Except that the historians who seek the retainment of the established 'version' are NOT constitutionally or legally mandated to do the same what the court in your analogy does or they have the people's mandate regarding faith in the particular section of historians through a public vote. What we have, instead, is a group of historians who have been brought up on one version of history, who refuse to hear,debate the other version just because that version does not agree with their own version and giving labels like 'Islamophobic', 'Hindu-centric garbage' to make their cop-outs sound more appealing to the public at large.
Rather what should happen is if the existing 'version' of history is challenged by an alternative hypothesis then it becomes imperative on the part of the old-timers to listen, hear and study the new 'hypothesis' and debunk that [if necessary] through professional means and fair,open debate. It is not in their power to "we will not hear it and hence it is false". Sorry that is not allowed. The more they run away from that, the more the credibility of what they seek to propogate comes under stake.
This is merely a repeat, a paraphrasing of your earlier comment, and has virtue only insofar as that it underlines the basic errors in comprehension and in role definition. It has a major drawback, in that it calls for a further elaboration of points already made, but sought to be set aside as not convenient for the argument being presented on behalf of quasi-history. A repeat, in greater detail; a paraphrase, with more elaborate, bordering on the simplistic, explanation. Shame, really; if only you had internalized the Lqtin tag
Verb. Sap.
An analogy was offered. The analogy was that of an accepted and tested methodology, one whose methodology is unchallenged and is used in the practice of a particular calling. The credentials of a court of law come from its constitutional position. The credentials of an academic discipline come from its roots in academic pursuit.
A court constituted by a regular constitution, granted to a sovereign nation by its people, or by inheritance from older systems has validity and credibility. A court, or quasi-court, constituted in contradiction to this is not a valid court, not as long as the regular constitution fails to make provision for it.
An academic discipline is accepted as regular not by a constitution granted to it by society at large, but by acceptance by the evolved system of academic enquiry. Any discipline, or variation of a discipline, put up by self-recognition, by a body or an aggregation of individuals who claim equivalence to the entire practice of academic enquiry on their own certification, lacks credibility.
The credentials of an academic discipline do not depend on the precise and mechanical duplication of the constitutional backing of a law court. They depend on the equivalent backing of the academic community. They do not depend on a popular vote either, and academic enquiry is not pursued by enlisting the sympathies or prejudices of people in a political process. Politics and academics are far removed from each other, to the extent that the touchstone of academic validity is not the number of people in general society backing a particular belief, but the number of people in specialized academic society backing that belief.
What we have before us is not a schism between two groups of historians. We have an academic discipline facing a claim by a handful of individuals of no academic credibility or recognition, who demand recognition by the simple fact of their existing, not by the backing of equivalent academic discipline in their efforts. The discipline of history has merely ignored this amateur effort. There has been no use of the terms that I have used by historians in an historiographical context. My remarks in this forum cannot be used to point to the regular discipline and its professional practitioners as a sign of their seeking refuge behind pejoratives, so that charge is totally misplaced, as already pointed out.
I have used the comparison between intelligent design and evolutionary theory before and reiterate it here. Intelligent design has the backing of scripture and religious writings, rooted in the religious cosmogony of times long past, writings which carry no weight in academic practice, except for the work of specialists in salvaging of clues to contemporary conditions of society and human activity. The entire weight of mainstream academic practice and practitioners is behind the theory of evolution. It is interesting to note that believers in intelligent design, mainly religious fundamentalists and politicians seeking a constituency among them, have often resorted to the populist argument used here in defence of quasi-history: a large number of people believe in these theories, so they should be considered. Not because of scientific or academic merit, but because they have the backing of society at large. Their isolation within the world of academic enquiry is brushed aside just as the isolation of quasi-history is sought to be brushed aside.