Pakistan’s army is building an arsenal of ”tiny” nuclear weapons—and it’s going to backfire
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Pakistan’s army is building an arsenal of ”tiny” nuclear weapons—and it’s going to backfire
Pakistan has the fastest growing nuclear arsenal and, within the next five to ten years, it is likely to double that of India, and exceed those of France, the United Kingdom, and China. Only the arsenals of the United States and Russia will be larger.
In recent years, Pakistan has boasted of developing “tactical nuclear weapons” to protect itself against potential offensive actions by India. In fact, Pakistan is the only country currently boasting of makingincreasingly tiny nuclear weapons (link in Urdu).
Pakistanis overwhelmingly support their army and its various misadventures. And the pursuit of tactical weapons is no exception. However, there is every reason why Pakistanis should be resisting—not welcoming—this development. The most readily identifiable reason is that, in the event of conflict between the two South Asian countries, this kind of weaponization will likely result in tens of thousands of dead Pakistanis, rather than Indians. And things will only go downhill from there.
Why would Pakistan want “the world’s smallest nuclear weapons”?
In late 1999, Pakistan’s general Pervez Musharraf (who took power of Pakistan through a military coup in Oct. 1999 and remained in power until 2008), along with a tight cabal of fellow military officials began a limited incursion into the Kargil-Dras area of Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir. While planning for this began in the fall of 1998, by the time Pakistani troops were discovered there in May of 1999 Pakistani forces had taken territory that was several miles into India-administered Kashmir.
Because the Pakistanis had the tactical advantage of occupying the ridge line, India took heavy losses in recovering the area from the invaders. The so-called Kargil War was the first conventional conflict between India and Pakistan since the two conducted nuclear tests in May 1998. International observers were wary that the conflict would escalate either in territory or aims, with the potential for nuclear exchange.
Fearing such escalation, then Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif sought support from China and the United States. Both were adamant that Pakistan respect the line of control, which separated the portions of Jammu-Kashmir administered by India and Pakistan.
Under international pressure and branded an irresponsible state, Pakistan withdrew its forces from Kashmir. It initially claimed that the intruders were mujahedeen—but this was later found to be pure fiction. While Pakistan was isolated internationally, the international community widely applauded India’s restraint. The Kargil War provided the United States with the opportunity to reorient its relations away from Pakistan towards India, while at the same time, demonstrated to India that the United States would not reflexively side with Pakistan.
In retrospect, the Kargil war catalyzed the deepening security cooperation between the United States and India. It also galvanized a serious rethink in India about its domestic security apparatus, intelligence agencies’ capabilities, and overall military doctrine.
Crucially, India learned from this conflict that limited war is indeed possible under the nuclear umbrella. In Oct. 2000, air commodore Jasjit Singh, who retired as the director of operations of India’s air force and headed India’s Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses until 2001, laid out the lineaments of an India’s limited war doctrine. However, no apparent effort was made to make this a viable military concept immediately and India persisted with its defensive posture. In late Dec. 2001, Pakistani terrorists from the Pakistan-backed military group Jaish-e-Mohammad attacked India’s parliament in New Delhi.
In response, India’s government began the largest military mobilizationsince the 1971 war, which resulted in the liberation of Bangladesh, then East Pakistan. Just as the crisis was subsiding, another group of Pakistani terrorists, Lashkar-e-Taiba, attacked the wives and children of Indian military personnel in Kaluchak, Kashmir. India again seemed poised to take military action but ultimately backed down. The crisis was officially defused after India held elections in Kashmir later that fall. Pakistan concluded that its nuclear arsenal had successfully deterred India from attacking.
As Walter Ladwig has written, analysts identified several problems with India’s posture during that crisis. First, the Indian army took a long time to mobilize which gave Pakistan time to internationalize the conflict and to bring international pressure to bare upon India. Second, the mobilization of India’s strike corps had no element of surprise. Even Pakistan’s modest surveillance capabilities could easily detect their movements, and given their “lumbering composition,” could quickly discern their destination. Third, according to Ladwig, India’s holding corps’ were forward deployed to the border but lacked offensive power and could only conduct limited offensive tasks.
In response to these collective inadequacies, and the prospects of enduring threats from Pakistan, the Indian defense community began formalizing what came to be known as “Cold Start.” Ladwig, who wrote the first comprehensive account, claims that the doctrine aimed to pivot India away from its traditional defensive posture, and towards a more offensive one. It involved developing eight division-sized “integrated battle groups” that combined infantry, artillery, and armor which would be prepared to launch into Pakistani territory on short notice along several axes of advance.
These groups would also be closely integrated with support from the navy and air force. With this force posture, India could quickly mobilize these battle groups and seize limited Pakistani territory before the international community could raise objections.
India could then use this seized territory to force Pakistan into accepting the status quo in Kashmir. While Indians insist that this doctrine never existed, other analysts discount Indian demurrals and note slow—but steady—progress in developing these offensive capabilities. Irrespective of India’s protestations, Pakistanis take “Cold Start” to be a matter of Quranic fact.
Worried that its primary tools of using terrorism fortified by the specter of nuclear war, and fearing that India would be able to force acquiescence, Pakistan concluded that it could vitiate “Cold Start” by developing tactical nuclear weapons. As Pakistan’s former ambassador the United States and current ambassador to the United Nations,Maleeha Lodhi, explained, the basis of Pakistan’s fascination with tactical nuclear weapons is “to counterbalance India’s move to bring conventional military offensives to a tactical level.’’
Pakistani military and civilians often boast of their fast growing arsenal of the world’s smallest nuclear weapons and routinely update the world on the progress of the short-range missile, the Nasr, that would deliver this ever-shrinking payload.
Why should ordinary Pakistanis care?
While Pakistanis overwhelmingly applaud their army’s continued efforts to harass India in pursuit of Kashmir—a territory that Pakistanwas never entitled to but fought three wars to acquire by force—there are numerous reasons why Pakistanis should be more sanguine, or evenalarmed by Pakistan’s development of tactical nuclear weapons.
The first reality that should discomfit ordinary Pakistanis is that there is really no such thing as a “tactical nuclear weapon.” Even the smallest so-called tactical nuclear weapon will have strategic consequences. (Simply calling them “battlefield nuclear weapons” does not obviate this serious problem.) If Pakistan should use such weapons on India, there is virtually no chance that India will be left responding alone. The international community will most certainly rally around India. The response to Pakistan breaking a nuclear taboo that formed after the Americans used atomic bombs on Japan will most certainly be swift and devastating.
Second, as Shashank Joshi, a war studies researcher at the University of Oxford, has argued, these weapons do not have the military benefits that Pakistan’s military boasts, yet they exacerbate the enormous command and control challenges, including the possibility that nefarious elements may pilfer them once they are forward deployed. For one thing, tactical nuclear weapons do not have significant battlefield effects on enemy targets. For another, it is not evident that these weapons are in fact capable of deterring an Indian incursion into Pakistan.
Third, while Naeem Salik, a former director for arms control at Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Directorate, has said that Pakistan has shifted away from merely doctrinal thinking towards “actual nuclear war fighting,” such thinking is hardly viable for the simple reason of faulty math.
Even if, for the sake of argument, one assumes that Pakistan deploys its one hundred odd weapons of 15 to 30 kilotons at India’s major cities, it is unlikely that Pakistan would be able to deploy all of these weapons to conduct a “splendid first strike,” by which Indian capabilities are completely destroyed.
Moreover, it takes considerably fewer weapons of similar magnitude to utterly destroy Pakistan. Pakistan has thoughtfully concentrated all but three corps in central the Punjab region, which is also its most populous province and the country’s industrial and agricultural center. In short, Pakistan will cease to be a viable political entity while India, though grievously hurt, will survive as a state. Even if Pakistan obtains a functioning triad and retains launch capabilities from submarines, they will be launched in defense of a state that, simply put, no longer exists.
There is a fourth problem that should disquiet Pakistanis perhaps even more than the triggering of the destruction of their country through the deliberate or inadvertent use of their micro-weapons—these tactical nuclear weapons are intended to be used first against Indian troops on Pakistani soil. According to a conference report by the Naval Post School, which hosted Pakistan’s military and diplomatic officials, one Pakistani luminary opined that the “Nasr creates a balancing dynamic that frustrates and makes futile the power-maximizing strategy of India.”
He envisages the Nasr’s shells being used to carry atomic explosives that would annihilate advancing Indian armored thrusts in the southern deserts and blunt Indian advances toward major Pakistani cities, such as Lahore. Retired military general S. F. S. Lodhi, in the April 1999 issue of the Pakistan Defence Journal, laid out four stages of escalation in Pakistan’s use of tactical nuclear weapons which aligns with this view as well.
The consequences of Pakistan nuking itself to keep the Indians out should disturb Pakistanis. According to calculations by Jaganath Sankaran, Pakistan would have to use a 30-kiloton weapon on its own soil, as this is the minimum required to render ineffective fifty percent of an armored unit.
Using Lahore as an example, a 30-kiloton weapon used on the outskirts of the city could kill over 52,000 persons. As Indian troops move closer to Lahore and as the population increases, such a weapon could kill nearly 380,000. Sankaran notes, as an aside, that this would “genuinely destroy a larger battalion or brigade.” Consequently, many more Pakistanis would be likely to die than these horrendous figures suggest.
All of sudden, Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons don’t look so fun for any Pakistani who thinks through the math.
Fifth, Pakistanis should be derisive of this new weapon in the national arsenal because it cannot do what the army promises: protect Pakistan from an Indian offensive. Would any Indian military planner take seriously Pakistan’s threat to use nuclear weapons on its own soil when the casualties are so high? Pakistan may have been willing to eat grass to get its nuclear weapons, but is it willing destroy its own center of gravity to maintain its ability to harass India with terrorism over territory to which it never had any legal claim? If the Indians do not take this threat seriously, how is it a deterrent against them? What additional deterrent capability do these weapons afford Pakistan that its strategic assets do not that compensates for the enormous risks they convey?
Finally, if India took Pakistan’s threats seriously, it does not have to invade Pakistan to coerce the country’s leaders to detonate one of these weapons on its own soil. Presumably simply looking adequately likely to cross the international border and threaten a major Punjabi city could provoke a “demonstration detonation.”
I am not encouraging a nuclear Armageddon upon Pakistan; rather expositing the limited utility that these weapons confer upon Pakistan.
Even if Pakistan fully inducts these weapons in its arsenal, it still has an army that can’t win a conventional war against India and nuclear weapons it cannot use. This leaves only an industrial farm of terrorists as the only efficacious tool at its disposal. And given the logic of the above scenario, India and the international community should consider seriously calling Pakistan’s bluff. The only logical Pakistani response to a limited offensive incursion is to accept the fait accompli and acquiesce.
So far, the West has seen Pakistan’s nuclear weapons as a proliferation threat rather than a security threat. The implications of this has largely been appeasement. The United States, worried that Pakistan’s weapons may fall into the hands of non-state actors or that Pakistan will once again reopen its nuclear weapons bazaar to aspirant nuclear powers, perpetually argues for engaging Pakistan diplomatically, militarily, politically, and financially. In essence, Pakistan has effectively blackmailed the United States and the international community for an array of assistance exploiting the collective fears of what may happen should Pakistan collapse.
In recent months, some US White House officials have even argued for a potential nuclear deal to reward Pakistan for making concessions in fissile material production, limiting the development and deployment of its nuclear weapons among other activates to address Washington’s proliferation concerns. Unfortunately, Washington has yet to seriously formulate punishments rather than allurements to achieve these ends, even though Pakistan has shown no interest in making such concessions.
There are reasons why the United States and the international community should begin to see Pakistan’s nuclear weapons as a direct security threat. For one thing, these nuclear weapons have always been intended to allow Pakistan to harass India through the use of militant proxies. Consequently, Pakistan has become an epicenter of Islamist terrorism.
Had Pakistan not had these nuclear capabilities, India could have sorted out Pakistan some time ago. Moreover, the critical time period for Pakistan’s nuclear program was in the late 1970s, when Pakistan was on the threshold of obtaining a crude weapon. (We now know that Pakistan had a crude nuclear weapon by 1984 if not somewhat earlier.) The United States even sanctioned Pakistan in 1979 for advances in its program.
The United States relented in its nonproliferation policy with respect to Pakistan after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Reagan, after getting sanctions waived in 1982, began supporting the so-called mujahedeen produced by Pakistan for use in Afghanistan. (Pakistan actually began its own jihad policy in 1974 on its dime without US assistance.)
Saudi Arabia matched America’s contributions. While al-Qaeda is not truly the direct descendent of the Afghan mujahedeen, there can be little doubt that the structures built to wage this jihad gave birth to the group. Had the United States remained focused on nuclear weapons in Pakistan, and used a different strategy in Afghanistan, a wholly different future could have been realized.
As tensions between the United States and Pakistan deepen, and as Pakistan’s arsenal expands and permits it to target US assets in South, Central, and Southwest Asia, the United States should begin considering Pakistan’s proliferation of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles as a direct threat to its security, rather than merely a proliferation problem to be managed.
We welcome your comments at ideas@qz.com.
Pakistan’s army is building an arsenal of ”tiny” nuclear weapons—and it’s going to backfire - Quartz
Indian generals have only one belief... If Any Nuke gets used on Indian Forces ..no matter where they are.... Pakistan will face maximum retaliation from Indian Nuclear arsenal. Hope that will make your generals sleep better that night.
Source: Pakistan’s army is building an arsenal of ”tiny” nuclear weapons—and it’s going to backfire | Page 2
Pindi Boy
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Is pakistan range limited to just to 60 km of NASR?is this the only missile in Pakistan inventory?Pakistan can hit any point in India, and if india respond is strategic in response to NASR then what do you think after firing NASR pakistan army will go back and sit and watch, they will every thing they have at their disposal that includes the 120 nuclear warheads and then we will find out that is India really big enough to sustain 120 warheads.
NASR is in response to india Coward start and we have put fear of GOD in every indian soldier who wants to do a coward start.If you dont intend to do a coward start then you dont need to worry about anything.NASR IS A REMINDER NEVER INTEND TO COME CLOSE TO PAKISTAN BORDER OR YOU WILL TURN INTO ASHES
We will get nuclear powered submarines in 3-4 years so that clear enough doubts of supa pawa indians of sustaining pakistan response
Abdullah S.
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Your desperation astounds me. No Pakistani watches random Indian political talk shows but your obsession with Pakistan is such that you're watching boring Pakistani political shows. I hope you find some better thing to do in life.
But anyway, Mushy said at least 2 times that he isn't aware of any details of the programs and these are just some rumors that he heard. So take it with with a pinch of salt. 2ndly, it doesn't matter what the economic cooperation is like between China and Pakistan, the military to military contact and dealings are separate from that and are handled by the military itself. Politicians can go and jump in the river Indus for all we care.
As I said, Politicians can go and jump in the river Indus for all we care. BTW, if you believe that then you better believe that almost all Indian Nuclear installations & scientists are in danger from rebels and poor maintenance.
So you bring a random, 3rd grade political show with 3rd grade unknown and unnamed analysts who don't know or understand anything? I guess you found yourself at home watching it.
Kid, let me explain it to you like an infant:
1. Indian Navy has a history of hiding their aircraft carrier in the Andaman & Nicobar Islands port due to the fear of Pakistani submarines during conflicts. Losing it would be too big a blow to Indian psyche and moral. Read up on it. So considering that this time around we'll have 3 Augusta 90Bs and, soon enough, 8 new Chinese subs, chances are high that they'll do the same again and MiG29Ks wont get a chance to see combat.
2. If IN grows a pair, which is unlikely, and sends their AC into real battle, MiG29Ks will be facing JF-17s with SD-10As (range 100 km) since Mirage IIIs will be replaced by them soon enough. .MiG29Ks carry R-77 (range 80km) BVR missile. Your AC has a STOBAR configuration, which means that aircrafts cannot launch with their maximum load, spend lots of fuel during the launch, and so there is corresponding reduction in max range as aircraft are not launched with full fuel. Russian carriers such as this were conceived to provide air-cover to Soviet surface action groups. The limited ordnance load and combat radius means that mostly their aircraft like MiG29Ks can only be used in an anti-access and area denial role over the carrier.
I don't have the data for MiG29K, but China's J-15 can only launch from their Lialong ski-jump with about 40% of its ordinance load. If we apply the same ratio of reduction to MiG29K then it would only be able to fly with 40% of its load with less than optimal fuel. Expecting a fighter with these limitations to fight with fully fueled and armed JF-17s with SD10s is not something I would recommend. JF-17 has better T/WR and will be under the cover of AWACS & SAMS while MiG29K will be handicapped completely if it tries to come near the coast. As mentioned above, its A2G ability + combat radius will be minimal at best so it can only be used to for point defence and area denial.
Regardless of all of the above, your own CAG said that "Nearly half of Indian Air Force’s beyond visual range (BVR) air-to-air missiles that were tested either did not home in on targets during evaluations or failed ground tests because they were ageing much before their shelf lives"
IAF’s air-to-air missiles are faulty: Report | Zee News
Nearly half of Russian air-to-air missiles with IAF have homing, ageing problems: CAG report - Indian Express
So not only would it be carrying fewer missiles than JF-17, those missiles don't work as well. So I wouldn't keep my fingers crossed if I were you.
First of all, you're quoting specifications of KLJ-7. JF-17 block 2 has been confirmed to have the much upgraded KLJ-7V2. So the assumption is that it improves on all of its parameters. 2nd, as I said before, Su30 with its elephant size RCS will be detected 500 km inside India and will have to fight JF-17s and F-16 block 52s under the cover of AESA AWACS ZDK03 & Erieyes & SAMS like HQ9s and Spada 2000 etc. Not to mention, JF-17 block 3 will also have IRST and and AESA radar itself. And both F-16 and JF-17 carry advanced ECM pods with DRFM technology. SU30 will be a dead elephant. And if some survive, they will have no place to land back in India due to our standoff weapons like 700km Babur LACM etc. End of story.
You seem to have no idea what you’re dealing with, Indian. This is Pakistan, not Gaza. You thought we’d be awed & scared by IAF’s A2G weapons list? Well, think again because PAF has much better A2G weapons than IAF. Our aerial standoff precision strike capability exceeds India’s by a mile, and then some. Get a load of this, and remember, it’s just the tip of the iceberg, we have much more waiting in store for you in the next war:
- Raad Air launched stealth cruise missile, 350km payload 450kg
- MAR-1 (Anti-radiation missile), 100km
- CM-400AKG hypersonic anti-shipping missile, 250km
- AGM-84 Harpoon anti-shipping missile, 124km
- Exocet anti-shipping missile, 180km
- C-802A Anti-ship missile, 180 km
- CM-802AKG Air launched cruise missile, 280 km
- CM 102 supersonic Anti-radiation missile, 100km
- GB-6 Air-Launched Standoff Submunition Dispenser Precision Guided Weapon, 130km
- Mk-82 (general purpose bomb), 500 lb
- Mk-84 (general purpose bomb), 2,000 lb
- Matra Durandal (anti-runway bomb)
- CBU-100/Mk-20 Rockeye (anti-armour cluster bomb)
- GBU-10 (Laser-guided/GPS), 2,000 lb
- GBU-12 (Laser-guided/GPS), 500 lb
- BLU-109 (Laser-guided/GPS), 2,000 lb
- LT-2 (Laser-guided), 1,100 lb
- AGM-65 Maverick, 22km
- AS-30L 1100 lb, 11km
- H-2 (electro-optically guided), 60km
- H-4 (electro-optically guided), 120km
- LS-6 (satellite-guided/INS), 60km payload 250kg, 500kg, and 750kg
- Joint Direct Attack Munition Kit (JDAM), 30km
- And the list goes on and on and on……
Your chakka dance + randi rona would have been amusing if it wasn't so sad. Ballistic missile launches are picked up the moment they are fired, through Chinese satellites which we currently have access to. Your burning or twisting or turning wont change this fact. And we'll soon be sending our own RSS and other military satellites as well. All the plans are ready in SUPARCO and work is going on at full pace.
Our Shaheen missiles series has maneuverable warheads and depressed trajectory to make them impossible to intercept through ABMs. And considering that none of your ABM systems are even operational yet, I predict a horrible outcome for your kind in the event of a Shaheen launch on you. Pray that it doesn't happen.
And BTW, your own generals are shouting that India lost Kargil war. And we still hold the highest peak there. Near Tiger Hill, Point 5353, Highest peak, still Pak-occupied. So enjoy.
So you say India is far ahead of Pakistan in every way? How about you start reading these reports?:
- There's more gender inequality in India than Pakistan: UN
- India child malnourishment rates worse than Sub Saharan Africa, let alone Pakistan: UN
- India below Pakistan in Global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI): Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative
- India tops world hunger list with 194 million people: UN report
- India among world's most racist countries, Pakistan among the least, says survey (This explains why you guys hate us so much.)
- India is home to world’s largest poor population.
- India’s HIV/AIDS adult prevalence rate much more than Pakistan's: World Health Organization
- India at 25th place in world suicide rate list, Pakistan at 76th, World Health Organization (People are so sick of living in suppa pawa India
) - World Happiness Report 2013: Pakistanis much happier than Indians, says United Nations Sustainable Development Solutions Network (But but but...I thought "ache din" aa gai in suppa pava? )
- 13 out of 20 most polluted cities in world are from India.
- Environmental Performance Index: Pakistan much ahead of India, says Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy.
- Environmental Vulnerability Index: India’s environment more vulnerable than Pakistan’s, says UN
- Global Slavery Index 2014: India tops the list with biggest number of slave population in the world.(Suppa pava in slavery?)
- India is the largest electronic spam producer in the world, CISCO Systems Report (I'm guessing you're one of them comrades.
) - India biggest recipient of US economic assistance over 66-year period: USAID (World's biggest beggar nation )
- Pakistan’s urbanization rate better than India, World Urbanization Prospects Report 2011 by UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
- Index of Economic Freedom 2015: Pakistan has more economic freedom than India, says The Heritage Foundation.
- "Ease of doing business" in Pakistan much better than India, says World Bank’s "Doing Business" Report 2015
- Life expectancy at birth in Pakistan better than India, World Health Organization 2013 Report.
Seriously man, this is so dumb, even for an Indian
. You're so desperate that you're giving me a video of some random man on TV who no one even knows. He doesn't even give his name and quotes a proverb in Urdu ke "char din bhi this and that nai ho sake ga". First of all, he's an unknown guy, and 2nd of all, "char din" proverb means "a few days", it doesn't literally mean 4 days. 
But anyway, its unlikely that you'll learn anything seeing how thick you are, but still, I'll try to show you how incapable your India is of fighting Pakistan, from your own official Indian sources no less:
Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) reported in Parliament that "India cannot fight a war beyond 15-20 days due to crippling shortages in its ammunition stocks. Stocking of 125 of the 170 different types of ammunition was not enough for even 20 days of war-fighting or "minimum acceptable risk level" requirements. "Further, in 50% of the types of ammunition, the holding was critical or less than 10 days,
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-faces-severe-ammunition-shortage-can-fight-war-for-only-20-days-CAG/articleshow/47209011.cms
Another gem from your own CAG: BMP vehicle shortfall affecting Army preparedness
A gem from your own Army Chief V.K. Singh:
"India’s tanks do not have enough shells to fire, its air defenses are obsolete and its ill-equipped infantry can’t fight at night, the country’s army chief told the prime minister in a letter. Singh said the army’s major combat weapons are in an “alarming” state, alleging that its tank fleet is “devoid of critical ammunition to defeat enemy tanks” and that India’s air defenses are “97 percent obsolete.”"
India’s army unfit to fight a war, army chief says
Now this one from a different army chief, lest you say your V.K Singh was an ISI agent:
"..General Deepak Kapoor, had announced that 80 per cent of his tanks were night blind, which in other words admits that they were unfit for war..."
Army war machine: Night-blind, old and unfit - Rediff.com News
Multiple Indian army chiefs are admitting this. General V.K Singh even mentioned those great air defense systems that you were yapping about
. But you say the Indian army is 100% ready? 
. Who to believe? I think I'll go with the army chiefs & CAG.Even your Defence Minister, Manohar Parrikar, said a couple of weeks back that "Indian armed forces are faced with a shortage of over 52,000 personnel, including 11,000 officers while the Indian Navy faces a shortfall of 1,467 officers."
Armed forces face shortage of over 52,000 personnel | The Indian Express
And, you also have severe shortage of pilots:The Indian Air Force's Big Problem: Not Enough Pilots!
And, even the world knows this: The only ones who are unaware of this fact are poor Indians like you: India has more to lose if another war erupts with Pakistan: NYT editorial
And you're telling me you think India can fight Pakistan?
Please stop embarrassing yourself even further, I already feel so terrible for you man 
. Just pack up and go home, just pack up and go home 
.Your client has admitted its guilt. There's nothing you can do now. .Oh wait, you have two other options as well: 1.
2.
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