Pakistan and Second-strike

[muse]

Critical readers will recognize trial balloons when they come across them - an echo from a near future




Second-strike challenges
Ahmed Ali Shah



On July 26, 2009, India launched its first nuclear submarine, capable of launching nuclear ballistic missiles. While the submarine, Arihant, and its nuclear reactor are still undergoing trials, the Indians have already started building a second such submarine.

The upshot is that the induction of this capability would enhance India’s outreach in and domination of the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean littoral and beyond. Since the development presents a serious threat to Pakistan, in theory, it has the potential to spur an arms race in South Asia. The Indian Navy could threaten Pakistan’s brown water navy and be in a much better position to blockade Pakistani ports and choke the flow of trade from the Persian Gulf via the Suez Canal in the west and the Straits of Malacca in the east.

Pakistan therefore needs to acquire a matching capability, not only to restore balance in the region but also to assure second-strike capability. There are several options available, though each presents its own unique challenges.

The easiest option is to modify the existing fleet of conventional submarines. The most potent submarine with the Pakistan Navy fleet at the moment is the French Agosta-90B. One of the Agosta-90Bs, the PNS Hamza, is equipped with an air-independent propulsion system, which enables the submarine to remain submerged for longer periods.

Currently, Pakistan is the only country in South Asia in possession of a submarine with air-independent propulsion. With a few modifications to its torpedo tubes — they are already capable of launching Exocet missiles — the PN can launch nuclear cruise missiles. That would provide an instant second-strike capability.

Compared to nuclear submarines, conventional submarines are smaller, more manoeuvrable, quieter and more capable of underwater offensives against adversaries. The flip side is that conventional submarines are marred by lesser range and limited submersion endurance time. This, however, should be viewed in the context of PN’s modest regional ambitions, limited to brown waters only.

Arihant will carry the K-15 Sagarika, a submarine-based ballistic missile with a 700-km range. If Pakistan is able to equip its Agosta-90Bs with cruise missiles, e.g. the Babur cruise missile with a 500-km to 750-km range, then it can match India. Both submarines will require similar distance to carry out a nuclear strike. If Pakistan can meet the technological challenges, this capability could be achieved even before Arihant’s reactor goes critical and the Sagarika missiles become operational.

In that scenario, Pakistan can have assured second-strike capability before the Indians.

But this assurance would be limited and may last only till Arihant becomes operational. A submarine with longer range and greater endurance under water is necessary for a credible assured second-strike capability. Pakistan will thus require a nuclear submarine at some point.

For an easier way out, Pakistan can opt for the second option, i.e. removal of the air-independent propulsion system and the diesel engine on the Agosta-90B and make room for a miniaturised nuclear reactor, thereby increasing the range of the Agosta-90Bs and enabling them to stay underwater for longer periods. Theoretically, this option is possible, but literature does not indicate if any state has attempted such an experiment.

That said, the French Rubis Class nuclear submarine could be an inspiration in this context: it is the most compact nuclear submarine ever built, almost the same size as Pakistan’s Agosta-90Bs.

The challenge in resorting to the above option is miniaturising the nuclear reactor, which should be small enough to fit into the slim frame of the Agosta-90B. If Pakistan does overcome this challenge, it would be illogical not to develop a nuclear submarine capable of launching ballistic missiles.

But as noted earlier, each option has its own unique challenges. Building such a submarine will require tremendous work and technological effort. A larger submarine will be required with enough room for a nuclear reactor and ballistic missile containers, apart from the miniaturisation of the nuclear reactor and improving warheads. Whether Pakistan can overcome all these challenges remains to be seen. Even so, if we can miniaturise a reactor, there is no reason to think we cannot meet the other challenges.

In view of the above argument, it would only be logical for Pakistan to develop a similar indigenous capability, especially since Pakistan’s command and control structure also suggests the country needs a triad of nuclear forces.

Ahmed Ali Shah is a defence and strategic analyst. He can be reached at ahmedalishah1@hotmail.com

 

[Comet]

Hate it... More money required for the defense of Pakistan.....

 

[muse]

Whether Pakistan can overcome all these challenges remains to be seen. Even so, if we can miniaturise a reactor, there is no reason to think we cannot meet the other challenges.

If one can assert "remains to be seen" in a meaningful sense, one has to admit that one is engaged in meeting the challenges - right??

Am I getting through to you, son?

 

[Comet]

I hope we meet these challenges...

 

[inferno]

Critical readers will recognize trial balloons when they come across them - an echo from a near future




Second-strike challenges
Ahmed Ali Shah



On July 26, 2009, India launched its first nuclear submarine, capable of launching nuclear ballistic missiles. While the submarine, Arihant, and its nuclear reactor are still undergoing trials, the Indians have already started building a second such submarine.

The upshot is that the induction of this capability would enhance India’s outreach in and domination of the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean littoral and beyond. Since the development presents a serious threat to Pakistan, in theory, it has the potential to spur an arms race in South Asia. The Indian Navy could threaten Pakistan’s brown water navy and be in a much better position to blockade Pakistani ports and choke the flow of trade from the Persian Gulf via the Suez Canal in the west and the Straits of Malacca in the east.

Pakistan therefore needs to acquire a matching capability, not only to restore balance in the region but also to assure second-strike capability. There are several options available, though each presents its own unique challenges.

The easiest option is to modify the existing fleet of conventional submarines. The most potent submarine with the Pakistan Navy fleet at the moment is the French Agosta-90B. One of the Agosta-90Bs, the PNS Hamza, is equipped with an air-independent propulsion system, which enables the submarine to remain submerged for longer periods.

Currently, Pakistan is the only country in South Asia in possession of a submarine with air-independent propulsion. With a few modifications to its torpedo tubes — they are already capable of launching Exocet missiles — the PN can launch nuclear cruise missiles. That would provide an instant second-strike capability.

Compared to nuclear submarines, conventional submarines are smaller, more manoeuvrable, quieter and more capable of underwater offensives against adversaries. The flip side is that conventional submarines are marred by lesser range and limited submersion endurance time. This, however, should be viewed in the context of PN’s modest regional ambitions, limited to brown waters only.

Arihant will carry the K-15 Sagarika, a submarine-based ballistic missile with a 700-km range. If Pakistan is able to equip its Agosta-90Bs with cruise missiles, e.g. the Babur cruise missile with a 500-km to 750-km range, then it can match India. Both submarines will require similar distance to carry out a nuclear strike. If Pakistan can meet the technological challenges, this capability could be achieved even before Arihant’s reactor goes critical and the Sagarika missiles become operational.

In that scenario, Pakistan can have assured second-strike capability before the Indians.

But this assurance would be limited and may last only till Arihant becomes operational. A submarine with longer range and greater endurance under water is necessary for a credible assured second-strike capability. Pakistan will thus require a nuclear submarine at some point.

For an easier way out, Pakistan can opt for the second option, i.e. removal of the air-independent propulsion system and the diesel engine on the Agosta-90B and make room for a miniaturised nuclear reactor, thereby increasing the range of the Agosta-90Bs and enabling them to stay underwater for longer periods. Theoretically, this option is possible, but literature does not indicate if any state has attempted such an experiment.

That said, the French Rubis Class nuclear submarine could be an inspiration in this context: it is the most compact nuclear submarine ever built, almost the same size as Pakistan’s Agosta-90Bs.

The challenge in resorting to the above option is miniaturising the nuclear reactor, which should be small enough to fit into the slim frame of the Agosta-90B. If Pakistan does overcome this challenge, it would be illogical not to develop a nuclear submarine capable of launching ballistic missiles.

But as noted earlier, each option has its own unique challenges. Building such a submarine will require tremendous work and technological effort. A larger submarine will be required with enough room for a nuclear reactor and ballistic missile containers, apart from the miniaturisation of the nuclear reactor and improving warheads. Whether Pakistan can overcome all these challenges remains to be seen. Even so, if we can miniaturise a reactor, there is no reason to think we cannot meet the other challenges.

In view of the above argument, it would only be logical for Pakistan to develop a similar indigenous capability, especially since Pakistan’s command and control structure also suggests the country needs a triad of nuclear forces.

Ahmed Ali Shah is a defence and strategic analyst. He can be reached at ahmedalishah1@hotmail.com

over ambitious to develop a nuclear submarine before commissioning of INS ARIHANT

 

[All-Green]

Without Second strike assurance the balance will be severely disturbed.
It is actually crucial for peace that Pakistan has second strike capability, to discourage any misadventure.

Refitting our Agostas with a Nuclear Reactor is not only a never before attempted feat of engineering but i am afraid that such things are technically not workable unless there is 80-90% similarity in parts and design...i do not know how similar both these classes are but still it shall be better to buy 2 dedicated Nuclear attack Submarines from France or China.
We need to have a blue water presence and for now the only assets we should consider are Nuclear Submarines.

 

[TaimiKhan]

Giving the Agosta Submarine & future submarine of PN the capability to launch cruise missile of Pakistani origin would be first step forward in getting a 2nd strike capability.

I think selling of Nuclear submarine is not allowed internationally as it violates nuclear proliferation rules. Plus if we did get a Nuclear Submarine, the Ballistic missiles for nuclear weapons delivery would be a problem, as MTCR does not allows sale of 300KM+ range missiles.

One option would be to build both things, nuclear submarine & ballistic missile on its own, which off course would be a very tiring & costly adventure looking at the meager resources we have.

2nd option would be to get a Chinese Nuclear Sub on lease & develop the sea based ballistic missile launching capability on its own & integrate it with the sub.

But again all options would be very tough & problematic.

At least we should get the Cruise Missiles nuclear tipped & capable to be launched from our subs. Then let time come & see what else we can get.

 

[Patriot]

Best option IMO is get the U-Boats asap and equip them with Naval version of Babur (and make sure Babur is nuke capable)

 

[black tiger]

Regarding converting agosta 90b subs, i think it's a waste of time because it is an very small sub and there simply is no room to put a good number of long range ballistic missiles. Better option would be build a new one using lessons learned building agosta's and in future u-214. As for the missiles one can always convert existing solid fuel missiles for sunmarine launch, u will have to acquire some new technologies but it can be done. The most difficult part would be the reactor once u can get it right then u can get ur sub. Till this can be done u can always use nuclear tiped cruise missiles fired from ur existing submarines.
Regards....

 

[forcetrip]

That does sound more logical ... More over its not easy to mini a reactor.. India had the foresight to be in R&D for an extensive period of time. Also Russian help greatly assisted in bringing them closer to their goal.

 

[MastanKhan]

Hi,

It is like a dog chasing its tail---when they talk about pak should opt for nuclear sub---we will keep going in circles and end up nowhere..

Pak navy is focussed on diesels and silent propulsion systems---that is where the pak navy shoyuld stay focussed---.

You guys must have seen the video news of swedish diesel sub taking out americans nuclear subs----the so called quitetest subs in the ocean---the americans claimed that their nuc subs were so quiet that one could hump a whale and the whale would not know who did it.

Pak navy is on the right track---stay focussed---stay in the direction that they have chosen---modify the missile systems to be launched from diesels---tactical nukes can be launched by the subs---nuke like the one dropped over hiroshima---doesn't take much to devise a gun type weapon---.

 

[All-Green]

I guess you are right about the complications of PN acquiring a Nuclear Submarine.
Also on a more subtle note the right approach would be to first develop an ICBM rather than getting both toys together and causing a pants wetting spree normally associated with any major Pakistan defense acquisition...

In terms of Payload and endurance there is a big gap between Nuclear and conventional submarines and this does matter a lot as far as ensuring a significant second strike capability.
While equipping our conventional subs with nukes will provide a threat...it will be limited in terms of range and destructive power due to design limitations...

I believe that acquiring a nuclear submarine should certainly be on the long term agenda as part of any strategy of Pakistan's naval projection beyond its shores...it will certainly not materialize anytime soon but the plan has to be there.

 

[MastanKhan]

Hi,

KISS----keep it simple stupid----there is no reason for us to follow whatever indian millitary is procuring----our resources are limited---.

Let india do what it wants to---we only need to cross the minimum threshold deterence---that is all---having nuclear subs and ships delivering nuclear weapons is going too far overboard---.

India and pakistan live in too closed and confined space----neither there is any time for warning nor there is any time to correct the error in judgement.

Pak millitary has too much on its plate at this moment---stay focussed---beware of the priorities---let the research in weapons systems do its job and see what direction they take and what break throughs they make in miniaturizing the req'd system.

In a five years time period---we will be in a different position to evaluate our standings.

 

[nightcrawler]

Hi,

It is like a dog chasing its tail---when they talk about pak should opt for nuclear sub---we will keep going in circles and end up nowhere..

Pak navy is focussed on diesels and silent propulsion systems---that is where the pak navy shoyuld stay focussed---.

You guys must have seen the video news of swedish diesel sub taking out americans nuclear subs----the so called quitetest subs in the ocean---the americans claimed that their nuc subs were so quiet that one could hump a whale and the whale would not know who did it.

Pak navy is on the right track---stay focussed---stay in the direction that they have chosen---modify the missile systems to be launched from diesels---tactical nukes can be launched by the subs---nuke like the one dropped over hiroshima---doesn't take much to devise a gun type weapon---.

This surely isn't correct!! If have read the original article it clearly talks about 1st & the 2nd strike capabilities & based upon the assumptions that Indians have got themselves two or three nuclear subs greatly rises their chances of not only winning sea war game but a total defeat to us!! (like my signature too demonstrates)

Because nuclear subs can easily place nuclear missiles upon our lands these subs surely gives Indians first strike capability ( even they can now use smaller range but accurate ballistics) & in case of nuclear missile launchers first strike against the comparatively smaller Pakistan will lead to total disaster; even can undermine our 2nd strike capability

 

[sigatoka]

India's acquisition of nuclear submarines for second strike capability is a misnomer. The true purpose of such a force is power projection, a hedge against an underperforming ICBM program by the Indian navy. It would allow Intermediate range ballistic or cruise missiles to project Indian power across the Middle East and South East Asia. A second strike capability for Pakistan would be much more cost effectively achieved through a larger inventory of ballistic missiles and warheads and through increased dispersion of mobile launchers. The performance of the U.S. forces during gulf war in spotting and destroying mobile launchers shows the inherent difficulty in such a process. Increased use of cruise missiles for a second strike would confound missile defense capabilities of India, especially in a saturated strike.

Saving resources on expensive nuclear submarines would allow for a larger more effective ballistic missile force for Pakistan. It is to be remembered that such a force can be also used in a conventional role, in deep strikes against enemy airbases and command and control centers. During the gulf war majority of allied casualties arose from Iraqi scud attacks against U.S. bases.

Pakistan's nuclear strategy and India's by extension is based on the false premise of mutually assured destruction. This has lulled both sides into a false sense of security, especially considering the small arsenals of both sides is insufficient in destroying the military, civilian and governmental structures of the other side. It is imperative for Pakistan to expand nuclear deterrent through major expansion of nuclear forces with effective delivery platforms including the airforce, surface naval units armed with cruise missiles and an expanded ground based ballistic force. The ability of Pakistan to destroy all Indian air and ground bases along the border followed by a wide thrust must factor highly with a large reserve counter-value force should India resort to targeting Pakistani cities.

The incoherence of Pakistan's nuclear strategy, especially considering conventional inferiority and which is based on mutually assured destruction when currently neither side can deliver the decisive blow is illogical. There is an opportunity for Pakistan to exploit this through preparation for fighting a limited nuclear war. This can be achieved through emphasis in training and doctrine.

This would not require extra resources for the military because such a strategy would induce a reduction in the size of military forces. With increased motorization troops would be protected from NBC battlefield environment; a force of 200,000 compared to half million currently. This would enable troops to be transferred to reserve part time status allowing for production in the economy while acting as a well trained pool to be drawn upon in an emergency.

The asymmetric situation facing Pakistan requires a rethink of a confounded war strategy that oscillates between minimum nuclear deterrence and mutually assured destruction. Pakistan must expand its non-conventional forces and disband the red lines policy. Such policies unnecessarily constrains Pakistan and fails to take advantage that non-conventional forces offers Pakistan's inferior conventional ability. It offers sharp policy choices for India, an expansion of nuclear capabilities negating its large investments in conventional forces and derailing of its international power projection ambitions. It increases the variability of outcomes in conflict between Pakistan and India, premptive counter-force strike by Pakistan followed by a general thrust would have a much higher probability of resulting in a disintegration of the front than would ever be possible through conventional forces alone. Further counter-force strikes by India would result in massive casualties on friendly forces and civilians while counter-value strikes on Pakistan would merely invite in kind retaliation by Pakistan.

Additionally, Indian adventures along the border and even Indian breakthroughs across the front would be fraught with danger. Disbandment of nuclear redline by Pakistan would enable conventional forces to be supplemented by counter-force nuclear strikes. While India would be free to reply in kind, it would be a disadvantage due to desire to keep the conflict non-nuclear especially considering the edge in conventional forces it enjoys.