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Pakistani Nuclear Safety: Queries

Kasrkin

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The following is a transcript of my email to Mr. Shaun Gregory, a respected professor at Bradford University and head of the Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU). Professor Gregory is widely consulted by the UK and international media about the security situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

I would like to credit Mian Asad for helping me in this. He was kind enough to take out time and discuss with me in great detail many of the issues raised. Also, S-2 was responsible for providing the link to the article and the email address. Agnostic Muslim, as usual, came up with some brilliant points that I tried incorporate in to the letter too. Enjoy!


Dear Mr. Gregory,

My colleagues and I represent an online forum dedicated to matters relating to Pakistani defense. We were interested in piece written by you, published by the CTC Sentinel in July of 2009, regarding the terrorist threat to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Some of our members commented positively, while others were critically inquisitive. We would like to bring to you some of the issues raised and we would be thrilled if you could address them.

The extracts in bold is commentary that was analyzed.

“The vulnerabilities within Pakistan’s nuclear safety and security arrangements mean that the risks of terrorist groups gaining access to nuclear materials are real. Moreover, militants have recently attacked a number of Pakistan’s nuclear facilities, including an August 20, 2008 incident at the Wah cantonment, widely understood to be one of Pakistan’s main nuclear weapons assembly sites…”

And,

“Pakistani Taliban suicide bombers blew up several entry points to one of the armament complexes at the Wah cantonment, considered one of Pakistan’s main nuclear weapons assembly sites…”

On both these occasions it is claimed that the Wah cantonment is widely considered or understood to be a nuclear weapons assembly site. We, however, were unable to find references to this claim. The BBC article referred to as part of the second extract only notes that ‘Wah is a strategically important town normally under heavy security as it is home to a large industrial complex producing conventional arms and ammunition’ and ‘it is a sprawling complex manufacturing everything from tanks and small arms to artillery shells.’

The importance of the attack on Wah is stressed repeatedly, implying both the terrorists’ ability and inclination to strike at Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure. And yet as per accounts from some of our members familiar with the site, and news reports at the time, the gates attacked were primarily used to access ordnance plants. The casualties too almost entirely consisted of low-clearance industrial workers leaving the premises during a shift change. The BBC article even talks about a local student on tour of the ordinance factories relating the event. Gaining access to the complex is not particularly hard, as can be attested by numerous civilians who’ve toured there, neither is the compound isolated or remote, thus further contrasting with Pakistan Army’s traditionally secluded strategic installations. All this seems to negate the possibility that a high level security breach was involved in regards to Pakistani nuclear assets, or that such was even the intention. Without evidence to the contrary, it is hard to see how the significance of the attack was anything more than a crude but effective attempt to inflict maximum casualties on menial workers under the payroll of the Pakistani government.

The Wah cantonment is extensive, as is the industrial complex that was attacked. The complex contains many factories producing all kinds of munitions, however the gates and the crew that became the target of the attack were still at least 300 feet from the nearest factory, and the bomb in the market obviously more so[1]. What is more, the paramilitary troops from the DSG battalions manning the check points (not to be confused with ASFC or SPD personnel, responsible for guarding Pakistan’s nuclear military and civilian installations respectively) sustained no fatalities. Therefore, while the bombings were undoubtedly expensive in terms of human life, pictures taken on the site reveal that the security parameter around the complex was not breached, despite the bomber’s ability to mingle with the crowd[2]. If the attacks revealed the security measures taken by POF to be inadequate, then the author has not elaborated on the point. As it is, Wah is a heavily protected cantonment surrounded by defenses, including anti-tank barricades, and the roads in and out of the town are permanently manned by the army. This, along with a heavy army presence nearby at Taxila and Rawalpindi, makes the chances of terrorists mustering with significant numbers and weapons inside the cantonment to be able to fight through the defenses around the POF complex and seize a factory inside remote at best.

The facility itself is a sprawling complex with more than a dozen factories. Satellite imagery shows them to be sizable blocky units however we were unable to find indications of nuclear weapons assembly from any of our sources. The closest reference to nuclear activities was that of the Wah Group (not to be confused with the Wah Nobel Group of Companies, which operates in the complex, happens to be a subsidiary of POF and hosts foreigners in its board of directors and deals with civilian contracts) who’ve been previously tasked with manufacturing industrial components used in nuclear warheads, such as the trigger mechanism, high-speed electronics, high-explosive lenses and other ultra-high precision chemical and mechanical parts. This, however, is not the same as claims of the facility, whose present links to the Wah Group are obscure at best, being Pakistan’s main site for assembling entire nuclear weapon systems. While it is conceivable that warhead or missile related components are produced in any of the dozen plus factories, there is no evidence to suggest, or so we feel, that complete warheads and/or delivery systems are produced, stationed, assembled or distributed from there. Close proximity to a sizeable civilian population resident in the cantt is also likely to discourage any critical nuclear weapons presence, not only because of a radiological threat to the populace but also to avoid easy photo-reconnaissance, sabotage or infiltration. If the author has references substantiating Wah’s purported significance as a critical joint in the manufacturing of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, then we’d be pleased to note it for academic purposes. However such intelligence is still unlikely to have been available to the terrorists.

Unless very particular information is available to the contrary, we’ll have no reason to believe that the 20th August attacks were intended to be anything but an attack on Pakistan’s much lauded, and internationally recognized, munitions producing installations at Wah. Facilities that are undoubtedly supplying conventional weapons and ammunition to Pakistani forces engaged in battle with the militants in Swat and FATA. Furthermore the terrorists did not display any particular motivation, resourcefulness, capacity or intelligence that implies a vulnerability or inadequacy of Pakistan’s nuclear security arrangements. Therefore, is it possible that the author’s references and their implied significance can be misleading in this context?

“With respect to personnel reliability, the Pakistan Army conducts a tight selection process drawing almost exclusively on officers from Punjab Province who are considered to have fewer links with religious extremism or with the Pashtun areas of Pakistan from which groups such as the Pakistani Taliban mainly garner their support…”

This claim was vigorously disputed, particularly by some of our Pashtun members with links to the armed forces. While there is no doubt that Pakistan’s PRP screens out potential militant-Islamist sympathizers, as has been officially acknowledged, the assertion of a bias in the PRP with regards to Pashtun officers is more questionable. This logic itself is dubious since it is widely acknowledged that the phenomenon of Islamist fundamentalism tends to transcend ethnic divisions. As it is the Punjabis and Pashtun share strong cultural and demographical links and Punjab hosts its significant share of Islamist militant activity and organizations. Punjabi political opinion too has been relatively empathetic to those Pashtuns opposed to military operations in their NWFP territories, as compared to the more insulated Pakistani ethnic groups down south who’ve been supportive in the WoT. The popular PML-N party that draws its support exclusively from Punjab, and has deep links in the Army, was vociferously opposed to Pakistan joining the war against terror.

If this logic is applied with regards to the present political and demographical realities then Punjabi officers are more likely to sympathize with the Pashtun tribal-taliban rebellion in the west than say Muhajir or Sindhi officers who hail from communities that tend to host strong anti-Pashtun and anti-Islamist tendencies. Thus the notion of Pakistan’s nuclear assets being the domain of an ‘almost exclusively Punjabi’ club of officers cannot be credited without appropriately sourced statistics or accounts, particularly since the army has worked hard over the last decade to reduce the number of Punjabi members and increase Pashtun recruitment. A Punjabi majority in the army and the country in itself cannot be used to imply an institutional prejudice with regards to the Pashtuns.

“Pakistan, with a few exceptions, chose to locate much of its nuclear weapons infrastructure to the north and west of the country and to the region around Islamabad and Rawalpindi—sites such as Wah, Fatehjang, Golra Sharif, Kahuta, Sihala, Isa Khel Charma, Tarwanah, and Taxila. The concern, however, is that most of Pakistan’s nuclear sites are close to or even within areas dominated by Pakistani Taliban militants and home to al-Qa`ida…”

Our members were all too aware of the international concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear program. However from a rational viewpoint it was pointed out that none of the mentioned installations are particularly close to areas hosting a significant Taliban presence; and certainly none are dominated or controlled by any of the insurrectionist elements presently confronting the Pakistani state.

“A series of attacks on nuclear weapons facilities has also occurred. These have included an attack on the nuclear missile storage facility at Sargodha on November 1, 2007…”

The attack in Sargodha on November 1st was actually a suicide attack on a bus carrying Air Force personnel from the Mushaf airbase to the Kirana Central Depot. These special strategic facilities are guarded by the ASFC and they were not attacked.

BBC NEWS | South Asia | Suicide bomb hits Pakistani bus

“An attack on Pakistan’s nuclear airbase at Kamra by a suicide bomber on December 10, 2007…”

BBC NEWS | South Asia | Children survive Pakistan attack

Again, the target was a military school bus near the Kamra air base. The Bill Roggio source states ‘The Air Weapon Complex at Kamra is devoted to air-to-surface munitions, among other activities, and would probably have at least some connection with the development of air-delivered nuclear weapons…’ But is it reasonable to imply that an attack on a student bus in the proximity of an airbase should be considered an attack on or a threat to the hazy nuclear aspect of the weapons developmental complex in said airbase?

The school bus was carrying the children of PAC employees. The PAC deals with producing and refurnishing aircraft and is not to be confused with the AWC which makes strategic air to ground weapons. We were told by a source that the AWC is not based in Kamra. And even if nuclear-capable weapon systems are transferred to an active combat squadron for testing or active operations, then they’d most likely be kept in the hardened bunkers of the base, designed to withstand enemy air and artillery attacks, along with the rest of the air force’s conventional arsenal.

“The final risk, and one that is usually overlooked, is that the Pakistan Army could itself decide to transfer nuclear weapons to a terrorist group. One argument for this, described in Philip Bobbitt’s Terror and Consent, is that states can become pressurized or incentivized to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorist groups because they are responding to threats from an external power but fear the consequences of being identified as the origin of a nuclear strike…”

Identification cannot be avoided since nuclear weapons origins can be traced by the plutonium and uranium fuel used even after the thermonuclear detonation. The consequences for Pakistan’s national security would not be very different if Pakistan was to go for a direct nuclear strike and claim the terrorists did it. It is highly questionable if Pakistan would want to take the risk of nuking a foreign country, directly or indirectly, unless its territorial integrity was being threatened, in which case a direct and overwhelming nuclear strike would be the preferable option to negate the enemy’s nuclear retaliatory capacity.

I hope my (no doubt amateurish) deliberations were worth your time. I await your reply with excitement and will be posting it on the forum.

[1] Google Earth Image

[2] Site of attack - Barriers intact

Kasrkin
Moderation team defence.pk
 
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Mr. Gregory's reply:

Thanks very much indeed for these comments. I am always interested in other views - especially corrections - and will look into the points you raise. Thanks also for the positive comments. I have tried my best to reflect the significant steps Pakistan has taken to secure and make safe its nuclear weapons - in which I myself played a small part some years ago - and also to critique the suggestions that the US - or anyone else - could easily destroy or remove Pakistan's nuclear weapons in the event of state collapse.

best

Shaun Gregory

This was Mr. Gregory's immediate reply. But I think we can keep our fingers crossed. We can expect a formidable reply or perhaps even some acknowledgments soon.
 
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1. the location of pakistan's weaponised nuke's is shrouded in mystery and ambiguity. it is the best kept secret in the world - i dare say the americans with their "sophistication" cannot precisely determine where the locations are - speculate yes as everyone else does.

linking the militant attacks on wah HIC and Sargodha PAF base airforce personnel is a "weak" attempt at proving that the pak nuke's are vulnerable to militant attack and takeover!

the alleged locations of pak nuke facilities is also shrouded in ambiguity as no one knows whether these facilities (as seen on google-earth) are involved in military or civilian nuclear work!

a few months ago the taliban were on the verge of capturing Islamabad (what was it 60km away) - please spare me these "Armagaddon Scenarios"

pls take time to read the following post:

Armagaddon at the top of the world:Not! in the strategic section!
 
1. the location of pakistan's weaponised nuke's is shrouded in mystery and ambiguity. it is the best kept secret in the world - i dare say the americans with their "sophistication" cannot precisely determine where the locations are - speculate yes as everyone else does.

linking the militant attacks on wah HIC and Sargodha PAF base airforce personnel is a "weak" attempt at proving that the pak nuke's are vulnerable to militant attack and takeover!

the alleged locations of pak nuke facilities is also shrouded in ambiguity as no one knows whether these facilities (as seen on google-earth) are involved in military or civilian nuclear work!

a few months ago the taliban were on the verge of capturing Islamabad (what was it 60km away) - please spare me these "Armagaddon Scenarios"

pls take time to read the following post:

Armagaddon at the top of the world:Not! in the strategic section!
Hmmm What about the list of nuclear facilities we share with India every year... Some sort of mutually agreed no-hit zones in each other's sites.
 
ISPR has also issued a statement contradicting the assertions that any attacks on Pakistan's nuclear program took place:

Abbas said Wednesday that none of the military bases named were used to store atomic weapons. He said the Wah ordnance factory makes small arms ammunition, Kamra is an air force facility and Sargodha is an air force ammunition dump for conventional weapons.

‘These are nowhere close to any nuclear facility,’ he said.
DAWN.COM | World | Pakistan denies militants attacked nuclear sites
 
Hmmm What about the list of nuclear facilities we share with India every year... Some sort of mutually agreed no-hit zones in each other's sites.

they are the known sites - as seen on google earth! - the weapons are not stored there!
 
a couple of things:

1. It might be a good move with respect to the conversation to wait for 'The Gregory' reply. I would not hold ones breath for a sane answer.
Does he know the complete correspondence exchange will be on a public forum?

2. There has been much discussion on what is and what is not at the various sites attacked over and above what was in the various media reports. the fine details may be known by some but why blurt it out as has occurred in the general forum area? Not too bright. But I may be wrong.
 
Thats a valid point RR. As you can see in my original letter, I had mentioned that I would be posting his reply on the forum. If Mr. Gregory wishes to abstain from a public discussion with regards to the matter then I'll retract my comments suggesting we can expect a detailed clarification. Maybe, my excitement was premature. Mr. Gregory has every right to proceed with his work in a private or alternative capacity.

In regards to your second point. You should know that I was careful to use open sourced references to make my assertions, the likes of BBC reports, Google Earth, Media images and such. None of this jeopardizes Pakistan's security, the serving officers I showed it to were not particularly concerned either. If its the unhealthy attention that we might be trying to avoid, then I suppose thats futile now given the news reports hitting the international media. Either way I'm confident in Pakistan's ability to secure its nuclear arsenal.

Pakistan denies al-Qaida targeting nuclear facilities | World news | guardian.co.uk
 
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Simple my second point was just a basic reminder that this sub forum is still totally public and hence a need to hold ones excitement down a bit, ie talk with limits.
It may be better if this sub forum was a little more private.
See PM anyway
 
Pakistan's nuclear bases targeted by al-Qaeda

Pakistan's nuclear weapon bases have been attacked by al-Qaeda and the Taliban at least three times in the last two years, it has emerged.

The allegations, by a leading British expert on Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, increased fears that terrorists could acquire a nuclear device or could trigger a nuclear disaster by bombing an atomic facility.

In a paper for the respected anti-terrorism journal of America's West Point Military Academy, Professor Shaun Gregory, director of the Pakistan Security Research Unit at Bradford University, detailed three attacks since November 2007 and raised the spectre of more incidents in the future.

He said militants had struck a nuclear storage facility at Sarghoda on Nov 1 2007; launched a suicide bomb assault on a nuclear air base at Kamra on Dec 10 2007; and set off explosions at entrance points to Wah cantonment, one of Pakistan's main nuclear assembly plants, in August 2008.

These attacks had been launched despite an extensive security cordon around the facilities and millions of dollars in American technical aid to prevent militant infiltration.

Dr Anupam Srivastava, director of the Centre for International Trade and Security at Georgia University, who has advised the US government on nuclear security issues, told The Daily Telegraph he believed there had been more than three attacks on Pakistan's nuclear facilities and the Taliban and al-Qaeda militants would intensify its assaults.

The attack on Wah was reported at the time as the deadliest terrorist strike against Pakistan's armed forces, with 63 people killed in two suicide bombings. The target was referred to as a major conventional weapons and ammunition manufacturing factory, but according to Prof Gregory and other analysts it is in fact an assembly plant for nuclear warheads. "These sites are all identified by various authorities as nuclear weapons or related sites," he told The Daily Telegraph last night.

Pakistan's nuclear weapons establishments are protected with heavily armed soldiers who patrol a wide security cordon, while inside state-of-the-art sensors guard against intruders. Employees are screened by vetting staff from its Strategic Plans Division security force and officials from its ISI intelligence service. Warheads, detonators and launch vehicles are stored separately to prevent them being seized together.

But despite this "robust" security system, Prof Gregory said the facilities remain vulnerable because they are located in areas where "Taliban and al-Qaeda are more than capable of launching terrorist attacks".

The three attacks they have already launched on nuclear sites proved their own intelligence capabilities, and highlighted the threat of three terror scenarios, he said.

"An attack to cause a fire at a nuclear weapons facility, which would create a radiological hazard; an attack to cause an explosion at a nuclear weapons facility involving a nuclear weapon or components or an attack with the objective of seizing control of nuclear weapons components or possibly a nuclear weapon," he said.

The potential for nuclear staff or soldiers with militant sympathies to collude in a Taliban or al-Qaeda attack was a cause for greater concern, he said. The army has been Islamicised in the past and has senior officers who are known to be anti-Western and anti-American. "No screening programme will ever be able to weed out all Islamist sympathisers or anti-Westerners among Pakistan's military or civilians with nuclear weapons expertise," he said.

The risk of Taliban or al-Qaeda terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons, components or expertise is "genuine", he said, and could only be countered by continuing Western pressure on and support to its government to monitor the threat.

Dr Srivastava said he believed an increase in the number of attacks on nuclear facilities was inevitable because of the growing antagonism between the Pakistan military establishment and the militants it had previously supported. "Pakistan is at war with itself. They have created a Frankenstein and the intensity of attacks on these facilities will grow," he said.

Pakistan's nuclear bases targeted by al-Qaeda - Telegraph
 
Pakistan's nuclear bases targeted by al-Qaeda

Pakistan's nuclear weapon bases have been attacked by al-Qaeda and the Taliban at least three times in the last two years, it has emerged.

The allegations, by a leading British expert on Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, increased fears that terrorists could acquire a nuclear device or could trigger a nuclear disaster by bombing an atomic facility.

In a paper for the respected anti-terrorism journal of America's West Point Military Academy, Professor Shaun Gregory, director of the Pakistan Security Research Unit at Bradford University, detailed three attacks since November 2007 and raised the spectre of more incidents in the future.

He said militants had struck a nuclear storage facility at Sarghoda on Nov 1 2007; launched a suicide bomb assault on a nuclear air base at Kamra on Dec 10 2007; and set off explosions at entrance points to Wah cantonment, one of Pakistan's main nuclear assembly plants, in August 2008.

These attacks had been launched despite an extensive security cordon around the facilities and millions of dollars in American technical aid to prevent militant infiltration.

Dr Anupam Srivastava, director of the Centre for International Trade and Security at Georgia University, who has advised the US government on nuclear security issues, told The Daily Telegraph he believed there had been more than three attacks on Pakistan's nuclear facilities and the Taliban and al-Qaeda militants would intensify its assaults.

The attack on Wah was reported at the time as the deadliest terrorist strike against Pakistan's armed forces, with 63 people killed in two suicide bombings. The target was referred to as a major conventional weapons and ammunition manufacturing factory, but according to Prof Gregory and other analysts it is in fact an assembly plant for nuclear warheads. "These sites are all identified by various authorities as nuclear weapons or related sites," he told The Daily Telegraph last night.

Pakistan's nuclear weapons establishments are protected with heavily armed soldiers who patrol a wide security cordon, while inside state-of-the-art sensors guard against intruders. Employees are screened by vetting staff from its Strategic Plans Division security force and officials from its ISI intelligence service. Warheads, detonators and launch vehicles are stored separately to prevent them being seized together.

But despite this "robust" security system, Prof Gregory said the facilities remain vulnerable because they are located in areas where "Taliban and al-Qaeda are more than capable of launching terrorist attacks".

The three attacks they have already launched on nuclear sites proved their own intelligence capabilities, and highlighted the threat of three terror scenarios, he said.

"An attack to cause a fire at a nuclear weapons facility, which would create a radiological hazard; an attack to cause an explosion at a nuclear weapons facility involving a nuclear weapon or components or an attack with the objective of seizing control of nuclear weapons components or possibly a nuclear weapon," he said.

The potential for nuclear staff or soldiers with militant sympathies to collude in a Taliban or al-Qaeda attack was a cause for greater concern, he said. The army has been Islamicised in the past and has senior officers who are known to be anti-Western and anti-American. "No screening programme will ever be able to weed out all Islamist sympathisers or anti-Westerners among Pakistan's military or civilians with nuclear weapons expertise," he said.

The risk of Taliban or al-Qaeda terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons, components or expertise is "genuine", he said, and could only be countered by continuing Western pressure on and support to its government to monitor the threat.

Dr Srivastava said he believed an increase in the number of attacks on nuclear facilities was inevitable because of the growing antagonism between the Pakistan military establishment and the militants it had previously supported. "Pakistan is at war with itself. They have created a Frankenstein and the intensity of attacks on these facilities will grow," he said.

Pakistan's nuclear bases targeted by al-Qaeda - Telegraph

why are we taking this piece any different then the countless such other articles - all have one objective - doomsday!:tdown:
 
I think Professor Gregory’s article can provide a case study of how the media, particularly the Indian media, is inclined to take, highlight and stress on aspects of reports that fit well into their pre-established notions of Pakistan’s irresponsibility. In many cases ignoring or under-stressing the positive elements that professionals comment on. For example, Prof. Gregory’s use of the term robust security system in regards to the nukes has been used as a quotation, while some of his other assertions have been taken entirely without reservation.

As the professor just pointed out, the article contained an important element refuting widely held misconceptions that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are vulnerable enough to be eliminated or confiscated in case of state collapse. This was not mentioned in any of the articles I saw. Pakistanis can understandably be weary of the sometimes less than entirely balanced views in regards to their security that come from the western and Indian medias. However, part of the concern for Pakistan’s safely, particularly its nuclear safety, is justified. Pakistan does not possess the formidable military resources or geographical largeness the likes of India or Russia that compensates for their hosting of insurrectionist elements as well as nuclear weapons. Pakistanis, through a fault of no one else’s, have also made considerable mistakes that have made us the subject of distrust and alarm in some quarters. At the end of the day, we need to work on that through engagement and collaboration with the international community, which is exactly what Prof. Gregory suggested. His concluding advice was that Pakistan needs to be supported and pressurized to secure its nuclear weapons, which is perfectly reasonable.

All countries have had or do have problems, and so does Pakistan. Domestic violence and rebellion has been faced down by nuclear powers like Russia, India and even the UK. Pakistan just happens to constitute a specific set of circumstances that makes it all seem more threatening and makes Pakistan appear more fragile. Scholars like Prof. Gregory should be lauded for their work, which they undertake with no political motivations in mind and with the best of intentions. In a way, his work represents an evaluation of the safety of, as well as threats to, Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure. People will be selective, but the research for its own merit and intention should be appreciated. I for one am glad that non-Pakistanis like Prof. Gregory take scholarly interest in Pakistan despite considerable constrictions in terms of information and accessibility.
 
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His concluding advice was that Pakistan needs to be supported and pressurized to secure its nuclear weapons, which is perfectly reasonable.

That is a reasonable conclusion, but it still suggests, or at least the 'pressurized' part does, that Pakistan is unwilling to commit resources to securing its nuclear weapons, when none of the open source information on the C&C systems put in place by Pakistan suggests anything but a rather comprehensive effort to secure those weapons.

We have a couple of threads detailing the systems and processes put in place (all information is open source so no one has to hyperventilate over it :D).

From the following thread:

http://www.defence.pk/forums/wmd-mi...ets-interview-director-spd-pakistani-nca.html

  • 10 member National Command Authority in charge of all Nuclear Facilities

  • The president will be the authority’s chairman and the prime minister its vice-chairman. The authority will include ministers of foreign affairs, defence, interior, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, chiefs of army, navy and air force, and director-general of the Strategic Plans Division. The director-general of the Strategic Plans Division will be the authority’s secretary.

  • Standard "Two Man Rule" to authenticate access to nuclear release codes.

  • Nuclear Warheads "De-mated" from missiles or bomb casings, and components are to be put into operation only with the consent of a National Command Authority.

  • Pakistan has developed its own version of "Permissive Action Links," or PALs, a sophisticated type of lock the U.S. uses to prevent unauthorized launching.

  • A comprehensive, intrusive Personnel Reliability System (along the lines of one in the US) that monitors employees, before, during and after employment.

  • A ten thousand member Security Force, led by a two star General, dedicated to guarding the Nuclear facilities.

  • Possible "phony bunkers and dummy warheads" to deter raids, by internal and external threats.

  • Possibly between 100 to 200 nuclear warheads (Number of Missile Delivery Systems unknown)

Different reports have suggested either a 'Three man rule' or 'Two man rule' for authenticating access to the nuclear release codes.

I would not argue that the security systems and process being used to protect Pakistan's nukes cannot be improved, but the reported negotiations with France and the continuing cooperation with the US over establishing stronger controls both suggest that the argument that Pakistan needs to be 'pressurized' to do so is incorrect.

What needs to be done is offer non-intrusive support and assistance, that does not attempt to compromise the secrecy of Pakistan's strategic programs. So long as it is hands off assistance, I do not see any reason Pakistan would refuse to accept it.
 
His concluding advice was that Pakistan needs to be supported and pressurized to secure its nuclear weapons, which is perfectly reasonable.
on a point of clarification was the prof referring to the weapons or to the collective nuclear infrastructure. This was the impression I got from the CTC Sentinel article.
 
Congratulations on following through by communicating with Dr. Gregory. Your letter to him was wonderful- pointed, direct, and polite.

I hope that his response is only preliminary and that he'll shortly amplify further on his thoughts. Beyond that, there's little more that can be practically done.

Again, kudos and we'll see together what transpires.:)
 

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