Police provide the first line of defence in society. In a city like Karachi, this function assumes much greater and challenging dimensions. By targeting police officials, terrorists and criminals can easily degrade and demoralise this force. The deadly mix of organised crime, politically patronised gangs, their nexus with militancy and bureaucracy, has
turned Karachi into a boiling cauldron, where 2,507 people lost their lives to various forms of violence in 2013. This also exposes law-enforcement agencies to daunting challenges, more so the police, which are the primary source of prevention, protection, pursuit and prosecution.
As many as nine casualties,
including Chaudhry Aslam; in the first nine days of 2014 explain the hazards of the environment in which the Karachi police operate. During 2013, police fatalities reached a staggering 166, up from 122 in 2012. This represents a three-fold increase compared with 2011, when about 53 cops fell in various operations.
Police losses in Karachi also provide an alarming indicator of rapid deterioration since 1992; in the 18 years until 2010, for instance, the police lost about 250 personnel, an average of roughly 14 a year. But the annual average since 2011 has jumped to 114.
One can count several reasons for these losses; they mostly result not only from the continuous nature of crime and militancy in Karachi, but also from non-state outfits. The dwindling effectiveness of the police also stems from the fact that in a polarised city such as Karachi, collective interests of politics, bureaucracy, militancy and organised crime far outweigh the capacity of police, which are hamstrung by many factors.
Firstly, the deputation of roughly 20 per cent of the police force for protocol/ VVIP duty adversely affects an already extremely poor citizen-police ratio in a city with a bulging population, spiralling crime and militant politics.
The enormity of organisational and operational problems can be gauged from the fact that despite arrests of roughly 12,000 suspects since the launch of the clean-up operation a few months ago, crime and terrorism continue to plague the city. Even though paramilitary authorities claim to have rounded up scores of target killers and members of various criminal gangs, hardly any long-term solution is in sight because of the limited investigation and prosecution capacity of the state.
Secondly, poor means of communication, such as unfit vehicles, absence or lack of life vests, bullet-proof jackets, as well as a limited number of armoured vehicles put a poorly trained police at a disadvantage.
Thirdly, officials of a largely politicised force often find it difficult to go after elements which may have links to their benefactors or mentors.
Fourth, the police — despite being strong on paper — suffer from a bad image, tainted by charges of massive and blatant corruption, as well as abuse of authority. Intellectual limitations, i.e.,
insufficient education in law and rights represents another deficit.
This perception of the police requires a massive corrective intervention. A recently launched capacity and image-building initiative by the Sindh government probably also stems from the realisation that the police need to be ‘retooled’. Being executed with funding from the German government, this initiative aims to help improve the public image of the Sindh Police.
At least verbally, most politicians agree on the need for the revision of the police laws of 1861 in order to reform the police, both intellectually as well as administratively. People at large need to push their representatives for reforms. This capacity-building initiative can also help reduce the trust between the citizen and the police.
Without drastic reform, the police cannot really function as society’s first line of defence.
Police: First line of defence? – The Express Tribune