Possible Missile Defenses
Pakistani sources interviewed before the IDEAS show, as well as some recently published information, indicates that Pakistan’s leadership is very interested in a limited missile defense capability. This appears to be inspired mainly by the desire to match any prospective Indian missile defenses that might be obtained from Israel or the United States. This impression was confirmed by sources interviewed at the IDEAS show, though there was general reluctance to discuss the details of any future missile defense system. Published sources indicate that Pakistan is considering buying or co-producing the FT-2000A surface-to-air missile (SAM).[9] In 1998 Chinese sources disclosed that this SAM, originally designed with a passive seeker intended to attack electronic warfare aircraft, would eventually feature an active-guidance system with antitactical ballistic missile (ATBM) capability.[10] In 2003 a Malaysian defense journal revealed that the FT-2000A did have a new active phased-array radar for long-range missile guidance.[11]
FT-2000A SAM: Pakistan is showing great interest in its own ATBM capability, and a future missile-intercept capable version of the Chinese FT-2000A appears to be the most likely choice.
Photo: RD Fisher via CPMIEC
The FT-2000 program is believed to stem from the HQ-9 program, which in turn has been described by U.S. and Russian sources as having benefited from Russian S-300 and U.S. Patriot PAC-2 SAM technology. In its active guided configuration, the HQ-9/FT-2000A might be as capable as early 1980s versions of the S-300 or early versions of the Patriot PAC-2. It will definitely feature the very difficult to jam "Track Via Missile" system pioneered by the Patriot, and then reportedly stolen by the Russians. This uses a missile seeker to home in on reflected energy from a narrow-beam ground-based phased array radar signal. Such radar and missile seekers are very difficult to jam.
H-200 Phased Array Radar: This phased array radar is associated with the KS-1A SAM. The sets of secondary radar phase shifters on the top and bottom are strong indications this radar also has a missile guidance function, leading to the possibility that both the KS-1A and the active guided FT-2000A use a “track-via-missile” technology.
Photo: RD Fisher
Impact on India
For Delhi, Pakistan’s missile force sustains a strategic preoccupation with its larger political-military challenge. Pakistan’s emphasis on increased accuracy, maneuverability and the apparent range of non-nuclear warheads, at least for the Ghaznavi, point to an edge over India, especially concerning SRBMs. While the Indian Prithvi SRBM is reported to have high accuracy and some maneuver capability, its use of liquid fuels might also limit its flexibility. This has led India to develop may push greater Indian interest in the Russian Iskander-E solid-fueled SRBM, which is capable of low, maneuvering trajectories, and has an optical seeker for attacking moving targets. Meanwhile, India has a clear superiority in the development of indigenous electro-optical and future radar satellites that can aid missile targeting. But Pakistan could quickly catch up if given access to information from imminent Russian-influenced Chinese electro-optical and radar satellites.
If acquired by Pakistan, the HQ-9/FT-2000A ATBM might be useful only against short-range Indian missiles like the Prithvi or Dhanush, not against the faster and longer-range Agni missiles. This points to a possible emerging Pakistani advantage: it may be in the process of developing a better defense against Indian SRBMs, and challenging possible future Indian ATBMs to take down a maneuvering and low-altitude Ghaznavi/DF-11 Mod 1. However, possible future Indian high-altitude ATBMs like the Israeli Arrow 2 might pose a credible defense against the lower-tech Ghauri or the Shaheen 2-if attacked early enough in the flight cycle.
One hope in the India-Pakistan missile competition is that the interest in missile defense systems might prompt bilateral interest in a stable balance of offensive and defensive systems. At this point it is too early to determine if this will prove the case. Nevertheless, during the Summer of 2004 Pakistan and India took clear and welcome steps to put in place new "confidence building measures" essential to build toward further dialogue.
Dangers of Proliferation
For Delhi, Washington and others, Islamabad’s missiles highlight the dangers of Beijing’s and Pyongyang’s continued proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and possible new dangers of secondary Pakistani proliferation. Washington has repeatedly sanctioned Chinese and Pakistani missile concerns on the basis of their continued cooperation. The ongoing development and deployment of successive Chinese and North Korean-based missiles in Pakistan is a sure indication that all three countries are choosing to ignore Washington’s concerns.
The last decade has also seen the dangers of Pakistan’s participation in nuclear weapons technology trafficking, especially by the "father" of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, Abdul Quadeer Khan. Khan’s network was exposed to the world by Libya, when in 2003 it chose to begin dismantling its nuclear and missile systems in return for Western recognition. And while Pakistan may have curtailed Khan’s personal involvement in WMD proliferation, there is the continued danger that Khan’s associates or other high-level Pakistani nuclear and missile experts may be inspired to follow his example. In the meantime, Pakistan’s solid and liquid fuel missile development and production infrastructure point to another potential area of proliferation that.
Patriot PAC-3: China’s building and proliferation of ballistic missile technology has generated programs to purchase the Lockheed-Martin Patriot PAC-3 ATBM in Japan and Taiwan, and has led to Indian interest in this missile.
Photo: Lockheed-Martin
While India and Pakistan may continue to strive for missile advantages to serve perceived deterrent objectives, outside actors have some tools for influencing this competition. Encouraging the positive dialogue between Delhi and Islamabad started in mid-2004 is an obvious one. But it is also useful to shift this competition into defensive systems, to help reduce the desirability of ever greater numbers offensive systems. To this end it serves the interests of South Asian stability for the U.S. to continue to engage India in missile defense cooperation. Such cooperation also serves to place positive pressure on China to reconsider its rapid build-up of offensive missiles and its unwillingness to halt its dangerous missile proliferation. While they are not all linked, missile defense cooperation with India can compliment U.S. missile defense cooperation with Australia, Japan and Taiwan. This effort affirms American strategic leadership in this region while demonstrating that Asian democracies will defend themselves against Beijing’s growing direct and indirect missile threats.
[1] October 11, 2004: Ghauri/Hatf 5; March 6, 2004: Shaheen 2/Hatf 6; October 11, 2003: Shaheen 1/Hatf 4: October 3, 2003: Ghaznavi/ Hatf 3
[2] On April 6, 2002 Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf stated his readiness to use nuclear weapons against India in the context of the build-up of Indian military forces in Kashmir, in turn a reaction to December 13, 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament by Pakistani-supported terrorists.
[3] Interview, Bangalore, India, June 21, 2004.
[4] Interview, October 4, 2004.
[5] Babar Ahmad, "Pakistan: Tests May Not Include Cruise Missile Tests," ***********, September 8, 2004,
http://www.****************/news/publish/article_001868.shtml
[6] Duncan Lennox, "Hatf 6 (Shaheen 2), Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, June 15, 2004.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Duncan Lennox, "Hatf 5 (Ghauri)," Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, June 15, 2004.
[9] Prasun K Sengupta, "Flying High; China's New Air Defense Systems Unveiled," September 8, 2004,
http://www.forceindia.net; Ahmad, op-cit.
[10] Interview, Zhuhai Airshow, November 1998.
[11] Prasun K. Sengupta, "China's KS-1A and FT-2000A air defence systems unveiled," Tempur, January 1, 2003, in FBIS SEP20030123000046.
Related Links
Report On the International Defense Exhibition and Seminar (IDEAS)
back to top ^
Powered by eResources
International Assessment and Strategy Center > Research > Pakistan’s Long Range Ballistic Missiles: A View From IDEAS