Analysis: Could the PN Strategy of Small Vessels Make Sense?
By M. Hussain
Pakistan has taken a rather unconventional approach to countering India’s massive maritime buildup. Instead of attempting to mirror the Indian Navy’s conventional assets, the Pakistan Navy (PN) has sought to respond asymmetrically. It is investing heavily on a sub-surface fleet, a disruptive technology that nearly tilted the balance during WWII.
The PN is also heavily investing in air assets such as MPAs and maritime strike capability, including another disruptive technology – the hypersonic anti-ship ballistic missile. This would have been enough for any naval strategist, in terms of responding effectively to a massive conventional imbalance, yet PN was not satisfied in stopping at that with its unconventional strategy; PN invested heavily in building a nuclear triad, and a land attack capability via the Babar cruise missile and related missiles.
Additionally, in terms of the surface fleet, PN has chosen to also buck the trend of larger and heavier ships, and focus on a seemingly unfashionable element – small ships. While disdained by other naval arms as having been “disproved” because of the ease with which missile boats were defeated during the Gulf War and during confrontations with lesser powers, the PN has taken a different view. She seems to believe that a networked force of smaller boats coupled with a few larger boats and a wide assortment of off-board sensors, along with reasonable air support can actually be effective. Not perhaps against gargantuan the US Navy, but definitely against the Indian Navy (IN).
Thus we have a wide range of small vessels from the Jalalat to the Hazmat class Fast Attack Crafts (FACs), Dutch and Smartship OPVs / corvettes and now 6 OPVs for the Pakistan Maritime Security Agency (PMSA). While some of these are purportedly only maritime, they can rapidly be up-fitted and pushed into service, particularly after the Type 21s are retired and a wide assortment of naval weapons are released including CIWS, SAMs, helicopters and AShMs.
These systems provide a capability opportunity rare for the same budget of less than 500 million USD. Consider the Smartship corvette as a standard example. It could have basic air defence, ASW and AShM roles yet have more to offer: 1) A helicopter that can provide meaningful anti-surface and sub-surface roles, 2) A UAV that can provide critical battlefield ISR, and 3) the potential for Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs) in place of its Rigid Hulled Inflatable Boats (RHIBs).
Let us expand on the last – a USV can bring in amazing disruptive capabilities. Two USVs could cruise ahead of a ship or a group of ships, sending back updates and being expendable assets that attract targeted weapons, from torpedoes to missiles. They can act as insurance against sea mines, spot incoming missiles and provide limited forward air defence, and even act as a travelling forward sonar buoy.
The smaller corvettes would, using such new technologies, thus pack a vital punch, particularly when networked and working as a team. And yet remain relatively low cost and expendable. They would essentially be the “bomb trucks” of the navy, to borrow an air force terms, and just like the AC-130s and F-16s, remain viable force multipliers because of the network and smart capabilities fostered by the IT revolution.
All weapons systems go through an evolution. Some mature and eventually become redundant. Warfare has always evolved, yet sometimes armies, air forces and navies become stuck in hubris. Ultimately the pay a big price, like the dreadnaughts and cruisers of WWI & WWII did.
In a seminal book titled The Future of War: Power, Technology, and American World Dominance in the 21st Century, the authors George and Meredith Friedman argued that each category of strategic weapon systems have a life-cycle. The Friedmans argue that strategic weapons systems can be considered on the basis of a list of eight points. These eight points determine what stage a weapon system is in its lifecycle between strategically significant and “senile” or obsolete systems.
They define a strategically significant weapon as “one that brings force to bear in such a way that it decisively erodes the war-making capability of the enemy,” while a senile weapon is defined as “the primary strategic function of the weapon has been obscured by the need to construct expensive defenses against threats to the weapons platform.” We can see a perfect example of this in today’s aircraft carriers, destroyers and cruisers.
The vast expense of these systems have little meaning other than to defend themselves. The best way to take out an enemy warship is not by sending a bigger and
badder warship, but rather, by sending an aircraft armed with missiles or a submarine. All it takes is one missile to get through the defenses to disable and leave helpless a 500 million dollar warship, and all its gold-plated systems.
In contrast, disruptive technologies seldom need such extensive or expensive self-protection suits. A UAV or USV is relatively expendable. A hypersonic ballistic missile needs little maneuvering. A small, fast FAC or corvette relies on its speed and small size to protect itself, and its network in a swarm of assets.
In conclusion, there seems method to the madness of the PN’s strategy; a network centric force with primary investments in subsurface and airborne assets. A surface fleet of networked combatants led by a Type 54A, corvettes and frigates, and fast attack crafts, along with a plethora of unmanned assets. A sword, far more than an army of shield bearers.