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Pakistan's Special Operations Forces: SSG | SSGN | SSW | SOW | SOG

The problem is that most Western advisers and trainers come to Pakistan thinking that Pakistani troops would be like those they have interacted with in many Middle Eastern Countries and Afghanistan. They come to Pakistan with a fairly basic curriculum and think that this would be enough for us. The reality is that many of our training institutions are as old as those of the US Army and that of other Western nations. Our troops know the basics of snipercraft and infantry training as well as any others. However the sniper employment has changed somewhat overtime and its always good to learn from the experiences of others utilizing such capabilities.

All of our special to arms and skills schools have a very developed curriculum. Where the Western input helps is in absorption of the new weapons and tactics into established training procedures. Part of being a good host is to listen to whatever the guest imparts and choose and pick what you think makes more sense in the local environment. What should give confidence to people about our own training programs is that we ourselves are invited to setup schools overseas.

I have a ton of stories about our students teaching their foreign instructors a thing or two but the overall story is that many come with a false notion about the standard of training here and are very surprised by the reality at least when interfacing with the regular forces.
 
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I have a ton of stories about our students teaching their foreign instructors a thing or two but the overall story is that many come with a false notion about the standard of training here and are very surprised by the reality at least when interfacing with the regular forces.

Well Blain, would be greatly appreciated if you could share a couple of those stories.
 
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django, most of the cases are those of foreign officers coming to Pakistan to attend a staff college or national defence course and having certain preconceived notions, mostly negative but coming away impressed one way or another. The more direct hands-on training examples that I have had some exposure to is again around the foreign side sending people to teach our people very rudimentary knowledge and they used to come and demonstrate it, the NCOs and jawans, who were really experienced chaps, used to demonstrate it back to them by adding a bit of the local flair and their own knowhow in very little time. This used to impress some as their past experiences operating and training other militaries were different.

One difference than we have had until recently, where we had allowed them to interact with the FC, is that the Army has always used the "train the trainer" approach. They would come and interact with our training staff/officers who in turn would teach it to the JCO/NCO cadres and then cascade the training down to other ranks. The point is that, other than very specialized training, any Army with well established schools knows its ways around. The biggest challenge for most Countries is to maintain and retain quality and consistency of training. We, fortunately, have that system in place.
 
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Well Blain one only has to read brigadier Yousafs book 'The bear trap' to grasp the professionalism of our armed forces, as you stated we always adopted the 'train the trainer' approach, and our chaps managed to achieve a better strike rate with the stingers than their US trainers, I guess that buried any preconcieved notions by uncle sam about our capabilities.
BTW your posts along with xerics are truly informative on the internal dynamics of pak army.
 
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Yes, Its true. Non-muslims are not allowed within Haram, I also read that there were two French SF personnel which converted before being taken to Makkah.

Because they (French) were only two in number , they were more into planning and monitoring operations, actual operation was conducted by Pak and Saudi SF personnel.

Grand Mosque Seizure - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Siege of Mecca, by Yaroslav Trofimov



Any links...? First time I heard this.

AFAIK, there were only 3 GIGN operatives and all were sitting outside Makkah in a camp in a advisory and overwatch role.
 
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TP,

I happened to read the above book as the author and others suggest that this siege was the true origin of Alqaida. Obviously I think the two are totally unconnected. But just for other's information, the above book only mentions Pakistan and the Pakistani Army concerning the burning of the US embassy in ISB as a result of this siege. The entire credit in the book for the operation is given to the Saudis and their French advisers and there is no mention of any Pakistani involvement.

While I am not absolutely definitive, but reverting back to the issue of the supposed SSG involvement in the Holy Kaaba siege, I believe Pakistani involvement was extremely limited if any. As an aside, I happened to know the Brig., later Maj Gen, who commanded the SSG from ~79-81 fairly well. At least I never heard from him of this involvement and the same goes for some of the other older SSG officers that I have interacted with. Back then the SSG was even smaller and such things did not stay a secret for long. One must also keep in mind that prior to the 80s, the SSG was a conventional SF. That is, its role was specifically for operations behind enemy lines. It was not trained for ATT missions which require training for things like built up area fighting, MoE etc.

The Western countries had been working on such capabilities after the incident at the Munich Olympics with the Germans forming a special force, later on the French and the British started imparting the same to their police and SAS respectively and this is the reason that the Saudis brought in the French Special Forces people. It was this evolution that resulted in the PA deciding on developing this anti-terrorism capability in the early 80s which led to the repurposing of Musa company on the orders of Gen Zia ul Haq. Our concerns were more specific including security of various vital points. The evolution of this force eventually gave way to the current Zarrar ATT detachment.

But as I have said initially, I must grant that I may have incomplete information about our involvement.
 
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