littleboy
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Both Israel and Pakistan have decided to field
tactical nuclear weapons aboard their small
flotillas of diesel-electric submarines. While
Pakistan is a declared nuclear power and Israel
has opted to pursue a policy of nuclear
ambiguity for the past four decades, both
nations military thinkers echo each other in
their frequent referrals to the sea as a source of
strategic depth . This shared emphasis stems, in
large part, from their growing sense of
continental claustrophia. Both countries are
territorially shallow, and resulting sentiments of
vulnerability have helped shape and sustain
already potent senses of embattlement. In Pakistan, meanwhile, last years decision to
formally establish a Naval Strategic Forces
Command should not be solely construed as a
tit-for-tat response to Indias own advances in
the naval nuclear domain (India launched its
first indigenous nuclear submarine, the INS
Arihant, in 2009 ), but also as an attempt to
add a measure of strategic depth to
Islamabads own growing nuclear arsenal.
Despite the fact that India has publicly stated
that it abides by a strict No-First-Use policy,
Pakistan lives under the constant fear that
India, the United States or both operating in
collusion could swoop in and preemptively seize
or destroy the smaller nations arsenal.
This deep-rooted paranoia is exacerbated by
the growing conventional military imbalance
between India and Pakistan. This asymmetry is
particularly stark in the maritime sphere, as
India steadily modernizes and expands its blue-
water navy, and an underfunded Pakistan Navy
struggles to make its case to an Army-
dominated national security apparatus. There
are growing concerns over Islamabads
vulnerability to a naval blockade, given that 95
percent of its trade by volume is transported by
sea.
This has led some to conclude that the country
urgently needs to nuclearize its submarine fleet.
When interviewed, Pakistani commanders
mention the precedent set by Israels alleged
decision to place nuclear-tipped cruise missiles
aboard conventional submarines, and suggest,
somewhat provocatively, that Pakistan should
follow suit. Another option, some have argued ,
would be stationing nuclear weaponry aboard
surface ships and maritime-patrol aircraft. Not
only would this provide the country with greater
strategic depth, it would also extend some of
the more dysfunctional elements of Indo-
Pakistani nuclear interactions from land to sea .
By threatening first nuclear use against an
advancing Indian aircraft carrier strike force,
Islamabad can hope to acquire escalation
dominance and considerably dilute its larger
neighbors coercive naval power.
Moreover, the introduction of nuclear weapons
will have a major impact on the future of naval
warfighting in the Indian Ocean. As veteran
naval analyst Captain Wayne Hughes has
noted , fleets caught under a nuclear shadow
are compelled to operate under different
principles. Most notably, ships must loosen up
their deployment patterns and adopt more
dispersed configurations in order to better
shield themselves from the ripple effects of a
nuclear blast. For Pakistani planners, acquiring
nuclear-armed cruise missile submarines (SSG)
would provide an opportunity to skew its
existing power relationship with India in
Pakistans favor, primarily by injecting a sizable
degree of uncertainty and ambiguity in Indias
tactical calculus, but also by preventing the
Indian Navy from concentrating the bulk of its
power projection platforms in one specific
location. The Damaging Effects of Continental
Claustrophobia for Nuclear Stability
Needless to say, the strategic side-effects of
both Israel and Pakistans continental
claustrophobia have the potential to be highly
destabilizing. Mounting concerns over a
perceived lack of strategic depth have led to a
privileging of offensive naval nuclear strategies,
which fuse dual-use systems and doctrinal
opacity with forward postures. In the event of a
conflict, there would be no way for their
adversaries to ascertain whether Pakistani or
Israeli subsurface vessels are nuclear-armed or
not. In addition to the radioactive fog of war
that would float over naval combat operations,
there are certain risks tied to both navies
conventional ways of war that would likely
carry over to their nuclear posture in times of
crisis.
In an environment already marked by dual-use,
it would be injudicious to assume that
conventional and nuclear dynamics will evolve
within tightly sealed vacuums. Both the
Pakistani and Israeli navies have learnt to
offset their numerical inferiority in times of war
by engaging in daring asymmetrical maneuvers
Pakistan through the offensive deployment of
its submarines , and Israel through the use of
naval commandos and missile strikes.
Notwithstanding manifold differences in terms
of tactical approaches, offense has often been
perceived as the best form of defense for small
navies laboring under overwhelming odds.
In effect, weaker naval powers have, throughout
history, manifested their desire to alleviate their
vulnerability by engaging in acts of deception or
preemptive attrition . Military historians and
political scientists have demonstrated the
extent to which it can be arduous for a military
organization steeped in a specific operational
culture to espouse an entirely different set of
procedures and tactics under wartime
conditions. While it has been reported that the
elite crews aboard each Israeli nuclear-armed
submarine have been subjected to a rigorous
battery of psychological tests and are
cognizant of the responsibilities that come with
their nuclear role, the Pakistan Navys future
command and control arrangements remain
alarmingly obscure. If the same Pakistani naval
officers charged with the conduct of
conventional operations against the Indian fleet
suddenly find themselves entrusted with
strategic weapons, their organizational
predisposition for offensive defense could be a
recipe for disaster. The scattering of nuclear
assets at sea, particularly aboard surface ships,
also heightens the risks of a nuclear weapon
being intercepted by a malevolent non-state
actor, an already perennial concern when
discussing Pakistans growing nuclear arsenal.
The Overriding Importance of Geography in
Nuclear Strategy
Geography remains one of the most important
determinants of a countrys nuclear strategy.
Whether a country feels territorially secure or
insecure has an immense impact on the shape
and form of its deterrent. For relatively small
coastal states such as Pakistan and Israel, the
quest for maritime depth has given birth to
naval nuclear force structures with the potential
to undermine stability during a crisis regardless
of the legitimacy or strength of some of their
strategic concerns. While it remains unclear
what can be done to alleviate both states
sense of existential vulnerability, appreciating
the extent to which a feeling of territorial
claustrophobia undergirds much of their elites
strategic culture could enable a better
understanding of their nuclear trajectories.
Iskander Rehman is an associate in the Nuclear
Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace and a Stanton Nuclear
Security Fellow.
sorry guys I could not post the link becauce my post count is below 30.
tactical nuclear weapons aboard their small
flotillas of diesel-electric submarines. While
Pakistan is a declared nuclear power and Israel
has opted to pursue a policy of nuclear
ambiguity for the past four decades, both
nations military thinkers echo each other in
their frequent referrals to the sea as a source of
strategic depth . This shared emphasis stems, in
large part, from their growing sense of
continental claustrophia. Both countries are
territorially shallow, and resulting sentiments of
vulnerability have helped shape and sustain
already potent senses of embattlement. In Pakistan, meanwhile, last years decision to
formally establish a Naval Strategic Forces
Command should not be solely construed as a
tit-for-tat response to Indias own advances in
the naval nuclear domain (India launched its
first indigenous nuclear submarine, the INS
Arihant, in 2009 ), but also as an attempt to
add a measure of strategic depth to
Islamabads own growing nuclear arsenal.
Despite the fact that India has publicly stated
that it abides by a strict No-First-Use policy,
Pakistan lives under the constant fear that
India, the United States or both operating in
collusion could swoop in and preemptively seize
or destroy the smaller nations arsenal.
This deep-rooted paranoia is exacerbated by
the growing conventional military imbalance
between India and Pakistan. This asymmetry is
particularly stark in the maritime sphere, as
India steadily modernizes and expands its blue-
water navy, and an underfunded Pakistan Navy
struggles to make its case to an Army-
dominated national security apparatus. There
are growing concerns over Islamabads
vulnerability to a naval blockade, given that 95
percent of its trade by volume is transported by
sea.
This has led some to conclude that the country
urgently needs to nuclearize its submarine fleet.
When interviewed, Pakistani commanders
mention the precedent set by Israels alleged
decision to place nuclear-tipped cruise missiles
aboard conventional submarines, and suggest,
somewhat provocatively, that Pakistan should
follow suit. Another option, some have argued ,
would be stationing nuclear weaponry aboard
surface ships and maritime-patrol aircraft. Not
only would this provide the country with greater
strategic depth, it would also extend some of
the more dysfunctional elements of Indo-
Pakistani nuclear interactions from land to sea .
By threatening first nuclear use against an
advancing Indian aircraft carrier strike force,
Islamabad can hope to acquire escalation
dominance and considerably dilute its larger
neighbors coercive naval power.
Moreover, the introduction of nuclear weapons
will have a major impact on the future of naval
warfighting in the Indian Ocean. As veteran
naval analyst Captain Wayne Hughes has
noted , fleets caught under a nuclear shadow
are compelled to operate under different
principles. Most notably, ships must loosen up
their deployment patterns and adopt more
dispersed configurations in order to better
shield themselves from the ripple effects of a
nuclear blast. For Pakistani planners, acquiring
nuclear-armed cruise missile submarines (SSG)
would provide an opportunity to skew its
existing power relationship with India in
Pakistans favor, primarily by injecting a sizable
degree of uncertainty and ambiguity in Indias
tactical calculus, but also by preventing the
Indian Navy from concentrating the bulk of its
power projection platforms in one specific
location. The Damaging Effects of Continental
Claustrophobia for Nuclear Stability
Needless to say, the strategic side-effects of
both Israel and Pakistans continental
claustrophobia have the potential to be highly
destabilizing. Mounting concerns over a
perceived lack of strategic depth have led to a
privileging of offensive naval nuclear strategies,
which fuse dual-use systems and doctrinal
opacity with forward postures. In the event of a
conflict, there would be no way for their
adversaries to ascertain whether Pakistani or
Israeli subsurface vessels are nuclear-armed or
not. In addition to the radioactive fog of war
that would float over naval combat operations,
there are certain risks tied to both navies
conventional ways of war that would likely
carry over to their nuclear posture in times of
crisis.
In an environment already marked by dual-use,
it would be injudicious to assume that
conventional and nuclear dynamics will evolve
within tightly sealed vacuums. Both the
Pakistani and Israeli navies have learnt to
offset their numerical inferiority in times of war
by engaging in daring asymmetrical maneuvers
Pakistan through the offensive deployment of
its submarines , and Israel through the use of
naval commandos and missile strikes.
Notwithstanding manifold differences in terms
of tactical approaches, offense has often been
perceived as the best form of defense for small
navies laboring under overwhelming odds.
In effect, weaker naval powers have, throughout
history, manifested their desire to alleviate their
vulnerability by engaging in acts of deception or
preemptive attrition . Military historians and
political scientists have demonstrated the
extent to which it can be arduous for a military
organization steeped in a specific operational
culture to espouse an entirely different set of
procedures and tactics under wartime
conditions. While it has been reported that the
elite crews aboard each Israeli nuclear-armed
submarine have been subjected to a rigorous
battery of psychological tests and are
cognizant of the responsibilities that come with
their nuclear role, the Pakistan Navys future
command and control arrangements remain
alarmingly obscure. If the same Pakistani naval
officers charged with the conduct of
conventional operations against the Indian fleet
suddenly find themselves entrusted with
strategic weapons, their organizational
predisposition for offensive defense could be a
recipe for disaster. The scattering of nuclear
assets at sea, particularly aboard surface ships,
also heightens the risks of a nuclear weapon
being intercepted by a malevolent non-state
actor, an already perennial concern when
discussing Pakistans growing nuclear arsenal.
The Overriding Importance of Geography in
Nuclear Strategy
Geography remains one of the most important
determinants of a countrys nuclear strategy.
Whether a country feels territorially secure or
insecure has an immense impact on the shape
and form of its deterrent. For relatively small
coastal states such as Pakistan and Israel, the
quest for maritime depth has given birth to
naval nuclear force structures with the potential
to undermine stability during a crisis regardless
of the legitimacy or strength of some of their
strategic concerns. While it remains unclear
what can be done to alleviate both states
sense of existential vulnerability, appreciating
the extent to which a feeling of territorial
claustrophobia undergirds much of their elites
strategic culture could enable a better
understanding of their nuclear trajectories.
Iskander Rehman is an associate in the Nuclear
Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace and a Stanton Nuclear
Security Fellow.
sorry guys I could not post the link becauce my post count is below 30.
Plus... what are you going to do about Gwadar port?
