"I don't have to try and cross the border to see how ineffective US/NATO efforts have been..."
Apparently you do or you'd recognize that your western borders aren't the central issue. Only because, however, we have (barely) adequate troops from Khost to Konar to make the effort of those coming from Pakistan for destinations in the interior of Afghanistan very, very difficult.
Do you understand the players? If so, then you understand that there are a variety of personages in Konar, for example.
Who are indigenous to the area and opposed to the Afghan gov't and/or America?
Who are those from other areas (Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kirghizstan) who assist out of allegiance/affiliation or a DESIRE to close with the Americans along the border? They've no intention in either case of proceeding further. Neither those indigenous nor those transiting down the Konar river valley from the Warkhan Corridor are, really, ANY responsibility of yours. Both, however, will have a deleterious effect along your side of that border too-again, for a variety of reasons.
Amazingly, a big portion of our issues there involve the local crime syndicates and lumber barons. They'll fight us, the Afghan border police and YOUR troops to assure their continued smuggling of timber. The uzbeks transiting down the Konar river valley are just looking for a fight, preferably with us but are, I suspect though am unsure, equally happy to lend their assistance to those fighting your forces in Bajaur.
Our concern is two-fold- how to extend the Afghan gov't writ of state there, which is decidedly opposed by the timber lords, and to attrit/degrade the infiltration of forces for provinces further west surrounding Kabul.
To date, I characterize our efforts in this area as adequate to good. Not great but good. I'd characterize our drug-control efforts there as good. I'd like to claim more given the decisive results but can't as I'm yet unsure the effect of a drought last year on this area's opium cultivation and to what extent efforts by key provincial leaders have taken permanent hold in the populace.
As there's a history of cultivation (and, apparently, domestic use), this is likely a long-term effort to dissuade. Still, America has had luck and success here. How much was luck and to what degree success can be sustained is central.
The south- Here's the problem and it's three-fold in my estimation-
1.) TERRAIN- the good here is that there's very little practical foliage/cover for infiltration from Quetta/Baluchistan. The bad? A wide open border extending hundreds of kilometers from Gardez through Kandahar and Helmand to Nimroz. Desert. Lots of it except the green zones. The land is geologically far more flat with none of the channelizing features of your rugged mountain borders in Bajaur. As such the infil routes are virtuallly anywhere, ad hoc, and easily adjusted.
2.) TROOPS-Not that it matters much because there is a absolute absence of control here on either side. Neither the Canadians nor the Brits have been south to your Baluchi border to any extent. Only in April did the Brits, for the first time ever, extend south of Garmsir town. I haven't tracked their recent activities but I'm certain it was McKiernan's intention to develop that battle-space this summer.
We'll see if McChrystal alters any of the planned deployments but I'd doubt it. Somehow, our presence must be extended into Kandahar's and Helmand's south. Without question, here lies the bulk of the opium.
This is a function of an absence of NATO troops and the continuing issues with raising a police and army in Afghanistan. We'll get no more, likely, from our allies and may, over time, see that slide. Over time is key. I don't anticipate any ORBAT changes to ISAF before a year from this August-fifteen months.
How much time does that buy? We're largely satisfied with the progress made by ANA units that are largely non-pashtu. We've had some success with ANP units that aren't pashtu (notably Hazaras. They take their work very seriously from anecdotal stories I've read of their work in Kandahar with the Canadians). I don't know about the Afghan Border Police here at all so can't comment.
The pashtu continue to prove the most difficult to reconcile and integrate as effective fighters. I was surprised but there appears to be real issues of drug use among MANY of these young men and their reliability is, obviously, questionable just for that reason alone.
Illiteracy is a serious issue too in this area. As bad as conditions seem in the east of Afghanistan, it's the south that is an economic and cultural death-zone from the immense variety of pressures extending on the pashtu here.
So can we raise adequately competent and MOTIVATED afghan security forces to begin backfilling projected ISAF losses fifteen months from now? 4,000 of our men in combat units are deploying to train AND, quite likely, fight. We understand that they'll be battlefield mentors and there are a whole bevy of related issues there too...but there's a CHANCE that fifteen months will see considerable improvement.
3.) OBJECTIVE- The south is KEY TERRAIN to the insurgency.
What kind of in-roads can be made by ISAF towards the Baluchi border? We'll see but I expect any serious, sustained efforts to be matched by the Quetta Shura. It is the pashtu heart of Afghanistan from which the shura draws it's recruits-either in Afghanistan or the afghan refugee camps inside Baluchistan. It is the opium heart that sustains, IMHO, the insurgency. For both reasons I'd imagine any serious forays will not go unchallenged.
"Like the Pakistanis, you are at best trying to accomplish that securing of borders, with nothing to indicate that you are doing any better than us."
I disagree. Bajaur is a discrete operation in a border district. It is the only one of which I'm aware that is on-going. Anywhere else? You read Kayani's conversation as related by General Conway. What conclusions did you draw about Pakistani deployments in Baluchistan?
Cynically, I've postulated that these men of the Quetta shura will be LAST to go. Omar has been assiduous in attempting to maintain good relations with your government's security forces. I'm unaware of a single incident involving these men and your troops and I believe it ties to his deep understanding of the good-will afforded by sanctuary.
It also explains his efforts to tie Mehsud, Bahadur, and Nazir into an alliance directed at Afghanistan and NOT Pakistan. He is your ally, in short.
Whether you remain his ally remains to be seen. In any case, if you've limited forces that can be committed (and don't we all face THAT issue) then you've no choice but to proceed with SWAT and Buner followed by Orakzai, Korrum, Khyber, Mohmand, and into the Waziristans.
If that's the pathway, then the south will remain undisturbed from your side for some time.
Should we do the same and leave this area and it's opium for a more suitable time where you've the forces and inclination to match our operations or would you prefer that we continue mission?
Anyway, my thoughts as devoid of sarcasm and cynicism as I can manage (grrrrr...@#$# much gnashing of teeth).
"you are a senior member and an MP..."
Scars to prove both and patiently awaiting def.pk's tardy recognition of the latter.
Oh to be
ferenghi at def.pk.
