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Excrept from the Article Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft Beyond Sea Denial, Author- John Patch, Published in: US Naval War College China Maritime Studies Number -11 China's Near Sea Combat Capabilities (link to download full report: U.S. Naval War College | China Maritime Studies)
Quote
Page-3
Houbei within a Changing Naval Strategy
It is important to note that with an expectation of increasing far-seas missions for larger PLAN combatants, fast attack craft will, logically, need to be relevant well outside coastal waters. The far-seas concept endorsed since the mid-2000s, for instance, clearly requires a PLAN that will operate with increasing reach and with offensive capabilities. The Center for Naval Analyses assesses that Beijing’s intent to extend its strategic depth for active defense is an “expansion of the armed forces’ geographic and functional security interests.” PLAN development trends in support of far-seas missions include longrange standoff weapons and extended overseas deployments including the requisite sustainment, such as at-sea logistics and overseas bases. As PLAN major combatants move out of the near seas, then, smaller combatants like the Houbei can be expected to fill the gap in the near seas.
The Houbei missions fit within the recent PLAN emphasis on expanding near-seas missions beyond sea denial (which, of course, is inherently defensive) to sea control. The PLAN has naturally focused on sea control for a Taiwan contingency, but recent exercises and deployments involving fast attack craft seem to demonstrate a shift to sea-control missions in the larger near-seas region. Indeed, RAND assessed in 2009 that PLAN modernization is “specifically designed to allow the PLAN to move over this period from sea denial to sea control capabilities in a regional conflict.” Many respected China watchers have reached similar conclusions, describing these developments as distinctly offensive in nature.
Page-4
Houbei’s Potential for Offensive Roles and Missions
If the fast attack craft is to be relevant to sea control missions, it must have inherently offensive capabilities and it does.
At first blush, the craft may seem to have only defensive weapons, but it is the Houbei’s collective offensive punch that has the most potential for sea control, as opposed to denial. Houbei fits into “green-water active defense,” but some forget that this role involves offensive missions in certain circumstances. The PLAN clearly designed the Houbei to act as an element of a larger combat system or linked network. For example, its largely passive electromagnetic and electro-optical sensors provide only localized, line-of-sight targeting, preserving the ship’s ability to operate undetected but seriously limiting its ability to identify and track targets. The Houbei’s surface-search radar cannot provide over-the-horizon targeting (OTHT), and stealthy ships by their nature rarely use active sensors in any case. Houbei’s extensive data-link connectivity, however, supports long-range coordination with aircraft, submarines, and other warships. All this points toward a craft optimized to receive over-the-horizon targeting within a larger combat network. Many sources cite China’s growing open-ocean OTHT capability, making coordinated antiship Houbei operations more possible. In 2011, a RAND analyst concluded that “China’s greatly improved detection, tracking, targeting, and long-range missile systems will soon pose a very real threat to US carrier groups operating to the west of Guam.” Offensive missions in the far reaches of all three near seas, however, will require the numbers necessary to make the Houbei a viable offensive arm of the PLAN. If so, the logical implication is that it will be unavailable for coastal-defense missions.
Eight long-range YJ-83 (C803, 135 nm range) antiship cruise missiles provide the Houbei’s offensive punch. A study by the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) highlighted the YJ-83 and follow-on antiship cruise-missile threat: “Future anti-ship cruise missiles are expected to continue to utilize advanced seeker capabilities including the expanded use of millimeter wave seekers and the possible use of coherent radar seekers that allow enhanced countermeasure discrimination.” Just a single YJ-83 would be a serious potential threat to a U.S. carrier or expeditionary strike group, but Chinese naval tacticians do not envision single-missile strikes against adversary capital ships. Hence, seen as a larger combat system, externally cued Houbeis become much more than coastal-defense craft.
Page-5
Houbei’s “semistealth,” speed and volume antiship-cruise-missile fires also make it a potentially lethal element within a stratagem of offensive surprise. The importance of the Chinese concept of the “assassin’s mace” is well known, but many analysts still associate PLAN near-seas capabilities within an anti access and area-denial (A2/AD) paradigm that is, largely defensive in nature. Alongside an increasing fleet of long-range antiship cruise-missile platforms, the Houbei class provides a distinctly offensive potential capability within the active-defense strategy. A recent RAND assessment points out that Chinese writings stress preemptive attacks on key U.S. power-projection capabilities including aircraft carriers prior to or quickly following formal declaration of hostilities. This stratagem is designed to disrupt the deployment of forces to the region, place Washington in a passive position, and deliver a psychological shock to the United States and its allies. RAND goes farther, to state that an aircraft carrier with escort, if surprised, would be particularly vulnerable to a saturation missile attack. Chinese descriptions of Houbei fast attack craft consistently stress covert, long-range attacks taking advantage of stealth, surprise, and standoff ranges.
A final factor that supports the idea of the offensive nature of the Houbei class is the fact that new Chinese coastal-defense cruise-missile (CDCM) capabilities are lessening the need for coastal-defense craft, freeing up the Houbei for missions farther out in the near seas—though, again, they cannot replicate the roles or missions of offshore patrol vessels.
Page-6
The PLAN could also use Houbeis for missions other than surface warfare. For example, some analysts argue that the Houbei could carry missiles other than antiship cruise missiles, possibly antisubmarine missiles or torpedoes. While the Houbei has no antisubmarine sensors, within a linked fleet it could act simply as a “shooter,” just as it can in coordinated surface attacks. Antisubmarine missiles fired from a low-signature, fast surface craft provide the advantages of surprising enemy submarines, not giving away the location of escorting Chinese submarines, and limiting enemy response, in that, as analysts assert, the Houbei would be a hard target for torpedo attack. Finally, some argue that the PLAN could modify the Houbei for land attack cruise missiles, as the missile housing can apparently accommodate C601 and similar weapons of the type. These possibilities remain speculative, though, as no evidence clearly indicates that the PLAN will deploy missiles other than an antiship type on Houbei.
Unquote
Excrept from the Article Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft Beyond Sea Denial, Author- John Patch, Published in: US Naval War College China Maritime Studies Number -11 China's Near Sea Combat Capabilities (link to download full report: U.S. Naval War College | China Maritime Studies)
Quote
Page-3
Houbei within a Changing Naval Strategy
It is important to note that with an expectation of increasing far-seas missions for larger PLAN combatants, fast attack craft will, logically, need to be relevant well outside coastal waters. The far-seas concept endorsed since the mid-2000s, for instance, clearly requires a PLAN that will operate with increasing reach and with offensive capabilities. The Center for Naval Analyses assesses that Beijing’s intent to extend its strategic depth for active defense is an “expansion of the armed forces’ geographic and functional security interests.” PLAN development trends in support of far-seas missions include longrange standoff weapons and extended overseas deployments including the requisite sustainment, such as at-sea logistics and overseas bases. As PLAN major combatants move out of the near seas, then, smaller combatants like the Houbei can be expected to fill the gap in the near seas.
The Houbei missions fit within the recent PLAN emphasis on expanding near-seas missions beyond sea denial (which, of course, is inherently defensive) to sea control. The PLAN has naturally focused on sea control for a Taiwan contingency, but recent exercises and deployments involving fast attack craft seem to demonstrate a shift to sea-control missions in the larger near-seas region. Indeed, RAND assessed in 2009 that PLAN modernization is “specifically designed to allow the PLAN to move over this period from sea denial to sea control capabilities in a regional conflict.” Many respected China watchers have reached similar conclusions, describing these developments as distinctly offensive in nature.
Page-4
Houbei’s Potential for Offensive Roles and Missions
If the fast attack craft is to be relevant to sea control missions, it must have inherently offensive capabilities and it does.
At first blush, the craft may seem to have only defensive weapons, but it is the Houbei’s collective offensive punch that has the most potential for sea control, as opposed to denial. Houbei fits into “green-water active defense,” but some forget that this role involves offensive missions in certain circumstances. The PLAN clearly designed the Houbei to act as an element of a larger combat system or linked network. For example, its largely passive electromagnetic and electro-optical sensors provide only localized, line-of-sight targeting, preserving the ship’s ability to operate undetected but seriously limiting its ability to identify and track targets. The Houbei’s surface-search radar cannot provide over-the-horizon targeting (OTHT), and stealthy ships by their nature rarely use active sensors in any case. Houbei’s extensive data-link connectivity, however, supports long-range coordination with aircraft, submarines, and other warships. All this points toward a craft optimized to receive over-the-horizon targeting within a larger combat network. Many sources cite China’s growing open-ocean OTHT capability, making coordinated antiship Houbei operations more possible. In 2011, a RAND analyst concluded that “China’s greatly improved detection, tracking, targeting, and long-range missile systems will soon pose a very real threat to US carrier groups operating to the west of Guam.” Offensive missions in the far reaches of all three near seas, however, will require the numbers necessary to make the Houbei a viable offensive arm of the PLAN. If so, the logical implication is that it will be unavailable for coastal-defense missions.
Eight long-range YJ-83 (C803, 135 nm range) antiship cruise missiles provide the Houbei’s offensive punch. A study by the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) highlighted the YJ-83 and follow-on antiship cruise-missile threat: “Future anti-ship cruise missiles are expected to continue to utilize advanced seeker capabilities including the expanded use of millimeter wave seekers and the possible use of coherent radar seekers that allow enhanced countermeasure discrimination.” Just a single YJ-83 would be a serious potential threat to a U.S. carrier or expeditionary strike group, but Chinese naval tacticians do not envision single-missile strikes against adversary capital ships. Hence, seen as a larger combat system, externally cued Houbeis become much more than coastal-defense craft.
Page-5
Houbei’s “semistealth,” speed and volume antiship-cruise-missile fires also make it a potentially lethal element within a stratagem of offensive surprise. The importance of the Chinese concept of the “assassin’s mace” is well known, but many analysts still associate PLAN near-seas capabilities within an anti access and area-denial (A2/AD) paradigm that is, largely defensive in nature. Alongside an increasing fleet of long-range antiship cruise-missile platforms, the Houbei class provides a distinctly offensive potential capability within the active-defense strategy. A recent RAND assessment points out that Chinese writings stress preemptive attacks on key U.S. power-projection capabilities including aircraft carriers prior to or quickly following formal declaration of hostilities. This stratagem is designed to disrupt the deployment of forces to the region, place Washington in a passive position, and deliver a psychological shock to the United States and its allies. RAND goes farther, to state that an aircraft carrier with escort, if surprised, would be particularly vulnerable to a saturation missile attack. Chinese descriptions of Houbei fast attack craft consistently stress covert, long-range attacks taking advantage of stealth, surprise, and standoff ranges.
A final factor that supports the idea of the offensive nature of the Houbei class is the fact that new Chinese coastal-defense cruise-missile (CDCM) capabilities are lessening the need for coastal-defense craft, freeing up the Houbei for missions farther out in the near seas—though, again, they cannot replicate the roles or missions of offshore patrol vessels.
Page-6
The PLAN could also use Houbeis for missions other than surface warfare. For example, some analysts argue that the Houbei could carry missiles other than antiship cruise missiles, possibly antisubmarine missiles or torpedoes. While the Houbei has no antisubmarine sensors, within a linked fleet it could act simply as a “shooter,” just as it can in coordinated surface attacks. Antisubmarine missiles fired from a low-signature, fast surface craft provide the advantages of surprising enemy submarines, not giving away the location of escorting Chinese submarines, and limiting enemy response, in that, as analysts assert, the Houbei would be a hard target for torpedo attack. Finally, some argue that the PLAN could modify the Houbei for land attack cruise missiles, as the missile housing can apparently accommodate C601 and similar weapons of the type. These possibilities remain speculative, though, as no evidence clearly indicates that the PLAN will deploy missiles other than an antiship type on Houbei.
Unquote
