakup of India. A section of Muslims demanded and got Pakistan (and BD) separated from 1947, so that fear of a repeat will probably remain till we have peaceful relations with Pakistan.
2. Who can lure Hindus out of dharmic tradition. Christian missionaries, some of them having done good in education sector, have lured poor Hindus giving monetary incentives for conversion. But I would like to add here that the fear is only directed to the missionaries and not in general to the Christian population, as there is no realistic demand or possibility for a separate nation for them.

All other minorities in India are too small in numbers, do not seek separate nation, and are not proselytizing. Hence, they are shown as exemplary.


Christian missionaries lost their steam once New Atheism won against Christianity in the West...and the world is way more connected now...Indians won't gobble down gobbelygook once they learn through the internet that Christianity has lost its ascendant position in the West..the only cache Christianity had in India was that it was the white man's religion..and many Indians thought may be the white man owes his progress in science, technology, military, exploration to Christianity..plain and simple


The only sort of Christianity that still means something in the West is the one that is tied to the National churches..like Orthodox Christianity of many Slavic countries ...etc




The only modern religion that has any sort of impetus and inertia attached to it is Islam and no one else


But the landscape of Islam too will change once MBS takes power and the Millenials take over Iran
 
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Remembering stories of loyalty and disloyalty

As Jaffrelot and others have argued, Hindutva actors use an historical argument to differentiate between the Hindu majority and minorities, but this is not the case for a differential relationship between minorities which is established by the requirements of the present and by a remembered story. That is, history establishes the relationship between the majority and minorities but it is not used to differentiate minorities into a hierarchy. Rather for Hindutva, it is the memory of the relationship; it is the rermembered past that differentiates between minorities. Memory is malleable to the requirements of the present; it is a mythical organisation of the past. Contemporary relationships are projected back in time rather than understanding the present in terms of an evolving past. Parsis and Muslims are differentiated by comparing two stories, a Parsi story of coexistence and a Muslim story of invasion, a Parsi story of acculturation and loyalty with a Muslim story of forcible conversion of Hindus to Islam and disloyalty. It is a comparison of mythical pasts as if they were historical pasts.

Comparing mythical stories denies the unique historical relationship each community has had with Hindus. Muslims ruled much of South Asia in the centuries before being deposed by the British. Muslims developed a set of strategies for coexisting with Hindus that was premised upon Muslim control of the polity. Parsis have not ruled anywhere since their 655CE defeat in Iran that precipitated their flight to India. In India they have always been a tiny community who have had to negotiate with the ruling community and polity. They have had to supplicate themselves before Hindu, Muslim and British rulers in order to negotiate their elite status. Their position is premised upon deft negotiations with another community who are politically and militarily more powerful. Parsis have developed a highly successful set of strategies for these negotiations in which the questioning of their loyalty is not a denial but an expression of their agency.

These strategies are encapsulated in a multivalent Parsi story that remembers the munificence of the political elite. Hindutva actors draw upon that remembered story and rework it for their own benefit. The remembering of a story of Parsi loyalty and Muslim disloyalty has its own historical development. The story by Golwalkar that began this article is a revision of a Parsi story that was first written in a 1599CE poem known as the Qesse-ye Sanjan, or the Story of Sanjan. For a translation of the poem into English see Williams (2009). Over many centuries Parsis have narrated various versions of a story that describes a first encounter with Hindus that trade’s asylum for a profession of loyalty, commonality and acculturation. All versions of the story recount an exodus from Iran due to religious persecution and an arrival by boat in a Gujarati village. The dominant contemporary Parsi version of the story is the 'Sugar in the Milk'. It narrates a meeting between a Hindu king and Parsis in which the king presents the Parsis with a glass full of milk to symbolise that the land has no room for them. A Parsi stirs sugar into the milk to symbolise that they will mix in and sweeten the society without displacing the milk. It is most commonly narrated orally but also appears in scholarly narratives, historical novels and films, children's books, paintings, poems and websites (Kamerkar and Dhunjisha 2002, 27; Nanavutty 1980, 40–1; Sidhwa 1991, 46–9; Khan and Metha 1998; Shroff and Mehta 2011; J. Patel, n.d.; Joshi 2003; Cama 2014).

Parsis and Hindus use the encounter and the conditions of asylum to negotiate, guide and elucidate the contemporary similarities and differences between the two communities. The pact for asylum explains to contemporary Parsis their syncretic fusion of Zoroastrian, Iranian and Hindu practices. Axelrod (1980) and Williams (2009) read the story as a myth that guides the Parsis. The past is invoked to guide a mutually beneficial relationship in the present. It is a morality tale, a myth where the meaning changes depending upon the context and requirements of the present. Whereas Parsis invoke a mythical past to negotiate their survival, Golwalkar, Savarkar and Modi have a different moral purpose. They use the past in order to bring about a Hindutva vision of India as a hierarchically plural Hindu nation.

From the Qesse-ye Sanjan until today the questioning of Parsi loyalty is pluralistic in its inclusiveness of the community. Questioning loyalty is rhetorical as Parsis can never profess anything but loyalty. In the Qesse-ye Sanjan a Parsi priest affirms their loyalty to the Hindu King saying 'We are all friendly to the land of Hend (India), we’ll slash your enemies in all directions.' (Williams 2009, 87 Verse 163) Later in the poem, Parsis join forces with Hindus against an invasion by Muslims. During colonial rule Parsis professed loyalty to the British. In the first work of modern Parsi history that was produced in the year following the 1857 rebellion against British rule the author wrote, 'Throughout the rebellion in the East the Parsees have maintained an unshaken loyalty to the British.' (Karaka 1858, x) In 2011, Modi prodded the Parsis to return to Iran, to which a Parsi replied, 'We don't want to go to Iran. We like India. We want to be here. It is our country.' (Mehta 2011) Although the loyalty of the Parsis shifts, they are publicly understood to be loyal. It is not that Parsis are loyal, rather it is the public remembering of loyalty in the form of a story.

The demand that a community profess loyalty and acculturate is not necessarily exclusionary when it is and has always been answered in the affirmative and is a story that expresses that community’s agency. For Parsis, the question of loyalty enables difference; it negotiates the meeting points and distinctness of Parsis and Hindus. The question of loyalty is not asked of people whose ancestors have assimilated and become Hindus, because they are no longer a distinct people. The Parsis were not the first Iranian Zoroastrians to migrate to India. Pre-Parsi migrants from Iran became a Hindu caste and ceased to be identifiably Zoroastrian or Iranian. They are known as Maga Brahmins (Kamerkar and Dhunjisha 2002, 8). It is only scholars who have uncovered the Maga Brahmins’ Iranian ancestry. Their loyalty is not questioned because they are Hindus. If Parsis had ceased to be Zoroastrian and distinct from Hindus, there would be no Indian Zoroastrians. The question of their loyalty is not only symptomatic of their difference but also constitutive. It enables them to be simultaneously Parsi, Zoroastrian and Indian.

Whereas the story about Parsis remembers them as loyal, the story about Muslims remembers them as disloyal. For Muslims the rhetorical question of their loyalty to post-colonial India is answered with denial because of a remembered story of disloyalty. Their loyalty has previously been denied. Muslims are imagined as repeatedly invading Hindu India and destroying temples (Thapar, 2005). The final chapter in their disloyalty to India is their role Partition. Pandey (1999) argues that the contemporary question of Muslim loyalty is tied to the existence of Pakistan and the idea of Muslim and Hindu nations. With the 1947 partition of British India into Pakistan and India, the question of the loyalty of Muslims who remained in India and largely supported the creation of Pakistan comes into question. A Muslim in India is forever responsible for the actions of his ancestors, who may or may not have been members of the Muslim League's campaign for Pakistan. The individual becomes responsible for the actions of their co-religionists. The charge of loyalty to Pakistan and disloyalty to India is one that Indian Muslims can never adequately counter. For Muslims the question of loyalty can only be answered with a denial of Islam, a denial of loyalty, or at best equivocal support.

The story of Muslim disloyalty denies their historical experience in India. They have not always been imagined as disloyal. In the period where Muslims were the sovereigns there was no question of their loyalty or disloyalty. British colonial power was primarily supplanting Muslim rule across much of North India and following their conquest they sought a profession of loyalty. It is with the 1857 uprising against British rule by Hindus and Muslims that Muslims are first imagined as disloyal. This uprising was opposed by the Parsis. For the British, the Parsis were loyal and Muslims were disloyal and it is this colonial era imagination of both that Savarkar drew upon.

To be continued ...

Brilliant. Even if I say so myself.

I am reading as I go along, and posting.

Cheers, Doc


This was me leading you to what I was saying.

Not the bit about self introspection etc. Hindus have a proven track record of being liberal, open minded, and having the ability to recognise wrongs and righting them free of doctrine and hardened stances.

Cheers, Doc
No one is questioning Parsi loyalty. What is the purpose of these lengthy posts extolling Parsi virtue?
 
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For me too India is a homeland

A matter of practicality. This is the Wikipedia page about the atashgah of Baku in Central Asia ( I have not read the page fully ).

This is honestly the first time I have heard you saying that India is your homeland, without a nonsensical communist disco move.

If Parsis had to be practical they would have converted to Islam and Zoroastrianized it like the majority of Iran did.

Parsis come from the cream of Persian society. The Athorans, the descendants of the Magi. The warrior priests.

In our faith, practicality is not part of our lexicon.

There are various grades of fires around the Zoroastrian world.

There are only 9 Atash Behram fires. I do not expect a Muslim to understand that significance.

A fire, any fire, not just an Agyari or Atash Behram fire, or even a Dar e Meher fire, cannot be consecrated on hostile land.

Cheers, Doc
 
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Christian missionaries lost their steam once New Atheism won against Christianity in the West...and the world is way more connected now...Indians won't gobble down gobbelygook once they learn through the internet that Christianity has lost its ascendant position in the West..the only cache Christianity had in India was that it was the white man's religion..and many Indians thought may be the white man owes his progress in science, technology, military, exploration to Christianity..plain and simple

The only sort of Christianity that still means something in the West is the one that is tied to the National churches..like Orthodox Christianity of many Slavic countries ...etc

The only modern religion that has any sort of impetus and inertia attached to it is Islam and no one else

But the landscape of Islam too will change once MBS takes power and the Millenials take over Iran
The missionaries have always targetted the poor and less educated masses. They wont go to internet to see where Christianity stands today. These missionaries are backed with a lot of money from west. They use these to offer incentives to convert. Ofcourse, not all conversion is due to this factor.
Christianity spread in Kerala much before modern missionaries. They were genuine converts out of acceptance of Jesus.
In Goa, people were either converted forcefully by Portuguese or people converted to get favors from ruling dispensation.
 
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wall of text about hinduism. couldnt be bothered to read it. dont tag me.

Its about Hindutva and Parsis. Your two favourite whipping boys.

So I thought you'd be interested.

Pity your reading challenges preclude your participation.

Cheers, Doc
 
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In 2011, Modi prodded the Parsis to return to Iran, to which a Parsi replied, 'We don't want to go to Iran. We like India. We want to be here. It is our country.' (Mehta 2011)

What was Modi's reason to say this ?

During colonial rule Parsis professed loyalty to the British. In the first work of modern Parsi history that was produced in the year following the 1857 rebellion against British rule the author wrote, 'Throughout the rebellion in the East the Parsees have maintained an unshaken loyalty to the British.' (Karaka 1858, x)

So no Parsi Bhagat Singh. Not even moneyed backers of the Indian freedom fighters ?

They have had to supplicate themselves before Hindu, Muslim and British rulers in order to negotiate their elite status.

I am interested to know how the Parsis negotiated with the Muslim rulers in India.

This is honestly the first time I have heard you saying that India is your homeland, without a nonsensical communist disco move.

What is nonsensical about Communism ?
 
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@peagle sorry I missed your name.

Based on your WIP thesis on the collective Indian mind on the other thread, I thought this might be grist for the mill.

Cheers, Doc
 
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The missionaries have always targetted the poor and less educated masses. They wont go to internet to see where Christianity stands today. These missionaries are backed with a lot of money from west. They use these to offer incentives to convert. Ofcourse, not all conversion is due to this factor.
Christianity spread in Kerala much before modern missionaries. They were genuine converts out of acceptance of Jesus.
In Goa, people were either converted forcefully by Portuguese or people converted to get favors from ruling dispensation.


The window of oppurtunity is next 10-12 years for Christianity in India....once India reaches $4-5,000 GDP per capita nominal...even the poorest of the poor will have smart phone and high speed internet as well as the basic education to navigate through videos to teach themselves



The only organized religion that still has relevancy and a chance to dominate is Islam..even Islam's stature will go down unless there is a Muslim Elon Musk to change the established order
 
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Remembering acculturation

Whereas for Savarkar it is stories of loyalty and commonality that are the basis for differentiating between minorities, for Golwalkar it is also the minority's public acculturation of Hindu symbols (Jaffrelot 2011, 46). He expressed this in the story that began this article in which Parsis were required to accept Hindu symbols such as respect for cows. As the question of loyalty simultaneously includes Parsis and excludes Muslims, so too does the demand to acculturate and be commensurable. Again, the comparison denies their very different historical experiences and is the remembering of a story designed to exclude Muslims. It is not a neutral demand.

Zoroastrianism and Brahminical Hinduism have a shared origin, they are familial. The oldest religious texts of both Hindus and Zoroastrians are composed in mutually intelligible coeval languages. They have a common ancestral Indo-Iranian religion from which they are both derived. They have diverged and there are differences but their common root provides a fertile ground for a discourse of acculturation and commensurability. The similarities and differences enable a comparative exposition of each tradition in their early stages. Zoroastrians and Hindus have engaged in a productive comparative dialogue for many centuries. Parsis and Hindus have been translating Zoroastrian ideas into a Hindu idiom even prior to the 1599 Qesse-ye Sanjan in the form of the Sixteen Sanskrit Slokas (Williams 2009, 233; Verse 167-181 Williams 2009, 87–91). From the 19th century both drew upon philology to understand both of their traditions historically (Chattopadhyaya 1894; Desai 1904; Hodivala 1925; Chapekar 1982). In the story by Golwalkar that began this article, the Hindu king demanded that the Parsis respect the cow. This is an adaptation of the Parsis own tradition. In the Qesse-ye Sanjan the Parsi priest says to the Hindu king 'We offer our respect to fire and water, and likewise to the cow, the sun and moon.' (Williams 2009, 87 Verse 169) The demand to acculturate does not entail a demand to shed Zoroastrianism. It is the public adaptation of certain practices of a familial tradition. The similarities and differences are constitutive.

In contemporary Hindutva thought Parsis and Muslims are distinguished by their acculturation. In an interview the playwright of the 2013 Gujarat Day play lauded the Parsis' contribution to the states culture as pioneers of Gujarati journalism, drama and their celebrated poets. He exalted the nationalist Parsis involved in the freedom struggle and his Parsi friends. It was not only in their contribution to Gujarat but in his words, that they 'have become 100% Gujarati'. For him Parsis have acculturated the traditions of Gujarati Hindus. He recounted the ancient links between Iran and India, of the Iranians who featured in the Indian epic the Mahabharata and the customs that Parsis and Hindus shared. There was a commonality between the Parsis traditions and his own Hindu traditions.

This is not the case for Muslims for whom the demand to acculturate Hindu symbols is a demand to shed Islam. The ancestors of South Asian Muslims have come to Islam through a variety of complex processes from migration to conversion (Eaton 1985; Eaton 1993). Muslims often share cultural expressions with Hindus of the same ethnicity while parting with those radically incompatible with Islam. Given that the difference between Muslims and Hindus belonging to the same language group is primarily in religious practice, the demand to acculturate is a demand to shed Islam. If Muslims concede and discard Islamic practices and symbols they become good Muslims, but only for a transitory moment. In this denial they cease to be Muslim and are subsumed at the bottom of the Hindu caste system. If they retain any outward expression of Islam, they are an anti-national threatening minority. This is not to suggest that there are no grounds for a dialogue between Hindus and Muslims. Such a dialogue is ongoing in India, but it is not one of acculturation and it is not one that Hindutva draws upon.

The Hindutva story of Muslims in India is the antithesis of acculturation because it remembers forced conversion and the destruction of temples. An official involved in the annual Gujarat Day play said ‘Parsis don't create problems over religion and are not violent.’ The religious problem he alludes to is conversion; an exemplary minority does not proselytise. Parsis generally do not accept converts to their religion of Zoroastrianism. With proselytisation, Muslims and Christians do not seek to adopt Hindu practices but negate them through conversion. Christian and Muslim proselytising is intimately tied to Hindu nationalism (Jaffrelot, 2007, 233). For Hindutva conversion presents two problems. First is that their movement is founded on the idea of a majoritarian Hindu nation, the gradual erosion of that numerical ascendency undermines the argument for a Hindu India. The second is in a democracy a Hindu nationalist movement requires a Hindu majority if it is going to form government (Menon, 2003, 43). Comparing the acculturation of Parsis and Muslims is comparing the incomparable. It is comparing a story of coexistence with a story of exclusion in order to advance a contemporary political agenda.

Conclusion

The ethnic nationalist framework for understanding movements such as Hindutva explains how a majority ethnic group is imagined against a threatening Other but it does explain their affection for some minority communities. While the use of threatening minorities establishes the nation as unitary, the use of exemplary minorities by ethnic nationalists movements such as Hindutva or terms such as Model Minorities enables the imagination of a plural society. A nationalist movement in an ethnically diverse society needs an exemplary minority in order to imagine the self as plural. Parsis serve this purpose, they illustrate the munificence and plurality of Hindus.

An exemplary minority establishes why other minorities are threatening. In plural societies an exemplary minority is predicated on the existence of a threatening one. In India, Parsis are exemplary because Muslims are threatening and vice versa. The exemplary minority is the model of what other minorities must but cannot become. Its use in India does not address Parsis, but Muslims exhorting them to follow the Parsi example.

Whether a minority is exemplary or threatening has little to do with their actions, rather it is determined by the political requirements of the present and how the demand to be loyal and acculturate has previously been answered. These are rhetorical questions and demands. A hierarchy of minorities is established by remembering a story of loyalty and acculturation that denies each community’s historical specificity. It is a denial of how each person and community came to find themselves in the situation they are today. It is the use of a politically charged remembered story in the guise of a historical understanding.

For ethnic nationalists a story of coexistence is tied to a story of conflict. When a story of coexistence that uses a treaty trading refuge for loyalty and acculturation is used on its own it can constitute a community as a unique entity and negotiate the similarities and differences between the majority and minority communities. But when that story is read against another of disloyalty its effect is to exclude. The comparison is not problematic for the exemplary minority, but it is for the threatening minority. The use of the exemplary minority, or model minority is not benign, it is an assault on those already discriminated against in order to imagine the self as plural.

Concluded

Source: https://openresearch-repository.anu...k-Parsis-Hindutva-ethnic-nationalism-2017.pdf


Interesting piece. Not dissimilar to what has been often said here. By the Other.

Cheers, Doc
 
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