What's new

Pakistan, Bangladesh Involved in North East Terrorism: Stratfor

This is another take on the issue but I am not sure what to make of it -


ISI-Islam connection is as false as ISI-Drug connection

by Abid Ullah Jan

(Wednesday, April 25, 2007)

The latest CIA allegation levelled against the Pakistan intelligence agency, the ISI, is that it is spreading Islamization in South Asia in collusion with the Bangladesh intelligence agencies to set a trap of Islamic militants for India.

These allegations appeared in America's premium news intelligence service STRATFOR, which is also known as the CIA's cousin. Those who work for STRATFOR are also the leading figures in running discussion groups such as the Political Islam Discussion Group (PIDL) for infecting the debate about Muslims and Islam.

Such reports are part of the CIA’s (read the US government’s) long term scheme to undermine Pakistan, starting with neutralizing its armed forces and its intelligence agencies. To be fair, like the overall Pakistan military force, the much dreaded ISI has been used like a whore by the CIA in every possible way. At home, both the civilian and military dictators use the ISI as a draconian tool. But this is all that the ISI is: just a tool, without any strategic mission, vision or direction of its own.

I, personally, remember being hounded by ISI officers who behaved like mad dogs when I wrote an article “Egyptianizing Pakistan” (June 1, 1999), criticising Nawaz Sharif’s using Hosnie Mubarak’s approach to crushing the opposition and prolonging his rule.

The ISI’s madness intensified when the then Egyptian ambassador wrote an article in response and called the criticism of Nawaz Sharif’s government a “malicious agenda” on my part. My subsequent article “Understanding Egyptianization,” (June 15, 1999) was a good enough provocation for the ISI to threaten me with death. One of their officers asked me: “What do you think, how would you have been treated if you were in Egypt?” Receiving no response from me, the officer added, “your family would have held your chaleeswan (40th day after death) by now.”

Interestingly, the same officers from the ISI and ISPR came to ask for my resume when they were considering suitable people for a ministerial portfolio. I was deemed worthy because I had written some articles in favour of the military take-over after the October 12, 1999 coup. The military government was in desperate need of allies at home and abroad.

Two years later, the same ISI turned my life into a living hell when I exposed just the tip of a corruption iceberg, in NGOs, to which a sitting military governor was closely linked.

This personal experience clearly shows that the ISI serves whoever is in power in Pakistan. Since no one could rule Pakistan without assuring Washington that he or she is a better stooge, the broader strategic direction for the ISI remains the directive given it from Washington. The question is: Why then does the CIA come up with these allegations against the ISI?

The answer is simple: to extract more obedience from Islamabad in the near future and to facilitate the ditching of the ISI in the longer term. History shows that the U.S. government has previously attempted to use ISI crimes to press Pakistani governments into submission. The Washington Post published a report in its September 12, 1994 edition in an attempt to implicate the Pakistan army in drug trafficking. The News published the same report in October 1994. In 2003, the ISI faced severe criticism at a U.S. Senate briefing on the drug trade, a crime in which the CIA has been involved since 1960. Peter Dale Scott and Jonathan Marshall tell us in Cocaine Politics Drugs, Armies and the CIA in Central America, (University of California Press, 1991 that the CIA works with narcotics traffickers and then fights to suppress the truth. They conclude, the U.S. government “is one of the world’s largest drug pushers.”

Time and again, the U.S. lawmakers threatened the ISI and Pakistan with allegations of drug trafficking, yet ignored the fact that even if some military or ISI officials were involved in drug trafficking on a personal level, the amount they privately smuggled into the United States was no more than a fraction of the amount trafficked by the U.S. agencies. According to Paul Johnson: “By the end of the 1980s it was calculated that the illegal use of drugs in the United States netted its controllers over $110 billion a year.” (Paul Johnson, Modern Times, New York: Harper Perenial, 1991 rev. ed., p.782.)

According to the San Diego Union-Tribune (August 13, 1996), Celerino Castelo--a former DEA agent--stated that together with three other ex-DEA agents, they were willing to testify in Congress regarding their direct knowledge of CIA involvement in international drug trafficking. Castillo estimates that approximately 75 percent of narcotics entered the United States with the acquiescence or direct participation of CIA and foreign intelligence agents.

In this backdrop, the March 2003 hearing of the U.S. Senate[1] was just another threat in the vast trap being laid for the Pakistani army for the next several years. Furthermore, ISI assets, Saeed Sheikh and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed were used in operation 9/11. The extent to which the ISI was dragged into the trap of 9/11 is not fully known. That, however, remains a time bomb for Pakistan. It didn’t get diffused with the “termination” of former ISI chief General Mahmood Ahmad. It can explode at any time the US decides to disarm and neutralise Pakistan like Iraq.

The entrapment process adopted by the U.S. agencies is very simple. They plan and commit a crime of serious magnitude. They achieve their strategic objective behind the crime. At the same time, they involve the victim in just a fraction of the overall criminal plan. The unknown/unintended cooperation in the crime is then later used to punish the victim. This is exactly how the BCCI was trapped. Irrefutable evidence demonstrates that the CIA funded the operation against the BCCI with drug money, earned through the organized selling of drugs to its own employees. According to the court transcripts of the BCCI case: “By late 1987, the agents had passed approximately $2.2 million derived from Don Chepe’s proceeds through the IDC account, and had split the 7-8 percent commission profit with Mora and Don Chepe’s representative Javier Ospina, without telling any BCCI officers about drugs.”[2] Yet, it was the BCCI that paid the price.

The recent allegations of the ISI’s spreading Islamization in South Asia is part of the overall pressure exerted to extract more obedience from Islamabad for strategic reasons. Unlike Mossad and the CIA with their long term plans, the ISI is nothing more than what its current masters want it to be. The allegations of its spreading Islamization are just nonsensical.

How is it possible for the commander in chief of the armed forces, hell bent on eradicating all traces of Islam from the constitution, the school curriculum and at home, to allow one of his strategic arm’s, the ISI – presently holding hundreds of Islamic activists in illegal detention – to evangelize Islam!

No doubt Musharraf is bluffing his paranoid masters with the mantra of enlightened moderation to prolong his rule. To believe, however, that his pet agency is working with a strategic vision for the spread of Islam would be naïve beyond the farther reaches of imagination.

Notes:

[1]. Dawn report, “ISI criticized at U.S. Senate hearing,” March 22, 2003.

[2]. U.S. District Court transcripts for the BCCI related case: U.S. Vs Amjad Awan et al 88-330-Cr-T-13(B) R48-791-49, 50 R67-1136-160, 161 and 162 R83-881-26,27, and 28 GE 3193.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

http://usa.mediamonitors.net/content/view/full/42839
 
.
THIS IS A MUST READ. This is a better article than the last one I put up and I am sure the Indians on the this forum will love this article even more -




National security at crossroads

Transit deal aims to transport Indian soldiers, armaments

M. Shahidul Islam in Toronto

HOLIDAY – April 27, 2007

Policies are as smart and effective as the makers who fashion them, so goes the argument. Today's global village is not the kind of place to adopt medieval tactic to exile political leaders or ordinary citizens. Nor do we live in a planet where arbitrary decision can be executed smoothly or digested calmly. That is why some recent decisions of the government with respect to domestic handling of political matters and the conduct of foreign policies have begun to rebound.

As a result, not only uncertainties are clouding our political horizon, national interest and national security faces grave dangers for reasons that are borne of hasty decision and lack of accountability.

No sooner it became clear that the military-backed regime was trying to exile the two women leaders, than protests from around the world began to reverberate and a barrage of anti-Bangladesh propaganda started springing anew, following a brief lull since the four-party alliance's relinquishment of power in October 2006.

Propaganda

Citing Indian and US intelligence sources, a Texas-based intelligence portal Stratfor -- which has the reputation of being the unofficial CIA front -- claimed on April 23 that Pakistan's Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) is working with Bangladesh intelligence agencies to facilitate cooperation between militant groups like ULFA and other jihadi outfits of the region, including Tamil rebels of Sri Lanka.

Titled as 'India: Islamisation of the Northeast', the report says "there is a growing Islamisation in the region, spurred by the ISI and the ongoing instability in neighbouring Bangladesh which is giving foreign powers (China and Pakistan) a gamut of exploitable secessionist movements for use to prevent India from emerging as a major global player."

The report goes on to say, there exists a strong nexus between ISI and Bangladesh's intelligence agencies and there are growing indications that these two agencies are working clandestinely in Bangladesh to bring all the Northeast-based insurgent outfits and jihadi elements under one umbrella.
"The ISI has facilitated cooperation between ULFA and other Northeastern militant outfits; with the LTTE in Sri Lanka, Islamist militant groups in Jammu and Kashmir, Islamist groups in Bangladesh and a growing number of Al Qaeda-linked jihadi groups operating in the region," claimed the report.

The report quoted one anonymous Bangladesh source as saying, there exists "meaningful cooperation between ISI and Bangladesh's intelligence agencies in their combined fight against terrorism, at the nudging of the West, but their joint efforts to trap India may just be a collateral strategic gain."
Observers say this latest anti-Bangladesh propaganda is part of an India-orchestrated campaign to obtain as much leverage from Dhaka, as may be feasible, while the non-party regime retains the power to decide matters arbitrarily without any debate by elected public representatives.

It also seems that Dhaka's umpteen assurances to India, including during the 14th SAARC summit in Delhi that Bangladesh soil is not being used by the Indian insurgents to launch attacks on Indian security forces, has had no substantive impact; India remains unconvinced.

As the insurgency in the Nnortheast becomes more ferocious, especially after the first suicide attack launched during PM Manmoham Singh's recent visit to the region, Delhi became desperate to overcome its geopolitical handicaps by using Dhaka's temporary regime to facilitate troops and military hardware movements to India's Northeast via Bangladesh, it was learnt.

Delhi thinks the strategy of using massive force in the 1980s against the Sikh separatists of Punjab can be emulated in Northeast India too.
But such a stratagem can easily backfire, say analysts. Unlike Punjab, where insurgents were mostly in an urban setting, the Northeast is remote, underdeveloped, desolate and ideal for guerrilla operations. Home to over 220 heterogeneous tribes and communities, the entire Northeast is infested with over 57 armed rebel groups with modern weapons and international connectivity.

Why then blame Bangladesh? Virtually disjointed from Delhi and the India's mainstream, the Northeast India succumbed to insurgency over 50 years ago when the Nagas launched their first armed struggle to secede from Delhi under the leadership of Angami Zaphu Phizo. The Manipuris followed suit under Hijam Irabot Singh as did the Mizos since the 1960s. In the late 1970s was born the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), which has proved to be the toughest bunch of all. All these groups are fighting for independent homelands of their own and scapegoating Dhaka is a political luxury that India never felt shy of using despite the real solution being in reaching lasting political settlements with the insurgents by redressing their genuine grievances.

Although it is unclear why Indian intelligence apparatuses are getting involved in anti-Bangladesh propaganda at this very moment, some analysts tend to believe the campaign may be related to the recent government decision to bar AL leader Sheikh Hasina's entry into the country.

Pressure on Dhaka

Geopolitical experts, however, maintain that India has been desperately exploring possibilities of a transit route via Bangladesh to transport military personnel, arms and ammunition to the war-torn Northeast as well as to reduce freight cost and distance between Kolkata and Agartala. It seems that the anti-Bangladesh media campaign is designed to exert psychological pressure on Dhaka.

The distance between Kolkata and Agartala is about 1,500 km. and, a transit route via Bangladesh is likely to reduce the rail distance to just 350 km, and reduce the freight costs substantially.

What seems certain is: being on the brink of loosing the Northeast to the ever powerful insurgents, Delhi's game plan to use Bangladesh as a transit has more to do with transporting military personnel and hardware to the war-torn Northeast than cut cost on freight and transportation of goods, although, the purpose does have a dual implication.

India also wants to revive subsequently other dysfunctional rail route linkages with Bangladesh, including the broad gauge connections between Gede-Darsana, Singhabad-Rohanpur, Petrapole-Benapole and the only metre gauge connection between Radhikapur and Shahbazar -- all with the aim to increase connectivity for military usages.

The arguments for military use become more impressive when one looks at the statistics of bilateral trades between India and its neighbours. During the fiscal 2006-07, Indian exports to Pakistan touched the billion-dollar mark. But imports from that country were worth no more than $ 350 million. The collaborations between the two nations are centered on reducing tension in Kashmir and making Indian presence in Afghanistan more prominent.
On the other hand, Nepal's Terai region is home to a large number of industries which were built only to sell in Indian markets. But Indian trade chambers have been vigorously lobbying for restricting imports from Nepal, arguing that, such imports undermine their own production base. Bangladesh ran up a deficit of $1.1 billion with India in 2002-03. The trade gap widened to a staggering $1.5 billion in 2005-06.

Experts say unless there is a clear understanding of what India will buy from Bangladesh to break even the huge trade gap, a transit treaty or agreement will be suicidal for Bangladesh. Dhaka must also make sure that it will not allow land, air or sea facilities for transporting India's military personnel or defence hardware due to the danger such a decision will unleash from the Northeastern insuregents who might conduct retaliatory attacks against Bnagladesh's interests any time, anywhere.

Yet, since the assumption of power by the current administration, a newly formed regional sub-group (South Asian Sub-regional Economic Cooperation (SASEC)) has been working diligently to finalize the transit, energy cooperation and other issues that India wants finalized before an elected government assumes office (see Holiday; April 20, 2007, p-1).
Reliable sources say, the decision to establish a rail link between Kumarghat and Agartala by December 2007 has already been taken. In return, Delhi offered a $150 million line of credit to Bangladesh for railway development. Besides, a regular railway service between Kolkata and Dhaka has already been announced.

While the government is keeping the nation preoccupied by chasing corrupt politicians and cleaning the so-called political mess, foreign nations are getting deals that are detrimental to national security and the economic survival of the country. Surprisingly, no one even cares to have a debate over those issues by brainstorming their ramifications. This is unfortunate, sad and dangerous.


http://www.weeklyholiday.net/front.html#02
 
.
Bangladeshi criminals take refuge in Kolkata

Most of Bangladesh's underworld dons, wanted criminals and politicians with godfather image have taken refuge in Kolkata, the capital of West Bengal, to escape the on-going police raids, media reports claimed.

Most of the local newspapers ran front page stories over the past one week, mentioning that many of the Bangladeshi criminals were now well established in Kolkata and some other parts of West Bengal, and were running businesses allegedly with the help of their Indian mentors over there.

Slipping of Giasuddin al-Mamun, a close business associate of Tarique Rahman, the eldest son of immediate-past Khaleda Zia her Bangladesh Nationalist Party's senior joint secretary general, to India with the assistance of a section of lawmen from both sides of the border was reported prominently in many newspapers.

Awami League leader Shamim Osman, a bank-loan defaulter businessman Obaidul Karim, ward commissioner Chowdhury Alam, and Monowar Hossain Dipjal are among many others who have crossed the border to India since the army-backed interim government took over on January 12. The government launched a combine operation against the criminals and corrupt people in a bid to free the country's politics from the influence of money and muscle powers.

A Bangla language newspaper, Ajker Kagoj, reported on Saturday from Kolkata that Mamun was being given security by a group of Bangladeshi criminals. The Bangladesh Government had announced bounty a few years ago for capturing him. "Mamun passes his time in holiday mood in Kolkata," headlined the vernacular daily.

New Age, an English language newspaper, reported quoting intelligence sources that Bangladeshi criminals who are now well-established in different places of West Bengal, were providing them with shelter and ensuring their security, using their influence on the local administration Some politicians, who have links with the underworld, and some businessmen, who have amassed huge wealth through illegal means, have managed to cross the border, it said.

"There are dozens others, including criminals, commissioners and political leaders, who have managed to reach Kolkata since the imposition of a state of emergency on January 12," said an underworld operative over telephone from Kolkata.

The New Age reported according to available information, a number of Bangladeshi wanted criminals took shelter in Kolkata over the last few years. The most-wanted criminals Subrata Bain, Khandakar Tanveer Islam Joy, Molla Masud, Haris Ahmed Haris, Kamrul Hasan Hannan (younger brother of the arrested criminal Liakat Hossain), Prakash, Imam Hossain, Aga Shamim, Moshiur Rahman Kochi and Jafar Ahmed Manik are staying in rented houses at Dumdum, Broad Street, Sealdah, Beck Bagan and a few other areas in Kolkata.

These criminals had maintained links mainly with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and the Awami League, and also the politicians who have links with crime and corruption. Many other criminals who got huge money sent to them by their understudies in Dhaka also took refuge to West Bengal and run informal cross border trading between the two countries.

Police say these criminals have been involved in all types of criminal and illegal activities like murder, extortion, mugging, and smuggling of firearms and drugs for decades.

http://www.zeenews.com/znnew/articles.asp?...549&sid=SAS
 
.
That is good that you turned to be true whenever you accused any of your neighbour!

By the way is there any internal problem in India as well or your neighbours are responsible for all these seperatist movements, religious killing, NAXAL, I have poset an article here from IDF which says India have 120 seperatist movements, though all not active, but this number is more then the number of seperatist movements around the world.

Is this all because of your neighbours or there is something going in inside?

A lot of that is bcoz of the poor and instable small neighbours that we have.

120 seperatist movements, how many are active? The active ones only do matter.
 
.
Insurgency in North East India

Degradation of humanity at its worst under Indian Authorities in Assam. Tortured to death victims being loaded on to a pyre made of scrap tyres refusing handing over the bodies to their families. They were later on burnt without giving them their last rites.

Isha Khan

United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) Formation:

Asom Sanjukta Mukti Morcha or the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) was formed on April 7, 1979 by Bhimakanta Buragohain, Rajiv Rajkonwar alias Arabinda Rajkhowa, Golap Baruah alias Anup Chetia, Samiran Gogoi alias Pradip Gogoi, Bhadreshwar Gohain and Paresh Baruah at the Rang Ghar in Sibsagar to establish a "sovereign socialist Assam" through an armed struggle.

War Cry: Joi Ai Asom

Leadership:

Arabinda Rajkhowa is the 'Chairman' of ULFA. 'Vice Chairman' Pradip Gogoi was arrested on April 8, 1998 , and is currently in judicial custody at Guwahati. 'General Secretary' Anup Chetia is under detention in the Bangladeshi Dhaka after being arrested on December 21, 1997. The outfit's founding member and ideologue Bhimakanta Buragohain, 'Publicity Secretary' Mithinga Daimary and 'Assistant Secretary' Bolin Das were arrested during the military operations in Bhutan in December 2003. Earlier, 'Cultural Secretary' Pranati Deka was arrested at Phulbari in the West Garo Hills district of Meghalaya.

Other leaders are: Bhimkanta Buragohin, Pradip Gogoi alias Samiran Gogoi, Mithinga Daimari, Pranati Deka and Ramu Mech ,Mithinga Daimary (real name Dipak Das),The cultural secretary of the Ulfa, Pranati Deka hails from Nalbari district. She is the wife of the group's finance secretary Chitrabon Hazarika. She was first arrested from a Mumbai hospital in 1996. Later, she was released on bail in 1998 only to be arrested again at Phulbari, Meghalaya in 2003 while trying to escape .

The ULFA has a clearly partitioned political and military wing. Paresh Barua heads the military wing as the outfit's 'commander-in-chief'. Following the military operations in Bhutan in December 2003, most of its top leadership reportedly operates from unspecified locations. According to reports, ULFA is in the process of relocating its camps in Myanmar, Mon district of Nagaland, Garo hills of Meghalaya and Tirap and Changlang districts of Arunachal Pradesh.

Areas of Activity and Influence :

The ULFA's organisational structure is divided into four zones :

East Districts(Purb Mandal)
West Districts(Paschim Mandal)
Central Districts(Madhya Mandal)
South Districts(Dakshin Mandal)

Sanjukta Mukti Fouj (SMF):

A military wing of the ULFA, the Sanjukta Mukti Fouj (SMF) was formed on March 16, 1996 . SMF has three full-fledged battalions (Bn): the 7th, 28th and 709th. The remaining battalions exist only on paper – at best they have strengths of a company or so. Their allocated spheres of operation are :

7th Bn (HQ- Sukhni) Responsible for defence of GHQ
8th Bn Nagaon, Morigaon, Karbi Anglong
9th Bn Golaghat, Jorhat, Sibsagar
11th Bn Kamrup, Nalbari
27th Bn Barpeta, Bongaigaon, Kokrajhar
28th Bn Tinsukia, Dibrugarh
709th Bn Kalikhola

Links and camps:

The ULFA sought shelter in the forests on the Indo-Bhutan border from the early 1990s and established several camps in the forest areas of southern Bhutan. Over the years, it reportedly developed linkages with several officers and personnel of the Royal Bhutan Army (RBA) and Police – which ensured, among other things, a steady flow of rations, logistical support as well as aid and contacts for money laundering. The ULFA's Bhutan set-up had a reported strength of around 2000 cadres spread across the outfit's 'General Head Quarters', it's 'Council Head Quarters', a 'Security-Training Camp' and a well-concealed 'Enigma Base'. Numbering around 13 in all, the major camps of the ULFA in Bhutan included:

1. Mithundra
2. Gobarkunda
3. Panbang
4. Diyajima
5. Pemagatsel Complex
i. Khar
ii. Shumar
iii. Nakar
6. Chaibari
7. Marthong
8. Gerowa
9. Sukhni (Merungphu): 'General HQ'
10. Melange
11. Phukaptong: 'Council HQ'
12. Dalim-Koipani (Orang)
13. Neoli Debarli

Most camps and other establishment of the ULFA were in Sandrup Jongkhar, a district in southern Bhutan that borders Assam's Nalbari district. The RBA is reported to have destroyed all the outfit's camps and observation posts during the military operations launched in December 2003.

In 1986, ULFA first established contacts with the then unified National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) of Myanmar for training and arms. ULFA linked up with the Kachins through the 'good offices' of the Naga rebels. It learnt the rudiments of insurgent tactics from the Kachins (who reportedly charged Rupees 100,000 per trainee). Subsequently, links were established with Pakistan 's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Afghan Mujahideen. Reports indicate that at least 200 ULFA activists received training in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Bangladesh authorities arrested its leader Anup Chetia on December 21, 1997 . He is currently under detention at the high-security Dhaka Central Jail. The main charges against Chetia include illegal entry into Bangladesh, possession of two forged Bangladeshi passports, possession of an unauthorised satellite telephone and illegal possession of foreign currency of countries as diverse as the US, UK, Switzerland, Thailand, Philippines, Spain, Nepal, Bhutan, Belgium, Singapore and others. Two other accomplices, identified as Babul Sharma and Laxmi Prasad, were also arrested along with Chetia.

ULFA gradually expanded its network to include operational control of activities and the receipt and shipment of arms in transit before they finally entered India. Owing to greater vigil along the known routes of ULFA arms flow, the group has, in recent times, been making attempts to set up bases in Meghalaya, especially in the West Garo Hills to coordinate the transit of arms.

ULFA has for long maintained close linkages with the Pakistan's ISI which procured several passports for Paresh Baruah and other ULFA cadres. Several ULFA cadres have also received arms training from the ISI at various training centres in Pakistan, close to the Afghanistan border. ULFA had also announced its support for Pakistan during the Kargil war. They described the Pakistani intruders – primarily Pakistani Army regulars and Afghan mercenaries – as 'freedom fighters'.

Reports indicate that the ULFA's mouthpiece, ULFA's a website newsletter Swadhinata also known as 'Freedom', receives editorial support from ISI inside Pakistan. It was in 'Freedom' that the ULFA first supported the Pakistanis during the Kargil war. The ISI has provided ULFA cadres with arms training, safe havens, funds, arms and ammunition. Training has been given at camps in Pakistan and Bhutan.

At least 300 ULFA cadres were also trained at Rawalpindi and other locations in Pakistan. The training included courses in the use of rocket launchers, explosives and assault weapons. Paresh Baruah has been regularly visiting Karachi since 1992-93. He is also reported to have met Osama bin Laden in 1996 during a visit to Karachi.

The ULFA leader was reportedly taken to a camp on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, where he not only received assurance of military help in the form of arms and ammunition, but also assurances of co-operation and logistical support of all international organisations owing allegiance to bin Laden, including the International Jehad Council, the Tehrik-ul-Jehad, Harkat-ul-Jehadi-e-Islami (HuJI), apart from the Al Qaeda.

The ISI has also trained ULFA terrorists in counter intelligence, disinformation and use of sophisticated weapons and explosives. Pakistan has facilitated the visits of Paresh Baruah and other ULFA leaders to Singapore , Thailand and other countries, and a channel for the transfer of funds and arms has been created. The ISI largesse enabled ULFA to buy arms in Cambodia, paying for these in hard currency routed through Nepal . The ISI also 'introduced' ULFA to LTTE transporters who, for a fee, undertook to transport arms from Southeast Asia into Myanmar. In April 1996, Bangladesh seized more than 500 AK-47 rifles, 80 machineguns, 50 rocket launchers and 2,000 grenades from two ships off Cox's Bazaar. Four Tamils were among those arrested.

Co-operation between various terrorist organisations in India's north-east and foreign groups was formalised with the formation of the Indo-Burmese Revolutionary Front (IBRF) in 1989.

The IBRF was made up initially of the NSCN-K, ULFA, United Liberation Front of Bodoland, Kuki National Front (KNF) (all from India) and Chin National Front ( Myanmar). Paresh Baruah is reported to have paid a substantial sum of money to the Kachins for the first large consignment of weapons from Thailand.

Manerplaw in lower Myanmar on the border with Thailand is the stronghold of the rebel Karen National Union which, in 1993, is reported to have delivered, from the Cambodian arms market, AK-56 rifles, machine guns, rocket-propelled guns and anti-tank rifles to the ULFA. The organisation's cadres have identified an arms dealer as an ethnic Kachin and wife of an assassinated Manipuri rebel Themba Song. The Communist Party of Burma is known to have gifted some weapons, mainly Chinese-made M10 rifles, to ULFA and Naga terrorist organisations.

Arrested ULFA cadres have claimed that Baruah used to smuggle heroin, procured in Myanmar into Assam as part of "a personal operation". According to surrendered ULFA cadres, the ULFA terrorists had also crossed over into China via Bhutan and established contact with the Chinese Army.

The group, on the basis of these contacts, had a rendezvous with a Chinese ship on the high seas in March 1995 during which a weapons' consignment was transferred to them. A further consignment ultimately landed up in Bhutan in 1999, though it was actually acquired in 1997. ULFA also runs profitable narcotics business in Myanmar and Thailand. A close nexus between ULFA and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) had also been reported. The LTTE is reported to have trained various ULFA cadres in explosives handling.

ULFA as a Revolutionary Organization:

United Liberation Front of Assam, ULFA, a revolutionary political organisation was born on the lawns of the historic Rang Ghar of Sibsagar on 7th April 1979.

ULFA'S aims & objects :

To liberate Assam , (a land of 78,529 square K.M.), through Armed national liberation struggle from the clutches of the illegal occupation of India and to establish a sovereign Independent Assam.

ULFA represents :

ULFA represents, as its name implies, not only the Assamese nation but also the entire independent minded struggling peoples, irrespective of different race-tribe-caste-religion and nationality of Assam. The struggle for national liberation of Assam never is a separatist or secessionist movement. Assam was never a part of India at any point of time in history. The fact is independent Assam has been occupied by India , and deploying occupation forces they are oppressing our peoples and persecuting them. ULFA itself and all freedom fighters of Assam are neither planning nor conspiring to break up India! We are not conducting any armed operation inside India . Freedom fighters of Assam are only trying to overthrow Indian colonial occupation from Assam.

The armed struggle for self-defence: The people of Assam are confronting with various problems. Among those, the National identity problem is basic. The communal riot that was followed by the partition of India and Pakistan was responsible for the influx of foreigners from the Indian sub-continent in large scale and thereby caused a real threat to the demographic composition of Assam. India has all along encouraged this influx because of a population base having ethnic affinity with main land India is always favourable to their long term security perspective. This is one of India 's major aspects of colonial occupation of Assam.

In the economic sphere, India has been engaged in large-scale exploitation. Despite its rich resources, Assam remains one of the most backward states. Therefore, the question of real threat to the national identity of the people of Assam under the colonial occupation and exploitation of India has become the basic problem. As a whole, the problem has become a question of life and death to the people of Assam.

The people of Assam confronted with the aforesaid problems such as influx of foreigners and massive exploitation of its natural resources and determined as national identity problem after summing up them. Against the gross injustice for sheer survival as a nation, as a people and as individuals, the people of Assam many times launched democratic and unarmed peaceful movement. However, India ruthlessly suppressed and crushed them ignoring the value of democratic movement. Though the people of Assam and leadership of the struggle have a strong stand for peaceful and amicable solution of the conflict, India has always been trying to force a military solution.

Indian military operation in Assam :

The main intention of this operation is to suppress the legitimate aspiration of the people of Assam , and their basic and fundamental human rights i.e., national self-determination. There are endless lists of gross human rights violations during this period by Indian occupation forces. They have killed hundreds of innocent people, hundred more have disappeared in their custody and many of our womenfolk have been raped while many more hundreds have beenseverely tortured to become handicapped. It is the reflection of direct consequence of colonial repressive policy of India. Today, Assam is an occupied country under Indian's martial law and an undeclared war inside Assam is running on. Any thing may happen at any time inside this war theatre. Colonial India's repressive policy compel the freedom fighters of Assam to take up arms for self-defence. So, the armed national liberation struggle of Assam is a democratic struggle for the survival of a Nation.

ULFA commander Paresh Barua :

One of the 'most wanted' north-east terrorist leaders, the 45-yr-old ULFA 'commander-in-chief' Paresh Barua is a versatile radical who has been successful in evading Indian forces for long despite non-stop efforts by the latter. Wanted for a series of robberies, killings and extortions, he is believed to be currently based in Bangladesh or Bhutan. Trained in guerrilla war by ISI, Kachin Independent Army (KIA) of Myanmar and NSCN, he can handle all kinds of weapons, travels on forged passports and identity cards and lives on money obtained from extortion or robbery.

Also known as Paban Barua and Pradip Barua. He, he is 173 cms in height, has black hair and black eyes, a scar on the palm of his right hand. On May 10, 1985 he and some others raided a bank in Guwahati and shot the manager and stole a sum of Rs 27, 549.62 in cash. Often dubbed as 'braveheart' by many ULFA sympathisers, he has had brushes with death several times, including in Dec 2000 when he was seriously wounded in a factional gun-battle in the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh. But there is other side of Barua story too. Born on May 1, 1957 , he is a very good football player, can speak a number of languages including English, Bengali, Hindi, Naga and Singpho and of course Assamese, his mother tongue.

Insurgent Outfits in North East India

Arunachal:

National Liberation Front of Arunachal: Koj Tara
Dragon Force (ADF)

Assam :

United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) :Paresh Baruah, Arbinda Rajkhoa, Anup Chetia, Daimari, Pradip Gogoi
National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)
United People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS)
Bodo Liberation Tiger Force (BLTF)
Dima Halim Daogah (DHD)
Karbi National Volunteers (KNV)
Rabha National Security Force (RNSF)
Koch-Rajbongshi Liberation Organisation (KRLO)
Hmar People's Convention- Democracy (HPC-D)
Karbi People's Front (KPF)
Barak Valley Youth Liberation Front (BVYLF)
United Liberation Front of Barak Valley

Manipur:

United National Liberation Front (UNLF)
People's Liberation Army (PLA)
People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK)
Manipur People's Liberation Front (MPLF)
Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP)
Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL)
Manipur Liberation Tiger Army (MLTA) I
ripak Kanba Lup (IKL)
People's Republican Army (PRA)
Kangleipak Kanba Kanglup (KKK)
North East Minority Front (NEMF)
Kuki National Front (KNF)
Kuki National Army (KNA)
Kuki Revolutionary Army (KRA)
Kuki National Organisation (KNO)

Mizoram:

Hmar People's Convention (HPC)
Hmar People's Convention- Democracy (HPC-D)
Hmar Revolutionary Front (HRF)
Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA)
Zomi Revolutionary Volunteers (ZRV)
Indigenous People's Revolutionary Alliance(IRPA)
Kom Rem People's Convention (KRPC)
Chin Kuki Revolutionary Front (CKRF)
Bru National Liberation Front

Meghalaya :

Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC)
Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC)
People's Liberation Front of Meghalaya (PLF-M)
Hajong United Liberation Army (HULA)

Nagaland:

National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah) – NSCN(IM)
National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang) – NSCN (K)
Naga National Council-NNC (Adino)

Tripura :

National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT): Biswamohan Debbarma, Nayanbashi Jamatia
All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) : Ranjit Debbarma
Tripura Tribal Volunteer Force (TTVF) T
ripura Liberation Force (TLF)
All Tripura Volunteer Force (ATVF)
Tripura National Army (TNA)
Borok National Council of Tripura (BNCT)

West Bengal :

Kamtapuri Liberation Organisation (KLO)

(Indian media reports and ULFA website)

http://civillibertarian.blogspot.com/2006/11/insurgency-in-north-east-india.html
 
.
T. Muivah, General Secretary, NSCN :‘Solution can be possible only when the Indian government respects the reality of the Nagas’

The ceasefire in the Naga hills still holding, he was here at the invitation of the Government to find a way to end the decades-old insurgency. Thuingaleng Muivah, the M in the I-M faction of the NSCN, the dominant Naga insurgent outfit, speaks to Shekhar Gupta, Editor-in-Chief of The Indian Express, on NDTV 24x7’s Walk the Talk programme. Excerpts from the interview


• What does it feel like now to be guest of the Government of India, you were fighting them, hiding from them for four decades?

We have been accorded hospitality and are thankful to them for that. But the greater question is that the issue is political and they have to appear to understand us.

• But do you think some understanding has developed now?

Yes, because they have recognised the uniqueness of history, a very significant step taken from the Indian side.


• But are you happy now that the fighting is over?

It is hard to say that the fighting is over. Despite the declaration of ceasefire, fighting is going on there because Indian armed forces used to attack our camps. So, sometimes it is difficult to predict.


• But it’s very little compared with what it was then.

Yes, yes, that’s right.


• Where do you see the talks going now? One feels you have been disappointed or bored or tired.

It has now taken more than seven years and it is time for us to have substantial understanding between us, which is still not there.


• So you are getting the seven-year itch as they say in a marriage. How have you found dealing with Indian officials and politicians?

Well, some are quite sensible and very understanding but that is not the case with all of them. We claim that they have understood much better now because we have made our stand sufficiently clear to them and it is for them to make their own decision now.


• But are you disappointed? As you have said sometimes, ‘I am disappointed, I am going away’.

I am not that disappointed but after talking for so many years if nothing substantial comes up, no one will be happy.


• So it’s not that you are going away in anger.

No, this is not the case.


• But you are going away?

Yes, we need to go out because we have had sufficient time here.


• So where are you headed now?

I will be heading to Europe.


• Summer-time is a good time to go to Europe if you can’t go to Nagaland.

Yes, but I went to Nagaland last year.


• It must be a strange feeling to have earlier fought the Indian Armed forces and now being under their protection.

Yes, of course. This is a fact now. There is an understanding and practically, there is no point for me to be apprehensive.


• You are one of the most protected people in Delhi. Even the most protected people can go out for a walk but not you. Do you think that by this time, you should have felt more secure personally. Who are your enemies?

The Government of India is taking special care of us and sees to it that nothing happens to us. That is very kind of them and it shows their concern.


• So, tell me your experiences about dealing with your negotiators? How much distance remains to be covered?

Well, it is hard to say. But you know it’s a long time now since we started talking and it is a fact that they have come to understand the uniqueness of Naga history. Our history is very clear.


• What is that uniqueness of your history, if you could tell me in brief.

Well, Nagas and Nagaland were never conquered by any alien nation, including India. It is the first point of our uniqueness. Secondly, Nagas are the first settlers of Nagaland and we fought against the British for 48 years and they occupied a small portion, which is another uniqueness. And when it was imminent that the British were to leave Indian Nagaland, our men told them that any arrangement without consultation with the Nagas will not be acceptable to them...they were sufficiently aware of their political rights and then they went on to meet Mahatma Gandhi who gave his commitment in no uncertain terms that Nagas have every right to be independent.


• But Mahatma Gandhi had a way of saying it. He said there will be a place where you can enjoy the glow of of freedom which he could have said to any commitment in India.

He said Nagas have a right to be independent because he knew the history of Nagas and he had respect for history.


• What is the way out now, given the realities of today’s world that cartographical changes are impractical.

Historical facts are to be taken into consideration first. Because of the changes in demography, facts of history cannot be dismissed altogether. We declared our independence on 14th August 1947, one day before India did. And when in 1950, the Union of India was formed for the first time in history, Nagas were also invited to become a part but Nagas refused. This historical fact cannot be ignored under any circumstance and that is the reason why Nagas were never a part of the Indian Union, either by conquest or consent.


• What is your ideal solution?

Solution can be possible only when the Indian government respects the reality of the Nagas.

• According to you, what are the five points which if the Government of India accepts there can be peace and tranquility?

We have tried to understand the leaders of India and we have come closer because there must be a solution. So the positive steps we have been taking are substantial.


• Tell me some of those steps.

It was a slogan of the Nagas—nothing to do with the Indians because they were never a part of the Indian Union; nothing short of complete sovereignty; nothing short of complete independence. These were the slogans of Naga people and they were not wrong.


• Now what has changed?

Here we have to understand the importance of interdependence, we cannot be inimical to India and vice-versa. Then what should be the meeting point, we have to understand. And if we can appreciate the difficulties on the part of the Indian Government, that has to be the first step.


• But you do appreciate that?

Yes, we appreciate that but the Indian Government should understand our difficulties. That is what they have not yet done. So the problem is not with us but with them still.


• So your difficulties are that whatever settlement takes place there has to be some feeling of autonomy, sovereignty?

No, no. Here, the question is this: Since the Government of India has recognised the uniqueness of Naga history, on the basis of that if we seek a solution, naturally there will be a solution.


• Forty years in the bush, fighting, training in China, I think five years spent in China in three spells. You are one of the oldest veterans in the art of guerrilla warfare. Aren’t you tired?

Well, tiredness is a different question. But upholding the just cause of the people is always first and foremost. One has to safeguard that so that the problem can be solved.


• But you are a young man for your age. I shall not mention it, may be you can.

Thank you, thank you. I think I am still strong enough.


• Pushing 70? Right?

Here, the question is that if there are any means to settle the problem with peace why not go for that. And there is nothing wrong.


• The fascinating thing about you is that you are not only one of the most experienced guerrilla fighters of the world, you are also among the best educated. You have a post-graduation in political science from Gauhati University. And in your fighting years, you had education and re-education, you were almost a socialist revolutionary first when you went to China. Tell me a little bit about your trek to China.

Then, I was just 20 years old.

• That was in 1964.

China was, at that time, one of the most respected nations of the world and how could a child be sent there to talk to great people there?


• And this is when India and China had just had the war and Nehru had just died in 1964.

You are right, you are right. At last, I accepted the order from the government and I went there. Along with me, 133 cadets went and it took more than three months. The commander, my friend, was General Thinosielie.


• Tell me a little bit of your days in Beijing. What happened, why did you first go? You met Chou En-lai...

I have great respect for Chinese leaders and the Chinese people. I see in them greatness and so I have admiration for them. They tried to understand our point of view and that is in a way inspiring. Because great people like Chou En-lai had the patience to listen to us and we were able to make our position very clear to them when they understood us. Of course, they were very happy.


• Tell me about your first meeting with Chou En-lai

Yes, he is a big man, admired all over the world. He had the patience to listen to us. And I admired that kind of attitude. Great men behave that way and it is a great lesson for us. He would support the revolutionary cause.


• Scato Swu, remember him, he was the president of provisional government for some time, then became a Member of Parliament.

I respect him.


• I was once driving with him during the 1982 elections and I asked him that in 1962, the Indian Army had left the North-East, the Chinese were here who were your friends, then why did you not take over? And he said something very interesting. He said some of us thought of our experiences in China, we thought of the lack of religious freedom and the way the Tibetan culture had been squashed. And we thought Nagas are wise people and may be in future it’s better to make peace with India on self-respecting terms. Do you agree with that?

That might have been his reasoning but I feel, I would have rather preferred the kind of conclusion that would have been drawn from own experiences.


• And what is that?

Everything has its end and changes would be there.


• Do you think rebellion is having its end now? Is it leading to politics?

No, that is not the case. It depends on the nature of the issue. If exploitation is justified, we have to go on fighting.


• But in today’s situation, do you think you are heading toward peace and politics or towards fighting in the bush?

So long as India believes in military might to solve the problem, there can be no meeting point. We can go on fighting. But in 1994, three generals declared that a military solution was no longer possible. It was a political issue, which could be solved through political means. If the Government of India has realised the futility of military might, we have to accept that. We have to come forward and talk.


• And are you getting the sense that the Indian Government is more positive, more practical and more understanding now?

So far as they believe in a political solution, you are right. But how far can that be proved from the Indian side. So it is still a big issue.


• So right now you are not pessimistic?

I am not pessimistic but there is no point for me to be optimistic always.


• So when you go overseas, when do you see yourself coming back and resuming the process? Or can the process carry on even when you are outside?

Yes, it can. But it depends to what extent the Government of India is prepared to understand the Nagas and respect the reality of our history. That will decide. On our part, we will take any possible step to come closer and get the problem solved through peaceful means. But if big brothers like India will depend on the big stick, of course, we will not accept that.


• Well, it’s always that one who wields the big stick must also speak softly. Does the Government of India speak softly with you?

Sometimes softly, but sometimes they change their tone.


• And what do they say to you?

Sometimes, in a manner of threatening, they would talk.


• Even now?

Not now, in the beginning. So we had to lash out. We had to retaliate saying we have our history, you have your history. It is good if we respect each other.


• Nobody underrates the Naga soldiers. Even in the Indian army, the Naga regiment is very highly rated. During the Kargil war, the Nagas fought very well.

May be so. But politically speaking, if they don’t have regard for the rights of the Naga people and the positive steps taken by them, there will be no meeting point. If they start imposing their Constitution on us, we will not accept that. We can accept a negotiated settlement, but we will not accept any kind of imposition, today or tomorrow.


• Once you are negotiating, why should there be any imposition? Do you think what you accept will be acceptable to all tribes and sub-tribes of Nagas?

Sure, we believe that.


• You were not seen as an outsider by the Nagas as you come from Manipur...

No, no.


• When I covered the North-East, one really struggled because there were so many languages in Nagaland. So do you tell the Government of India, mafarimo (never mind), let’s move on to the future.

Yes, that’s why you are finding me here. Because we don’t bring guns here and that’s a change but the Indian government may not appreciate that.


• I am sure they do appreciate that and I am sure it leads to real change in the future...

Let’s hope so but let’s not be presumptuous.


• Let me also tell you that none of us can be fighting for 40 years and still be fit and tough like you.

If anybody forces me, I can still go further because I don’t come here to surrender my rights.

URL: http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.php?content_id=72984
 
.
Uprooted in the Northeast:The imbalance of rights, ethnic claims and histories of dispossession

Sanjib Baruah

In Meghalaya in 1997, the Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council, which has constitutional jurisdiction over Khasi 'customary law', passed the Khasi Social Custom of Lineage Bill. The Khasis have a matrilineal kinship system and the bill sought to codify the system of inheritance through the female line. But it became highly controversial. A number of organisations, including the influential Khasi Students Union and the Syngkhong Rympei Thymmai (literally, 'association of new hearths') opposed the measure arguing that instead of codifying an 'outdated system' of matrilineal succession, Khasis should 'modernise' their kinship system. They proposed a change that would allow only children of two Khasi parents to be regarded as Khasi.

Why did legally establishing who is and who is not a Khasi become so important? Because the Khasis are designated a scheduled tribe (ST) and the lion's share of public employment, business and trade licenses, and even the right to seek elected office is reserved for STs. Nearly 85 percent of public sector employment in Meghalaya, where a majority of them lives, and 55 of the 60 seats in the state legislative assembly are reserved for STs. While the historical disadvantages that the tribal peoples suffered account for this elaborate protective discrimination regime, the status of non-tribals in the northeast Indian state of Meghalaya, as well as in the neighbouring states of Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram and Nagaland, where such a protective discrimination regime exists, is best described as that of 'denizens'. In all these states, the rights to land ownership and exchange, business and trade licenses, and access to elected office are restricted.

The term 'denizen' goes back to the power of 'denization' that British monarchs once had to grant aliens some of the privileges of natural born subjects. At a later stage, the parliament sought to control the royal power of denization by passing laws that disallowed denizens from being members of the Privy Council and the houses of parliament, from occupying civil or military offices of trust, or from obtaining grants of land from the crown. While the restrictions on the rights of the non-tribal population have a very different history and rationale, the particular limits, eg on rights of
property ownership, access to public employment and elected office are not dissimilar to those applicable to denizens.

The category 'tribal' and its definition would be considered problematic in many academic circles. In India, however, it remains part of the policy discourse because the protective regime necessitates the official recognition of certain groups as 'tribal'. Article 342 of the Indian constitution provides for the president of India by public notification, to specify the "tribes or tribal communities or parts of or groups within tribes or tribal communities which shall for the purposes of the Constitution be deemed to be Scheduled Tribes". The use of 'tribal' here simply means a group included in that list – hence scheduled tribe or ST. According to one scholar who has examined how the Indian government has arrived at the list, tribes were "defined partly by habitat and geographic isolation, but even more on the basis of social, religious, linguistic and cultural distinctiveness – their 'tribal characteristics'. Just where the line between 'tribals' and 'non-tribals' should be drawn has not always been free from doubt" (Marc Galanter, Competing Equalities, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1984).

This protective discrimination regime is the result of an incremental policy-making dating back to colonial times when policy instruments were devised to protect vulnerable aboriginal peoples living in isolated enclaves – once described as 'backward tracks'. Under the Sixth Schedule of postcolonial India's constitution, many of these enclaves became autonomous districts, and autonomous regions within those districts, each identified with a particular tribe. Subsequently, many of these territories became full-fledged states, whereby the protected minorities turned into majority groups in these states, and the system lost some of its original logic.

In three of these states – Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram and Nagaland – the continuation of the colonial institution of the 'inner line', which requires any outsider entering these territories to first secure a permit, creates an even stronger layer of protection against potential settlers. In spite of this, thanks to the changes in demographic trends inherent in economic development policies, such as the forging of national markets for large numbers of unorganised migrant labour crisscrossing the country, where again Indian citizens have become 'subjects without rights', the majority status of these protected groups is under increasing stress.

One of the unintended effects of the tensions between this process of incremental policy-making on the one hand, and migration into the area on the other, is that the notion of exclusive homelands, where certain ethnically defined groups are privileged, developed into an inflexible principle. This dynamic has translated into (often violent) exclusionary politics. Thus, the Northeast today is a hotbed of ethnic clashes between competing groups for exclusive rights to the same assets and, consequently, the site of significant levels of internal displacement.

Condemned to move
In recent years, internal displacements caused by violent ethno-national conflicts between tribals and denizens in many parts of northeast India have attracted the attention of refugee advocates. While most agree that there is substantial internal displacement in the region, calculating the precise number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) has not been easy. Jawaharlal Nehru University professor Mahendra Lama describes the nature of the problem in India as a whole. Political sensitivities prevent the government from releasing data on displacement, he says. But without "a central authority responsible for coordinating data from central and state governments, regular monitoring is not possible in such a huge country". The "nature, frequency and extent of the causes of internal displacement" in India are so varied that it would be a "Herculean task to monitor and record them".

The Norwegian Refugee Council's profile of internal displacement in India in 2000-01 is illustrative of the wide divergence that exists between various available estimates of IDPs in northeast India while also pointing to the absence of data in some cases. The available estimates of the number of IDPs in the state of Assam in 2000-01, for instance, varied between 87,000 persons to more than 200,000. The estimates for Riangs displaced from Mizoram and living in refugee camps in Tripura varied between 31,000 and 41,000. The profile cites one estimate that at least 80,000 Bengalis have been uprooted in Tripura since 1993. In Manipur, conflicts between tribal groups have led to the displacement (at least temporarily) of as many as 13,000 Kukis, Paites and Nagas since 1992, but there were no estimates of the number of IDPs in Manipur. In Arunachal Pradesh, as many as 3000 Chakmas had become internally displaced, but the number of those who have left the area was unknown. The US Committee for Refugees in its report for 2000 estimated that there were 157,000 displaced persons in northeast India.

These estimates, even if not precise, underscore the magnitude of the IDP crisis in northeast India. It is important to delve into the historical conditions and the institutional context in which the typical ethno-political conflicts of the region take place and examine why these conflicts have proven to be conducive to ethnic violence and displacement.

In the 20th century, tribal societies in the Northeast went through a process of transition, from shifting cultivation to settled agriculture, from clan control of land to its commodification, and urbanisation and cultural change associated with a continuing process of 'modernisation'. The new economic niches created in this process of social transformation attracted large-scale migration to this sparsely populated frontier area of the Subcontinent. Today, except for Assam and Tripura, all the other states show growth rates that are above the national average during the 1991-2001 decade. However, in the states of Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland as well as in Assam's two autonomous districts (Karbi Anglong and North Cachar hills), STs as a proportion of the total population are on the decline. At the moment though, except for Karbi Anglong district,

the majority status of STs is not immediately under threat. This trend of population growth is, of course, the rationale for freezing the present balance of ST representation in the state assemblies. The protective discrimination regime, outlined earlier, arose partly as a response to these demographic trends.

Too often, the demographic change in the region has been seen only from the perspective of what scholars of migration call 'push factors'. But it is important to bring in the 'pull factors' as well – the economic transformation and process of class differentiation in these states that have provided significant economic opportunities to new immigrants – some of which may be hidden from the gaze of law. In one area of Karbi Anglong, for example, while ownership rights are in the name of tribals, 'Bihari', Bengali and Nepali denizens, more adept at the state-encouraged settled cultivation than the STs who are traditionally shifting cultivators, are the real owners. Indian security forces, ostensibly there to deal with the security threat posed by insurgencies, are appropriated by the denizens because of shared ethnic ties, and often assist in this process the agency for this.

There are informal ways in which denizens acquire de facto property rights that are likely to become de jure rights in future. In Meghalaya, for instance, some powerful individuals having captured what is formally clan-controlled land now exercise substantial control over both urban and agricultural land, sometimes up to 1000 acres – something that would never have been allowed by custom. Chiefs and headmen have been issuing land deeds to non-Khasis and Khasis alike for a fixed rent. The breakdown of customary modes of land control has meant the introduction of absentee landlordism, realisation of rent from land, sharecropping, land mortgage and even landlessness. Such land grab has also been made possible by official development policies that have encouraged plantation crops such as tea, coffee and rubber.

Since the protective discrimination regime in place restricts what denizens can legally do, numerous informal arrangements have emerged in the ownership and control of agricultural land and in business practices. And as exemplified above, those informal niches are sometimes positions of advantage vis-à-vis a person belonging to an ST and at other times the ST person may not be at a position of advantage. The normalisation of the idea of exclusive homelands for ethnically defined groups generates a kind of politics that is in dissonance with the existing political economy of the region. The emerging pattern of class differentiation taking place within the framework of the protective discrimination regime of these transitional economies is complex, with some settlers exploiting indigenous tribal people and others occupying the most marginal of economic niches. And, while the regime has enabled some tribal people to do well, it has not stopped the proletarianisation of others.

The other side of the privatisation of clan-held lands is the emergence of a poorer group of people eking out a living by working as agricultural workers or sharecroppers or by whatever other means possible. To be sure, most of them are local tribals, who despite the protection given to them as members of STs, lack the social and political resources to benefit from the privatisation of clan-lands or to be able to hold on to lands allocated to them. But occupying these economic niches, are also a large number of denizens – Nepalis, Biharis and Bangladeshis among them – who are easier to 'uproot' should a dispute arise.

This is the context in which the idea of exclusive homelands – expressed in the institutional language of "autonomous district councils" or "separate statehood" – has shaped the imagination of tribal as well as non-tribal activists of the region. This particular configuration of institutional legacy, demographic trends, and political discourse in northeast India has wrought an extremely divisive politics of insiders and outsiders that has led to the incidence of displacement. While this combination of circumstances is unique to this part of India, the introduction of similar ideas of exclusive homelands in demographically mixed situations has produced similar conflicts – with the attendant risk of ethnic violence and internal displacement – in other parts of India as well.

A notable example is the new state of Jharkhand where, in 2002, a government proposal to link public employment to "ancestral roots" through a domicile policy led to a bandh (strike) and violence in which many died. Whether a particular regime of differentiated citizenship can achieve its intended goals must be a matter for investigation for the costs of sacrificing the basic principle of equal citizenship are high, and regimes of differentiated citizenship have intended as well as, importantly, unintended consequences.

Excluded areas to exclusive homelands
Attempts to deal with 'aborigines' by creating protected enclaves where they can be allowed to pursue their 'customary practices' including kinship and clan-based rules of land allocation go back to the earliest period of British colonial rule in India. It is worth remembering, however, that the idea of protection came only after enormous violence was visited on some of the same people by the early colonisers in the course of pacification campaigns against 'savage tribes' and, after it became clear that the initial onslaught of colonial transformation had led to the massive dispossession and displacement of many of these peoples who were organised in pre-capitalist social formations. For many, whatever protection came along, was too little and too late.

As early as 1874, the Indian legislature had passed a scheduled districts act. The Government of India Act of 1919 empowered the governor general to declare any territory to be a backward track where laws passed by the Indian legislature would not apply. The Statutory Commission, which in 1930 had examined the political conditions in British India and proposed constitutional reforms, did not like the term 'backward tracks'. It proposed a change of name from 'backward tracks' to 'excluded areas'. The Government of India Act of 1935 therefore provided for "excluded" and "partially excluded areas" – so called because they were excluded from the operation of laws applicable in the rest of British-controlled India.

Some of the potential problems, especially the dangers to non-aboriginal people living in those areas, were anticipated by the debates about these measures even in colonial times. One of the best-known critiques of colonial-era tribal policies is GS Ghurye's 1943 book, The Aborigines – So Called – and their Future (Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Pune, India, Publication No 11). "The acknowledgement of the right of the so-called aborigines to follow their traditional pursuits, like the practice of shifting cultivation, without any reference to the needs of the general community", wrote Ghurye in reference to the recommendations of the Statutory Commission, "was the most dangerous doctrine endorsed by the Commissioners". The commissioners, he charged, had not considered the impact on non-aborigines living in those places and "much less did they give their thought to the proportions of such people in the various areas, unless we discover it in the distinction of the two categories of excluded areas made by them".

If the distinction between excluded and partially excluded areas was indeed based on the proportions of non-aborigines living in those areas, he wrote in a later work, it was too broad a distinction to be useful. About the Government of India Act of 1935, Ghurye wrote that in its "eagerness to do something for the tribals", the British parliament barely considered the condition of the non-tribal people in whose midst the protected aborigines live and on whom they depend to some extent for their livelihood. That these non-tribals too have rights, that their goodwill and cooperation, next only to the conscious and deliberate internal organisation of the tribals themselves, are the most essential factors for the welfare and future development of the so-called aborigines, failed to receive adequate consideration.

That some non-tribals may have indeed taken "unfair advantage of the simplicity and ignorance of the aborigines", Ghurye argued, was no reason to write off their contribution to "socio-economic development", and much less to treat all of them as a "right-less population".

Nevertheless, the Indian constitution of 1950, retained most of the provisions of the 1935 act, though the nomenclatures and some of the institutional forms were modified. Not surprisingly, Ghurye could reprint the same book with only a few changes and a new title in 1963. Most importantly, from our perspective, the constitution made a distinction between the tribal areas of Assam (five of the seven states of today's northeast) and those in the rest of the country. While the tribal peoples of the rest of India came under the Fifth Schedule, the Sixth Schedule provided for the administration of the tribal areas of northeast India.

The chairman of the subcommittee of the constituent assembly that drafted the Sixth Schedule, later Assam's chief minister, Gopinath Bordoloi, in presenting its proposals justified them by referring to the uncertain political conditions in the region at the time of independence. Bordoloi stressed the need for continued protection because of the doubts among the tribal people of what a postcolonial dispensation would bring; he spoke of the need to 'integrate' these peoples in a Gandhian way. The fear of being swamped by outsiders once the colonial era restrictions were suddenly removed was indeed a concern expressed by leaders of the tribal communities. That the Naga revolt broke out soon after independence – and continues till this day – indicates that the anxiety expressed by Bordoloi was far from theoretical.

Scheduled differences
The Sixth Schedule distinguished two sets of tribal areas of undivided Assam, which at the time was the entire Northeast barring Sikkim, using the administrative categories that were then in effect: a) the districts of the United Khasi and Jaintia Hills (excluding Shillong), Garo Hills, Lushai Hills, Naga Hills, North Cachar Hills and the Mikir Hills, and the North East Frontier Tracts and the Naga Tribal Area. The first set of areas today comprise the states of Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and parts of Assam, and the second category consists mostly of the state of Arunachal Pradesh and a part of the state of Nagaland. The Sixth Schedule institutions were meant for sets of areas, but the latter set of territories – which were mostly un-administered during colonial times – was considered to be not quite ready at that time for self-governing institutions. The administration of those areas was going to be carried out directly from Delhi – with the governor of Assam acting as the agent of the Indian president.

The Sixth Schedule provided for autonomous districts and autonomous regions within those districts with elected councils which enjoyed powers to levy some taxes, to constitute courts for the administration of justice involving tribals and law-making powers on subjects including land allotment, occupation or use of land, regulation of shifting cultivation, formation and administration of village and town committees, appointment of chiefs, inheritance of property, marriage and social customs.

However, the schedule was not intended to protect all the STs of northeast India. Only those that were considered to be relatively concentrated in the old excluded and partially excluded areas, and for which the constitution used the term tribal areas, came under the purview of the Sixth Schedule. The Bordoloi subcommittee did not consider the situation of other STs. Among them were groups such as Bodos, Misings and Tiwas that are described today as plains tribes to distinguish them from the hill tribes that came under the Sixth Schedule. In the Constituent Assembly, the special needs of the plains tribes were the responsibility of a separate subcommittee, which was in charge of minority rights. A Bodo politician, Rupnath Brahma, was a member of the minority rights subcommittee.

The process of formation of Autonomous District Councils, however, did not quite proceed the way constitution-makers had anticipated. The outbreak of the independentist Naga rebellion, for instance, meant that political conditions for holding elections to the Naga Hills District Council did not exist. Instead, in 1963, the state of Nagaland was created. The North East Frontier Tracts where the Sixth Schedule was eventually supposed to be in place also went through a different process of institutional change than the one anticipated prior to the Indo-China war of 1962. The area is now the state of Arunachal Pradesh, where tribals enjoy protection at the state level. Meanwhile, the Sixth Schedule has been extended to Tripura in response to tribal militancy, where the Tripura Tribal Areas District Council was formed.

It is not accidental that Nagaland was created in 1963, a year after India's war with China. The Chinese invasion exposed India's vulnerabilities in the region. Already, the Naga independentist rebellion had begun to make officials of the postcolonial Indian state anxious. There were stirrings of unrest in other parts of the region as well. Beginning with the China war, the managers of the Indian state began to see the external and internal 'enemies' in this frontier region coming together and constituting a looming threat to national security. Extending the institutions of the state all the way into the international border – nationalising this frontier space – has been the thrust of Indian policy ever since. Over the next few years, the governmental structure of the region was fundamentally redesigned to create what I have called a cosmetically federal regional order. Thus, with the creation of Nagaland, statehood in northeast India became de-linked from questions of fiscal viability and of its implications for the constitutional architecture of the larger polity. Building on the elementary apparatus of state institutions created by the Sixth Schedule became a good way to ensure both the penetration of the state and the creation of local stakeholders in the pan-Indian dispensation.

Northeast Indian states: Reserved seats for Scheduled Tribes in state legislative assemblies
States ST as % of Population* Leg. Assembly Total Members Leg. Assembly Seats of STs Leg. Assembly Unreserved Seats
Arunanchal 63.7 60 59 1
Assam 12.8 126 16 102**
Manipur 34.4 60 20 40
Meghalaya 86.6 60 55 5
Mizoram 94.8 40 39 1
Nagaland 87.7 60 59 1
Tripura 31.0 60 20 33***

*BASED ON 1991 CENSUS DATA **RESERVED FOR SCHEDULED CASTES ***RESERVED FOR SCHEDULES CASTES

Apart from consolidating the idea of exclusive homelands, organising the region into a number of mini states, all of them with the formal institutions of other Indian state governments, also had the effect of imposing a particular developmental paradigm. There is, after all, a standard vision of development which is contained in the routine practices of the bureaucracy of a 'developmentalist state' that allocates funds to departments such as public works, rural development and industries; and that vision only gets bolstered by the patronage politics of an electoral democracy. In the sparsely populated parts of this frontier region, these economic trends have invariably meant more immigration.

The most significant aspect of this new regional order, from the perspective of the theory and practice of citizenship, however, is that the vast majority of seats in the state legislatures of the mini states – indeed all but one seat in the case of three legislatures – are reserved for candidates belonging to the STs. The table below gives the number of reserved seats in the state legislatures of northeastern states and also gives the percentage of the ST population.

In the legislative assemblies of Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram and Nagaland all but one seat is reserved for STs. In Meghalaya, 55 of the 60 seats are reserved. Apart from the issue of the denizens not being able to contest elections, the principle of one-person, one-vote, one-value has had to be undermined in other ways as well in order to achieve such a weighted system of representation. Generally, the norm about ensuring the equality of the relative weight of each vote in a democracy requires that in electoral systems with single-member constituencies, the electorates in all districts be roughly of the same size. That could not be done if the legislative assemblies were to have such a weighted system of representation. As a result, Nagaland's largest urban centre, Dimapur, for instance – which has a very high concentration of denizens – is divided into two constituencies and one of them is the sole unreserved (non-tribal) seat in the Nagaland assembly. This unreserved constituency has many times the number of voters of each of the other constituencies in the state.

Through another constitutional amendment the balance between reserved and unreserved seats in the assemblies of Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland has been frozen in order to ensure that delimitation of constituencies in light of demographic changes in future does not change the current balance.

Whatever the philosophical dilemmas these arrangements present to the theorist of citizenship, the emergence of elected state governments under the control of tribal politicians and of a visible well-to-do tribal elite in those states has captured the imagination of tribal as well as non-tribal ethnic activists in the region. There is a perception that the STs in the states with the most comprehensive protective discrimination regimes have done well economically and have been relatively successful in insulating themselves from being swamped by immigrants. While a homeland has become something to aspire for on the part of those ethnic groups (STs as well as others) who do not have one, ethnic activists of the existing homelands have become zealous defenders of what they see as their statutory entitlements. This was exemplified in the case of Khasi activists in Meghalaya.

Returning to the controversy in Meghalaya over Khasi succession rules, the authority of the Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council to decide on Khasi succession rules is derived from the Sixth Schedule of the constitution. According to its sponsors, the goal of the Khasi Social Custom of Lineage Bill was to stop non-Khasis from adopting Khasi surnames to take advantage of opportunities reserved for STs. The activists opposed to the bill would hardly disagree with that goal. However, the attempt to codify 'customary practice' drew public attention to the liberal way in which the Khasis have traditionally incorporated outsiders into their fold. The practice by which children of a Khasi mother and a non-Khasi father can become a Khasi came up for special scrutiny.

The opponents of the bill argued that the system allows too many people to pass off as Khasi and take advantage of opportunities reserved for Khasis. Thus, the president of the Syngkhong, Keith Pariat, was quoted in the press as saying that the matrilineal system no longer serves contemporary needs and that, if it was allowed to continue, the 'pure Khasi tribe' will become extinct in another 10 to 15 years. The bill, however, did not become law because it did not receive the governor's assent – a constitutional requirement aimed at moderating the powers of state legislatures.

By raising questions about the way 'outsiders' have historically been incorporated into the Khasi fold, the controversy had the effect of putting under the cloud the rights – including rights to property ownership, public employment and to seek elected office – of significant numbers of people living in Meghalaya, some for generations. And since the proposed reforms would have denied those rights to people who had some claim to being a Khasi, the climate generated by the controversy could only have been worse for most denizens – such as residents of Meghalaya who have no claim to being Khasi or a member of one of the other STs.

Ethnic homelands: An anachronism
While the Northeast becomes increasingly polarised over the insider/outsider groups of high-stakes politics of the region, people from the Northeast may in fact be quietly be joining the Indian mainstream. Modern India, according to the jurist Professor Upendra Baxi, has achieved "national integration without achieving national integrity". But, perhaps the postcolonial social transformation of northeast India, taking place under the protective cover of the Sixth Schedule, is slowly making the region a part of this grid of 'unconstitutional national integration' in somewhat unexpected ways.

The Bangladeshi and Nepali presence in the region points to a significant transnational dimension of this as well. At least a part of the demographic change in northeast India has to be explained by this migrating proletariat meeting the labour demands of the building boom in the region – made possibly partly by the state resources being pumped in and the substantial leakage of funds through corruption – and the class relations in the emerging forms of post-shifting cultivation agriculture. Their presence in these economic roles is certainly very visible to any visitor to northeast India today.

Slowly but steadily, the dispossessed tribal of northeast India is also sure to join this mass of humanity on the move. Thus, if the Bihari denizen in Karbi Anglong takes advantage of the misery of the poor Karbi to take effective control of his land, a tribal landlord in the Naga foothills, often empowered and enriched by positions in or connections to the state government of Nagaland, may be in a position of power and dominance vis-a-vis the Bengali denizen sharecropper informally leasing his land. Questions of social justice in northeast India are significantly more complex today than what
the regime of protection was originally designed to accomplish.

How anachronistic the homeland idea has become in the context of the existing political economy of northeast India today is apparent in the demand for a homeland for the Bodos on the north bank of the Brahmaputra. Bodo speakers today number only 1.1 million or 11.5 percent in the area they want for their homeland. They have come in conflict with the Koch Rajbongshis, who if they 'win' ST status will become by far the predominant tribal group in the recently approved Bodo Territorial Council area. They have also come in conflict with the All Assam Students Union, which spearheaded the Assam movement of the 1970s-80s against 'aliens', and is now in discussion with the state and central government about ways to protect Assam's 'indigenous people'. Since the term 'indigenous people' in international human rights discourse is roughly synonymous with what in India are called scheduled tribes, the extension of the word 'indigenous' to include a non-tribal people – especially one that is itself at loggerheads with some of Assam's STs – has aroused deep suspicion.

More than any other case, the displacement of Santhals in Kokrajhar district in the late 1990s – victims of violence by Bodo militants – dramatised this incongruity. The Santhals in Assam are descendants of tea workers brought to Assam as indentured workers, many of them more than a century ago. Their displaced forefathers provided the muscle for the tea industry that marked the arrival of global capitalism in Assam in the 19th century. That such a group could be displaced for the second time in the course of an 'indigenous' group's search for an ethnic homeland – no matter how tragic the story of injustice done to them – brings home the absurdity of the way insiders and outsiders are framed in the homeland discourse of northeast India. The discourse today has become a serious challenge to the foundational principles of citizenship. It cannot be expected to provide a framework for the struggles for social justice of today and of the future.

Dual citizenship
Minimally, what is needed is a framework that does not involve the state forever categorising groups of people in ethnic terms and making descendants of immigrants into perpetual outsiders. While mechanisms to control immigration are no doubt necessary, so are rules about absorbing the descendants of immigrants – no matter how restrictive. And at least a generation or two later, they have to become full citizens. This writer suggest that the notion of dual citizenship, not unknown in federal systems – citizenship both of India and of a state – might be able to provide such a framework. Such a regime of dual citizenship would be a variation in the theme of the differentiated citizenship regime that exists in northeast India. But its purpose would be to replace the ethnic principle with a civic principle and to give the right to define the rules of inclusion and exclusion to territorially defined political communities.

A quick review of the language in which the citizenship laws of countries are framed illustrates how the logic of the citizenship discourse necessarily differs from that of the discourse of homelands for ethnically defined groups. In principle, most countries recognise three ways of becoming a citizen: birth within the territory of a country (jus soli), descent from a citizen (jus sanguinis) and naturalisation. If jus sanguinis incorporates the principle of citizenship gained through blood ties to citizens, the other two principles can incorporate the ethnically or culturally different outsider. In contrast to that, the homeland discourse tends to define political communities in static and exclusively ethnic terms. Of course, in reality, countries vary enormously on how much of the jus soli principle is applied to the claims to citizenship of children of immigrants born in the country and on the degree of difficulties that are involved in obtaining citizenship through naturalisation. Indeed, in countries like Israel and Japan, jus sanguinis remains the predominant way of acquiring citizenship. Yet the openings for new members that exist in principle makes the discourse of citizenship different from the exclusionary logic of the discourse of exclusive homelands.

The framework of dual citizenship can define political communities in civic terms, incorporate new members and make a decisive break from the notion of ethnic homelands

Certain recent developments in the citizenship policies in Europe help illustrate this point. Despite the political rhetoric against foreigners in Europe today, the trend in most European countries has been to extend the right of citizenship to second-generation immigrants. The labour demands during the latter half of the 20th century induced a major part of Europe's recent immigration. Originally, the migration was thought of as temporary, as illustrated by the notion of guest worker. However, as many temporary migrants became permanent settlers, countries have had to respond creatively to the reality of a growing number of foreign non-citizen residents living in their midst. Whatever their degree of economic and social integration, lack of citizenship had tended to separate immigrant groups from the broader community in significant ways and implicitly justified xenophobic and exclusionary rhetoric. Thus, it was hard not to see a direct connection between Germany's inability to recognise Turks, Yugoslavs and other former guest workers as potential German citizens and the attacks on Turks as 'foreigners'. Germany, of course, has since 2000 changed the laws of citizenship recognising the right of second-generation immigrants to citizenship.

Indeed except for Austria, Greece and Luxemburg, the other 12 European Union countries now give second-generation immigrants the right to citizenship. Of course, there are conditions attached including, in some cases, double jus soli – besides the applicant, a parent too has to be born in the country. The point is not however to debate the laws, but to draw attention through example to the fact that, unlike the homeland discourse, it is hard within the discourse of citizenship not to recognise the right to citizenship of second-generation immigrants. In that sense the citizenship discourse is qualitatively different from the homeland discourse of northeast India that makes denizens and perpetual foreigners out of ethnically defined outsiders and their descendants.

The obvious advantages of the framework of dual citizenship are that it can define political communities in civic terms, introduce a dynamic element of incorporating new members and thereby make a decisive break from the notion of ethnic homelands that is part of the legacy of colonial subject-hood. Dual citizenship would imply that elected state governments and legislatures could make rules by which an internal immigrant becomes a citizen of the state and a member of the political community embodied in that state.

Furthermore, under a strong dual citizenship regime, even national citizenship could become a concurrent subject requiring for instance, that international treaties affecting the flow of people from outside the country into India – for instance the treaties affecting the rights of ethnic Nepalis or Bangladeshis in India – would need the concurrence of state governments. Making such treaty a part of state level political debates could give such treaties the popular legitimacy that they appear to lack in northeast India. Giving state legislatures a formal say in controlling the flow of people into the region – restrictions that exist today, but primarily through non-transparent colonial-era bureaucratic practices like the inner line or as an indirect effect of the protections given to STs – will give legitimacy to the internal immigration into the region that is only likely to increase in coming years.

Indian public opinion, however, is unlikely to be friendly to the idea of dual citizenship, which is been announced recently as a sop for the West-based non-resident Indian. Indeed, in the 1999 debate that followed the autonomy resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir assembly, commentators specifically pointed at the dangers of the dual citizenship idea. Columnist Arvind Lavakare, for instance, recently argued that if a state had such power, it would "discriminate in favour of its citizens in matters such as the right to hold public office, to vote, to obtain employment or to secure licenses for practicing law or medicine". He gave the example of Jammu and Kashmir, where the right to acquire immovable property is restricted to the state's permanent residents to illustrate how "politically explosive" the idea of dual citizenship can be. "With that solitary exception [sic]", he noted with satisfaction, an exception that could be removed by abrogating Article 370 of the constitution, "the Indian federation has largely achieved, and seeks to maintain, uniformity in basic civil and criminal laws". Like many Indian commentators, Lavakare is oblivious of the Northeast and of Article 371 (which immediately follows the much-reviled article on Jammu and Kashmir), that gives some of the northeastern states their special forms of autonomy.

The choice in the Northeast today is not between a new set of restrictions that dual citizenship would introduce for the first time and a uniform national citizenship where all Indian citizens have unrestricted rights to movement, residency and property ownership. What exists on the ground is a set of rules that distinguishes between citizens and denizens, rules that have fuelled an increasingly exclusionary politics of homelands and have been prone to generating ethnic
violence and recurrent episodes of displacement. Dual citizenship in such a situation would be able to introduce for the first time a regime of civic citizenship that will be in line with the actually existing political economy of the region.

Such a citizenship regime will also be consistent with the traditional liberal incorporative ethos of the region. In the controversy over the Khasi Social Custom of Lineage Bill, the matrilineal system of succession that Khasi activists would like to 'modernise' has a remarkably liberal and progressive conception of group membership. While descent is traced along the female line, that does not stop children of non-Khasi women married to Khasi men from being absorbed into Khasi society. Children of such marriages typically adopted the non-Khasi mother's given name or occupation as a clan name and over time such names became recognised as Khasi clan names. Indeed, there are many Khasi clans today that trace their ancestry to non-Khasi women who were wives or concubines of Khasi men, abducted from the plains in the course of trading expeditions and wars. This also does not discriminate against children married out of wedlock.

As Khasi sociologist Tiplut Nongbri points out in a recent paper on Khasi women and matriliny: while the Khasi rules of descent may render "the ethnic boundary of the Khasi highly porous, it makes the addition of new members into the society relatively easy and adds to the vibrancy of the system". Dual citizenship will only return the Northeast to the spirit of such progressive traditions of incorporating new members – so dramatically different from the caste sensibilities of mainstream India – and make a clean break from the colonial constructions of ethnic subject-hood that have generated today's lethal politics of homelands.

http://www.himalmag.com/2003/march/essay_2.html
 
.
India's violent north-east

A wave of violence in the north-eastern Indian states of Assam and Nagaland has again highlighted the tensions and fissures in this part of the country. News Online looks at why there is so much violence in north-eastern India.

Why is north-eastern India so restive?

Before the British, none of the previous empires in India had managed to control the remote north-eastern areas. So the region had enjoyed a long history of independence. There are also sharp differences in culture and tradition with the rest of the country. Separatists in Nagaland, Mizoram, Manipur and Assam have tapped into these differences and been able to challenge the control of the Indian state. The central government has used military force to quell these rebellions, which in turn has often provoked more violence. Recent years have seen the growth of conflicting demands for independent homelands between various ethnic groups in the region, which have also resulted in much bloodshed.
How serious is the violence?

Very - particularly the violence between the various ethnic militias of the region, into which innocent villagers and non-combatants have often been drawn. Violence unleashed by ethnic rebel armies against the settlers from outside the region has also assumed serious proportions.

How is the central government trying to end the violence?

It uses military force to try to contain the rebels and weaken them. Naga rebels want independence from India But Indian military commanders admit that only political solutions can resolve the many conflicts. The Indian government has opened dialogues with many of these groups and correspondents say its attitude is more flexible than in the past. Its basic position is that the various rebel groups have to accept Indian sovereignty over the region and give up violence. The central government also pumps in a lot of federal funds to promote economic development that is seen as crucial to win the hearts and minds of the locals. But local people complain that lot of these funds are pilfered by a corrupt local elite in collusion with unscrupulous contractors and businessmen resulting in a lack of development.

Are the conflicts restricted to Indian territory?

They are largely restricted to Indian territory but rebels from north-eastern India have ethnic cousins across the borders . They find shelter in those countries, particularly in the remote border hill regions.

Are there any beacons of hope?

The peace settlement in Mizoram, signed in 1986 between the Indian Government and the Mizo National Front, has held good and the once-troubled state is largely peaceful.
The National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), the strongest rebel group of Nagaland and perhaps in the whole region, has also been negotiating with the central government for six years now. Civil society groups in the region are more active than ever before. They are playing a leading role in initiating dialogues and sustaining the peace process. After 50 years of bloody guerrilla campaigns, many civilians are tired and desperate for peace.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/3224670.stm
 
.
NSCN (IM) will continue fight for greater Nagaland

Dimapur, Aug 03: National Socialist Council of Nagalim (IM) wants the Centre to address the issue of integration of Naga dominated areas of Northeast. The outfit during its recent meeting with the senior Union government officials has made it clear that it has almost freeze the demand of independence but will continue to fight for creation of greater Nagaland.

Some political bigwigs in Nagaland politics has suggested 'partial integration of Naga dominated pockets of Northeast' to keep the peace ball rolling. " The NSCN (IM) has now initiated two pronged pressure tactics for creation of greater Nagaland- it is supporting the blockade of National Highway 39 in Manipur sponsored by the All Naga Students' Association, Manipur (ANSAM) and has limited the time frame of ceasefire to just six months instead of the usual one year.

Ever since the truce was signed in 1997 both the Centre and NSCN (IM) have preferred to sign one year ceasefire agreement," political analyst here felt. A cadre of NSCN (IM) told northeasttribune.com that it has been almost eight years since the centre- NSCN-IM truce was signed. The NSCM (IM) general secretary T.Muivah had nearly 12 rounds of discussion with the UPA government's ministerial team but no major headway has been made. " The centre remains non committal on the NSCM (IM)'s core demand of Naga integration. This has made the NSCN (IM) leadership impatient," he said.

The cadre further said that NSCN (IM) is expecting concrete steps by the centre government in the next six months. " What is the use of extending the ceasefire if the vital issues concerning the Naga people remains unaddressed. Nagas have fraught for 50 years and will continue fighting for another half century if the centre do not understand the genuine demand of Naga people," he warned.

Nagaland Chief Minister, Neiphiu Rio has been maintaining that integration of the Naga inhabited areas of region is aspiration of the Naga society. However for Central Government it is catch twenty situation as the three North eastern states of Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur have made it clear that they will not give an inch of there land to the NSCN (IM).

The extension of ceasefire in the Naga inhabited areas of Assam and Manipur has evoked strong protest and centre government was forced to roll back the ceasefire from these areas. Political analyst opined that the centre government is contemplating to set up a boundary commission to evolve consensus among the Northeastern states on the vexed boundary issue which has seen Manipur- Nagaland and Assam- Nagaland up in arms. " But given the present mood of the confronting Northeastern states there are serious doubts on the efficacy of proposed boundary commission.

http://northeasttribune.com/4601.htm
 
.
Naga Blockade of Manipur – An Analysis

by Anand Kumar

The oldest insurgency of northeast which is undergoing through a peace process got further complicated due to an ill-timed and indiscreet political decision of the Manipur Chief Minister. This decision not only turned the clock backward in the peace process, but also created problems for the people of Manipur. Besides, it also spurted the extremist Naga movement aimed at uniting all Naga dominated territories with the Indian state of Nagaland.

The Naga tribal community claims that the areas inhabited by them were unfairly divided by British colonial rulers and subsequently by India . They believe that because of this part of Naga areas have been shared with the neighbouring states of Manipur , Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. Of the estimated 3 million Nagas, 2 million live in Nagaland and the rest are scattered over the three states. To once again unite these areas inhabited by the Nagas, preferably under a sovereign state, a Naga extremist movement was launched in northeast.

This insurgency has been called the mother of all insurgencies in the northeast India . Its birth, growth and evolution coincided with many other parallel insurgency movements in Nagaland and other six northeastern Sates, some of which antagonistic to each other. The split in original National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) led to the birth of the dominant NSCN (Isak-Muivah) outfit which fought battles with the Centre as well as the other off-shoot of NSCN, the arch rival NSCN (Khaplang) group. Other ethnic rebels and tribal groups in the three states have strongly opposed any plan to redraw boundaries.

Despite these differences, the powerful NSCN-(IM) guided the direction of extremist Naga movement in the region with Chairman Isak Swu and General Secretary T Muivah remote controlling the process of conflict and reconciliation with Delhi from ‘exile’ for over 30 years. It was during the last NDA rule that Swu and Muivah returned ‘home’ to pick up threads of peace knitted together well by the Central representative and former Home Secretary K Padmanabhaih during his years of interactions with the duo either in Bangkok or in Amsterdam.

Muivah and chairman Isak Chishi Swu arrived in India in December last year and spent several weeks in Nagaland meeting a cross-section of society, including the apex tribal body, Naga Ho Ho, NGOs, representatives of students, youth and women's organisations and the church. They also held talks with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, UPA chairperson Sonia Gandhi, the group of Ministers on the Naga issue and leaders of various political parties. This was the second time that top NSCN (I-M) leaders have interacted with top Indian leaders since the truce with the Government came into effect in 1997.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has felt that negotiations with NSCN (I-M) were moving at a “satisfactory” pace and voiced confidence that it would be brought to a “successful conclusion”. But the insurgent group now does not seem satisfied with the pace of the talks. As a result, the talks appear to be headed towards a deadlock. Probably because of this reason the ceasefire has now been extended only by six months.

Both sides have now clear cut differences. For instance, the insurgent leaders want New Delhi not to insist too much that the solution must be ‘within the Constitution of India’. Some believe that it is a political strategy of the NSCN (I-M) leaders to build pressure to extract better bargain on the key issues of autonomy and territorial integrity that is unification of all Naga inhabited areas. Muivah has reportedly also rejected greater devolution of powers under Article 371 (a) of the Constitution to give a Jammu and Kashmir-like status to Nagaland. His line for the record remains: “The destiny’ of Naga must be left to Nagas themselves...And we are talking about it."

Muivah recently said, "If this uniqueness of Naga history is respected by this government, naturally there is a possibility of coming to a possible meeting point." The Naga leaders have also claimed that Indian leadership was conspiring to quell ‘Naga revolution’ by colluding with Myanmar . Muivah alleged that Indian forces had recently killed five of his NSCN cadres in Nagaland.

The NSCN proposal obviously can not be accepted by the Indian leadership. The central government is concerned that recognizing Naga "uniqueness" could stoke separatist sentiments in other parts of the country.

The rigid stand of the NSCN (IM) has not received full backing from Naga institutions like Baptist Church, Naga Council and ‘Gao Buda‘ who hold rather ‘soft‘ stand on several contentious issues. Muivah concedes that there are ‘differences’ with Naga institutions including the Church. Yet he hopes that this time around positive results could be expected from the negotiations.

When the peace process appeared to be floundering, an impetus to Naga demand was provided by the ill-timed decision of Manipur Chief Minister O Ibobi Singh. In a hasty decision, Singh declared June 18 as “State Integration Day”. That was the day in 2001 when at least 20 people were killed and dozens wounded in Manipur’s capital Imphal after police opened fire to disperse agitators protesting New Delhi ’s decision to extend the jurisdiction of a ceasefire with the NSCN beyond Nagaland to cover Manipur. The Nagas of Manipur perceive the government's move to commemorate the 2001 uprising as a challenge to their goal of integrating all Naga-inhabited areas of the region.

By this decision, Ibobi Singh wanted to make political capital in Manipur. But it also stirred emotions in Nagaland and in Naga dominated areas of Manipur. This decision provided the trigger for the blockade as it was contrary to the position of NSCN. The All Naga Students Association of Manipur (ANSAM) stated that the decision of Manipur government was against the Naga demand for the unification of all Naga-dominated areas, including those in Manipur. The organisation started a blockade to force the Manipur government withdraw this decision.

The blockade, sponsored by the All Naga Students Association of Manipur (ANSAM) began at the midnight on June 19 and was enforced along the two national highways. It chocked the supply chain by preventing trucks carrying essentials and other supplies from entering Manipur. On any normal day, at least 400 trucks ply between Assam and Manipur. With NH-39 — that links Manipur with Assam through Nagaland — remaining blocked since June 19, movement of essential items — foodstuff, fuel, life-saving medicines etc — virtually stopped. The other highway, NH-53, that links Manipur with Guwahati via Meghalaya and the Barak Valley in south Assam, however, was first opened after large-scale deployment of troops on July 18, to be closed again within 24 hours as suspected NSCN (IM) cadres damaged a vital bridge on the Irang river, about 120 km from here, by using a gas welding device. Though it was reopened later, this highway is in a very bad shape and is prone to landslides.

The Naga activists also “sealed” several offices in the four Naga-dominated districts of Senapati, Chandel, Tamenglong and Ukhrul. Later some violence also took place and on July 9, at least 10 government offices in four districts of Manipur were burnt down by Naga protestors after two of their colleagues were injured in a lathicharge.

All efforts to reopen traffic on NH-39 — that links Manipur with the rest of India through Nagaland —failed miserably with the Manipur Chief Minister failing to convince his Nagaland counterpart, Neiphiu Rio, to help him out. The two in fact ended up in a blame game with Rio reportedly justifying the solidarity extended by various Nagaland-based NGOs to the ANSAM blockade as a ‘‘brotherly gesture to the Nagas.’’

The crisis divided Manipur on ethnic lines. Even the politicians were not spared by it. The North East Sun has disclosed that the former chief minister of Manipur Rishang Keishing wrote a letter to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh asking for unionification of the Naga-dominated region of Manipur with Nagaland. Besides Keishing, the others who signed the letter include Shri Mani Charanamei, member of Lok Sabha and 11 members of the Manipur Legislative Assembly including Gaikhangam, Francies Ngajokpa, A Aza Shimray, B D Behring, D K Kortngthang, Wungnaoshang Keishing, Danny Shaiza, Henry Paotei, R K Thekho, Samuel Jendai and Z Mangaibou.

In the letter Rishang Keishing wrote, "At the outset, we the undersigned democratically elected leaders wish to express our deep appreciation to the government of India for acknowledging the 'unique history and the situation of the Nagas' and the progress of talks in the right direction." While extending support to the government of India for its efforts, he noted, "In case of territorial integration of the Naga areas, we believe that it is our sincere question and the basic fundamental right of the Naga people to be under one political entity and live together. We therefore fully support the aspiration of the Naga people for integration."

An umbrella organisation of Manipuri students, the United Committee Manipur UCM), blamed the Centre for not developing the Imphal-Silchar highway (NH-53) which it said could have been used as an alternative to the blocked NH-39. It also criticized the Centre for not deploying enough forces to keep the highway open. Yet, the Meiteis who constitute the majority of the population in Manipur have been unusually restrained as they knew that any hasty reactions could only strengthen the campaign to divide Manipur.

Both the centre and the Manipur government knew that use of force against Nagas in Manipur will further intensify the movement. Hence they wanted to engage ANSAM in peace talks so that the organization could be persuaded to lift the blockade. ANSAM showed its willingness for the talks but wanted the Manipur Chief Minister to come to the hill districts where Nagas reside. But this proposal was not accepted by Ibobi Singh who did not want to appear yielding too much to Naga pressure.

Situation became more complex on August 1, when an influential group of Naga elders, the Naga Hoho, and student and citizens’ groups expressed dissatisfaction at the “pace of negotiations” during the ceasefire between the Centre and the NSCN (I-M) and re-affirmed their commitment to carving out Nagalim from Nagaland and neighbouring states. This view was expressed when a delegation of the Hoho, led by president Horangse Sangtam, met Home Minister Shivraj Patil, UPA convenor Sonia Gandhi, and South Block mandarins overseeing the Centre-NSCN (I-M) negotiations.

The blockade has caused violation of human rights as this has resulted into immense suffering for the people who are already poor and deprived. They had to go without the basic essentials for over a month. As the crisis was deepening in Manipur, New Delhi finally decided to air-lift the essential supplies to Imphal. It was soon followed by the decision of ANSAM to lift the blockade.

The effectiveness of blockade has boosted the morale of insurgents and their sympathizers. This has once again brought the NSCN (IM) demands to the centrestage and strengthened their bargaining position. The groups supported by them may resort to similar tactics even in future. The decision of ANSAM to lift the blockade has now eased the situation in Manipur. But the ill timed decision of Ibobi Singh has given impetus to the NSCN (IM) demand of unionisation of Naga inhabited areas. It has also made evident the ethnic fault lines in northeastern politics. This blockade should serve as a wake up call for the government. It should now develop good alternative route to connect Manipur. A possible solution to the frequent blockades could be the completion of railway line from Jiribam, a border town near Cachar district of Assam, to Toupul, about 35 kms west of Imphal. This would save the Manipur residents from facing the similar situation in future.

http://saag.org/papers16/paper1503.html
 
.
Terrorists in North-East India get support from America

The recent terrorist strikes in the USA on September 11, 2001, in which the World Trade Centre and Pentagon were "crash-bombed" by large airplanes, have brought a new resolve in the global community to root out terrorism from all parts of the world. The Americans are playing a leading role in building a world coalition against terrorism. This is the best time to remind the Americans that Baptist Christian terrorists are active in India's North-East and they derive their financial support from the southern parts of the USA where the Baptist Church has a strong following. Funds are collected in the form of donations in various church establishments in the name of evangelical work. Some of this money is spent in true philanthropic work of spreading education and healthcare. However, it has been suspected for a long time that a part of this fund gets diverted for buying arms for the Baptist terrorists of the North-East. Our ex-Chief Election Commissioner, T.N. Seshan, gave voice to this suspicion in a television panel discussion on Doordarshan as early as in 1993. Our Army is baffled by the seemingly unending supply of sophisticated and expensive supply of arms and equipment flooding into our North-East. All terrorists of various hues, the so-called Darjeeling Gorkha, the so-called Kamtapuri, Bodo, Ulfa, Naga, Manipuri, Tripuri etc, are flush with automatic rifles, land mines, remote control devices and so on. Money generated by the local extortion of businessmen and citizens account for only a small fraction. Therefore the greater part must be coming from abroad. It is suspected that the funds come from Islamic sources such as the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan, the Gulf states etc. and Christian sources such as the Baptist Church in southern USA and the Presbyterian Church of the UK.

The most prominent among the terrorist outfits of Tripura is the NLFT (National Liberation Front of Tripura). It employs terror tactics to effect mass conversion to Christianity (The Statesman 1999, 2000; Ghosh 1999) and is a predominantly Baptist (Protestant) organisation. Whatever token non-Christian representation it had, it has lost recently. Nayanbashi Jamatiya, a Hindu leader, led a revolt against the policy of forcible conversion of the NLFT and left a rebel camp in neighbouring Bangladesh with his followers. On April 8, 2001, while his party was moving towards the Indian border, it was attacked by the main group; seven activists were killed and he himself was seriously injured and taken to a government hospital in Bangladesh. (The Statesman 2001a, 2001b).
¨
The sectarian nature of the Baptist terrorists has come to the fore. They killed a Catholic priest called Father Victor Crasta on July 25, 2000. In protest the Catholic Church of Tripura called a bandh (closure) in all Catholic run institutions on August 10, 2000. (The Telegraph 2000)

On August 6, 1999, four RSS (Rashtriya Swayam-sevak Sangh) workers of Tripura, named Shyamal Kanti Sen Gupta, Sudhamoy Dutta, Dinendranath Dey, Shubhankar Chakraborti, were kidnapped by the NLFT, taken to a camp in the jungles of Bangladesh and a ransom of Rs 2 crores was demanded from their parent organisation. The RSS refused to pay and they were done to death sometime in the month of December 2000 or January 2001. The news of their killing was confirmed by the Central Government in July 2001 and carried by all prominent national dailies. Their "guilt" was that they were preaching among the tribals to preserve Hinduism. Our Consti-tution permits propagation of a faith by legitimate means. If that is so then work for the preservation of a faith too is surely permissible. However, the kidnap and murder of these Hindu pracharaks of the RSS by Christian terrorists did not create a media sensation. This is not the first time that a Hindu preacher has been attacked in North-East India. I found reference to such an event in a most unlikely place albeit most authentic. Swami Gokulananda (1999), the present head of the Ramakrishna Mission Ashrama of New Delhi, has written that he had been the Secretary of the Khasi Hills Ashrama in Meghalaya in the 1980s. He futher writes:

The hostile forces were against our movement as it was trying to bring back the lost tradition of faith among the people of the Khasi hills. Since it was like a speed breaker in their path they wanted to remove me. One day a time bomb was planted in my room but they did not succeed in killing me.

It should be noted that the most dominant church in the Khasi hills is Presbyterian (Protestant) which is based in the UK. Christian terrorists have been active in various States of North-East India for a long time. Recently they have spread to North Bengal also. Reverend John Thwaites, a Protestant priest who had been in North Bengal for over three decades, was asked to leave the country in January 2001. No reason was given and he defied the order. The West Bengal Government quietly arrested and prosecuted him. There were demonstrations by his sympathisers during the trial which ended in August 2001. The judge sentenced him to three months simple imprisonment following which he was to be deported to his native land of the United Kingdom. Is there a link between the Protestant priest and the terrorist activities of the Kamtapuri separatists? The question is pertinent because just prior to the "quit India" order served on Reverend Thwaites (January 2001), the Kamtapuri terrorists had killed eight CPI-M activists including a District Committee member in the four-month span from August to November 2000. The West Bengal State Government has the answer to this question. They have not made public way the Reverend was asked to leave the country in the first place and the BJP-led government at the Centre has played ball the way the State Government wanted.

In the aftermath of the airplane crash-bombing of the World Trade Centre, President George W. Bush has said that America would do what it takes to rid the world of the scourge of terrorism. America would target not only the terrorists but also the those who shelter and finance them. If he is true to his word, he should have to look into his own backyard first. It is inconceivable that those in southern United States who collect funds for the Baptist Church's evangelical work in India have no inkling of the end use of that fund. One among several end uses is buying weapons for organised terrorism.

http://www.freeindiamedia.com/current_affairs/21_july_current_affairs.htm
 
.
Assam: Identity and grievances

The ferment in Assam is the superficial manifestation of a discontent that is much deeper than what is seen outside as sentiments aroused by the question, "who is an Assamese?"
WHO is an Assamese? This is one of those silly and argument-stopping questions posed by those who ought to know better in any discussion or debate on the present situation, marked by intermittent outbursts of ferment and violence, in Assam.

This ferment is the superficial manifestation of a deeper discontent that has found expression at three different, but inter-related, levels. First, there is the general discontent about the lack of economic development and the unequal apportionment of national resources by the government in Delhi. This is a near-universal grievance cherished by all the States, many far more developed and much better off than Assam according to every indicator of economic and social progress. Elected governments and political parties operating nationally or within a State or region within the framework of the Constitution routinely articulate such discontent - and not merely in Assam.

Second, the same grievances are articulated in a broader historical and political context unique to Assam, relating this lack of development to a whole sequence of events and colonial initiatives beginning with the annexation of Assam by the British to Partition and Independence, and further relating these to the problems arising out of the movement of migrants from East Bengal (legal), East Pakistan and, since 1971, Bangladesh (illegal), into Assam in this historical, political and social context. These aspects of the past (and the present and the future) are also shared by other States in the region affected by migration and Partition and (illegal) migration. However the exceptionality of the ferment in Assam is related to the impediments these developments - beginning with war, defeat and annexation - have affected the evolution and consolidation of the Assamese as a people, particularly in the context of the similarities and distance between Assam and its far bigger and more resourceful neighbour, Bengal.

The principal, though not the only, influential voice articulating the grievances in these terms is that of the All Assam Students' Union (AASU). AASU came into its own when it launched the "anti-foreigner nationals" movement in 1979 and signed the Assam Accord (Memorandum of Settlement on the Problem of Foreigners in Assam) with the Union and State governments in August 1985. The Accord, which had a developmental content and promise, was also the midwife that assisted in the birth of the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP), the first regional party in Assam, whose leadership was virtually identical to the leadership of the AASU, to capture political power and form the State's first regional party government. The implementation of this Accord, 20 years after it was signed, continues to be on the agenda of its three signatories.

Finally, these grievances have acquired an explicitly separatist expression articulated by the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), also a child of the Assam movement that has outgrown its begetters. Taking the desire for greater autonomy implicit in the earlier nationalist assertions to its logical end, ULFA believes that all these problems are rooted in history and can only be resolved by the establishment of a Swadhin Asom (Sovereign Assam).

The argument-stopping question posed above is asked, and in the very way it is asked is also answered, in the context of the Assam Accord and, what was evident even when the Accord was signed, the built-in impediments in the way of its implementation. For Clause Six of the Accord has this to say:

Constitutional, legislative and administrative safeguards, as may be appropriate, shall be provided to protect, preserve and promote the cultural, social, linguistic identity and heritage of the Assamese people.

Except for auxiliary and conjunctional words that too are not entirely neutral in their context, every word in this clause is fraught with ambiguities, thus meaning different things to different people. The phrase, "... as may be appropriate... " for instance, is not simple bureaucratese; it provides several strategies and tactics of retreat into inaction.

There are two aspects to this supposed disjunction, and the problems it has created in the matter of the implementation of the Assam Accord. One is obvious, and the other has grave implications for the very integrity and identity of the State and its people.

At the most obvious level evident to the simplest of minds, the question highlights, with little originality, the disjunction between the "Assamese", a nationality corresponding to any other Indian nationality whose identity has no ambiguities in the perspective of those who are themselves Assamese, and the people while not being Assamese in those terms have come to inhabit the land of Assam and may choose to remain what they are or over a period of time lay claim to be asombasi, those who live in Assam, as a first step in their eventual evolution to Assamese. Even though there is a general feeling in Assam that this phenomenon of an incremental evolution of a people who are not Assamese into Assamese is a unique sign of the openness of Assamese society and its ability to absorb other streams and make these its own, corresponding instances of such openness and mobility across language and other identities are to be found in every language and culture group. For it is only through such plasticity that a culture and a people absorb change remain alive.

That such obvious points need to be laboured is just another indication of the frivolousness of approach that marks debate over issues that are matters of life and death in Assam. Such disjunction is a feature of the demographic composition of every State of the Union, barring perhaps Kerala where 96.6 per cent of the population speak Malayalam and, presumably, also return themselves as Malayalis. Every State of the Union has a substantial population of minorities who inhabit the land, who indeed, unlike in Assam, have inhabited the land for much longer periods, but are not identifiable with the nationality-nomenclature derived from the name of the land they inhabit and the language spoken by the majority of the inhabitants.

Table 1, downloaded from the Union Home Ministry's website, Census online, which provides the 1991 Census data, illustrates the point.

If at all there is a disjunction, it is between the name of a language and the "mother tongue(s)", most of them cognates of the language cited and so grouped under the language, as has been brought out in two interesting Tables from the 1991 Census: Languages and Mother Tongues (Scheduled Languages) and their strength, and Languages and Mother Tongues (Non-Scheduled Languages) and their strength. As the Tables make clear, this disjunction, if it is that, is present not merely in respect of the 18 "Scheduled Languages" but also in respect of 63 of the 96 other languages not specified in the Eighth Schedule having a strength of 10,000 speakers and above. Interestingly, 25 of the 33 languages not specified in the Eighth Schedule where there is "one to one unity" between the name of the language and the mother tongues of the speaker listed under that language are spoken in the northeastern region.

Cited below in Table 2 are some telling figures from Table 1. While the Table identifies 13,079,696 persons as Assamese, those identified as speakers of Assamese as mother tongue are 12,962,721. Table 1 cites 12,958,088 Assamese speakers; the discrepancy in respect of 4,633 persons between the two figures is perhaps yet another indication of the ambiguities even in the matter of self-identification.

Perhaps the corresponding figures in respect of the four major languages of South India (with the number of speakers who returned the language under both categories), and a brief account of how Hindi fares in such categorisation may clarify the issue of the disjunction; and also point out that such questions can be asked about any of the languages and nationalities in the country.

The figures for Hindi are even more interesting. Of the 337,272,114 persons listed under Hindi, as many as 103,839,285 (nearly a third) declare 48 cognate languages as mother tongue. The same is the picture in respect of almost all the languages, including most of the languages not included in the Eighth Schedule.

In other words, ambiguity marks the language and larger social (or "ethnic") identity of the overwhelming majority of Indians who are multilingual, barring those living in very small and isolated pockets. As noted by the poet and scholar A.K. Ramanujan, one constantly switches one's language identity in the public and the private sphere, the home and the world.

One can say the same thing in respect of one's "ethnic identity" too, to the extent that language is linked to "ethnicity". Who is an Assamese? Equally, who is a Tamil, who is a Bengali? Or, indeed, who is an Indian?

AND yet, the question is posed, not always in malice or out of ignorance or the wish to be clever. For the Assam Accord makes this identity central to the providing of "constitutional safeguards" to the people so identified and by definition not available to people not so identified.

If one were charitable, one would say that the Assam agitation leaders did not apply their minds seriously when they agreed, in fact insisted, upon this clause. However, even 20 years ago when the Accord was signed, indeed even earlier, the certain certainties about the Assamese identity had received some hard knocks. The days of a Mavis Dunn, a Khasi woman from Shillong who was then the provincial Minister, proudly proclaiming that she belonged to the "sisterhood of the same Assamese community of which Mrs [Narayani] Handiqui was an ornament and example" (speech delivered on the occasion of the unveiling of the portrait of the late Narayani Handiqui at the Narayani Handiqui Historical Institute, Guwahati, on February 7, 1940, Bulletin No. 4 of the Department of Historical and Antiquarian Studies, Government of Assam) are gone, never to return. The mass mobilisation during the Assam agitation superficially papered over these cracks and in the euphoria of a triumphalist and militant Assamese autonomist/nationalist assertion, further strengthened by the swift capture of political office and state power, these cracks were lost sight of.

However, the very moment of the triumph of such assertion as articulated by AASU and the formation of the first regional party government in the State headed by the AGP also marked the corresponding assertion, in some respects the re-assertion of such autonomist/nationalist tendencies long cherished, by communities that had always been viewed (at least in the Assamese nationalist imagination) as an integral part of the "greater Assamese society". The first was the agitation in the name of the Bodo people, constituting less than 5 per cent of the State's total population, for a separate Bodoland, mobilised by the All Bodo Students' Union (ABSU). Its calculatedly provocative slogan, "Divide Assam Fifty-Fifty", outmatched anything that earlier movements seeking separation from Assam had been able to articulate.

During its decade and a half of struggle which involved much violence, as well as the emergence of a separatist stream articulating the demand for an "independent and sovereign Bodoland" (paralleling the articulation of Swadhin Asom by ULFA), there was an accord on the creation of a Bodoland Autonomous Council (February 1993), substantially restructured later following more violent struggle, and the signing of another accord for the creation of a Bodoland Territorial Council (February 2003). Both the accords were clinched when the Congress party was in office in the State. Since then, even smaller groups, tribal and non-tribal, in opposition to real or perceived Assamese dominance have been relentlessly pressing for corresponding concessions.

Leaving aside the Hill Tribes inhabiting the two Hill districts of Karbi Anglong and North Cachar, which under the provisions of the Sixth Schedule already enjoy substantial autonomy (and are engaged in an agitation for greater autonomy, in the form of an "autonomous State within Assam" provided for under Article 244-A of the Constitution), there are nine (plains) tribal communities in Assam, the most numerous of whom are the Bodo (12,67,015). The remaining eight are listed below in the descending order of their numerical strength (according to 1991 Census figures):

Mising (4,67,790); Sonwal Kachari (2.51,725); Rabha (2,38,931); Lalung, now known as Tiwa (1,43,746); Deori (35,839); Barman of Cachar (13,348); Mech (6,738) and Hojai (4,582).

None of the representative organisations of these communities accepts these figures as accurate; all of them dismiss them as deliberate and politically calculated gross under-enumerations.

Three of these - the Mising, the Rabha, and the Tiwa - have autonomous councils which they want to be upgraded into territorial councils. Recently, the State government, with the forthcoming elections in mind, passed legislation providing for the creation of autonomous councils for the Sonwal Kachari and Deori communities as well. There is little doubt that these too will eventually join the demand for territorial councils though the creation of such a territorial council even in respect of the Bodos whose population is more than that of all other Plains Tribes taken together, has created more problems than ever, since the issue of demarcation of the BTC territory still remains unresolved.

Consider, for instance, the case of the Deori, a Plains tribe, who now have an autonomous council whose jurisdiction is supposed to be "Deori-dominated areas of the North Bank in Lakhimpur district". The 35,839 persons enumerated as Deori in the 1991 Census live in four districts of Upper Assam on both banks of the Brahmaputra, though it is convenient for the government to acknowledge a supposedly "predominant area" inhabited by the Deori. A territorial council for the Deoris, whose total population is less than that of any municipal ward of a small town, would be an unnecessary exercise.

There are other communities on the periphery of existing tribal communities or entirely outside that world who too have corresponding, sometimes contrary, demands, all hinging ultimately on that magic word, identity. For the demands are not always for greater autonomy; they are marked by far greater variety and complexity. For instance, communities such as the Koch Rajbongshi or the Sarania Kachari, both of whom have moved away from their historical tribal roots and are now recognised as Other Backward Classes (OBC), want their tribal status to be restored. Similar is the demand of the Adivasis. These descendants of tea-garden labourers, who migrated from central India where communities going by their ancestral identities continue to be recognised as Scheduled Tribes, have lost their S.T. status in Assam because of the location-specificity of such identities. Those now recognised as Plains Tribes want for themselves the concessions made in respect of the Bodos.

Virtually every identifiable community barring the caste Hindu Assamese and, to an extent, the Assamese Muslims, have similar identity-autonomy based demands for recognition as a S.T.; for "upgradation" of such recognition by seeking inclusion in the Sixth Schedule, for territorial autonomy. Identity is the name of the game; the trajectory is the one charted by the ABSU, which in turn closely modelled its agitational methods after those of the AASU.

Where will all this end, one may well ask, instead of asking who is an Assamese.

www.flonnet.com/fl2216/stories/20050812001504400.htm
 
.
Why is such propaganda with absolutly no debates doing up here. the poster has been posting one after another without uttering a word.
 
.
When I asked the same thing to this chap few weeks back,he replied he was on a mission to show to the world the real face of India :devil:

Bull,dont distrub the kid,he might get up from his dreams :D
 
.
When I asked the same thing to this chap few weeks back,he replied he was on a mission to show to the world the real face of India :devil:

Bull,dont distrub the kid,he might get up from his dreams :D

lol.....:enjoy:
 
.
Back
Top Bottom