My dear indian friends "
Vish", "
Ghatak", "
nitesh", and "
cactuslil58" ..today I had a short time, I was not expected to stay at forum today due to some important engagements to attend one of my serious injured causin laying in hospital, but during this visit here I observed that the debate is gong to enter almost disputable zone.
Dear friends I respects your views, and observed that, you peoples are really very much sensitive & caring intellectuals who respect to the whole humanity and appreciate their serious concerns on the discussing issue, I regards all of you friends.
Dear fellows as we all knows well that the human is the very beautiful, brilliant & unique creation, God made it with the emotions of caring, love and affection. The human beings is called some how social animal live in societies, care & love with respect to each other by his built-in nature, through out the world every society, community and nation off course have their own values and customs religions, races and casts, but one thing would be common is each of them, that is their built in nature (love care & respects).
In western world their values may be effected by their specific certain evolutionary process including materialism, but the stated natural values still exists with its virtue up to its real extent in Asia specially the sub-continent region, where peoples are rich in social values, customs & cultures of love, care and hospitality for each other regardless any difference.
We live in villages, towns & cities, we care and respect, we enjoy gatherings of our friends our neighborhood or in other areas, we invite each other to house parties, but never ever think to capture or dominant on some body of our friends or neighbors nor we ever thought to threat or grasp their home.
Similarly, off course there is a border (wall) as geographically, but it should not be emotionally, and I believe the peoples of both sides have love and respects for each other, even we knows there would be many families who has relations in both countries, so its like the houses in neighborhood. We should enjoy our friendship & neighborhood by caring each other instead to threat, even with having maintained our individual identifications.
Despite of above, we all knows the facts about the rapid changes coming in this world which really became a global village, the race is being held among nations and superiors want to became more superior as a ruler of the global. In this situation there is war off-course as vish told in his post not like a tradition war) but its has several aspects to jeopardize the world and create clashes on religious, economical, ethnical and cultural etc. Its only us The public who may save their cultures by forcing their own territories political administrators/rulers. But for this purpose we have to avoid egotism and have to realize the facts / scenarios.
This forum Defence Pk, is a unique platform, a strong source of mature discussion, like a sort of boundaries-less social group to share knowledge & view with all together irrespective of differences, and where we discuss every topic with no intention to hurt any specific.
Now I come to present few details about the aggressive approach of India which has been most fact taken by the researches of Indian & American authors which I will quote at the end of this article:
One of the key milestones in world history has been the rise to prominence of new and influential states in world affairs. The recent trajectories of China and India suggest strongly that these states will play a more powerful role in the world in the coming decades.
One recent analysis, for example, judges that "the likely emergence of China and India ... as new global players--similar to the advent of a united Germany in the 19th century and a powerful United States in the early 20th century--will transform the geopolitical landscape, with impacts potentially as dramatic as those in the two previous centuries.
India also is no longer geopolitically contained in South Asia, as it was in the Cold War, when its alignment with the Soviet Union caused the United States and China, with the help of Pakistan, to contain India. Finally, the sea change in Indian-U.S. relations, especially since 9/11, has made it easier for India to enter into close political and security cooperation with America's friends and allies in the Asia-Pacific.
For India, this maritime and southward focus is not entirely new. However, it has been increasing due to New Delhi's embrace of globalization and of the global marketplace, the advent of a new Indian self-confidence emphasizing security activism over continental self-defense, and the waning of the Pakistan problem as India's relative power has increased. Other, older, factors influencing this trend are similar to those that once conditioned British thinking about the defense of India: the natural protection afforded the subcontinent by the Himalayan mountain chain, and the problem confronting most would-be invaders of long lines of communications--the latter a factor that certainly impeded Japan's advance toward India in World War II.
The December 2004 tsunami that devastated many of the coasts of the Indian Ocean (IO) turned the world's attention to a geographic zone that New Delhi increasingly sees as critically important and strategically challenging. The publication of India's new Maritime Doctrine is quite explicit on the central status of the Indian Ocean in Indian strategic thought and on India's determination to constitute the most important influence in the region as a whole. The appearance of this official paper complements a variety of actions by India that underscore New Delhi's ambitions and intent in the region.
While India assume that it's a "continental" power, so it has to occupies a central position in the IO region, a fact that will exercise an increasingly profound influence on--indeed almost determine--India's security environment. Writing in the 1940s, K. M. Pannikar argued that "while to other countries the Indian Ocean is only one of the important oceanic areas, to India it is a vital sea. Her lifelines are concentrated in that area, her freedom is dependent on the freedom of that water surface.
No industrial development, no commercial growth, no stable political structure is possible for her unless India will have powerfull strength to capture the shores." This was also emphasized in the most recent Annual Report of India's Defence Ministry, which noted that "India is strategically located vis-a-vis both continental Asia as well as the Indian Ocean Region.
From New Delhi's perspective, key security considerations include the accessibility of the Indian Ocean to the fleets of the world's most powerful states; the large Islamic populations on the shores of the ocean and in its hinterland; the oil wealth of the Persian Gulf; the proliferation of conventional military power and nuclear weapons among the region's states; the importance of key straits for India's maritime security; and the historical tendency of continental Asian peoples or powers (the Indo-Aryans, the Mongols, Russia) to spill periodically out of Inner Asia in the direction of the Indian Ocean.
The position of India in this environment has sometimes been compared to that of Italy in the Mediterranean, only on an immense scale. To this list may be added the general consideration that, in the words of India's navy chief, Indians "live in uncertain times and in a rough neighborhood. A scan of the littoral shows that, with the exception of a few countries, all others are afflicted with one or more of the ailments of poverty, backwardness, fundamentalism, terrorism or internal insurgency. A number of territorial and maritime disputes linger on.... Most of the conflicts since the end of the Cold War have also taken place in or around the Indian Ocean region.
India geographically large and also ambitious--believes that its security will be best guaranteed by enlarging its security perimeter and, specifically, achieving a position of influence in the larger region that encompasses the Indian Ocean. As one prominent American scholar recently noted, "Especially powerful states are strongly inclined to seek regional hegemony.
Unsurprisingly, New Delhi regards the Indian Ocean as its backyard and deems it both natural and desirable that India function as, eventually, the leader and the predominant influence in this region--the world's only region and ocean named after a single state. This is what the United States set out to do in North America and the Western Hemisphere at an early stage in America's "rise to power": "American foreign policy throughout the nineteenth century had one overarching goal: achieving hegemony in the Western Hemisphere." Similarly, in the expansive view of many Indians, India's security perimeter should extend from the Strait of Malacca to the Strait of Hormuz and from the coast of Africa to the western shores of Australia. For some Indians, the emphasis is on the northern Indian Ocean, but for others the realm includes even the "Indian Ocean" coast of Antarctica.
In this same vein, one--probably not atypical--Indian scholar judges that "a rising India will aspire to become the regional hegemony of South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region, and an extra regional power in the Middle East, Central Asia and Southeast Asia. Ceteris paribus: a rising India will try to establish regional hegemony just like all the other rising powers have since Napoleonic times, with the long term goal of achieving great power status on an Asian and perhaps even global scale.
India's strategic elite, moreover, in some ways regards the nation as the heir of the British Raj, the power and influence of which in the nineteenth century often extended to the distant shores of the Indian Ocean, the "British Lake.
Historian Ashley Jackson is even more explicit in highlighting the Indian dimension in all of this. He writes that:
India under the Raj was a sub imperial force autonomous of London
whose weight was felt from the Swahili coast to the Persian Gulf and
eastward to the Straits of Malacca. There was, in fact, an "Empire
of the Raj" until at least the First World War, in which Indian
foreign policy interests were powerfully expressed and represented
in the Gulf and on the Arabian and Swahili coasts, often in conflict
with other British imperial interests.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, this imperial "Indian" posture in the Indian Ocean reflects the strategic vision of many influential Indians today.
A second motive for India, and one obviously related to the foregoing, stems from anxiety about the role, or potential role, of external powers in the Indian Ocean. The late prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru summed up India's concerns in this regard: "History has shown that whatever power controls the Indian Ocean has, in the first instance, India's sea borne trade at her mercy and, in the second, India's very independence itself." This remains India's view. The Indian Maritime Doctrine asserts: "All major powers of this century will seek a toehold in the Indian Ocean Region. Thus, Japan, the EU, and China, and a reinvigorated Russia can be expected to show presence in these waters either independently or through politico-security arrangements." There is, moreover, "an increasing tendency of extra regional powers of military intervention in IO littoral countries to contain what they see as a conflict situation
India's concern about external powers in the Indian Ocean mainly relates to China and the United States. The Sino-Indian relationship has improved since India's war with China in 1962 and the Indian prime minister's 1998 letter to the U.S. president justifying India's nuclear tests in terms of the Chinese "threat." Most recently, the Chinese premier paid a state visit to India in April 2005, during which the two sides agreed to, among various other steps, the establishment of a "Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity." Chinese and Indian naval units also exercised together for the first time in November 2005.
However, and notwithstanding the probably episodic progress registered of late, China and India likely will remain long-term rivalsIn the words of one Indian scholar, China's "rise will increasingly challenge Asian and global security. Just as India bore the brunt of the rise of international terrorism because of its geographical location, it will be frontally affected by the growing power of a next door ... empire practicing classical balance-of-power politics.
Most recently, India's defense minister said in September 2005 that the Sino-Indian "situation has not improved. Massive preparations and deployments by China in the Tibetan and Sikkim border areas near Arunachal Pradesh and the Aksai Chin ... has created an alarming situation".
Narrowing its focus to the IO, India cannot help but be wary of the growing capability of China's navy and of Beijing's growing maritime presence. (25) In the Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea, especially, New Delhi is sensitive to a variety of Chinese naval or maritime activities that observers have characterized collectively as a "string of pearls" strategy or a "preparation of the battlefield." For Beijing, this process has entailed achieving the capability, and thereby the option, to deploy or station naval power in this region in the future. A key focus in this connection is Burma (Myanmar), where Chinese engineers and military personnel have long been engaged in airfield, road, railroad, pipeline, and port construction aimed at better connecting China with the Indian Ocean, both by sea and directly overland.
India also remains somewhat nervous about the large U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean to India's west--in the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf. India's Maritime Doctrine observes that "the unfolding events consequent to the war in Afghanistan has brought the threats emanating on our Western shores into sharper focus. The growing US and western presence and deployment of naval forces, the battle for oil dominance and its control in the littoral and hinterland ... are factors that are likely to have a long-term impact on the overall security environment in the [Indian Ocean region]." In similar fashion, the 2004-2005 Annual Report of India's Defense Ministry states, "
The Indian Navy maintained its personnel and equipment in a high state of combat preparedness due to the continued presence of multinational maritime forces in the Indian Ocean Region resulting in a fast pace of activities in the area."
A baisc motive for India in the Indian Ocean is energy. As the fourth-largest economy (in purchasing-power-parity terms) in the world, and one almost 70 percent dependent on foreign oil (the figure is expected to rise to 85 percent by 2020), India has an oil stake in the region that is significant and growing (see figure). Some Indian security analysts foresee energy security as India's primary strategic concern in the next twenty-five years and believe it must place itself on a virtual wartime footing to address it. India must protect its offshore oil and gas fields, ongoing deep-sea oil drilling projects in its vast exclusive economic zone, and an extensive infrastructure of shore and offshore oil and gas wells, pumping stations and telemetry posts, ports and pipeline grids, and refineries. Additionally, Indian public and private-sector oil companies have invested several billion dollars in recent years in oil concessions in foreign countries, many of them in the region, including Sudan, Yemen, Iran, Iraq, and Burma. These investments are perceived to need military protection.
On the other hand, the continuing development of ties with the United States lately seems to have moderated Indian sensitivity to the U.S. presence in the Arabian Sea. In September and October 2005, for example, the two sides conducted their first naval maneuvers--MALABAR 05--employing U.S. and Indian aircraft carriers, and this occurred in the Arabian Sea. Many Indians, moreover, also recognize that because of Washington's desire to draw closer to India in response to overlapping "China" and "terrorism" concerns, the increased American role in the Indian Ocean region lately has increased India's "strategic space" and political-military relevance. Any decrease in the level of U.S. involvement in the region also would increase pressure here from China. Wariness about China also is a factor in recent Indian efforts to increase Japan's profile in the IO. This was most recently made manifest by the March 2005 Indo-Japanese agreement to develop jointly natural gas resources in the strategically sensitive Andaman Sea. (29) In any case, as one retired Indian diplomat recently commented, "asking outside powers to stay away is a pipe dream.
Of particular note, this last realization has led New Delhi to discard its traditional rhetoric about the Indian Ocean as a "zone of peace." That language, along with "nonalignment" and a diplomatic approach marked by peachiness and a "moral" dimension, were the policies of an India that was weak. That India now belongs to history: "India has moved from its past emphasis on the power of the argument to a new stress on the argument of power.
A forth factor animating Indian interest in the Indian Ocean region is anxiety about the threat posed by Pakistan and, more broadly, Islam in a region that is home to much of the world's Muslim population. Formerly this may not have been an important consideration. Today, however, Islamic civilization often finds itself at odds with the West and with largely Hindu India, and this conflict frequently will play out in the Indian Ocean region. India's Maritime Doctrine, for example, observed "the growing assertion of fundamentalist militancy fueled by jihadi fervor are factors that are likely to have a long-term impact on the overall security environment in the Indian Ocean region. In a similar vein, India's naval chief recently declared that the "epicenter of world terrorism lies in our [India's] immediate neighborhood." India, however, will approach these matters pragmatically, as illustrated by New Delhi's close ties with Iran.
The foregoing considerations are the primary ones for India in the region. However, there also are important commercial reasons for New Delhi to pursue a robust Indian Ocean strategy. In the Indian view, "the maritime arc from the Gulf through the Straits of Malacca to the Sea of Japan is the equivalent of the New Silk Route, and ... total trade on this arc is U.S. $1,800 billion." In addition, large numbers of overseas Indians live in the region--3.5 million in the Gulf and Arab countries; they, and their remittances, constitute a factor in Indian security thinking.
In light of these interests, India is pursuing a variety of policies aimed at improving its strategic situation and at ensuring that its fears in the theater are not realized. To these ends, New Delhi is forging a web of partnerships with certain littoral states and major external powers, according to India's foreign secretary, to increase Indian influence in the region, acquire "more strategic space" and "strategic autonomy," and create a safety cushion for itself. One observer states: "
To spread its leverage, from Iran ... to Myanmar and Vietnam, India is mixing innovative diplomatic cocktails that blend trade agreements, direct investment, military exercises, aid funds, energy cooperation and infrastructure-building." In addition, India is developing more capable naval and air forces, and it is utilizing these forces increasingly to shape India's strategic environment.
India's pursuit of closer ties with its neighbors in the region and with key external actors in the region is not haphazard. Rather, and as one would expect, India is systematically targeting states that will bring India specific and tangible security and economic benefits.
The relationship with the United States is intended to enhance and magnify India's own power, and it constitutes perhaps the most important measure that is intended, inter alia, to promote the realization of India's agenda in the Indian Ocean. The United States, of course, is the key external actor in the IO and has a more significant military presence there--in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, Pakistan, east and northeast Africa, Singapore, and Diego Garcia--than it did even a few years ago. Thus, America's raw power in the region has made it imperative that New Delhi, if it is to achieve its own regional goals, court the United States--at least for some time. The U.S. connection, of course, also promotes Indian goals unrelated to the Indian Ocean.
This developing relationship has been abetted by common concerns about international terrorism, religious extremism, and the rise of China. It also is a fundamental departure from the past pattern of Indian foreign policy.
Since President William Clinton's visit to India in 2000 (the first visit by a president in decades) and, more recently, the realization by the George W. Bush administration of the importance of a rising India, as well as the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack on the United States, the two nations have embarked on a broad program of cooperation in a variety of fields, especially security. This cooperation has included Indian naval protection of U.S. shipping in the Malacca Strait in 2002, a close partnership in responding to the 2004 tsunami, combined military exercises, U.S. warship visits to India, a dialogue on missile defense, American approval of India's acquisition of Israeli-built Phalcon airborne warning and control systems, and an offer to sell India a variety of military hardware, including fighter aircraft and P-3 maritime patrol planes.
Indo-U.S. ties recently have advanced with particular speed. In March 2005, notably, an American government spokesman stated that Washington's "goal is to help India become a major world power in the 21st century. We understand fully the implications, including military implications, of that statement." This declaration was followed, in June 2005, by a bilateral accord, a ten-year "New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship" that strongly implies increasing levels of cooperation in defense trade, including coproduction of military equipment, cooperation on missile defense, the lifting of U.S. export controls on many sensitive military technologies, and joint monitoring and protection of critical sea lanes.
George Bush hosted a summit with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in July 2005, promising to strive for full civil nuclear cooperation with India. In effect, the president recognized India as a de facto, if not de jure, nuclear-weapon state and placed New Delhi on the same platform as other nuclear-weapon states. India, reciprocating, agreed to assume the same responsibilities and practices as any other country with advanced nuclear technology. These include separating military and civilian nuclear reactors and placing all civilian nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards; implementing the Additional Protocol (which supplements the foregoing safeguards) with respect to civilian nuclear facilities; continuing India's unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing; working with the United States for the implementation of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty; placing sensitive goods and technologies under export controls; and adhering to the Missile Technology Control Regime and to Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines. The American and Indian delegations also agreed to further measures to combat terrorism and deepen bilateral economic relations through greater trade, investment, and technology collaboration. The United States and India also signed a Science and Technology Framework Agreement and agreed to build closer ties in space exploration, satellite navigation, and other areas in the commercial space arena.
Notwithstanding this dramatic advance in relations, which--assuming eventual congressional approval of implementing legislation--establishes a very close United States-India strategic relationship,
some bilateral problems will persist. One is Pakistan
India does not expect an end, for a very long time at best, to difficulties in its relations with Pakistan. It is hoping, however, to manipulate the relationship in a manner that will leave India stronger and Pakistan weaker at the end of the day. The termination of support for perceived restraint in Islamabad's embrace of China, and eventually even the United States, are among India's goals.
The U.S. administration's policy now is to expand relations with both India and Pakistan but to do so along distinct tracks and in differentiated ways, one matching their respective geostrategic weights. From New Delhi's perspective, this is a distinct advance. Nonetheless, there will remain a residual Indian suspicion that any American efforts to assist Pakistan to become a successful state will represent means, potential or actual, of limiting Indian power in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. Such concerns have been diminishing; nonetheless, New Delhi will try to weaken or modify U.S. policies intended to strengthen United States-Pakistan ties, including continuing plans to sell the latter a large package of military equipment.
Other lingering problems in Indo-U.S. relations include New Delhi's close ties to Iran, apparently continuing Indian reservations about the large U.S. military presence in Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf, India's pronounced emphasis on preserving its "strategic autonomy" and a persistent disinclination on India's part to ally itself with American purposes. In the latter regard, India, like China, Russia, and the European Union, will remain uncomfortable with a unipolar world and will do what it can to promote a multipolar order--in which it is one of the poles. New Delhi, therefore, will need to proceed adeptly to ensure that ties with the United States continue to develop and expand in such a way that its own policies and ambitions in the Indian Ocean are buttressed and advanced.
As noted above, India's Maritime Doctrine underscores the importance of the Arabian Sea region in the Indian view and highlights a growing attentiveness to challenges and opportunities arising there. Efforts by New Delhi to advance the Indian cause to its "near West" and in the "Arabian Seas" subregion have focused mainly on Pakistan, Iran, Israel, and several African states.
Elsewhere in the Arabian Sea, India already has enjoyed considerable success in wooing Iran. That state, with its Islamic government, seems a strange partner for democratic India, but the two lands have long influenced each other in culture, language, and other fields, especially when the Mughals ruled India. India and Iran also shared a border until 1947. Iran sees India as a strong partner that will help Tehran avoid strategic isolation. In addition, economic cooperation with New Delhi (and Beijing) dovetails with Iran's own policy of shifting its oil and gas trade to the Asian region so as to reduce its market dependence on the West. For India, the relationship is part of a broader long-term effort, involving various diplomatic and other measures in Afghanistan and Central Asia, to encircle and contain Pakistan.
TO BE CONTINUE ...>>>>> WITH THE DETAIL & REFERENCE OF WEAPON WHICH INDIA ARE TAKING MORE TO BE INFLUENTIAL
Meanwhile please also check the folowing link to have few more details for india weapons arrangment negociations with different countries.
http://disarmament.un.org/RCPD/pdf%20ROK/Berlin.pdf
Now would any of fellows here plz guide me, should we just wait and watch that what will be apearing for our fortune????
Here I would like ot request again to the Patriotic Pakistanis where ever they are to please understand the situation and be prepared & equiped not only with equipments but with whole hearted couragious & brilliant diplomacy, get rid of Slaves (Mir Jaffers & Mir Sadiqs) as early as possible as they cud be big more dangerous then the visible rivals, specially in this changing world.
LONG LIVE
PAKISTAN