Pakistan Navy | News & Discussions.

[Imran Khan]

i didn't meant to offend you sir , what i am trying to say is the Karachi Shipyard is capable to build ships like type 42 then why PN prefers second hand ships

i was also not trolling bro its same reason we both keep mixed always because UK -USA ex ships can work for us 15-20 years sometimes even more . karachi shipyard can produce 17,200 tons but its only if gov is ready to pay . our navy has less budget then army airforce always .

 

[fatman17]

Experts Wary of Pakistan Nuke Claims

Few Details Available on Naval Strike Capability.


May. 26, 2012 - 10:36AM | By USMAN ANSARI



ISLAMABAD — Days after Pakistan hinted that it possesses a sea-based second nuclear strike capability, Indian Defence Ministry officials remained silent on the matter, and outside observers were skeptical that the Navy had such a capability.

On May 19, the head of the Pakistan Navy, Adm. Asif Sandhila, inaugurated the Headquarters of the Naval Strategic Force Command (NSFC). A press release by the military’s Inter Services Public Relations stated the NSFC “will perform a pivotal role in development and employment of the Naval Strategic Force,” and was “the custodian of the nation’s 2nd strike capability.”

Beyond the announcement, Pakistan’s Navy has said little about the office or about the service’s capabilities.

In February, Sandhila told Defense News that the Pakistan Navy was mindful of India’s plans to complete the sea-based arm of its nuclear triad, and was “taking necessary measures to restore the strategic balance” in the Indian Ocean region.

Christian Le Mière, a research fellow for naval forces and maritime security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, said Pakistan’s sea-based deterrent is “most likely” the widely speculated submarine-launched variant of the Babur/Hatf-7 (Vengeance-7) cruise missile.

“The Babur is already nuclear-capable and is expected to be used on submarines,” he said. “I have not seen verifiable evidence of any tests for a submarine-launched version, but it is perfectly feasible that a [submarine-launched cruise missile] is now available.”

Analyst Usman Shabbir, with the Pakistan Military Consortium think tank, said Pakistan has been working on its sea-based deterrent for some time.

“When the Babur was first revealed in 2005, it was claimed that it is mainly designed to be deployed from submarines. There was at least that speculation,” he said.

The Navy “has pretty good experience in using similar systems; for example, both submarine-launched Harpoon and Exocet [missiles] use a similar system, and [the Navy] has operated both for a long time.”

Shabbir speculated that the Babur/Hatf-7 missiles might be fired from torpedo tubes, similar to UGM-84 Harpoons.

But Le Mière believes there may still be some room for doubt.

“The phrase ‘sea-based second strike’ suggests a surface vessel could also be used if a submarine-launched version is not yet ready,” he said. “But obviously, while a surface vessel is mobile, it is far less survivable and far more detectable than a sub.”

As for Pakistan’s neighbor to the east, Harsh Pant, international relations lecturer at the Department of Defence Studies at King’s College in London, said India is neither alarmed nor disadvantaged by this development.

“India had factored this reality into its force posture much before this acknowledgement,” Pant said. “I do not see this changing the ground reality, insofar [as the] India-Pakistan nuclear posture is concerned. Despite what outsiders might think, nuclear deterrence in South Asia remains robust.

“The real problem remains the role of non-state actors,” he added. “In that context, Pakistan’s sea-based second strike capability is more reassuring, because the non-state actors will not have as easy access to it as the land- or air-based one.”

He said, “Indian policymakers should welcome this development, as it removes the veil of secrecy over this issue.”

New Delhi analyst Nitin Mehta also cast doubt on Pakistan’s nuclear maritime capability.

“It is unlikely that Pakistan has the capability to design and develop a sea-based nuclear missile, since even China, which is known to be helping Pakistan in its nuclear capabilities, does not possesses a credible submarine-launched missile,” he said. “Pakistan could be developing an undersea nuclear ballistic missile, but it cannot do it on its own.”

Other analysts are not certain the Pakistan Navy can afford to undertake the responsibility of the nation’s second-strike capability.

Brian Cloughley, a former Australian defense attaché to Islamabad, said the size of Pakistan’s submarine force is too small to carry out such a task.

“Pakistan’s current submarine fleet is not adequate in numbers [although well-trained] to be able to undertake detection and effective interdiction of the Indian fleet, given its size — which is increasing, even if slowly,” he said.

Pakistan has two refurbished 1970s-era Agosta-70 and three 1990s-era Agosta-90B subs. The latter are equipped with air independent propulsion (AIP) or are in the process of being retrofitted with the AIP module, and incrementally entered service beginning in 1999.

Le Mière believes Pakistan could, at a stretch, maintain a constant deterrent patrol.

“Once all the Agosta-90Bs are fitted with AIP, this should theoretically allow for one submarine deployed for most of the time, with another in refit and another in reserve,” he said. “In theory, this allows for constant patrols, but in reality, problems with boats usually lead to gaps if there is a three-boat fleet.”

Le Mière conceded, though, this would cause other problems.

“This would be the majority of the Pakistani fleet dedicated to nuclear strike, or certainly dedicating a significant portion of its arsenal to nuclear-tipped Baburs,” he said. “Hence, whether this second-strike capability will in fact be deployed in a form of near-constant at-sea deterrence is questionable until Pakistan is able to procure further submarines to fill the conventional role, as well.”

Cloughley said the interdiction of India’s fleet “must remain [the Navy’s] first priority,” and he considers “conversion of the present assets to take Babur not only costly, but a most regrettable diversion of budget allocation.

“I would go so far as to say that, in present circumstances, it would be a grave error if such a program were to go ahead,” he added.

Pakistan has a requirement for 12 to 14 subs to meet Navy expansion plans. This would allow for a constant war patrol of at least one deterrent-tasked submarine, leaving other submarines to carry out more traditional tasks.

However, Cloughley is still certain that Pakistan does not require such a capability.

“[Pakistan] has plenty of nuclear-capable SSMs and strike aircraft, and does not need a Navy-oriented second-strike capability,” he said.

Correspondent Vivek Raghuvanshi in New Delhi contributed to this report.

 

[UmarJustice]

Pakistan Navy launches probe

Pakistan Navy has launched an internal probe under the direct supervision of one of its top bosses into the reported involvement of Navy personnel in the kidnappings for ransom and extortion activities in Pakistan's largest cosmopolitan city Karachi.
The Director General Naval Intelligence (DG NI) Jawed Akhar is leading the investigation under the command of Deputy Chief of Naval Staff (Administration) Vice Admiral Shafqat Jawed, it is learnt.
According to intelligence sources, the probe would also cover allegations involving the killing of a low-ranking Navy official at the hands of Naval Police and NI at the NHQ Islamabad last year.
A media report on Friday had revealed the involvement of three NI personnel including two assistant directors in the kidnapping of a trader from Karachi. The kidnappers had demanded a ransom of five million rupees for the trader's release. One of the abductors was nabbed after being shot by a police officer when he was receiving the ransom amount, the media report stated. Two of the three accused NI personnel are identified in the report as Assistant Director Ishfaq and Sepoy Dilpazir Akhtar while another reported assistant director remained unidentified.
Reportedly, this has rung alarm bells within the top naval circles after an initial internal probe is said to have verified the allegations regarding the involvement of naval personnel in extortions and kidnappings in Karachi.
Following this, Naval Chief Admiral Asif Sandila reportedly assigned the top officials at Operations Branch and NI directorate to conduct a detailed probe into these allegations.
A Pakistan navy commander at the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in Islamabad and a navy commander at the NI in Karachi are jointly conducting the investigation and they would report the respective findings to the DG NI, to be shared with the Deputy Naval Chief (operations) before being put up to the Naval Chief, the intelligence sources said.
This is not the first time that NI officials have been found involved in allegedly highhanded methods against common citizens and even the Navy personnel. Last year, Naval Police had arrested a sweeper from the NHQ Islamabad on theft charges. He was reportedly handed over to the NI. Allegedly, the Naval Police and NI officials tortured the sweeper to death during the interrogation.
The deceased's father, who was also reported to be a Navy employee, had purportedly protested over the incident but the Naval authorities had allegedly hushed up the issue by financially accommodating the said person.
Back in 2011, journalist Saleem Shahzad had reported about alleged contacts between the Taliban militants and some naval officials before he was kidnapped and brutally killed.
Shahzad had reported that attack on Mehran Base in Karachi was the result of failed negotiations between the naval authorities and militants for the release of those navy officials who were probed for having alleged links with the militants and were detained at NHQ Karachi. Interestingly, the NHQ Karachi is the same place where the captive trader, according to Friday's media report, was kept.
Earlier, responding to the kidnapping allegations, Pakistan Navy's Spokesman Commodore Irfan-ul-Haq had said on Friday that Navy denied any involvement of NI personnel in abduction or extortion activities. The incident reported by a section of newspaper and media channel was being investigated in coordination with civil police, he had said, adding that if any of Navy person was found going beyond the lawful mandate, strict disciplinary action would be initiated accordingly.
The DG NI-led investigation, the intelligence officials said, is mandated to ascertain the extent of the involvement of Naval personnel in allegedly highhanded activities, by means of finding out the exact number of such kinds of incidents and the number of accused involved.
The revelation regarding NI personnel's alleged involvement in kidnappings and extortion has taken the Pakistan's political circles by storm with some parliamentarians questioning the credibility and capability of the intelligence agencies to deal with terrorism.
Referring to the NI, Senator Ghulam Ali wonders if an intelligence agency involved in extorting money from citizens could "counter Indian espionage," whereas Senator Zahid Khan suggests that the NI personnel, if proved guilty, "should be court-martialled."

Pakistan Navy launches probe

 

[fatman17]

Pakistan Navy launches probe

Pakistan Navy has launched an internal probe under the direct supervision of one of its top bosses into the reported involvement of Navy personnel in the kidnappings for ransom and extortion activities in Pakistan's largest cosmopolitan city Karachi.
The Director General Naval Intelligence (DG NI) Jawed Akhar is leading the investigation under the command of Deputy Chief of Naval Staff (Administration) Vice Admiral Shafqat Jawed, it is learnt.
According to intelligence sources, the probe would also cover allegations involving the killing of a low-ranking Navy official at the hands of Naval Police and NI at the NHQ Islamabad last year.
A media report on Friday had revealed the involvement of three NI personnel including two assistant directors in the kidnapping of a trader from Karachi. The kidnappers had demanded a ransom of five million rupees for the trader's release. One of the abductors was nabbed after being shot by a police officer when he was receiving the ransom amount, the media report stated. Two of the three accused NI personnel are identified in the report as Assistant Director Ishfaq and Sepoy Dilpazir Akhtar while another reported assistant director remained unidentified.
Reportedly, this has rung alarm bells within the top naval circles after an initial internal probe is said to have verified the allegations regarding the involvement of naval personnel in extortions and kidnappings in Karachi.
Following this, Naval Chief Admiral Asif Sandila reportedly assigned the top officials at Operations Branch and NI directorate to conduct a detailed probe into these allegations.
A Pakistan navy commander at the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in Islamabad and a navy commander at the NI in Karachi are jointly conducting the investigation and they would report the respective findings to the DG NI, to be shared with the Deputy Naval Chief (operations) before being put up to the Naval Chief, the intelligence sources said.
This is not the first time that NI officials have been found involved in allegedly highhanded methods against common citizens and even the Navy personnel. Last year, Naval Police had arrested a sweeper from the NHQ Islamabad on theft charges. He was reportedly handed over to the NI. Allegedly, the Naval Police and NI officials tortured the sweeper to death during the interrogation.
The deceased's father, who was also reported to be a Navy employee, had purportedly protested over the incident but the Naval authorities had allegedly hushed up the issue by financially accommodating the said person.
Back in 2011, journalist Saleem Shahzad had reported about alleged contacts between the Taliban militants and some naval officials before he was kidnapped and brutally killed.
Shahzad had reported that attack on Mehran Base in Karachi was the result of failed negotiations between the naval authorities and militants for the release of those navy officials who were probed for having alleged links with the militants and were detained at NHQ Karachi. Interestingly, the NHQ Karachi is the same place where the captive trader, according to Friday's media report, was kept.
Earlier, responding to the kidnapping allegations, Pakistan Navy's Spokesman Commodore Irfan-ul-Haq had said on Friday that Navy denied any involvement of NI personnel in abduction or extortion activities. The incident reported by a section of newspaper and media channel was being investigated in coordination with civil police, he had said, adding that if any of Navy person was found going beyond the lawful mandate, strict disciplinary action would be initiated accordingly.
The DG NI-led investigation, the intelligence officials said, is mandated to ascertain the extent of the involvement of Naval personnel in allegedly highhanded activities, by means of finding out the exact number of such kinds of incidents and the number of accused involved.
The revelation regarding NI personnel's alleged involvement in kidnappings and extortion has taken the Pakistan's political circles by storm with some parliamentarians questioning the credibility and capability of the intelligence agencies to deal with terrorism.
Referring to the NI, Senator Ghulam Ali wonders if an intelligence agency involved in extorting money from citizens could "counter Indian espionage," whereas Senator Zahid Khan suggests that the NI personnel, if proved guilty, "should be court-martialled."

Pakistan Navy launches probe

no clear-cut allegations in this poorly written article.

 

[niaz]

Fact that security agencies have had contacts with non-state actors involved in the Afghan war & in the Kashmir insurrection is common knowledge. Even the TTP Punjab Chief nicknamed Muawiyah had allegedly close links with ISI and had also participated in Kashmir jihad. It is therefore reasonable to assume that extremist ideology may have been rubbed off on some the security personnel as well.

There have been allegations of the Lej & other terrorist organization links with the MI & ISI for a long time. Besides, inroads by Hizb e Tehrir into the rank & file of the armed forces have already come out in the open with the Court Martial of Brig Ali Khan in 2011

Everyone will agree that one cannot serve two masters. Unless you have undivided loyalty to the State of Pakistan, you have no place in the armed services. IMHO it is a must that armed forces in general and the security agencies in particular are weeded out of all individuals with divided loyalties.

 

[fatman17]

Fact that security agencies have had contacts with non-state actors involved in the Afghan war & in the Kashmir insurrection is common knowledge. Even the TTP Punjab Chief nicknamed Muawiyah had allegedly close links with ISI and had also participated in Kashmir jihad. It is therefore reasonable to assume that extremist ideology may have been rubbed off on some the security personnel as well.

There have been allegations of the Lej & other terrorist organization links with the MI & ISI for a long time. Besides, inroads by Hizb e Tehrir into the rank & file of the armed forces have already come out in the open with the Court Martial of Brig Ali Khan in 2011

Everyone will agree that one cannot serve two masters. Unless you have undivided loyalty to the State of Pakistan, you have no place in the armed services. IMHO it is a must that armed forces in general and the security agencies in particular are weeded out of all individuals with divided loyalties.

you are correct however, the major issue lies with retd. intell officers who continue to advice/handle the militant networks - Q is do they do it on the instructions of ISI or on their own as 'rogue' elements. many such serving officers have been dismissed and in return they continue to stay in contact / handle the militants.

 

[Donatello]

you are correct however, the major issue lies with retd. intell officers who continue to advice/handle the militant networks - Q is do they do it on the instructions of ISI or on their own as 'rogue' elements. many such serving officers have been dismissed and in return they continue to stay in contact / handle the militants.

Any element of the Armed Forces that acts against the interests of the state should be considered a traitor.

Remember what Stalin and Mao did to their officers who were found not obeying the orders?

Pakistan needs to do the same. If you know the persons are involved in abetting the enemy, they should be executed. Simple as that.

You simply cannot shyt and eat in the same place.

 

[Black Eagle 90]

Experts Wary of Pakistan Nuke Claims

Few Details Available on Naval Strike Capability.


May. 26, 2012 - 10:36AM | By USMAN ANSARI



ISLAMABAD — Days after Pakistan hinted that it possesses a sea-based second nuclear strike capability, Indian Defence Ministry officials remained silent on the matter, and outside observers were skeptical that the Navy had such a capability.

On May 19, the head of the Pakistan Navy, Adm. Asif Sandhila, inaugurated the Headquarters of the Naval Strategic Force Command (NSFC). A press release by the military’s Inter Services Public Relations stated the NSFC “will perform a pivotal role in development and employment of the Naval Strategic Force,” and was “the custodian of the nation’s 2nd strike capability.”

Beyond the announcement, Pakistan’s Navy has said little about the office or about the service’s capabilities.

In February, Sandhila told Defense News that the Pakistan Navy was mindful of India’s plans to complete the sea-based arm of its nuclear triad, and was “taking necessary measures to restore the strategic balance” in the Indian Ocean region.

Christian Le Mière, a research fellow for naval forces and maritime security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, said Pakistan’s sea-based deterrent is “most likely” the widely speculated submarine-launched variant of the Babur/Hatf-7 (Vengeance-7) cruise missile.

“The Babur is already nuclear-capable and is expected to be used on submarines,” he said. “I have not seen verifiable evidence of any tests for a submarine-launched version, but it is perfectly feasible that a [submarine-launched cruise missile] is now available.”

Analyst Usman Shabbir, with the Pakistan Military Consortium think tank, said Pakistan has been working on its sea-based deterrent for some time.

“When the Babur was first revealed in 2005, it was claimed that it is mainly designed to be deployed from submarines. There was at least that speculation,” he said.

The Navy “has pretty good experience in using similar systems; for example, both submarine-launched Harpoon and Exocet [missiles] use a similar system, and [the Navy] has operated both for a long time.”

Shabbir speculated that the Babur/Hatf-7 missiles might be fired from torpedo tubes, similar to UGM-84 Harpoons.

But Le Mière believes there may still be some room for doubt.

“The phrase ‘sea-based second strike’ suggests a surface vessel could also be used if a submarine-launched version is not yet ready,” he said. “But obviously, while a surface vessel is mobile, it is far less survivable and far more detectable than a sub.”

As for Pakistan’s neighbor to the east, Harsh Pant, international relations lecturer at the Department of Defence Studies at King’s College in London, said India is neither alarmed nor disadvantaged by this development.

“India had factored this reality into its force posture much before this acknowledgement,” Pant said. “I do not see this changing the ground reality, insofar [as the] India-Pakistan nuclear posture is concerned. Despite what outsiders might think, nuclear deterrence in South Asia remains robust.

“The real problem remains the role of non-state actors,” he added. “In that context, Pakistan’s sea-based second strike capability is more reassuring, because the non-state actors will not have as easy access to it as the land- or air-based one.”

He said, “Indian policymakers should welcome this development, as it removes the veil of secrecy over this issue.”

New Delhi analyst Nitin Mehta also cast doubt on Pakistan’s nuclear maritime capability.

“It is unlikely that Pakistan has the capability to design and develop a sea-based nuclear missile, since even China, which is known to be helping Pakistan in its nuclear capabilities, does not possesses a credible submarine-launched missile,” he said. “Pakistan could be developing an undersea nuclear ballistic missile, but it cannot do it on its own.”

Other analysts are not certain the Pakistan Navy can afford to undertake the responsibility of the nation’s second-strike capability.

Brian Cloughley, a former Australian defense attaché to Islamabad, said the size of Pakistan’s submarine force is too small to carry out such a task.

“Pakistan’s current submarine fleet is not adequate in numbers [although well-trained] to be able to undertake detection and effective interdiction of the Indian fleet, given its size — which is increasing, even if slowly,” he said.

Pakistan has two refurbished 1970s-era Agosta-70 and three 1990s-era Agosta-90B subs. The latter are equipped with air independent propulsion (AIP) or are in the process of being retrofitted with the AIP module, and incrementally entered service beginning in 1999.

Le Mière believes Pakistan could, at a stretch, maintain a constant deterrent patrol.

“Once all the Agosta-90Bs are fitted with AIP, this should theoretically allow for one submarine deployed for most of the time, with another in refit and another in reserve,” he said. “In theory, this allows for constant patrols, but in reality, problems with boats usually lead to gaps if there is a three-boat fleet.”

Le Mière conceded, though, this would cause other problems.

“This would be the majority of the Pakistani fleet dedicated to nuclear strike, or certainly dedicating a significant portion of its arsenal to nuclear-tipped Baburs,” he said. “Hence, whether this second-strike capability will in fact be deployed in a form of near-constant at-sea deterrence is questionable until Pakistan is able to procure further submarines to fill the conventional role, as well.”

Cloughley said the interdiction of India’s fleet “must remain [the Navy’s] first priority,” and he considers “conversion of the present assets to take Babur not only costly, but a most regrettable diversion of budget allocation.

“I would go so far as to say that, in present circumstances, it would be a grave error if such a program were to go ahead,” he added.

Pakistan has a requirement for 12 to 14 subs to meet Navy expansion plans. This would allow for a constant war patrol of at least one deterrent-tasked submarine, leaving other submarines to carry out more traditional tasks.

However, Cloughley is still certain that Pakistan does not require such a capability.

“[Pakistan] has plenty of nuclear-capable SSMs and strike aircraft, and does not need a Navy-oriented second-strike capability,” he said.

Correspondent Vivek Raghuvanshi in New Delhi contributed to this report.

PN should take some serious notice of its air and surface defence; PN should place an order for 3 Spada-2000 Batteries as well as Chinese High Altitude SAMs too.

 

[Zarvan]

@Aeronaut @Leader @WebMaster @nuclearpak @Oscar @Antibody @Imran Khan @fatman17 @Icarus @Rafi @Areesh and others their is whole article in every news paper almost why is that ?
http://e.thenews.com.pk/9-3-2013/page23.asp

 

[Leader]

good !!!!!!

 

[air marshal]

Indigenously-built warship F22 Frigate PNS ASLAT, manufactured at Karachi shipyard is successfully inducted into Pakistan Navy.

 

[alibaz]

Congrats PN

 

[fatman17]

PAKISTAN’S NAVAL FUTURE

The Pakistan Navy (PN) faces a future with narrowing options and prospects, just as the country finds itself being moved closer into the Chinese orbit by the developing strategic shape of central, north and south Asia.
6th Jun 2013.

Pakistan
Pakistan’s Naval Future
Byline: Mark Farrer / Canberra

The Pakistan Navy (PN) faces a future with narrowing options and prospects, just as the country finds itself being moved closer into the Chinese orbit by the developing strategic shape of central, north and south Asia.

Any nation’s military capability depends on its economy. The economy of Pakistan is in a poor and deteriorating condition. Historically (1951/52 until 2011/12), the average economic growth was 5%, varying from -1.8% to +10.2%. The country has not emulated the remarkable and steady development of the rest of Asia - a development which has lifted hundreds of millions from poverty and led to industrialisation, integration into the global economy and a brighter future for hundreds of millions. Pakistan remains one of the poorest countries in the region, with a semi-industrialised economy that is not doing well. Literacy is low, the education system is poor, and aid, agriculture and remittances remain central to the economy. Worse, GDP growth is outstripped by population growth, meaning that per capita income is actually falling. Much of the foreign aid vanishes into corrupt governance practises and rare is the foreign investor willing to risk capital in a country with locally mutable laws and deeply ingrained corruption. On top of this is the rising influence of Islamists in the country, which more closely resembles a collection of city-states and warlord-dominated hinterlands than a Westphalian nation-state.

For a continental state in such an environment, the army must have first call on resources for national security, followed by the air force, with the navy a definite last. This ‘last for funding priority’ position is exacerbated by the demands naval forces place on highly educated, skilled manpower - something Pakistan is very short of. The traditional source of naval support has been the UK and USA: both have supplied second-hand warships for low prices in the past. Now there is a marked reluctance to do so.

Consequentially, the upgrade of the Pakistan Navy is in grave doubt, and the already-wide gap between the PN and the Indian Navy - against whom it measures itself - is set to widen dramatically. The economy of Pakistan cannot provide the resources to maintain, let alone much expand, the PN.

The PN is a significant force for a nation with only a few hundred miles of shoreline, its major units being 11 frigates (four Chinese-designed F-22P Zulfiquar class, six obsolescent ex-RN Type 21 class and a Oliver Hazard Perry class lacking its helicopter and SAM system) and five submarines (two elderly Agosta class and three Agosta 90-B). The problem with these major units is that the six Type 21 class and two Agosta class are obsolescent at best. Worse, the combat systems of the Type 21 are particularly dated and suffer serious reliability issues. The PN has been arguing in Islamabad for the purchase of four to seven ex-USN Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates or for the purchase of the four Batch 3 Type 42 class destroyers the RN is disposing of.

It is not likely to get either.

There is very little chance in current circumstances of the USA agreeing to the PN acquisition of any of the Perry class it is retiring during 2013-14. The six scheduled to be retired in fiscal year 2013 have been offered for foreign disposal. Taiwan is the most serious contender, as it wishes to replace all eight of its ex-USN Knox class ASW frigates. The Oliver Hazard Perry class is particularly suited to Taiwan, having a good ASW capability and an AAW capability the Knox class lacks can easily be added to them. This class is in some demand, with both Mexico and Thailand also discussing acquisition of ex-USN vessels with Washington. In view of this and the issues the USA (and indeed the UK) are experiencing with Pakistan it is not likely that a PN request for ex-USN frigates will be favourable received. The UK is somewhat more likely to sell the PN the four Batch 3 Type 42 class but the relevant word is sell, and Islamabad has little money to devote to such a project.

In addition, India is a significant market for British military equipment and the British are well aware of hostile Indian views on the sale of warships with even semi-modern capabilities to the PN - a navy entirely lacking an area defence SAM capability. The Chinese FM-90 system fitted to the Zulfiqar class is at best a point defence system and is relatively incapable against modern SSM. PNS Alamgir, the PN’s sole Perry class, is not fitted with the Mk 13/Standard SAM system she was built with. It was removed from USN service in 2004, four years before she was transferred. It is unlikely that London would be willing to risk future sales to India, which has a rapidly expanding economy and which is getting wealthier even in per capita terms in order to sell four Type 42 class destroyers to the PN.

Essentially, the only realistic, affordable source of new frigates is China. Analysis of past announcements by the PN indicates that their preferred order of battle is six to eight Perry class complete with a SAM system for at least point defence, the four existing Zulfiqar class (F-22P) and four Type 54A (Jiangkai II) complete with its 32-cell HQ-16 VLS system. This missile is a joint People's Republic of China – Russian upgrade of the Russian Navy’s 9K37M1-2 'Shtil' (NATO SA-N-12). This is an area-defence SAM system of good capability - yet even the Chinese want some money on the table.

There is little doubt that the Chinese will sell the additional four F-22P (Zulfiqar) class ships Pakistan is widely reported to have ordered in late 2012, yet purchasing these might well make financing any possible deal for AAW-capable Type 54A class ships unaffordable even at ‘political influence’ prices. It is certain that China would use such a deal to continue the process of enmeshing Pakistan in their area of influence and in their effort to keep India encircled – and they cannot be ‘blamed’ for this.

China faces a problem it has never before experienced in its history in that it is now economically dependent on imported energy: China is now dependent on maritime trade. This has never occurred before. A Chinese ally using Chinese equipment, under significant Chinese influence and located in the mouth of the Gulf of Oman is obviously in their interest. Much of China’s oil now comes from the Persian Gulf. However, there is little evidence to support the persistent low-reliability reports that the Chinese plan to build, acquire or use a naval base in Pakistan.

So while the Type-54A would be a good match for the PN’s area air defence requirements such an acquisition might indicate more than a simple purchase. Indeed, any PN acquisition of Chinese-built warships would well repay close examination of its financial terms. Generous financial terms from China would be evidence of Chinese strategic policy towards protection of their now-essential trade routes. The obvious trade-off inside the ‘significant changes and upgrades’ the PN has requested for the four-ship order is to upgrade from FM-90 to HQ-16 VLS as fitted to the Type 54A. It has to be stressed that at time of writing there was no confirmation of this part of the requested upgrade package, although it is confirmed that Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works (KSEW) will be building two of the new ships. KSEW is also building three Azmat class fast attack craft, the first of class having been built in China at Xingang Shipyard. The ships are a 560 ton fast attack with C-802A surface-to-surface missiles. The vessels are 60 metres long, have a range of 1 000 nautical miles and a top speed of 30 knots. They are a cheap and reasonably modern missile craft although their SSM fit cannot be regarded as particularly effective.

When China Shipbuilding Trading Corporation (CSTC) secured the four-ship, improved F-22P Zulfiquar class order, no details were released regarding the nature of the changes the PN required for the type. What was announced was that the changes requested had been accepted, and that “A spokesman for CSTC was unable to say if the eight FM-90 SAMs (based on French ‘Crotale’ copies) would be replaced by a larger number of more capable missiles housed in a VLS….” It would be premature to come to any conclusion that HQ-16 might be fitted to these four ships, but the possibility of it should be carefully noted.

The PN is also in dire need of new submarines. The two Agosta 70 cannot be considered operational even though they are still reported to operate in local waters. These are believed to be training activities. The three Agosta-90B are a modern and capable platform, yet once again a replacement program should be well under way by now. There are few signs that one is since the end of the 2011 talks concerning Pakistan’s negotiations for a deal for six Chinese-built submarines. The PN has been actively canvassing other builders since 2011, but the problem once again is money. Once again the only realistic option is China, which currently has two modern submarine designs in production or available. These are the 4,000-ton (submerged) Type-041 Yuan class, and a smaller design, the 2,300-ton (submerged) S-20. Both can be fitted with an AIP module. The constant speculation regarding the PN acquiring Chinese SSN remains merely that, there is no evidence even of a Chinese willingness to discuss such a matter, and the PN’s ability to operate an SSN is assessed to be low. They will be doing well to maintain extant numbers of capable submarines (three) over the longer term.

Of deeper concern is the steady Sinification of the PN. It is altering from a western-oriented force with older but capable ex-RN and ex-USN types, to a Chinese ‘satellite’ Navy, with a gradual decrease in non-Chinese influences being noteworthy. This is certainly in China’s strategic interest, yet it is not necessarily against western interests either. China now has a valid strategic requirement for a local partner of some sort – at the very least they will continue to shoulder an increasing burden of traditional ‘maritime constabulary’ functions: anti-piracy being just the most obvious. And this is driven not by Chinese expansionism into the Indian Ocean, but by their new strategic reality – that’s where a lot of their energy imports come from. The ‘interesting twist’ in this strategic alteration is the tension between China and Pakistan on one hand and India on the other.

In that equation several factors are still to come fully to flower. First among these are the implications of the new US Air-Sea Battle doctrine and the so-called (and almost certainly hollow, given his rundown of the US military) Obama policy of the ‘Asia Pivot’. What is certain is that a slow strategic change which began twenty years ago is starting to now influence day-to-day operational and strategic realities in the northern Indian Ocean.

 

[Zarvan]

PAKISTAN’S NAVAL FUTURE

The Pakistan Navy (PN) faces a future with narrowing options and prospects, just as the country finds itself being moved closer into the Chinese orbit by the developing strategic shape of central, north and south Asia.
6th Jun 2013.

Pakistan
Pakistan’s Naval Future
Byline: Mark Farrer / Canberra

The Pakistan Navy (PN) faces a future with narrowing options and prospects, just as the country finds itself being moved closer into the Chinese orbit by the developing strategic shape of central, north and south Asia.

Any nation’s military capability depends on its economy. The economy of Pakistan is in a poor and deteriorating condition. Historically (1951/52 until 2011/12), the average economic growth was 5%, varying from -1.8% to +10.2%. The country has not emulated the remarkable and steady development of the rest of Asia - a development which has lifted hundreds of millions from poverty and led to industrialisation, integration into the global economy and a brighter future for hundreds of millions. Pakistan remains one of the poorest countries in the region, with a semi-industrialised economy that is not doing well. Literacy is low, the education system is poor, and aid, agriculture and remittances remain central to the economy. Worse, GDP growth is outstripped by population growth, meaning that per capita income is actually falling. Much of the foreign aid vanishes into corrupt governance practises and rare is the foreign investor willing to risk capital in a country with locally mutable laws and deeply ingrained corruption. On top of this is the rising influence of Islamists in the country, which more closely resembles a collection of city-states and warlord-dominated hinterlands than a Westphalian nation-state.

For a continental state in such an environment, the army must have first call on resources for national security, followed by the air force, with the navy a definite last. This ‘last for funding priority’ position is exacerbated by the demands naval forces place on highly educated, skilled manpower - something Pakistan is very short of. The traditional source of naval support has been the UK and USA: both have supplied second-hand warships for low prices in the past. Now there is a marked reluctance to do so.

Consequentially, the upgrade of the Pakistan Navy is in grave doubt, and the already-wide gap between the PN and the Indian Navy - against whom it measures itself - is set to widen dramatically. The economy of Pakistan cannot provide the resources to maintain, let alone much expand, the PN.

The PN is a significant force for a nation with only a few hundred miles of shoreline, its major units being 11 frigates (four Chinese-designed F-22P Zulfiquar class, six obsolescent ex-RN Type 21 class and a Oliver Hazard Perry class lacking its helicopter and SAM system) and five submarines (two elderly Agosta class and three Agosta 90-B). The problem with these major units is that the six Type 21 class and two Agosta class are obsolescent at best. Worse, the combat systems of the Type 21 are particularly dated and suffer serious reliability issues. The PN has been arguing in Islamabad for the purchase of four to seven ex-USN Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates or for the purchase of the four Batch 3 Type 42 class destroyers the RN is disposing of.

It is not likely to get either.

There is very little chance in current circumstances of the USA agreeing to the PN acquisition of any of the Perry class it is retiring during 2013-14. The six scheduled to be retired in fiscal year 2013 have been offered for foreign disposal. Taiwan is the most serious contender, as it wishes to replace all eight of its ex-USN Knox class ASW frigates. The Oliver Hazard Perry class is particularly suited to Taiwan, having a good ASW capability and an AAW capability the Knox class lacks can easily be added to them. This class is in some demand, with both Mexico and Thailand also discussing acquisition of ex-USN vessels with Washington. In view of this and the issues the USA (and indeed the UK) are experiencing with Pakistan it is not likely that a PN request for ex-USN frigates will be favourable received. The UK is somewhat more likely to sell the PN the four Batch 3 Type 42 class but the relevant word is sell, and Islamabad has little money to devote to such a project.

In addition, India is a significant market for British military equipment and the British are well aware of hostile Indian views on the sale of warships with even semi-modern capabilities to the PN - a navy entirely lacking an area defence SAM capability. The Chinese FM-90 system fitted to the Zulfiqar class is at best a point defence system and is relatively incapable against modern SSM. PNS Alamgir, the PN’s sole Perry class, is not fitted with the Mk 13/Standard SAM system she was built with. It was removed from USN service in 2004, four years before she was transferred. It is unlikely that London would be willing to risk future sales to India, which has a rapidly expanding economy and which is getting wealthier even in per capita terms in order to sell four Type 42 class destroyers to the PN.

Essentially, the only realistic, affordable source of new frigates is China. Analysis of past announcements by the PN indicates that their preferred order of battle is six to eight Perry class complete with a SAM system for at least point defence, the four existing Zulfiqar class (F-22P) and four Type 54A (Jiangkai II) complete with its 32-cell HQ-16 VLS system. This missile is a joint People's Republic of China – Russian upgrade of the Russian Navy’s 9K37M1-2 'Shtil' (NATO SA-N-12). This is an area-defence SAM system of good capability - yet even the Chinese want some money on the table.

There is little doubt that the Chinese will sell the additional four F-22P (Zulfiqar) class ships Pakistan is widely reported to have ordered in late 2012, yet purchasing these might well make financing any possible deal for AAW-capable Type 54A class ships unaffordable even at ‘political influence’ prices. It is certain that China would use such a deal to continue the process of enmeshing Pakistan in their area of influence and in their effort to keep India encircled – and they cannot be ‘blamed’ for this.

China faces a problem it has never before experienced in its history in that it is now economically dependent on imported energy: China is now dependent on maritime trade. This has never occurred before. A Chinese ally using Chinese equipment, under significant Chinese influence and located in the mouth of the Gulf of Oman is obviously in their interest. Much of China’s oil now comes from the Persian Gulf. However, there is little evidence to support the persistent low-reliability reports that the Chinese plan to build, acquire or use a naval base in Pakistan.

So while the Type-54A would be a good match for the PN’s area air defence requirements such an acquisition might indicate more than a simple purchase. Indeed, any PN acquisition of Chinese-built warships would well repay close examination of its financial terms. Generous financial terms from China would be evidence of Chinese strategic policy towards protection of their now-essential trade routes. The obvious trade-off inside the ‘significant changes and upgrades’ the PN has requested for the four-ship order is to upgrade from FM-90 to HQ-16 VLS as fitted to the Type 54A. It has to be stressed that at time of writing there was no confirmation of this part of the requested upgrade package, although it is confirmed that Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works (KSEW) will be building two of the new ships. KSEW is also building three Azmat class fast attack craft, the first of class having been built in China at Xingang Shipyard. The ships are a 560 ton fast attack with C-802A surface-to-surface missiles. The vessels are 60 metres long, have a range of 1 000 nautical miles and a top speed of 30 knots. They are a cheap and reasonably modern missile craft although their SSM fit cannot be regarded as particularly effective.

When China Shipbuilding Trading Corporation (CSTC) secured the four-ship, improved F-22P Zulfiquar class order, no details were released regarding the nature of the changes the PN required for the type. What was announced was that the changes requested had been accepted, and that “A spokesman for CSTC was unable to say if the eight FM-90 SAMs (based on French ‘Crotale’ copies) would be replaced by a larger number of more capable missiles housed in a VLS….” It would be premature to come to any conclusion that HQ-16 might be fitted to these four ships, but the possibility of it should be carefully noted.

The PN is also in dire need of new submarines. The two Agosta 70 cannot be considered operational even though they are still reported to operate in local waters. These are believed to be training activities. The three Agosta-90B are a modern and capable platform, yet once again a replacement program should be well under way by now. There are few signs that one is since the end of the 2011 talks concerning Pakistan’s negotiations for a deal for six Chinese-built submarines. The PN has been actively canvassing other builders since 2011, but the problem once again is money. Once again the only realistic option is China, which currently has two modern submarine designs in production or available. These are the 4,000-ton (submerged) Type-041 Yuan class, and a smaller design, the 2,300-ton (submerged) S-20. Both can be fitted with an AIP module. The constant speculation regarding the PN acquiring Chinese SSN remains merely that, there is no evidence even of a Chinese willingness to discuss such a matter, and the PN’s ability to operate an SSN is assessed to be low. They will be doing well to maintain extant numbers of capable submarines (three) over the longer term.

Of deeper concern is the steady Sinification of the PN. It is altering from a western-oriented force with older but capable ex-RN and ex-USN types, to a Chinese ‘satellite’ Navy, with a gradual decrease in non-Chinese influences being noteworthy. This is certainly in China’s strategic interest, yet it is not necessarily against western interests either. China now has a valid strategic requirement for a local partner of some sort – at the very least they will continue to shoulder an increasing burden of traditional ‘maritime constabulary’ functions: anti-piracy being just the most obvious. And this is driven not by Chinese expansionism into the Indian Ocean, but by their new strategic reality – that’s where a lot of their energy imports come from. The ‘interesting twist’ in this strategic alteration is the tension between China and Pakistan on one hand and India on the other.

In that equation several factors are still to come fully to flower. First among these are the implications of the new US Air-Sea Battle doctrine and the so-called (and almost certainly hollow, given his rundown of the US military) Obama policy of the ‘Asia Pivot’. What is certain is that a slow strategic change which began twenty years ago is starting to now influence day-to-day operational and strategic realities in the northern Indian Ocean.

Sir the only problem is shortage of money other wise most countries don't use frigates of different countries Sir most of them use war ships and submarines built by one country mostly either Russia or Europe Sir so we need to get money and if we get them we can get better version of F22 or if called F23 and also get new destroyer from China and by the way may by UK would be also willing to sell us because they have to improve their economy more

 

[Zarvan]

@fatman17 yes if we have some of oil reserves and other reserves we can offer China to extract them and take some percentage of them and in return give us War Ships and Submarines and Fighter Jets for our forces and above all use gawadar make it their trading and military base @Aeronaut @Leader @Oscar @nuclearpak and others