Pakistan caught in a bind by Sharif’s Saudi debt

[sonicboom]

Pakistan caught in a bind by Sharif’s Saudi debt

Author: Sajjad Ashraf, NUS

Stung by his complete failure to muster the parliamentary support needed to join in a Saudi-led intervention in Yemen’s civil war, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is now counting the costs of his $1.5 billion folly.

Sharif was put on the spot when the official Saudi news agency released a statement, after King Salman and Sharif spoke by phone last week, stating that Pakistan promised to place its military potential at Saudi disposal. The Saudis requested airplanes, ships and ground troops in support of its operations in Yemen. In the absence of a denial and with an active ministerial campaign in support of Saudi Arabia, it is near certain that Sharif did give an understanding of this nature to the Saudi King, when Sharif visited Saudi Arabia at short notice during March this year.

Sharif and the Saudi royals have cultivated good relations for some time. The Saudis softened their nuclear sanctions on Pakistan in 1998 when, as prime minister, Sharif decided to conduct Pakistan’s first nuclear testing. They gave billions of dollars worth of oil to Pakistan on deferred payment terms but effectively free for five years. The Saudi government later denied this facility when General Pervez Musharraf, who succeeded Sharif, asked for its extension.

The Saudis made a calculated investment. After saving the Sharif family from Musharraf’s jails, they hosted them in style during their years in exile. They backed Sharifs to set up multi-million dollar enterprises based in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. When the political space opened up in Pakistan, they sent Sharif back in 2007 on board a royal Saudi plane to prevent his deportation. Musharraf had thwarted Sharif’s earlier attempt to return, breaking what had been a solid commitment of a maximum ten-year exile. Sharif and his family owe much of their new billions to Saudi patronage. As such, Sharif ‘is very much Saudi Arabia’s man in Pakistan,’ as a Saudi prince put it.

And in 2014, when the Pakistani rupee was sinking, a mysterious deposit of US$1.5 billion showed up in Pakistan’s central bank reserves — ‘from a friend’, who did not wish to be named. Pakistanis who questioned the wisdom of accepting this money were misleadingly told there was no quid pro quo. But it is now payback time for Sharif’s debt to the Saudis.

There were signs that something was afoot. Saudi Arabia was the first country that Army Chief General Raheel Sharif visited after assuming command in 2014. The Saudi Foreign Minister and the Crown Prince, now King Salman, visited Pakistan early last year in quick succession. Reports of Saudi purchases of Pakistani arms rapidly gained currency. Last month before the Saudi offensive was launched in Yemen, Sharif was literally summoned to Saudi Arabia at short notice and in a most unusual departure from protocol the Saudi King Salman, the Crown Prince and the whole cabinet received him at Riyadh airport.

Pakistan’s economy is not picking up. Pakistan is in need of money, which the Saudi regime is ready to pay in return for renting out the services of Pakistan’s military. In fact, Pakistan has done this deal before and seems poised to do it again. Pakistan Air Force pilots flew Saudi airplanes as early as 1969, repelling a South Yemeni incursion reportedly supported by Saudi nemesis Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser. At the height of deployment during the 1980s Pakistan reportedly rotated about 50,000 troops in Saudi Arabia.

There is also a constant supply of retired servicemen (resembling US ‘contractors’) in Saudi Arabia, as well as a little fewer than a thousand servicemen from Pakistan who remain there in technical support and medical roles.

The Saudis hold another strong card. Pakistani expatriates living in the kingdom send over US$8 billion home annually, a figure that represents almost half of Pakistan’s total US$16 billion in offshore remittances and helps to shore up the sagging economy.

Yet again, despite pretentions otherwise, Sharif’s personal obligation to the Saudi royal household is casting a heavy shadow over issues of national interest. Pakistan’s wariness in joining another war is understandable. Pakistan’s involvement as a proxy, beginning with the ‘Afghan Jihad’ against the Soviets, has come at a serious and high cost to Pakistan as a state and society. Radicalism has spread in the form of intolerant versions of Islam, the Taliban, a drugs and gun culture and massive funding directed to Saudi-sponsored seminaries. The latter has promoted sectarianism by financing murderous Sunni campaigns against the Shia minority.

Since the Iranian Revolution, Pakistan has become the ideological battleground between Saudi Arabia and Iran. An already fractured society, Pakistan would be better off staying out of this combustible adventure.

Sajjad Ashraf is an adjunct professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore. He was a member of the Pakistan Foreign Service 1973–2004.

Pakistan caught in a bind by Sharif’s Saudi debt | East Asia Forum

 

[sonicboom]

Poisoned gifts and unmet expectations

Ayaz Amir
Tuesday, April 14, 2015

Islamabad diary

Pakistan could have handled this mess better, with slightly more finesse and subtlety. But the quality of decision-making in Islamabad is what it is. So there is no point in moaning over it, or being surprised by the fact that Pakistan is ending up annoying all sides and pleasing none. We’ve had jokers at the foreign office before but it is hard to recall when we had such a crew as the present one presiding over foreign policy. And let’s not forget who the foreign minister is: the PM himself.

Saudi annoyance is not hard to understand. Everything suggests that the government conveyed more than it is now in a position to deliver. If this was not the case the Saudi and Emirati reaction would not have taken the form it has. They feel let down, which is a mild form of putting it, all because our side instead of being thrifty with pledges earlier was puffing out its chest and making bold and unwarranted declarations about the people of Pakistan ready to lay down their lives for the Holy Mosques, etc.

We knew as well as anyone else that the Holy Places were never under any threat, and were not likely to be. The Saudis wanted troops and materiel for ground operations in Yemen. It shouldn’t have taken a Rommel to see this. But we kept at the swinging rhetoric and managed to give the wrong impression. Now that the Saudis are discovering the reality of our pledges, they can be forgiven for feeling let down if not betrayed.

If only we had the firmness of mind to convey a clear sense of what we could do prior to the Saudi action in Yemen. As it is, we have taken the right decision – there should be no doubt about that – but in a clumsy manner. Saying no is one thing but adding insult to injury requires special talent.

The Chinese never supported us in any direct manner in 1971. But they did not give any other impression. They did not promise anything that they did not deliver.

All the same, let us get some facts straight. It is not just Yemen which is in ferment. The entire Middle East is in a state of crisis and Saudi Arabia has much to do with this state of affairs. The Saudis have suddenly become the guardians of order and legitimacy, denouncing the Houthis as rebels. Did anyone in the Arab world much remember legitimacy when British and French fighter planes were bombing Muammar Qaddafi’s forces and Qatar and Kuwait among others were helping arm and fund the anti-Qaddafi rebels? Qaddafi was taken care of but Libya, a stable country before, was plunged into chaos. There was no Al-Qaeda in Libya before; now there is.

What about Syria? Saudi Arabia put its full weight behind the rebels trying to oust Bashar al-Assad from power and it’s been unhappy with the United States for not bombing Assad’s forces.

What about Egypt? Mohamed Morsi was the legitimate ruler, duly elected, but the Saudis couldn’t stand the Muslim Brotherhood and backed el-Sisi when he seized power, immediately writing fat cheques to support the new regime.

The Saudis don’t like the Brotherhood. They don’t like the Islamic State. They are paranoid about Iran. They are unhappy with the United States for not completely following their agenda. They are worried about their Yemen backyard. They have no problem with Israel. The question to ask: what do the Saudis like? What would make them feel completely secure?

The Saudis are unhappy and worried because their Middle East is crumbling around them. Assad survives in Syria…with help from Iran, Hezbollah and Russia. And instead of Saudi-supported rebels gaining strength, the Islamic State (IS) has carved out a presence for itself on Syrian soil and spread its tentacles across the border into Iraq.

Left to its own devices, the Iraqi government could not have defeated the IS. But with Iranian help – and leadership provided by one of Iran’s top generals, Qasem Soleimani – the IS advance towards Baghdad has been stopped, and captured Tikrit retaken. Iranian influence dominant in Iraq only adds to Saudi gloom.

The Houthi advance in Yemen comes on top of all these developments. And the kingdom, its patience boiling over, is resorting to arms to redress this situation…and calling upon its friends – in Pakistan’s case, nearly ordering it – to come to its assistance. The Houthis or their allies (forces still loyal to the former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh) are thus just a part of the problem. For the Saudis the major problem is the spread of Iranian influence across the region. The likely conclusion of a nuclear deal with Iran, with its attendant promise of ending Iranian isolation, adds to Saudi unease.

Before the Arab spring the Middle East was such a comfortable place from the Saudi point of view, everything in its proper place. Now everything is in ferment and nothing is predictable except further disorder.

But a further question to ask is whether Iran through insidious and sinister policy has manufactured this discontent or whether, by accident or design, it has merely profited from a situation not of its making. One does not have to be a Shia loyalist or an Iranian partisan to see that Iran had no hand in the Libyan uprising. It did not foment the unrest against Bashar al-Assad in Syria. It has not created the Islamic State. If anything, American and Saudi short-sightedness have created the conditions for the Islamic State’s rise and spreading influence.

Iran has not created Saudi Arabia’s Houthi problem. And Iran has not influenced the Pakistani parliament to express its ‘neutrality’ in the Yemen conflict.

For the moment, however, all these calculations take a backseat to the outcome of the fighting in Yemen. Can Saudi Arabia or the coalition it heads change the military situation against the Houthis? Can the Houthis be defeated and peace terms discussed with Saudi Arabia dictating the terms of a settlement?

The use of airpower is one thing but most expert opinion is agreed on two mutually contradictory conclusions: 1) that a ground operation is necessary to push back the Houthis and create favourable conditions for the Saudis; and 2) that because of Yemen’s geography and the warlike temper of its people a ground operation is not a very sensible option.

Presently, the Saudis are in no mood to listen to any advice which goes against the position they have taken. They want concrete help, what they were looking for from Pakistan, not advice…which is why the Saudi special adviser on religious affairs, Dr Abdul Aziz, who is visiting Pakistan has bluntly said that talk of mediation to resolve the Yemen issue was nothing but a joke.

The Saudis are putting what pressure they can…the Emiratis having already hinted at unpleasant consequences for Pakistan. So does Pakistan remain firm on the path it has chosen or will it succumb to pressure? Let us at least eschew the clumsiness…in which context assorted ministers given to shooting from the hip would be well advised to leave formal responses to the foreign office.

It’s not that we should get involved. Of course we shouldn’t. But Pakistan’s leaders should not have given the impression of promising more than what they could actually do. And they should have had the good sense to see why Saudi Arabia’s rulers were giving them a royal gift of 1.5 billion dollars. After all, the fires raging in the Islamic world have been there for some time and Saudi concerns and sensitivities are no secret. So when this gift was offered, the leadership should have had the sense to foresee the likely quid pro quo.

Far from asking any questions the leadership rejoiced in the perception that it had such good relations with the Saudis. Then it was the national interest to take the money (and where that money has gone, or to what ends it has been used, no one seems to know). Now that the Saudis want their chips to be cashed, the national interest is morphing into the colours of ‘neutrality’. They are not likely to be to be greatly amused.

Email: bhagwal63@gmail.com

Poisoned gifts and unmet expectations - Ayaz Amir

 

[Paksanity]

Poisoned gifts and unmet expectations

Ayaz Amir
Tuesday, April 14, 2015

Islamabad diary

Pakistan could have handled this mess better, with slightly more finesse and subtlety. But the quality of decision-making in Islamabad is what it is. So there is no point in moaning over it, or being surprised by the fact that Pakistan is ending up annoying all sides and pleasing none. We’ve had jokers at the foreign office before but it is hard to recall when we had such a crew as the present one presiding over foreign policy. And let’s not forget who the foreign minister is: the PM himself.

Saudi annoyance is not hard to understand. Everything suggests that the government conveyed more than it is now in a position to deliver. If this was not the case the Saudi and Emirati reaction would not have taken the form it has. They feel let down, which is a mild form of putting it, all because our side instead of being thrifty with pledges earlier was puffing out its chest and making bold and unwarranted declarations about the people of Pakistan ready to lay down their lives for the Holy Mosques, etc.

We knew as well as anyone else that the Holy Places were never under any threat, and were not likely to be. The Saudis wanted troops and materiel for ground operations in Yemen. It shouldn’t have taken a Rommel to see this. But we kept at the swinging rhetoric and managed to give the wrong impression. Now that the Saudis are discovering the reality of our pledges, they can be forgiven for feeling let down if not betrayed.

If only we had the firmness of mind to convey a clear sense of what we could do prior to the Saudi action in Yemen. As it is, we have taken the right decision – there should be no doubt about that – but in a clumsy manner. Saying no is one thing but adding insult to injury requires special talent.

The Chinese never supported us in any direct manner in 1971. But they did not give any other impression. They did not promise anything that they did not deliver.

All the same, let us get some facts straight. It is not just Yemen which is in ferment. The entire Middle East is in a state of crisis and Saudi Arabia has much to do with this state of affairs. The Saudis have suddenly become the guardians of order and legitimacy, denouncing the Houthis as rebels. Did anyone in the Arab world much remember legitimacy when British and French fighter planes were bombing Muammar Qaddafi’s forces and Qatar and Kuwait among others were helping arm and fund the anti-Qaddafi rebels? Qaddafi was taken care of but Libya, a stable country before, was plunged into chaos. There was no Al-Qaeda in Libya before; now there is.

What about Syria? Saudi Arabia put its full weight behind the rebels trying to oust Bashar al-Assad from power and it’s been unhappy with the United States for not bombing Assad’s forces.

What about Egypt? Mohamed Morsi was the legitimate ruler, duly elected, but the Saudis couldn’t stand the Muslim Brotherhood and backed el-Sisi when he seized power, immediately writing fat cheques to support the new regime.

The Saudis don’t like the Brotherhood. They don’t like the Islamic State. They are paranoid about Iran. They are unhappy with the United States for not completely following their agenda. They are worried about their Yemen backyard. They have no problem with Israel. The question to ask: what do the Saudis like? What would make them feel completely secure?

The Saudis are unhappy and worried because their Middle East is crumbling around them. Assad survives in Syria…with help from Iran, Hezbollah and Russia. And instead of Saudi-supported rebels gaining strength, the Islamic State (IS) has carved out a presence for itself on Syrian soil and spread its tentacles across the border into Iraq.

Left to its own devices, the Iraqi government could not have defeated the IS. But with Iranian help – and leadership provided by one of Iran’s top generals, Qasem Soleimani – the IS advance towards Baghdad has been stopped, and captured Tikrit retaken. Iranian influence dominant in Iraq only adds to Saudi gloom.

The Houthi advance in Yemen comes on top of all these developments. And the kingdom, its patience boiling over, is resorting to arms to redress this situation…and calling upon its friends – in Pakistan’s case, nearly ordering it – to come to its assistance. The Houthis or their allies (forces still loyal to the former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh) are thus just a part of the problem. For the Saudis the major problem is the spread of Iranian influence across the region. The likely conclusion of a nuclear deal with Iran, with its attendant promise of ending Iranian isolation, adds to Saudi unease.

Before the Arab spring the Middle East was such a comfortable place from the Saudi point of view, everything in its proper place. Now everything is in ferment and nothing is predictable except further disorder.

But a further question to ask is whether Iran through insidious and sinister policy has manufactured this discontent or whether, by accident or design, it has merely profited from a situation not of its making. One does not have to be a Shia loyalist or an Iranian partisan to see that Iran had no hand in the Libyan uprising. It did not foment the unrest against Bashar al-Assad in Syria. It has not created the Islamic State. If anything, American and Saudi short-sightedness have created the conditions for the Islamic State’s rise and spreading influence.

Iran has not created Saudi Arabia’s Houthi problem. And Iran has not influenced the Pakistani parliament to express its ‘neutrality’ in the Yemen conflict.

For the moment, however, all these calculations take a backseat to the outcome of the fighting in Yemen. Can Saudi Arabia or the coalition it heads change the military situation against the Houthis? Can the Houthis be defeated and peace terms discussed with Saudi Arabia dictating the terms of a settlement?

The use of airpower is one thing but most expert opinion is agreed on two mutually contradictory conclusions: 1) that a ground operation is necessary to push back the Houthis and create favourable conditions for the Saudis; and 2) that because of Yemen’s geography and the warlike temper of its people a ground operation is not a very sensible option.

Presently, the Saudis are in no mood to listen to any advice which goes against the position they have taken. They want concrete help, what they were looking for from Pakistan, not advice…which is why the Saudi special adviser on religious affairs, Dr Abdul Aziz, who is visiting Pakistan has bluntly said that talk of mediation to resolve the Yemen issue was nothing but a joke.

The Saudis are putting what pressure they can…the Emiratis having already hinted at unpleasant consequences for Pakistan. So does Pakistan remain firm on the path it has chosen or will it succumb to pressure? Let us at least eschew the clumsiness…in which context assorted ministers given to shooting from the hip would be well advised to leave formal responses to the foreign office.

It’s not that we should get involved. Of course we shouldn’t. But Pakistan’s leaders should not have given the impression of promising more than what they could actually do. And they should have had the good sense to see why Saudi Arabia’s rulers were giving them a royal gift of 1.5 billion dollars. After all, the fires raging in the Islamic world have been there for some time and Saudi concerns and sensitivities are no secret. So when this gift was offered, the leadership should have had the sense to foresee the likely quid pro quo.

Far from asking any questions the leadership rejoiced in the perception that it had such good relations with the Saudis. Then it was the national interest to take the money (and where that money has gone, or to what ends it has been used, no one seems to know). Now that the Saudis want their chips to be cashed, the national interest is morphing into the colours of ‘neutrality’. They are not likely to be to be greatly amused.

Email: bhagwal63@gmail.com

Poisoned gifts and unmet expectations - Ayaz Amir

Ayaz Mir summarised the whole situation for us.

 

[WishLivePak]

Nawaz can say no. He won't lose much.

But then get ready for all Pakistani in Middle East workers to be sent back to Pakistan. No one wants that to happen.

Middle East can easily replace Pakistan. But no other country or region can be replacement for us.

 

[Mrc]

Nawaz can say no. He won't lose much.

But then get ready for all Pakistani in Middle East workers to be sent back to Pakistan. No one wants that to happen.

Middle East can easily replace Pakistan. But no other country or region can be replacement for us.

This is a empty threat for several reasons.
1. This is not end of warfare in midfle east . They will need pakistan again and again
2. They cannot afford to loose a friend.
3. Pakistani military training is important for them
4. Our ex serviceman is also an important source of military stability in the region

 

[WishLivePak]

This is a empty threat for several reasons.
1. This is not end of warfare in midfle east . They will need pakistan again and again
2. They cannot afford to loose a friend.
3. Pakistani military training is important for them
4. Our ex serviceman is also an important source of military stability in the region

Well they can send a few thousands back to refuse to give more visas.

Anyway, if you think this is an empty threat, then so shall be other threats.

Remember, they can kick us out and replace us with Bengalis and Indians. But where will our people go once kicked out?

 

[Husnainshah]

Well they can send a few thousands back to refuse to give more visas.

Anyway, if you think this is an empty threat, then so shall be other threats.

Remember, they can kick us out and replace us with Bengalis and Indians. But where will our people go once kicked out?

Talk some sense. What other country could assure Saudi unconditional territorial integrity?
The UAE minister and Arabs in general are just speaking out of their asses.
Besides, this is just the beginning - more's to follow. Iran already has 4 Arab capitals in it's bag - namely, Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, Sana'a. Saudis might be dumb but I doubt they're dumb enough to ditch Pakistan at this stage.

With regards to that Ayaz Amir's article, the part addressing Pakistan's role is pure non-sense.
Pakistan hasn't offered anything more than it can't commit. The point of iterating Pakistan's response with regards to Saudi's territorial integrity was to send a message to everyone including Iran that Saudi's border is the red line. Not sure why almost everyone outside decision making considers themselves better strategists than both Politicians and Army officials.

 

[Mrc]

Well they can send a few thousands back to refuse to give more visas.

Anyway, if you think this is an empty threat, then so shall be other threats.

Remember, they can kick us out and replace us with Bengalis and Indians. But where will our people go once kicked out?

They dont have guts...
Pk is too impotant for their security...

 

[Mrc]

Let me explain. In a very worse but seeable scenario..iran starts using iraqi border to forment uprising in saudia. Entirely possible as saudia also has a large shia population..

Pakistan is only military to fall back on as their local population wont allow US boots on ground. This is what exactly beeing said again and again and again....threat to saudi integrity will not be tolerated...

Now no body can expect houthis to march on to saudia... its iran via iraqi route which is bothering saudia
Also pakistan can neutralize iran using tactical battlefield nukes......in minutes....
Some thing US can also do but will charge alot of money and may have alot more consequences

 

[hussain0216]

Once the red line is crossed for Saudi Arabia Pakistan will step up...

This current conflict in Yemen isnt a nation ending threat to Saudi its a war of choice for influence

 

[SipahSalar]

With regards to that Ayaz Amir's article, the part addressing Pakistan's role is pure non-sense.
Pakistan hasn't offered anything more than it can't commit.

Knowing our Prime Ministers Bongapun, it's best to keep expectations as low as possible.

 

[WishLivePak]

They dont have guts...
Pk is too impotant for their security...

Yeah we know how that worked with USA.

India would love to be friends with KSA so as to isolate us further. Even ignoring India, friends aren't forever.

 

[Mrc]

Yeah we know how that worked with USA.

India would love to be friends with KSA so as to isolate us further. Even ignoring India, friends aren't forever.

Did you even read my second post or just here to rant??

Well rant away....

 

[Viper0011.]

Pakistan caught in a bind by Sharif’s Saudi debt

Stung by his complete failure to muster the parliamentary support needed to join in a Saudi-led intervention in Yemen’s civil war, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is now counting the costs of his $1.5 billion folly.

Here we go again. It is ALL NS's fault to some, who care not to remember the reality and waste theirs and others time through cheap shots and propaganda!!!

Who went to KSA, Libya, etc, to Finance the Nuke operation all together? How many of Pakistan's generals go to places like Dubai and KSA and have properties there....99%. How many senior generals are EMPLOYED post Pakistan Army's employment in KSA and Dubai......99%.
In fact, the operation to destabilize Pakistan through using IK, was created, supported and a coupe like situation was created by the X-Spy Master living in Dubai. If Gen. Sharif wasn't there, you might have had a bloody civil war, where 5 generals were supporting NS and the remainder were against him. Imagine that!!!!

The reality is, the nation/s who financed billions of dollars worth of nuke plants for Pakistan, would call upon it in their time of need. KSA is no different. In 1991, Pakistan sent Army to "protect" KSA, and there is a decent contingent protecting the "Royal Family" at any given time.

So......the moral of the story is, KSA will call upon Pakistan because of their need. It doesn't matter who is in power. In fact, every time they've called upon Pakistan to send Army, this is THE FIRST time it said no, THANK YOU democracy!!! Where votes of people matter and the elected officials make the calls necessary for the country!!

 

[WishLivePak]

Did you even read my second post or just here to rant??

Well rant away....

What happened to USA sentiment that "Pakistan is too important for security"?

Here we go again. It is ALL NS's fault to some, who care not to remember the reality and waste theirs and others time through cheap shots and propaganda!!!

Who went to KSA, Libya, etc, to Finance the Nuke operation all together? How many of Pakistan's generals go to places like Dubai and KSA and have properties there....99%. How many senior generals are EMPLOYED post Pakistan Army's employment in KSA and Dubai......99%.
In fact, the operation to destabilize Pakistan through using IK, was created, supported and a coupe like situation was created by the X-Spy Master living in Dubai. If Gen. Sharif wasn't there, you might have had a bloody civil war, where 5 generals were supporting NS and the remainder were against him. Imagine that!!!!

The reality is, the nation/s who financed billions of dollars worth of nuke plants for Pakistan, would call upon it in their time of need. KSA is no different. In 1991, Pakistan sent Army to "protect" KSA, and there is a decent contingent protecting the "Royal Family" at any given time.

So......the moral of the story is, KSA will call upon Pakistan because of their need. It doesn't matter who is in power. In fact, every time they've called upon Pakistan to send Army, this is THE FIRST time it said no, THANK YOU democracy!!! Where votes of people matter and the elected officials make the calls necessary for the country!!

Actually it's not democracy victory. Container bapu took all the credit and said he forced nawaz to stay out along with "namaloom" parties.