Pakistan says Kashmir not its part, people there should decide

[Bull]

What the hell does that mean?

Kashmiris aren't a blood raven bunch of naked spear chucking Tamil negro savages selling their women to bombay pimps for wheystone money to kill their buddhist, christian or muslim neighbours. We are perfectly capable of deciding what's best for us, thank you very much.

You care so much about India, "Brahmin", do the entire subcontinent a favour. Deal with the hordes of Dravidians that are now filling your universities and army thanks to the socalist quotas and stick them in the reservations where they belong. Leave us Kashmiris be.

uffff......so much hatred.

 

[niaz]

we should not give up our stand. india will not do his part...they will not accept anything unless pakisatani kashmir...they will give you nothing..its their nature...
we have to do something else...

What is "Something Else" that you suggest Sir, or it is just for the sake of disagreement with Musharaff. I thought it is "Something else" that Musharraf is suggesting. What about the ground realities?? must we be like ostriches??

" Will of the Kashmiries" is what counts. Isn't this what a plebscite means? Kindly look at UN 1948 resolution. It stated that there will be a plebscite to determine whether the Kashmiris wanted to join India or Pakistan.
Resolution also included a precondition that the armies of both the combatants should be out of Kashmir before a plebscite will take place. This didnt happen as neither country trusted the other. There were a couple of rounds on 'Ali- Nehru" talks on this issue in 1949/1950 without any result. Nowhere was it said that Kashmir was a part of Pakistan. We just assumed that in case of plebscite Kashmiris will vote to join Pakistan. By making borders irrelevant will achieve the will of Kashmiris in a round about way. At least it is a way out of the impass.

However, if you think by sticking to our stance will get us Kashmir, we may have to keep on waiting for eternity.

My main point was that anti Musharraf journalists spin the facts/situations to suit their purpose. Please read the article once again. Mr Siddiuqi is implying that because we sided with the US, we got very little but India has 100's of billions of dollars. The fact is that whether we had sided with US or not, India would have had this money because it is coming from IT. Had we not sided with the US we may have been bombed to dark ages. This is not even considered in the article. He goes on to say that $12-billion are only good for 6-months imports ( Pak had less than 6 weeks imports cover before the U-turn), a totally irrelevant fact to the stance on Kashmir.Mr Siddiqui is insulting my intelligence!!

 

[dabong1]

No. Solving the Kashmir dispute means the end of Army dominance in the Pakistani political space.

I think you are totally correct.

 

[Lahori paa jee]

Originally Posted by Srirangan
No. Solving the Kashmir dispute means the end of Army dominance in the Pakistani political space.

And i agree too. This would mean an end to all the mauj masti our army is enjoying for the last so many years.

 

[niaz]

Hon Members,

Here is what in my humble opinion is a more realistic analysis of the new stance on Kashmir which I read in today's 'Daily News' on the internet. This article correctly describes what my personal view on the Kashmir issue is.

However, Kashmir is an essential part of our our psyche and is of such importance that no one view can either be correct or acceptable to all. The more such a topic is debated the better. IMO before any final agreemnt can take place; in addition to agreement by the Kashmiris, there should also be a referendem in Pakistan. I also concur that once Kashmir problem is sorted out, role of the Army in politics would become a thing of the past.

A new stance on Kashmir, Plain words
By M B Naqvi

President Pervez Musharraf in his interview to NDTV on December 5 has given the ultimate concession to India. It is a clean break from Pakistan's 59-year-old stand. True, Pakistan withdrawing the UN-supervised plebiscite demand is conditional on India showing flexibility and as such is tentative: for the sake of further the argument. But once the president says he can resile from the old stance, any prospect of a plebiscite ever happening has disappeared. What is implied has, however, the merit of being realistic -- peacemaking with India, on largely the basis of what the Indians insist on, is unavoidable.

The Indians insist that Kashmir has acceded to India and that is that. The rest of the world has to live with the reality of Kashmir Valley being an integral part of India. Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh used the deft formulation: let's make the borders irrelevant; they will be there alright but would not matter in the daily lives of the Kashmiri citizens of the two countries. To make this proposal more acceptable, Dr Singh has thrown in a yet-to-be-negotiated quantum of autonomy for the two Kashmirs, Indian and Pakistani (AJK). Pakistan has tentatively accepted this Indian idea and has itself developed the Indians' concept.

There are four aspects of Musharraf's Kashmir proposals. One is of course autonomy for the two Kashmirs. The second is the attempt to make the border soft -- "irrelevant" -- by allowing the Kashmiris on both sides of the LOC to cross it more easily and to conduct trade across it. How free that trade is has to be worked out. The third element is thinning out of the troops on both sides, although Musharraf's use of the term de-militarisation is unlikely to be acceptable to the Indian security establishment -- true strength of which is now becoming clear. Finally, there has to be a joint mechanism between the two countries to manage the all-Kashmir problems that concern both parts or arise from time to time.

President Musharraf has thus notionally recognised India's sovereignty over the parts of Kashmir it is occupying. That has a ring of finality about it. It is no use Pakistan Foreign Office saying that policy has not changed. It is a theoretical proposition. For the rest of the world Pakistan has resiled from the old demand and is now open to other ideas.

There are also some obscurities: why is Musharraf in such a terrible hurry? But he is a soldier and should be credited with knowing his trade. New ideas pre-empt the threat of war: He and his ministers proclaim that no stable peace can come to South Asia without a satisfactory solution of the Kashmir problem. This implies that if the Indians do not accept Pakistan's pleas, there is bound to be a war; stable peace is contingent on the desired settlement. It involves a threat from Pakistan's side.

Now that India has been brought to the negotiating table -- two rounds of negotiations having failed, a third, or is it fourth, may soon progress --President Musharraf's initial indication is that the likely Kashmir settlement is to be basically on India's terms. This arrangement could have been arrived at five, 10 or 15 years ago. The reasons why Musharraf now proposes to recognise India's sovereignty over Kashmir Valley, Jammu and Ladakh are based on hard realism, though that is something painful for patriots to admit.

A war with India is now out of the question. Pakistan's minimum nuclear deterrent and the conventional arms preparedness together do not make war with India a practical proposal. The experience of the 2002 crisis, with the armies of the two countries eyeball t eyeball, showed that a nuclear war between these two neighbours is no longer possible for either side. Note that India had credibly threatened to invade Pakistan knowing that Pakistan was a nuclear power; George Fernandes had threatened that India can absorb Pakistan's first strike but would retaliate massively and destroy its seven or eight industrial-military centres.

There was obvious truth in it. This means that India's larger deterrent has more deterring power than Pakistan's smaller one. Therefore, Pakistan cannot take the initiative to start another war and whichever way another war starts, it will not be to Pakistan's advantage. That changes the whole complexion of the Kashmir dispute: now no solution can be predicated on military force. Musharraf knows it and good that he is proceeding on this basis.

This will certainly cause much argumentation. This should have been known earlier. After spending so much and after so much human effort, we are faced with simple facts: India is a larger country with a larger deterrent; it is more developed; it is richer and more influential in the world. Pakistan went to war so many times but only to force India to the negotiating table -- a silly proposition. If you cannot solve a problem through war, how diplomacy after an inconclusive war can get you Kashmir? Why were the wars inconclusive? Because of Pakistan being poorer and weaker. Didn't Pakistani generals know this? Why did poor Pakistanis have to pay for a huge military establishment that has usurped people's political rights, subverted politics and foisted the army's unending domination over the whole polity.

Well, what has happened has happened. It cannot be undone. We had better do some course correction now. That poses an urgent question before Pakistanis. We have a large paraphernalia of military preparedness, nuclear deterrent, complete with missiles. What to do with it? It is costly to maintain. Our economy could never sustain it without foreign aid. Musharraf has himself said that Pakistan faces no existential external threat; only internal threats need attention. Why not reduce expenditure on the military and give people a peace dividend. Let this be an issue of the 2007 elections.

Also up for discussion is the question of what kind of development we need. Considerable disarmament and demilitarisation is needed for the economy itself. Its main paradigm must be to ensure all the democratic rights, including jobs for the maximum number of people and social security for those who cannot be provided with jobs. The paradigm actually followed in recent years has increased disparities of income both vertically and horizontally. We need a more pro-poor development paradigm. Social equity is an integral part of political freedom. Let's follow this paradigm.

The writer is a veteran journalist and freelance columnist. Email: mbnaqvi@cy ber.net.pk

 

[Contrarian]

very good view of Mr Naqvi

 

[Neo]

Wednesday, December 20, 2006

A shift in Pakistan’s Kashmir policy?
By Ijaz Hussain

Musharraf appears to be a man in a great hurry. He seems to believe that now is the time for a deal on Kashmir favourable to Pakistan, as India is destined to become a global player before long

The other day President Musharraf threw a mini-bombshell when during an interview with Dr. Prannoy Roy of the NDTV he observed that Pakistan would be prepared to give up its claim on all of Kashmir if India agreed to make it a self-governing and autonomous territory. The Indian Prime Minister has welcomed the proposal. However, the opposition parties in Pakistan have denounced it. For example, rejecting it as being contrary to Pakistan’s “long-standing principled position”, Qazi Hussain Ahmed termed it a “sell out”. He insisted on seeking a solution based on the UN resolutions. Similarly, Ahsan Iqbal of the PML (N) censured Musharraf for acting without consulting Parliament, the National Security Council or the corps commanders of the Pakistan Army. Is the criticism against Musharraf justified and has Pakistan changed its policy on Kashmir?

To answer these questions we need to look at how Musharraf has approached Kashmir ever since he took over. The UN resolutions have always been a linchpin in Pakistan’s policy on Kashmir ever since the UN adopted them. They have been so crucial to Pakistan’s stand that the latter never jettisoned them even during the most critical times. For example, it did not officially abandon them during the Bhutto-Swaran Singh talks in the 1960s, though behind closed doors the two interlocutors explored the possibility of a solution that departed from the hallowed principle that they enshrine. Similarly, it held on to them when it concluded the Simla Agreement that rendered the Kashmir dispute a bilateral matter, or when it entered into the Lahore Declaration that set in motion the peace process between the two countries.

It was only after the advent of Musharraf to power that Pakistan’s traditional stand on the UN resolutions started to erode. An important milestone in this regard was the statement that Musharraf made towards the end of 2003 in an interview with the Reuters news agency, in which he made important observations on Pakistan’s abandonment of these resolutions. India and the West welcomed the new stance, as in their opinion it constituted an important step forward towards the resolution of Kashmir, whereas Pakistan’s opposition parties denounced it as a sell-out. Musharraf was soon in denial of any change in Pakistan’s traditional Kashmir policy by observing that his offer was conditional. Now he has again made a conditional renunciation of the UN resolutions during the NDTV interview. The difference between the two situations is that, unlike the past, this time there is an explicit offer to give up the claim. That explains the hullabaloo in Pakistan and euphoria in India.

Notwithstanding denials by Musharraf, there is a general impression that Pakistan’s policy on Kashmir has undergone a definite shift. Musharraf clearly deserves the benefit of doubt because of the conditionality of the offer. However, if we look at another development on Kashmir we are more likely to agree with his detractors. Consider the following.

Unlike in the past, when the Pakistan government always invoked the UN resolutions as the only way forward for conflict resolution in Kashmir, around 2001 it effected a change in its position. It started employing the formulation of “wishes of the people of Kashmir”, though for appearances’ sake it also occasionally mentioned UN resolutions. The Pakistan Foreign Office has since then followed this formula, though the principal emphasis remains on the new formulation. Now the problem with the new formulation is that it excludes the concept of UN-supervised plebiscite that is the essence of the UN resolutions. This development, if not Musharraf’s conditional renunciation of the UN resolutions, has the effect of radically changing Pakistan’s Kashmir policy.

Now Musharraf has effected these changes in full public view. How do we explain this highly unusual way of conducting diplomacy? Is it because Musharraf has a penchant for publicity or is there some other explanation for it? Musharraf’s hunger for publicity does not explain it, as he is too responsible a head of state to indulge in it. There are two explanations for it, that appear to be valid at the same time. First, the public diplomacy could have the purpose of mentally preparing the people of Pakistan to accept a solution based on ‘new realities’ in Kashmir. According to this view, the right of self-determination as enshrined in the UN resolutions is utterly obsolete and needs to be replaced by a ‘realistic’ paradigm. Secondly, Musharraf appears to be targeting the Western audience in order to occupy a moral high ground on Kashmir in case the current peace process aborts as a result of the Indian intransigence. It is this thinking rather than anything else that explains his numerous and gratuitous concessions to India on Kashmir.

How sound is Musharraf’s strategy of public diplomacy? In my judgment, it is flawed on both counts. As far as domestic public opinion is concerned, Musharraf is trying to deal with the people of Pakistan, directly bypassing their public representatives. This strategy may not work at the end of the day for a number of reasons. First, hostile public representatives could mar Musharraf’s party on Kashmir by bringing people to the street. Secondly, it is a moot point whether there are takers for Musharraf’s thinking in the army, particularly the corps commanders. Let us not forget that Kashmir has been the graveyard of many governments in Pakistan. As far as the international and particularly the Western public opinion is concerned, it clearly favours India and expects Pakistan to align its position with the latter’s. Consequently, it is doubtful whether the strategy of public diplomacy is likely to bear fruit, though in the process Musharraf has done irreparable damage to Pakistan’s position on Kashmir.

Musharraf appears to be a man in a great hurry. He seems to believe that now is the time for a deal on Kashmir favourable to Pakistan, as India is destined to become a global player before long. He does not trust future generations or the forces of history to deliver a verdict favourable to Pakistan or Kashmiris. Under him, Pakistan also appears to suffer from some kind of ennui on Kashmir, as if the burden of struggle for the Kashmiris’ right of self-determination has been too exhausting to continue. Perhaps these factors explain Musharraf’s numerous gratuitous concessions to India, particularly on UN resolutions. They also seem to inspire his latest offer to surrender claim on Kashmir in return for large autonomy. In this backdrop, India deserves to be commended for conducting a relentless and ruthless campaign to bring Pakistan to its knees. The question is whether history will remember Musharraf conducting the Kargil misadventure twice.

The writer is a former dean of social sciences at the Quaid-i-Azam University. He can be reached at hussain_ijaz@hotmail.com

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006\12\20\story_20-12-2006_pg3_2

 

[Adux]

Honestly Friends for Pakistan is decreasing, India's emergence in the Global Arena has taken the world by storm. But at the same time pakistan is no pushover.

 

[Awesome]

Pakistan has already developed the capability to match growth with growth. India's much larger and that means a lot more different things, but Pak would remain a no-pushover till India comes to agreement on something fair for the three sides.

The DailyTimes editorial however Quotes Musharraf wrong. He did not submit to give Pak administered Kashmir to India and then India makes it an autonomous region. Instead he said we both would make it into an autonomous region, TOGETHER.

 

[Bull]

Pakistan has already developed the capability to match growth with growth. India's much larger and that means a lot more different things, but Pak would remain a no-pushover till India comes to agreement on something fair for the three sides.

The DailyTimes editorial however Quotes Musharraf wrong. He did not submit to give Pak administered Kashmir to India and then India makes it an autonomous region. Instead he said we both would make it into an autonomous region, TOGETHER.

Well who are the three parties,both india and Pakistan wants kashmir.Now after 50 years of trying pakistan realised they cant snatch it with india and hence the proposal for jt governance.

India too realises the same and is ready to convert LOC into IOB.

 

[zpak]

The political parties in Pakistan always like to blame the army for their own short comings and corrupt practices. During the time of civilian rule, if these political parties actually did something constructive to help strengthen civilian institutions, the army wouldn't have to come in.
Not saying that the army is full of angels. But as a Pakistani, one would prefer the army over the chaos these political parties bring anytime.

 

[Bull]

If the army keeps on steppping each time the politicians get it wrong then you will never come out of this mess.

If politicians go corrupt,PA comes to rescue, if PA gets corrupt then who will rescue pakistan.

 

[dabong1]

Well who are the three parties,both india and Pakistan wants kashmir.Now after 50 years of trying pakistan realised they cant snatch it with india and hence the proposal for jt governance.

India too realises the same and is ready to convert LOC into IOB.

I think the indian line on kashmir is not to draw no borders.By converting the LOC into IB would be doing exactly that reddrawing borders.
The pakistanis played along with the americans in afghanistan and got bombs and an anti pakistani government in kabul.Thank god the military has realized its mistake and is now backing the taliban.
The kashmir thing will end up the same...promises of a fair resolution but at the end nothing.Then the pakistani army will come to the conclusion that a intifada in kashmir along the lines of the palestinans and a fighting force modelled on hezbollah will be needed as all moves towards peace with india where rebuffed with american know how.
I was told a story about bhutto when he went to algeria and asked the algerian government for help on the kashmir issue.He was taken to a graveyard where over a 100'000 people that had fought the french where buried and was told when kashmir had a graveyard that big it would get it's freedom.
The indians want the LOC as the border.If the pakistani government accepts... it has been defeated in kashmir.
Has india made even a single proper gesture with some weight behind it on kashmir like musharaff.
Kahmir will only be got through the barrel.The lebanese fought a long time against israel but eventually won.

 

[HASEEB66]

JUST GIVE ALL OF KASHMIR INCLUDING AZAD KASHMIR AND NORTHERN AREA TOTAL INDEPENDENCE WHAT SO EVER.DO YOU AGREE?HOW CAN WE BELEIVE THE INDIAN ARGUMENT THE KASHMIRIES CAN NEGOTIATE WITH HUMAN RIGHTS,WOMEN RIGHTS,MINORITY RIGHTS ABUSERS ITSELF.A COUNTRY WITH THE HIGHEST SUICIDE RATES,HIGHEST ACCIDENT RATES AND ABOVE ALL SUPPORTER O TERRORISM IN SRI LANKA,NEPAL,BURMA,VEITNAM,MYAMAR.

 

[dabong1]

There is a page in the bbc news websites that puts forward possible solutions for Kashmir.There are good maps what go with the report.I have highlighted a few points from the report.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/south_asia/03/kashmir_future/html/default.stm

Scenario one: The status quo
Kashmir has been a flashpoint between India and Pakistan for more than 50 years. Currently a boundary - the Line of Control - divides the region in two, with one part administered by India and one by Pakistan. India would like to formalise this status quo and make it the accepted international boundary. But Pakistan and Kashmiri activists reject this plan because they both want greater control over the region.

Scenario two: Kashmir joins Pakistan
Pakistan has consistently favoured this as the best solution to the dispute. In view of the state's majority Muslim population, it believes that it would vote to become part of Pakistan. However a single plebiscite held in a region which comprises peoples that are culturally, religiously and ethnically diverse, would create disaffected minorities. The Hindus of Jammu, and the Buddhists of Ladakh have never shown any desire to join Pakistan and would protest at the outcome.

Scenario three: Kashmir joins India
Such a solution would be unlikely to bring stability to the region as the Muslim inhabitants of Pakistani-administered Jammu and Kashmir, including the Northern Areas, have never shown any desire to become part of India.

Scenario four: Independent Kashmir
The difficulty of adopting this as a potential solution is that it requires India and Pakistan to give up territory, which they are not willing to do. Any plebiscite or referendum likely to result in a majority vote for independence would therefore probably be opposed by both India and Pakistan. It would also be rejected by the inhabitants of the state who are content with their status as part of the countries to which they already owe allegiance.

Scenario five: A smaller independent Kashmir
An independent Kashmir could be created from the Kashmir Valley - currently under Indian administration - and the narrow strip of land which Pakistan calls Azad Jammu and Kashmir. This would leave the strategically important regions of the Northern Areas and Ladakh, bordering China, under the control of Pakistan and India respectively. However both India and Pakistan would be unlikely to enter into discussions which would have this scenario as a possible outcome.

Scenario six: Independent Kashmir Valley
An independent Kashmir Valley has been considered by some as the best solution because it would address the grievances of those who have been fighting against the Indian Government since the insurgency began in 1989. But critics say that, without external assistance, the region would not be economically viable.

Scenario seven: The Chenab formula
This plan, first suggested in the 1960s, would see Kashmir divided along the line of the River Chenab. This would give the vast majority of land to Pakistan and, as such, a clear victory in its longstanding dispute with India. The entire valley with its Muslim majority population would be brought within Pakistan's borders, as well as the majority Muslim areas of Jammu.