Defending the defence budget
By Shujaat Ali Khan
The military establishment is a necessity, however undesirable it may be considered. Without an adequate defence, our sovereignty could be compromised, not necessarily by an all-out war, but through coercive actions
The Rs297 billion proposed Defence Budget for 2008-9 is less than last years in real terms. Still, there is talk of excessive spending on defence. It is important to put the issue in perspective, starting with some basics.
The budget caters to expenditure incurred to meet the cost of maintaining and upgrading the armed forces and their weapon systems. This expenditure is normally in proportion to the size of the forces and their force goals. The size and force goals are determined by the Defence Strategy as dictated by the Defence Policy, which in turn is subordinate to the National Policy. It is assumed that National Policy (de jure or de facto) is a reflection of our national aspirations.
The threat perception is the most important factor in determining a states military response; consequently it impacts our budget. The perception of the threat flows from the threat environment. It is viewed somewhat differently by civil analysts and military planners.
Generally, bilateral relations, geo-strategic compulsions, international pressures and economic interests, are some of the factors which influence the threat environment. In our case, in the last sixty years, Kashmir has put Indo-Pak relations under severe strain. Ironically, it is the political leaders on both sides that have adopted an inflexible stance. In this adverse climate of mutual hostility expecting sudden improvement in the threat environment would be unrealistic.
Consequently, civilian analysts need to appreciate that unless there is a significant improvement in the regional environments, our military guard can only be lowered at a cost to our sovereignty.
Military planners tend to view the threat perception differently. They give little weight to the environment, and look rather cynically at friendly relations or good intentions of other states. Defence establishments work on the principle that in international relations there are no permanent friends, only permanent interests.
On the table of military balance, a comparison with Indian armed forces indicates a numerical superiority of 2:1 in land forces and 4:1 in naval and air forces. This numerical advantage does not take into account the distinct edge in quality of weapon systems.
India is acquiring state of the art armament from the USA, Russia, Europe and Israel. Its defence budget has grown at an average rate of 16 percent a year for the last many years. This year it has announced military spending of USD26.5 billion, five times more than Pakistans. (It may be noted that the Indian defence budget, like ours, does not reflect financial outlays on major weapon system acquisitions, usually transacted on long-term credit and loans.)
The asymmetry in the combat potential of conventional forces of India and Pakistan, to a large extent, has been neutralised by symmetry in nuclear capabilities. Indian superiority in the number of warheads or their delivery systems, is marginal, and enables us to maintain the credibility of nuclear deterrence. But India is also constantly upgrading its nuclear capabilities aiming at a triad of delivery systems in addition to state of the art anti-ballistic missiles. If we remain complacent, we risk degradation and even possible neutralisation of our nuclear deterrence capability.
It is misleading to think that acquisition of nuclear deterrence capability eliminates dependence on conventional forces. The assumption is correct only to the extent that a marginal asymmetry in conventional forces does not upset military balance so long as the force differential is not so wide as to tempt a larger neighbour to impose its will or settle scores through low intensity conflicts (stopping short of an all-out war).
A balance between nuclear and conventional forces is essential to any defence strategy. There is already a wide disparity between the conventional forces of India and Pakistan. Any significant cut in the existing potential will tilt the balance dangerously in favour of India.
Here are some conclusions from these hypotheses:
* There is an indirect relationship between Defence Strategy and National Aspirations, but a direct relationship with threat perception.
* Threat perception has to be viewed in terms of a states military capabilities. It is not a simple function of regional environments (which are dynamic and evolutionary in nature) or good intentions of neighbours.
* Regional environments can and should be improved by a fresh pragmatic approach (e.g., the Kashmir dispute). However, improvement in the regional threat environments, do not necessarily eliminate the threat in the short term. At best they transform an imminent threat into a threat in being, and help in pushing up the conflict threshold.
* Reduction in conventional forces is a viable option if it is based on an acceptable mutual and balanced force-reduction formula.
* Defence expenditures are not transparent in any country of the world because of security and secrecy requirements. However, a one liner statement is not enough, and some broad details should be given to Parliament (as it is being done this time) In any case, select committees can always examine these expenditures in greater detail, as is done in the developed democracies.
* Historically, there has never been a war between two nuclear states. Pakistan and India have achieved this equation, thus making all-out war a near impossibility.
* Collectively, we do not live any more under a Security State Syndrome, nor a Kashmir Fixation. In fact, there is far greater pragmatism on Kashmir today than a decade ago, although some rightwing parties continue to display a no compromise attitude.
From these arguments it would appear that we are in a bind, having to choose between a rock and a hard place. This year the economic situation is precarious, and may get even worse in the short to mid term. But despite economic difficulties, we may not be able to cut our forces drastically (without a shift in our national policy). I would nevertheless, recommend a gradual cut back over a few years.
Our military system needs rationalisation to save on recurring expenditure. There are three suggestions:
Firstly, make a gradual shift from an all-volunteer army to partial conscription, phased over five years. The Turkish model may be worth emulating.
Secondly, cut down the teeth to tail ratio and outsource maintenance and supply services.
Thirdly, institute compulsory absorption of all retiring persons under sixty years of age in the civilian sector, particularly in security organisations (It is not generally known that average retiring age for officers is 51 years, and 42 for servicemen below commissioned rank).
Pensions could thus be deferred till the age of superannuation, and the services of a disciplined manpower can be utilised. Pensions are not part of the defence budget, but nevertheless are a burden on the national exchequer. It would be a very unpopular step, particularly with the civil establishment, but practical nevertheless. (In developed countries, it is the constitutional right of all citizens to serve till the age of superannuation (60 or 62 years. Consequently the retiring age of military personnel is the same as civilians.)
In the ultimate analysis, the military establishment is a necessity, however undesirable it may be considered. Without an adequate defence, our sovereignty could be compromised, not necessarily by an all-out war, but through coercive actions. In the friendliest of regional environments, we could be living under benevolent domination of a bigger neighbour.
Shujaat Ali Khan was a Major General in the Pakistan Army, later serving as Pakistans Ambassador to Morocco. He was also Director General of ISIs internal wing
Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan
