Introductory Disclaimer:
A lot has been written on the future plans of the Pakistan Air Force and much more has been speculated with complete disregard for even the slightest of factual hypothetical (if there was ever a term like that possible) or even the basic tenets of logic. We have relatively young/new members going ahead and speculating based on what are nothing more than piecemeal ideas thrown out as public press releases by various branches of Pakistan’s political establishment within the civilian government that deal with the military. If the track record is anything to go by, then we can safely assume that most if not all of the information is based on interpretation of basic concepts or ideas given to them by what are essentially the real decision-makers within the Pakistani military.
On the opposite end of the spectrum we have certain members who based on both seniority and time spent on the forum are basing their ideals on either a picture of gloom and doom or the best case hodgepodge of possible facts and misunderstood figures.
While I am not going to claim be an expert in the subject at all am not trying to impose my opinion upon anybody; I will try to elaborate on certain known information and possible unknown known information that quietly circulates the web and is generally unseen (the correct term should be undecipherable). This information is not based on any insight sources for the time being. Since these regardless of how accurate these may or may not be. It is also based on my word and as far as I’m concerned, even for myself, my word on online forums means zilch.
I will not be looking to point out any sources for this because those who had not bothered to do the research to find resources should have the focus to go around and look at what is public knowledge (if only the public would look at it). This sounds rather arrogant, but it is in fact a resignation from my end regarding attempts to justify claims both for Pakistan’s and the more rabid and generally cynical kind that we get from across the border.
I’m not going to go beyond the early 2000’s to try and chart out what transpired. For the Pakistan air force post September 11, 2001. I will only disclose that since the PAF has already published a generally honest history of the 10 years between 1988 to 1998 , which includes its attempts to procure modern combat aircraft to supplant its increasingly obsolete fleet after the procurement of the F-16s via the United States fell through.
Instead, I will focus on what happened immediately after September 11. What is not known is that as soon as the Twin Towers fell there was a lot of speculation as to where the United States was going next. As it became clear where the problem lay and how the Pakistani intelligence services may be indirectly implicated as having ties to the enemy, regardless of their ignorance and innocence when it came to the events of September 11. Many had speculated that the United States may decide to take a wide spread intervention, both in Afghanistan and perhaps carry out intimidating strikes within Pakistan itself. With the capitulation of Gen Musharraf to the very brash and direct threats from the US government put Pakistan squarely on the side of the “good guys”. The resulting opening up of markets, which included those from the defence sector gave the generally cautious and under confident procurement departments of the Pakistani military a chance to flex their options.
Before going further on why Pakistan chose its current (easily changeable) air force upgrade plans. It is important to look into the late 80s and the perceived impact seen by Pakistani intelligentsia on its word relations with regards to its nuclear weapons program. The super seven program was born, not just to create a local aviation industry within Pakistan . But also to allow a controllable source of air power that could be projected regardless of any dip or rise in relations with the well-known suppliers of defence equipment. To sum it up as succinctly as possible; the super seven or JF 17 program has nothing to do with any potential procurement from sources abroad and can be placed on a relative scale of importance to Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions. It is considered as a lifeline in case Pakistan ends up being outcast out of the world arena again.
Pre-2001:
The Pakistani fleet prior to September 11, comprised mostly of outdated but somewhat effective, Mirage fighter bombers, 40 odd older F-16 models, Chinese facsimiles of the Mig-21C and the tail end occupied by completely obsolete and ineffective Chinese mig-19 facsimiles. A good number of Mirage aircraft were updated with somewhat modern avionics which multiplied the effectiveness and greatly, including the utilization of a very limited number of beyond visual range missiles (with the very restrictive employment parameters).
A number of Chengdu F7MG fighters were being procured as a stopgap measure to replace the Mig-19 aircraft. These aircraft were to be used in air superiority scenarios using Ambush and embedded tactics that could utilize the relatively good manoeuvrability of this platform. However, these were still in the process of delivery and induction.
While the F-16s were considered the most effective type in the fleet, the combat availability of these aircraft was generally suspect beyond the first few days of a conflict. This was aptly demonstrated during the 2001 stand-off between Pakistan and India in which a key requirement laid in the emergency spares by Pakistan to the United States was for the F-16.
Post-2001:
Right after September 11, the regrouping staff of the Pakistani air force (having lost some of its best officers to an air crash that same year), huddled around to evaluate the new options based on the incoming aid and the rebounding economy propped up by the technocrats. It was a consensus among the military leadership that Pakistan was about to become a competitive market for many vendors and the best way to attract the maximum attention of potential suppliers was to hold a defence exposition (IDEAS).
However, since the JF 17 program was now in full swing and some of the key decision makers in the Pakistani force were convinced that it was to form the backbone of the PAF as it brought with it the potential to form an effective air defence fighter; it was decided to focus on the glaring lack of an effective strike element within the Pakistani force.
Since the Pakistani air force had been operating the Lockheed Martin F-16 (then Gen dynamics) for almost 18 years, its first focus was to use that existing knowledge of operating what was still a very effective aircraft (in its latest guise) by inducting a number of used airframes to complete its original staff plan of having 110 F-16s forming a multi role backbone for the PAF. This was considered the most potent way to quickly regain lost ground (of which there was a lot) against its primary threat in India. Hence, the F-16 procurement programme was put immediately back on track in the months that followed the unofficial declaration of alliance with the United States. Since this process required the approval of the US Congress and Senate, budgetary allocations were made to accommodate the time required for this process.
While the F-16 was a very effective strike fighter; it was deemed it necessary based on previous experience to have a second are strike platform that could still operate well into a week of a conflict in case (which is considered a certainty) of sanctions applied by the United States due to a conflict. In addition, it was considered that the United States may not allow the purchase of a refuelling aircraft that would allow the F-16s to strike deep within the heart of Indian territory, as was required (However, the US supplied per the Pakistani request the latest generation F-16 that it could export to Pakistan with conformal fuel tanks that accommodated the range requirement)
Having evaluated and selected the Mirage 2000-5 as its primary strike element in the early 90s, the Pakistan air force was then and in 2001 convinced that the aircraft met its requirements perfectly.
In addition, the Pakistan air force had also evaluated multiple other aircraft during the sanction years, which included the Eurofighter Typhoon, Dassault Rafale, SU 27, Mig-29 and had been given the chance to get first impressions of the Chinese J 10 fighter.
As they had decided on the Mirage 2000 – 5, the Pakistan air force approached the idea of meeting other vendors at the exposition as a cursory exercise. The French, however, refused to offer the Mirage 2000 and instead insisted that the Pakistan air force purchased the Rafale instead. While many conspiracy theories will be thrown about regarding the leadership of Pakistan military and its role in terms of kickbacks and corruption in trying to rig the procurement of new equipment; none of these wild (but not entirely baseless) ideas hold any salt when it comes to the selection of Pakistan’s new fighter.
Faced with a dilemma of being unable to purchase the Mirage 2000 and unable to afford the Rafale in the numbers it wanted, and unable to secure a guarantee of spares from the partner nations in the Eurofighter programme; the Pakistan air force decided to look for an out-of-the-box solution.
As they had already taken a look at the Chinese J 10 fighter and been given a preview of their plans to upgrade that aircraft, the Pakistan air force put forward a requirement to the Chengdu aircraft Corporation for modifications to the J 10 that would allow it to favourably compare with the Mirage 2000 in a strike role. In addition, just as with the JF 17 programme and other defence procurement from China; the aircraft was available immediately via a soft loan from the Chinese.
The timeline for these events is end of 2004 post the IDEAS exposition where the talks for the Mirage 2000 finally fell through. At this time the Pakistan air force was about to put on concrete plans for procuring 150 JF 17 aircraft (as the programme was maturing enough and the Pakistan air force was confident of its abilities to form the backbone of its fleet), 36 new F-16 block 52+ fighters, 45 used F-16 fighters and 48 Pakistan specific J-10 Variants. The used F-16s were to be upgraded equivalent avionics to the newer aircraft. The goal was to have by the year 2020 a fleet comprising of 110 F-16s, 110-125 JF-17s, 48-60 J-10, 60 F-7PG and 48 upgraded Mirage V strike aircraft. This would bring Pakistan air force to its desired level of around 350 combat aircraft. In addition, there was a procurement of force multiplying elements such as airborne early warning and control, airborne ground surveillance, multi layered ground-based air defence system , and unmanned intelligence gathering platforms.
The effect of the 2005 earthquake in Kashmir cannot be understated. The financial resources which were then allocated for the purchase of equipment were redirected (both justly and unjustly) two words relief and rehabilitation of the region (of which is substantial amount of money was lost to corruption). The PAF was forced to cut back the timeline for its procurement of its 36 new F-16 fighters and it chose to keep 18 as a future budgetary opening. In the years that followed, the economic policies of the technocrats lost their effectiveness at the same time when external aid was made more restrictive in its use available to the Pakistan military. However, the actual damage to the military procurement programs was undertaken during the disastrous and corruption ridden period that followed in the civilian government post Musharraf.
A systematic cannibalisation of the Pakistani state’s economic abilities was undertaken to feed the self-serving requirements of the rulers during that period. Any revenue that the state was generating was immediately directed to the offers of the ruling party, along with a scripting of any monetary “meat” from the proverbial skeleton of the Pakistani economy. The resulting deficit in the budget left the Pakistan air force scrambling to even provide basic maintenance for its aircraft. Within two years of the Pakistan People’s party government, it was clear that the PAF’s plans were finished and the best it could hope for was to sustain the programmes it had already made payments for.
This meant that by 2011 the Pakistan air force had settled on a last resort figure of 80 F-16s(both new and old), 150 Jf-17s and 50 F-7PGs by 2020. A total of 280 combat aircraft and a far cry from the ambitions it held for the higher 300 figure just a few years ago.
Yet all hope was not lost, and it was characteristic of the ever optimistic Pakistani consider a better economic turn where they would be able to exercise the options for more new and used F-16 fighters to bolster their strength until they were able to undertake the procurement of the fifth generation combat aircraft, which was to be around the mid 2020s.
In the years that followed, the focus was to try and keep up with the loan payments to be made to various lenders (with the major being in China, followed by Sweden and certain private sector lenders). This was done so that the credit rating for the Pakistan air force as a customer would improve among potential suppliers and procure more equipment if the opportunity would present itself.
Based on the latest reports that are available which includes those via the Ministry of Defence production, popular aviation journals and new sites, along with official announcements; the following picture for procurement by the Pakistan air force appears:
The JF 17 programme is performing better than expected and is being relied upon to supplement those that were previously considered specific to the F-16 fleet. This has allowed greater flexibility to purchase ancillary equipment such as surface-to-air missiles, electronic warfare systems, intelligence gathering Systems, along with stockpiling a very large number of spares for the F-16 fleet to allow it to operate even under the duress of sanctions.
The marginal improvement from the dire economic straits a a few years ago, along with the more pertinent investment shown by the Chinese has allowed the Pakistan air force to focus on multiple sources to procure secondary defence systems that are to be integrated with its air defence and long-range strike options. This also includes options to improve the airlift capability and infrastructure improvements.
Yet, there is no proof not anything beyond piecemeal statements given by civilian officials called in general are ignorant of military matters in Pakistan of any concrete development in procuring a new platform. As for now, the Pakistan air force is set on ensuring that by 2020 It will have a fleet that comprises of 80-90 F-16, 150 JF-17, 60 F-7PG and 36-48 Upgraded Mirage variants. It has decided to focus its resources on the development and procurement of a fifth-generation fighter which it intends to conduct by 2025.
To allow for any changes that can be interpreted by concrete evidence available within the news and other reliable and publicly open resources, I will be updating this from time to time.
Addendum 1:
The J-10 Procurement was abandoned entirely due to the budgetary restrictions that arose out of the post 2008 financial crises( having very little relation to the global crises) that the PAF faced along with the projected usefulness of the aircraft vis a vis limited budget diminishing over the years.
A J-10 would have been useful in 2016 but not in 2020.
@ghazi768 @Bilal Khan 777 @Bilal Khan (Quwa) @Manticore
Any factual inaccuracies may be pointed out at will and appreciated.
A lot has been written on the future plans of the Pakistan Air Force and much more has been speculated with complete disregard for even the slightest of factual hypothetical (if there was ever a term like that possible) or even the basic tenets of logic. We have relatively young/new members going ahead and speculating based on what are nothing more than piecemeal ideas thrown out as public press releases by various branches of Pakistan’s political establishment within the civilian government that deal with the military. If the track record is anything to go by, then we can safely assume that most if not all of the information is based on interpretation of basic concepts or ideas given to them by what are essentially the real decision-makers within the Pakistani military.
On the opposite end of the spectrum we have certain members who based on both seniority and time spent on the forum are basing their ideals on either a picture of gloom and doom or the best case hodgepodge of possible facts and misunderstood figures.
While I am not going to claim be an expert in the subject at all am not trying to impose my opinion upon anybody; I will try to elaborate on certain known information and possible unknown known information that quietly circulates the web and is generally unseen (the correct term should be undecipherable). This information is not based on any insight sources for the time being. Since these regardless of how accurate these may or may not be. It is also based on my word and as far as I’m concerned, even for myself, my word on online forums means zilch.
I will not be looking to point out any sources for this because those who had not bothered to do the research to find resources should have the focus to go around and look at what is public knowledge (if only the public would look at it). This sounds rather arrogant, but it is in fact a resignation from my end regarding attempts to justify claims both for Pakistan’s and the more rabid and generally cynical kind that we get from across the border.
I’m not going to go beyond the early 2000’s to try and chart out what transpired. For the Pakistan air force post September 11, 2001. I will only disclose that since the PAF has already published a generally honest history of the 10 years between 1988 to 1998 , which includes its attempts to procure modern combat aircraft to supplant its increasingly obsolete fleet after the procurement of the F-16s via the United States fell through.
Instead, I will focus on what happened immediately after September 11. What is not known is that as soon as the Twin Towers fell there was a lot of speculation as to where the United States was going next. As it became clear where the problem lay and how the Pakistani intelligence services may be indirectly implicated as having ties to the enemy, regardless of their ignorance and innocence when it came to the events of September 11. Many had speculated that the United States may decide to take a wide spread intervention, both in Afghanistan and perhaps carry out intimidating strikes within Pakistan itself. With the capitulation of Gen Musharraf to the very brash and direct threats from the US government put Pakistan squarely on the side of the “good guys”. The resulting opening up of markets, which included those from the defence sector gave the generally cautious and under confident procurement departments of the Pakistani military a chance to flex their options.
Before going further on why Pakistan chose its current (easily changeable) air force upgrade plans. It is important to look into the late 80s and the perceived impact seen by Pakistani intelligentsia on its word relations with regards to its nuclear weapons program. The super seven program was born, not just to create a local aviation industry within Pakistan . But also to allow a controllable source of air power that could be projected regardless of any dip or rise in relations with the well-known suppliers of defence equipment. To sum it up as succinctly as possible; the super seven or JF 17 program has nothing to do with any potential procurement from sources abroad and can be placed on a relative scale of importance to Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions. It is considered as a lifeline in case Pakistan ends up being outcast out of the world arena again.
Pre-2001:
The Pakistani fleet prior to September 11, comprised mostly of outdated but somewhat effective, Mirage fighter bombers, 40 odd older F-16 models, Chinese facsimiles of the Mig-21C and the tail end occupied by completely obsolete and ineffective Chinese mig-19 facsimiles. A good number of Mirage aircraft were updated with somewhat modern avionics which multiplied the effectiveness and greatly, including the utilization of a very limited number of beyond visual range missiles (with the very restrictive employment parameters).
A number of Chengdu F7MG fighters were being procured as a stopgap measure to replace the Mig-19 aircraft. These aircraft were to be used in air superiority scenarios using Ambush and embedded tactics that could utilize the relatively good manoeuvrability of this platform. However, these were still in the process of delivery and induction.
While the F-16s were considered the most effective type in the fleet, the combat availability of these aircraft was generally suspect beyond the first few days of a conflict. This was aptly demonstrated during the 2001 stand-off between Pakistan and India in which a key requirement laid in the emergency spares by Pakistan to the United States was for the F-16.
Post-2001:
Right after September 11, the regrouping staff of the Pakistani air force (having lost some of its best officers to an air crash that same year), huddled around to evaluate the new options based on the incoming aid and the rebounding economy propped up by the technocrats. It was a consensus among the military leadership that Pakistan was about to become a competitive market for many vendors and the best way to attract the maximum attention of potential suppliers was to hold a defence exposition (IDEAS).
However, since the JF 17 program was now in full swing and some of the key decision makers in the Pakistani force were convinced that it was to form the backbone of the PAF as it brought with it the potential to form an effective air defence fighter; it was decided to focus on the glaring lack of an effective strike element within the Pakistani force.
Since the Pakistani air force had been operating the Lockheed Martin F-16 (then Gen dynamics) for almost 18 years, its first focus was to use that existing knowledge of operating what was still a very effective aircraft (in its latest guise) by inducting a number of used airframes to complete its original staff plan of having 110 F-16s forming a multi role backbone for the PAF. This was considered the most potent way to quickly regain lost ground (of which there was a lot) against its primary threat in India. Hence, the F-16 procurement programme was put immediately back on track in the months that followed the unofficial declaration of alliance with the United States. Since this process required the approval of the US Congress and Senate, budgetary allocations were made to accommodate the time required for this process.
While the F-16 was a very effective strike fighter; it was deemed it necessary based on previous experience to have a second are strike platform that could still operate well into a week of a conflict in case (which is considered a certainty) of sanctions applied by the United States due to a conflict. In addition, it was considered that the United States may not allow the purchase of a refuelling aircraft that would allow the F-16s to strike deep within the heart of Indian territory, as was required (However, the US supplied per the Pakistani request the latest generation F-16 that it could export to Pakistan with conformal fuel tanks that accommodated the range requirement)
Having evaluated and selected the Mirage 2000-5 as its primary strike element in the early 90s, the Pakistan air force was then and in 2001 convinced that the aircraft met its requirements perfectly.
In addition, the Pakistan air force had also evaluated multiple other aircraft during the sanction years, which included the Eurofighter Typhoon, Dassault Rafale, SU 27, Mig-29 and had been given the chance to get first impressions of the Chinese J 10 fighter.
As they had decided on the Mirage 2000 – 5, the Pakistan air force approached the idea of meeting other vendors at the exposition as a cursory exercise. The French, however, refused to offer the Mirage 2000 and instead insisted that the Pakistan air force purchased the Rafale instead. While many conspiracy theories will be thrown about regarding the leadership of Pakistan military and its role in terms of kickbacks and corruption in trying to rig the procurement of new equipment; none of these wild (but not entirely baseless) ideas hold any salt when it comes to the selection of Pakistan’s new fighter.
Faced with a dilemma of being unable to purchase the Mirage 2000 and unable to afford the Rafale in the numbers it wanted, and unable to secure a guarantee of spares from the partner nations in the Eurofighter programme; the Pakistan air force decided to look for an out-of-the-box solution.
As they had already taken a look at the Chinese J 10 fighter and been given a preview of their plans to upgrade that aircraft, the Pakistan air force put forward a requirement to the Chengdu aircraft Corporation for modifications to the J 10 that would allow it to favourably compare with the Mirage 2000 in a strike role. In addition, just as with the JF 17 programme and other defence procurement from China; the aircraft was available immediately via a soft loan from the Chinese.
The timeline for these events is end of 2004 post the IDEAS exposition where the talks for the Mirage 2000 finally fell through. At this time the Pakistan air force was about to put on concrete plans for procuring 150 JF 17 aircraft (as the programme was maturing enough and the Pakistan air force was confident of its abilities to form the backbone of its fleet), 36 new F-16 block 52+ fighters, 45 used F-16 fighters and 48 Pakistan specific J-10 Variants. The used F-16s were to be upgraded equivalent avionics to the newer aircraft. The goal was to have by the year 2020 a fleet comprising of 110 F-16s, 110-125 JF-17s, 48-60 J-10, 60 F-7PG and 48 upgraded Mirage V strike aircraft. This would bring Pakistan air force to its desired level of around 350 combat aircraft. In addition, there was a procurement of force multiplying elements such as airborne early warning and control, airborne ground surveillance, multi layered ground-based air defence system , and unmanned intelligence gathering platforms.
The effect of the 2005 earthquake in Kashmir cannot be understated. The financial resources which were then allocated for the purchase of equipment were redirected (both justly and unjustly) two words relief and rehabilitation of the region (of which is substantial amount of money was lost to corruption). The PAF was forced to cut back the timeline for its procurement of its 36 new F-16 fighters and it chose to keep 18 as a future budgetary opening. In the years that followed, the economic policies of the technocrats lost their effectiveness at the same time when external aid was made more restrictive in its use available to the Pakistan military. However, the actual damage to the military procurement programs was undertaken during the disastrous and corruption ridden period that followed in the civilian government post Musharraf.
A systematic cannibalisation of the Pakistani state’s economic abilities was undertaken to feed the self-serving requirements of the rulers during that period. Any revenue that the state was generating was immediately directed to the offers of the ruling party, along with a scripting of any monetary “meat” from the proverbial skeleton of the Pakistani economy. The resulting deficit in the budget left the Pakistan air force scrambling to even provide basic maintenance for its aircraft. Within two years of the Pakistan People’s party government, it was clear that the PAF’s plans were finished and the best it could hope for was to sustain the programmes it had already made payments for.
This meant that by 2011 the Pakistan air force had settled on a last resort figure of 80 F-16s(both new and old), 150 Jf-17s and 50 F-7PGs by 2020. A total of 280 combat aircraft and a far cry from the ambitions it held for the higher 300 figure just a few years ago.
Yet all hope was not lost, and it was characteristic of the ever optimistic Pakistani consider a better economic turn where they would be able to exercise the options for more new and used F-16 fighters to bolster their strength until they were able to undertake the procurement of the fifth generation combat aircraft, which was to be around the mid 2020s.
In the years that followed, the focus was to try and keep up with the loan payments to be made to various lenders (with the major being in China, followed by Sweden and certain private sector lenders). This was done so that the credit rating for the Pakistan air force as a customer would improve among potential suppliers and procure more equipment if the opportunity would present itself.
Based on the latest reports that are available which includes those via the Ministry of Defence production, popular aviation journals and new sites, along with official announcements; the following picture for procurement by the Pakistan air force appears:
The JF 17 programme is performing better than expected and is being relied upon to supplement those that were previously considered specific to the F-16 fleet. This has allowed greater flexibility to purchase ancillary equipment such as surface-to-air missiles, electronic warfare systems, intelligence gathering Systems, along with stockpiling a very large number of spares for the F-16 fleet to allow it to operate even under the duress of sanctions.
The marginal improvement from the dire economic straits a a few years ago, along with the more pertinent investment shown by the Chinese has allowed the Pakistan air force to focus on multiple sources to procure secondary defence systems that are to be integrated with its air defence and long-range strike options. This also includes options to improve the airlift capability and infrastructure improvements.
Yet, there is no proof not anything beyond piecemeal statements given by civilian officials called in general are ignorant of military matters in Pakistan of any concrete development in procuring a new platform. As for now, the Pakistan air force is set on ensuring that by 2020 It will have a fleet that comprises of 80-90 F-16, 150 JF-17, 60 F-7PG and 36-48 Upgraded Mirage variants. It has decided to focus its resources on the development and procurement of a fifth-generation fighter which it intends to conduct by 2025.
To allow for any changes that can be interpreted by concrete evidence available within the news and other reliable and publicly open resources, I will be updating this from time to time.
Addendum 1:
The J-10 Procurement was abandoned entirely due to the budgetary restrictions that arose out of the post 2008 financial crises( having very little relation to the global crises) that the PAF faced along with the projected usefulness of the aircraft vis a vis limited budget diminishing over the years.
A J-10 would have been useful in 2016 but not in 2020.
@ghazi768 @Bilal Khan 777 @Bilal Khan (Quwa) @Manticore
Any factual inaccuracies may be pointed out at will and appreciated.
Last edited:
