What's new

Pakistan's Economy - News and Updates

Pakistan, Belarus agree to intensify bilateral cooperation in agriculture, industry, technology

Pakistan and Belarus on Friday agreed to optimally utilize the existing institutional mechanisms and intensify bilateral cooperation in agriculture, industry and technology.

The consensus was reached at a bilateral meeting between Prime Minister Imran Khan with
President Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus on the sidelines of the 19th SCO Council of Heads of State meeting in Bishkek.

According to the Foreign Office, during the meeting, the two leaders exchanged views on all aspects of bilateral relations and reaffirmed the desire to upgrade mutual collaboration in diverse fields.

The two sides also agreed to increase the frequency of high-level political exchanges. It was further agreed by the leaders that the next session of Inter-Governmental Commission (IGC) would be held during the second half of 2019 and concrete steps would be identified for approval at the leadership level.

http://www.app.com.pk/pakistan-bela...operation-in-agriculture-industry-technology/
 
I'd like to know more details about your tourist attractions.
Could you give me a link about tourist attractions in Pakistan? It's better to be as comprehensive as a guidebook.

wish we had one
our tourism dept is sleeping for last 70 years once they wake up we will guide you to their handbook.
 
Pakistan, Iran agree to strengthen bilateral trade by removing bottlenecks

Pakistan and Iran have agreed to strengthen bilateral trade and economic ties and vowed to remove potential bottlenecks coming in the way, local media reported on Friday.

The understanding came during the first session of the 8th Pakistan-Iran Joint Trade Committee, which was attended by an Iranian delegation, led by Minister of Industry, Mines and Business Reza Rahmani and Pakistani delegation led by Pakistani Prime Minister's Advisor on Commerce and Textile Abdul Razak Dawood on Thursday here.

During the meeting, Pakistan urged the Iranian side to take appropriate measures to remove non-trade barriers so that real potential of bilateral trade could be actualized, suggesting removing various forms of taxation such as road and loads taxes on vehicles which are crossing the borders.

The Iranian side pledged to address all the issues which were hampering bilateral trade on its part, and assured a win-win situation for both sides.

While recognizing the fact that Pakistan-Iran trade relations are not up to the mark, both sides reflected on ways and means to enter into barter trade deal.

"To start barter trade, both countries should select a few items having competitive advantage," Dawood said, adding that in this regard, Pakistan can enhance export of wheat, sugar, rice and fruits to Iran.

During the meeting, Iran also showed profound interest in import of 500,000 tons of rice from Pakistan and asked the Pakistani side to devise necessary mechanism for early shipment.

http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-07/05/c_138202023.htm
 
ADB finds ‘deadly flaws’ in Peshawar BRT project
Lender’s findings reveal substandard material used in project

The Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (K-P) government significantly deviated from the original, agreed design and used inferior quality material in the Rs70 billion Peshawar metro bus project putting lives and assets at risk in the process, according to the Asian Development Bank’s (ADB) findings.

They were recorded by a technical team of the ADB after an on-site inspection of the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) project in March this year, according to an official correspondence between the lender’s headquarters and the K-P government available with The Express Tribune.

The ADB has warned in clear words that BRT buses could collide at stations number 10, 12, 15 and 26 during operations because the lane width is less than the minimum requirement of 6.5 metres.

Also in March, the ADB stopped the provincial government from making future payments to contractors because of the poor quality of work. The ADB loan will not be disbursed further until the provincial government introduces changes in the design to address “critical” deficiencies.

BRT underpasses still closed

The inferior quality construction could damage the project’s reputation at the international level, warned the lender that had approved a $335 million (Rs53 billion) loan for the project in mid-2017.

The critical deficiencies would result in improper docking of buses at the stations and could cause injuries to passengers as well. The tiles are slippery and directional arrow tiles are missing as well.

The ADB noted that there were “significant design deviations from the agreed detailed design that impede or degrade system performance.

The provincial authorities also used “inferior material” that both harm system functionality as well as deliver an aesthetically inferior product, according to the correspondence.

The lender’s third major objection relates to the lack of adequate construction supervision and communication. The ADB seeking modifications to remove the defects might not only slow down the completion of the already much-delayed project, but also further surge its cost.

The project was initially approved to be constructed at a cost of Rs50 billion.

However, after coming into power in the Centre, the federal government allowed an increase in the cost by 38% or Rs18 billion to nearly Rs70 billion.

‘Critical’ deficiencies

The ADB has identified 22 “critical” deviations from the detailed project design at the implementation stage, which not only compromised its quality but could also cause injuries to passengers.

While compromising on the safety of passengers, the provincial authorities have used slippery floor tiles. The lender has asked the authorities to replace these tiles. The safety signalling yellow tiles are also missing even though they were included in the design.

Instead of using directional tiles as was required, the provincial government has placed “taped arrows”.

“It is disappointing that the directional arrows are entirely missing from the implementation. As a remedy, it will not be acceptable to merely place taped arrows on the surface,” the ADB correspondence read.

In yet another
glaring deviation, the curb interface between the vehicle and the platform does not meet the Kassel curb design mandated in the detailed design of the project.
“The lack of an effective curb means that the docking process will be slow, inefficient and potentially damaging to the vehicle tyres,” the lender observed.

The width of the lane, against the requirement of a at least 6.5 metres, is generally below the minimum threshold at many stations, which the ADB noted “causes concern over the safety and efficiency of the operations”.

“There is significant concern of corridor lane widths at turns near BS10, BS12, BS15 and BS26. Over the course of operations, the current design may well result in collisions between BRT vehicles,” according to the ADB correspondence.

The station roofs are not built as per the design and at many stations the passengers will be exposed to rain during boarding. The road marking is also defective.

Despite the ADB’s strong recommendation to install anti-cut and anti-climb fencing, the provincial government used a fencing material on the instructions of former Chief Minister Pervez Khattak that could be “broken and stolen”.

The lender has asked the provincial authorities to change the pit design of the Chamkani depot and station number 1 to provide adequate drainage. It has also objected to the change of sub-contractors for signage work, observing that it could compromise the quality of work.

The ticketing kiosks are also of inferior quality where corrugated steel has been used. “This is not acceptable for the effort and investment made into the Peshawar system; this will generate a very negative view of the system both [on a] national [level] and internationally,” the lender warned.

The stair step height varies “considerably”, which presents a safety problem. “The mild steel flooring material utilised for the ramps and stairs is of an unacceptable quality,” the ADB noted.

At many places, pillars or stairways “do not align properly”. At certain stations, the stairs and escalators have been built in the middle of the stations, obstructing walking space. “The footpaths are blocked by the placement of the public toilets and stairways,” according to the correspondence
 
Spices exports increase 11.77 pc

July 19, 2019

7687587691563549988.jpg



The exports of spices from the country witnessed an increase of 11.77 percent during the first eleven months of fiscal year against the exports of the corresponding period of last year.

According to a statement, the spices exports from the country were recorded at 83.081 million dollar during July-May 2018-19 against the exports of 74.333 million dollar during July-May 2017-18.

In terms of quantity, the exports of spices witnessed an increase of 9.79 percent by going up from 19,511 metric tons to 21,421 metric tons, according to the data. Meanwhile, on-year-on-year basis, the export of spices, witnessed an increase of 1.89 percent during the month of May 2019 when compared to the same month of last year.
 
CPEC is dead. Somebody tell Beijing.

Pakistan’s political and military leadership, and business elite, have stopped investing their capital in CPEC. Now how do we get out of it?


It’s over. If ever there was a thought within Pakistan’s leadership — political, military, and business — that Beijing could replace Washington as the foreign capital with the most influence in Islamabad, that idea is now firmly dead. We just have not gotten around to telling China yet.

Over the past few weeks, Profit has spoken to several sources in both Pakistan’s business elite circles as well as people who are familiar with the thought process of the military leadership and the picture emerging is not a favourable one of the relationship with China: the more Pakistanis learn about the true costs of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the less inclined they are to want to participate any further than we already have.

If anything, the signal coming from the country’s establishment appears to be that, far from pivoting Pakistan’s economic and political orientation towards China, Pakistan should retain its historical role as the country that is able to balance its relationship with both China and the United States.

This emerging consensus — particularly within the military leadership — represents a subtle but important shift in the relationship with Beijing. Pakistan stared long and hard at the costs and benefits of becoming an integral part of what Beijing hopes will become the new Pax Sinica world order, and found it wanting. For all its flaws, Pax Americanastill offers Pakistan a good deal. Nobody in Pakistan’s leadership wants to offend China, but nobody wants to bend over backwards to become a Chinese satellite state either.

Why CPEC is a raw deal

The biggest difference between the Pax Sinica and Pax Americana is one of how each superpower defines its own self-interest. The United States, though far from perfect, has a somewhat more enlightened view of the world order and America’s place in it: at least until the advent of President Donald Trump, the United States wanted to create a world order which is designed to benefit both the United States and its allies. China it seems, by contrast, wants to build a world order where China’s needs are met first and foremost, and the rest of the world’s needs — including those of its allies — are at best secondary considerations, and at worst, not even considerations at all.

We will explain why we think this difference exists, and how it impacts Pakistan, but first, it is important to recognise why it may have developed in the first place.

The United States started becoming a powerful country in the 1890s as its wealth grew, but in the early years, the US did not make the effort to translate that wealth into significant military power, though it developed increasingly sophisticated military capabilities over the next 50 years.

By the end of World War II, however, the United States was not just the richest country in the world, it was richer than the rest of the world combined. (Seriously, for over 10 years following the war, the United States accounted for over half of global GDP.) It was also, despite some threats from the Soviet Union, more powerful militarily than the rest of the world.

It was in that heady moment of near absolute power that the United States stumbled into having to create Pax Americana, never having fully wanted a globally dominant role, and never having historically seen itself as the arbiter and guarantor of global peace and stability. That absolute power gave America a confidence that is unrivaled in history, and the accidental nature of its arrival in power allowed it to be generous with those who were losing it.

As a result, the system that the United States designed — the Bretton Woods institutional order, the Marshall Plan, etc. — were all designed to enable mutually beneficial relationships between Washington and its allies. America was unquestionably the leader, but it was a confident leader that did not feel the need to thump its chest and point out that it was the leader.

China, by contrast, is arriving at its Great Power status in a very different set of circumstances. We tend to speak of the ‘rise’ of China, but the truth is that for most of human history, China has been the richest and most powerful country on earth. The past three hundred years where this has not been the case are actually a historical anomaly, and, from the Chinese perspective, an embarrassing interregnum from which they must recover.

In other words, China is not merely stumbling into Great Power status: it wants it, it believes it deserves it, and it will brook no opposition to getting what it wants.

The system that China has designed, therefore, is geared towards a completely different goal: unlike the United States, which was comfortable sharing its wealth and power as a means of growing wealth for both itself and its allies, China wants to create a global system where wealth and power flow in the direction of China as a means of strengthening it relative to its main rival (the United States), even if that means weakening its allies in the process.

This latter system has obvious flaws from the perspective of Pakistan, which has seen itself as one of modern China’s oldest and staunchest allies. The deal that Islamabad is getting from Beijing in the form of CPEC looks impressive from a distance, but is in fact far from a mutually beneficial relationship. CPEC makes British colonialism in South Asia look generous by comparison.

The flaws in CPEC

The biggest so-called mystery about CPEC is as follows: if CPEC was supposed to be such a huge bonanza for Pakistan in terms of investment, which is it not showing up in the foreign direct investment (FDI) numbers? Why is Pakistan’s current account balance still negative? In fact, why is Pakistan’s current account balance actually getting worse?

The answer is relatively straightforward: because CPEC is not an investment into Pakistan, it is structured as a resource extraction exercise. Here is how it works: China announces that it has invested in a project in Pakistan worth, let’s say $1 billion. That $1 billion, however, is required to mostly be spent on Chinese equipment, and labour, a significant portion of which is to be imported from China as well, with very little by way of supplies coming from the local economy.

That $1 billion, therefore, never hits Pakistan’s economy as an investment. It is $1 billion that goes from the Chinese government or state-owned company to a state-owned company within China to pay for equipment. Even the Chinese labour gets its salaries deposited into bank accounts within China. The money, in other words, stays completely within China and so never shows up as foreign investment into Pakistan.

Where it does show up is in the trade statistics: that $1 billion of equipment will show up as an import, against which Pakistan will have to arrange foreign currency from somewhere. And it will show up as a liability on the balance sheets of whichever company or government entity is contracting with the Chinese government or state-owned company.

Let us recap what we get and what China gets out of this so-called $1 billion investment.

China gets:

· $1 billion in sales for a Chinese state-owned company

· $1 billion in new loans for a Chinese state-owned bank at very high interest rates

Pakistan gets:

· $0 in investment

· $1 billion in imports and increase in net trade deficit

· $1 billion in liabilities for a Pakistani company or government entity

As is evident from the above, this is an arrangement designed purely to benefit one party and that party is not Pakistan. It could still work out in Pakistan’s favour if the economic value of the asset being built was greater than the $1 billion in liabilities taken on to build it. Unfortunately, more often than not, it is far from clear as to whether that is the case.

1*36I8kGmuIQRV3MgD6Yx1XA.png

This example cited above, by the way, is not hypothetical. It is actually showing up in Pakistan’s macroeconomic numbers.

Pakistan’s imports from China have dramatically increased since 2013, when CPEC was first announced. Prior to 2013, Pakistan’s imports from China had been rising because of the 2007 China-Pakistan Free Trade Agreement, but had stabilized to around $6.6 billion a year. After 2013, the rise has been very steep.

1*bRb9yucJURHeS4OxLqGCTQ.png

We estimated how much of that is CPEC-related by assuming that the pre-2013 levels of imports from China can be categorized as the “normal” level and the amounts above that are broadly CPEC-related. By our calculations, using data from the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, we estimate that Pakistan’s CPEC-related imports have come to $31 billion over the past six years.

Does that number sound familiar? It is very close to the number that was originally touted as the total economic value of CPEC’s “fast-track” projects. The government of China was not lying when they said CPEC would be worth that much. They just left out to whom.

The actual investment flows from China during that time have been higher than in the past, it is true, but still relatively smaller compared to this other method. Since 2013, China’s net investment into Pakistan has been $2.5 billion, much higher than the $813 million China invested in Pakistan in the 10 years prior to 2013, but still a relatively small sum compared to the wild projections and promises that the Pakistani press and government wanted to believe when it was first announced.

The shift in Pakistani thinking

While Pakistan’s civilian and military leadership is prone to making bad decisions, they are not completely stupid. They can see these numbers, and they are privy to far more details than have been told to the public about the specific terms of the agreements with China for CPEC projects. And it is becoming increasingly clear that they are becoming deeply uncomfortable with the direction this has taken Pakistan.

Neither the civilian politicians nor the military leadership want to accept the blame for what is clearly a massive blunder on the part of the government of Pakistan in negotiating the CPEC contracts. If any lawyers reviewed them, it is unclear if they understood them, or if their views were taken into consideration at all by the decision-makers. (Hint: there is a reason why good lawyers in the United States are rich: American businesses are willing to pay big money to them to help avoid precisely this kind of massive blunder. It is an investment well worth it.)

The deed is done now, however, and Pakistan cannot easily extricate itself from these arrangements. But, sources familiar with the military leadership’s thinking tell Profit, the leadership in the military has decided to start following the first rule of being in a hole: stop digging. A public renunciation of CPEC would be too embarrassing for the government — both the politicians and the Army — but they are certainly not willing to undertake any further agreements with the government of China.

According to one source, one factor that helped influence the military leadership came when even the military-owned FWO was subjected to exploitative lending contracts by Chinese state-owned companies for construction of CPEC infrastructure projects. It may not be worth risking the relationship with China to try to wriggle out of those contracts, but it was enough to disabuse the top brass of the notion that CPEC would be part of a mutually beneficial relationship with China.

That reluctance to dive into further CPEC-related projects is on display in Pakistan’s business leadership’s decision as well. Take Engro, for instance. In 2016, it appeared that the company was going to jump in head on into the CPEC-related energy projects and direct significant investment towards them. However, in the ensuing three years, Engro appears to have changed course: while it is continuing its investment in Thar Coal energy projects, those are in partnership with the Sindh government. And it is not considering any additional investments in CPEC-linked areas.

CPEC is dead. What comes next?

Slowly but surely, CPEC will die off as a talking point in the government of Pakistan and as a topic of conversation in the media. But the government of Pakistan is still stuck with the agreements they have already signed, and with the expectations they have raised in Beijing that CPEC will be a showcase for the broader Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) for China.

Those expectations will now need to be tempered. Sources familiar with the military leadership’s thought process on the matter say that the military — which sets the foreign policy agenda in Pakistan — is now contemplating a return to the pre-CPEC Pakistani foreign policy of serving as one of the few countries that was able to balance an alliance with both the United States and China.

That is likely easier said than done, however. Firstly, China is not in the mood to play second-fiddle to the United States anymore, in Islamabad or anywhere else in the world. This current Chinese government — under President Xi Jinping — is considerably more assertive than it has ever been in the past. They are unlikely to take kindly to Pakistan scaling back its share of the commitment to CPEC.

And secondly, Pakistan had made a very overt turn towards Beijing and away from Washington. The United States is not exactly in the mood to have Pakistan back as an ally either, at least not without significant concessions on Pakistan’s part. It is unclear whether Pakistan will be willing to make all of those concessions, but it is at least a conversation they will have to consider if the pivot back towards Pakistan’s historic foreign policy arrangements are to be successful.

Sources familiar with the matter say that the government of Pakistan has already made initial overtures to the United States and made it clear that Islamabad’s pivot towards Beijing has effectively been cancelled. Those overtures certainly did not hurt as Pakistan negotiated with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for its 12th bailout in three decades.

What does this mean for the Pakistani economy?

Pakistan’s business leadership — accustomed as it is to the ways of Britain and the United States — has always been significantly more comfortable staying in the Pax Americana orbit than it ever was going to be in Pax Sinica. Think about it: would the typical Pakistani business executive send their child to Harvard or to Tsinghua University? Are Pakistani executives likely to be comfortable negotiating with their American or European counterparts or would they be comfortable seeking approval for everything they do from Zhongnanhai? Is a Pakistani general more comfortable in Sandhurst and West Point or whatever the Chinese equivalent is?

In material terms, the direction of the Pakistani economy is unlikely to be too dissimilar from what it has been in our history. Pakistan’s single largest export market is the United States and the largest geography to which it exports is the European Union. Investment flows from the US and Europe dwarf — even in the CPEC era — anything that China ever invested in Pakistan.

But in terms of what the future direction of the country could have been, this will be very different. It will mean all of those people learning Mandarin can either stop or continue knowing that it will likely just be a curiosity rather than an economic need. It will mean that Pakistani businesses can stop pretending to have a CPEC strategy. And it will mean that the supposed disentanglement from the US-dominated global financial system need not happen.

The more things change, the more they stay the same.


17



73




 
Last edited:
Some reasonable suggestions:


DAWN.COM
TODAY'S PAPER | AUGUST 06, 2019


Economy: policy problems
Munir Akram
Updated August 04, 2019

5d461161ecf50.jpg

The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.


OVER the past year, the PTI government’s economic focus has been on redressing macroeconomic imbalances. However, there are a host of other policy problems that require honest, competent and decisive decisions. Here are 10 important examples.

Reko Diq: The recent $5.9 billion award by the World Bank’s court (ICSID) against Pakistan is a classic outcome of misplaced patriotism, incompetence and corruption. Like India, and as suggested by the UN trade organisation UNCTAD, Pakistan should have long ago denounced the unequal investment treaty which allowed a foreign company to sue it.

The court’s award on Reko Diq is now final and contesting it further may be futile and impede foreign investment, and further delay exploitation of the huge ($1 trillion) deposits of copper and gold in and around Reko Diq. While rejecting the award in principle, the government ought to explore a pragmatic solution which circumvents the exorbitant award and enables early, efficient and beneficial exploitation of the mineral resources.

There are several areas in the economic landscape that require competent decision-making.

LNG imports: Although well aware of the rapid depletion of Sui gas, Pakistan’s preceding leaders failed to arrange for sustainable imports, eg through the Iran pipeline. The previous government negotiated a ‘sweetheart’ LNG deal with Qatar. Two LNG terminals were assigned in an equally opaque exercise. Now, an intricate game appears to be underway to determine who gets the sorely needed third terminal. To remove the smell of rotting fish, the government should make the entire decision-making process on the LNG business totally transparent.

‘Autonomous’ entities: Over 300 government entities cumulatively lose two per cent of Pakistan’s GDP each year. Everyone agrees these entities have to be restructured, divested or closed down. For over a decade, nothing has moved. Previous governments found it difficult to divest or restructure politically sensitive but commercially disastrous entities like PIA and the Steel Mills. The temptation is to sell off the most profitable enterprises first (eg the two Punjab power plants). Instead of trying to reinvent the wheel, the government would do well to hire one or more specialist firms to propose a plan and execute it quickly.

Housing and wealth creation: The allocation of government land and financing of home acquisitions are traditional vehicles for wealth creation and GDP expansion, as illustrated by the history of America and modern China. In Pakistan by contrast, government land has been parcelled out through official entities mostly to house the rich and powerful rather than the poor or middle class. This has accentuated economic and social inequality. The prime minister’s housing scheme can be the vehicle not only to provide shelter, but also create wealth for the poor and middle class (and expand GDP) through the allocation of adequate land and cheap credit for affordable housing.

SMEs: The heavy borrowing on the local market by recent governments has consistently squeezed out lending to small and medium enterprises which are the main creators of jobs, goods and services. Today, many SMEs in Pakistan are borrowing money for business development at exorbitant 20pc to 30pc interest rates from so-called private financing channels. A conscious policy is required to provide easier credit at market rates through normal banking channels to SMEs.

SEZs: The establishment of Special Economic Zones including under CPEC have been delayed mainly due to the fight over whose land would host the zones (and be sold at enormous profit). The government ought to promulgate a law on ‘eminent domain’, allowing it to requisition sites for SEZs at pre-industrial prices. This will save the government money and speed up creation of the SEZs.

Waste disposal: Pakistan’s major cities are drowning in their own filth, as illustrated by Karachi’s plight after last week’s monsoons. Karachi produces 11,000 tons of solid waste daily; Lahore 7,000; Hyderabad 4,000, etc. Waste-to-power plants are one answer to dispose of solid waste. Some Latin American countries are paying 16-20 cents p/kwh to have US and Swedish companies fully finance the installation of the most efficient plants. In Pakistan, provincial authorities offer nine to 10 cents. The one Chinese plant set up in Lahore at this rate has been abandoned. Realistic power rates and collection fees are essential to attract investment for these waste-to-power plants.

Thar coal: Pakistan will be unable to fully exploit the vast Thar coalfield for power generation because there is insufficient water to cool the plants, the carbon emissions will be unacceptably high and the electricity produced is not much cheaper than alternatives because the cost of mining (with outdated equipment) is very high ($40 vs $8 in Virginia, US). Thar coal could be used for power, fertiliser and other purposes if gasified to pipeline quality, the carbon emissions captured and mining made more efficient. Advanced technologies to achieve this are available. The government and power companies need to make the decision to invest in and apply these technologies.

Read: Thar coal plant begins pumping power into national grid

Manufacturing: In Pakistan, manufacturing contributes only 10pc to GDP. The country will remain non-industrialised unless it builds the essential tariff and non-tariff ‘protections’ for its nascent domestic industries (disregarding the suicidal ‘liberalisation’ advocates) and/or encourages its enterprises to enter into joint ventures with efficient foreign producers (who will enter such joint ventures if they cannot export into Pakistan).

CPEC: Pakistan needs infrastructure to develop; only China is ready to build it; its official loans are ‘cheap’ (2pc to 3pc with long repayment periods, akin to ‘grants’). The loans for power projects to Pakistani companies were ‘commercial (around 6pc interest). Chinese companies have executed most of the projects, since Pakistan had limited capability to do so. The equipment supplied for the power plants was mostly Chinese but many of the turbines and boilers were sold by America’s General Electric. The power projects are highly profitable, perhaps excessively so. There is no ‘debt trap’. The Chinese loans will be easily repaid (unless the projects are rendered economically unviable by retroactive conditions).

Expanded cooperation with China remains the best route to Pakistan’s industrial and commercial development. In the afterglow of the Washington visit, some among Pakistan’s business and official elite seem susceptible to the Western propaganda against CPEC and China. They risk making a major strategic blunder.

The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.

Published in Dawn, August 4th, 2019
https://www.dawn.com/news/1498004/economy-policy-problems
 
Back
Top Bottom